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Abstract 
This thesis explores how secularism affected women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran 
between 1920 and 1939. Situated within the religio-legal jurisdiction of Shari’a, family law in 
the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region has been critically scrutinised by both 
adherents to Islam and Western observers. There is consensus between both tradition that 
secularism had no meaningful impact on women’s rights in the private sphere due to the 
continued influence of Islam on social and cultural practices in the region. 
The nature of the Egyptian and Iranian states has altered with varying degrees of religiosity 
being evident. This is partially dependent on individuals in power; however, interactions 
with foreign actors have also contributed to fluctuations in the secular or religious nature of 
the state. Despite arguments that increased gender equality arises within more secular 
environments, the authoritarian implementation of policies in some secular states results in 
further impediments. Religious interpretations also heavily influence policy development, 
with debates continuing about the compatibility of women’s rights and Islam as prescribed 
in the Qur’an.    
 
Silences emphasised through contemporary events such as 9/11, 7/7, the Arab Spring and 
the emergence of ISIS highlight significant gaps in our historic understanding. Occidentalist 
arguments frequently emerge stating that increasing religious traditions serve to protect the 
identity and traditions of the state from Western influences. Whilst this perspective is 
heavily contested, patterns of a similar nature become evident in the early twentieth 
century following escalations in foreign presences in Egypt and Iran. Whilst twenty-first 
century family law in many Muslim countries remains firmly embedded in religious law, it is 
possible to see how the implementation of secularism during the early twentieth century 
influenced the trajectories of family law, facilitating the legal structures visible today.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction: 
Equality and Matrimony 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines how secularism, and more specifically the secular nature1 of the state 
shaped the development of women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 
1939. Understanding the history of women’s rights and their relationship with the state is 
imperative as it allows for a more nuanced comprehension of the historical context of each 
country by bringing to the forefront issues at the heart of the development of women’s 
rights in the twentieth century. This analysis contributes to a growing body of literature 
seeking to challenge dominant assumptions about women’s positions in the Middle East 
North Africa (MENA) region that are based largely on stereotypes about Islam’s oppressive 
nature towards women. The tendency to homogenise the MENA region was explored in 
detail in Said’s seminal work Orientalism (1978: 84), in which he argued that colonial 
attitudes towards the Asian and African continents were particularly evident in the 
Orientalist’s belief that Egypt was the key to both continents. Evident in the strategic 
labelling of the region as the ‘Middle East’ which amalgamates all peoples, cultures and 
religions into one common object which was represented as different by imperial and 
colonising powers are the effects of imperialism (Tripp, 2013: 17), thus reinforcing the 
orientalist lens.  
This research seeks to make an original contribution to the current literature on gender and 
MENA history by providing a comparative-historical analysis of the relationship between the 
secular nature of the state and women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran; as well as to 
(re)emphasise the similarities and differences which occur between the two states with 
regard to matrimonial equality. It also seeks to shift away from a religious paradigm as the 
analytical focal point for gender equality in the MENA region. Its incorporation throughout 
                                                 
1 This refers to whether secularism developed within the state or was ‘imported’ as a result of foreign 
occupation (see section 1.4). It should not however, be confused with Reilly’s (2011: 8) understanding of 
‘internal secularization’ whereby ‘religions are becoming more oriented towards social or political issues, or 
self improvement, and less concerned with ‘transcendence’ of the material world’; this is also referred to as 
‘worldliness’.   
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this project is inevitable however, not because of the ‘patriarchal nature’ of Islam, but 
because family law remained within a religio-legal jurisdiction. The primary research 
question underpinning this thesis is thus: ‘how has the secular nature of the state shaped 
the development of women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939? 
Related to this original research question, this project will also explore the following: 1) 
What marital rights did women have in Egypt and Iran? Were they similar? 2) What marital 
rights did men have in Egypt and Iran? Were they similar/different from women? 3) What 
restrictions were placed on both men and women with regard to marital rights? 4) How has 
this history shaped women’s marital rights in contemporary Egypt/Iran? Finally, 
understanding the relationship between men, women and the state with specific reference 
to marital rights will allow their culturally diverse histories of gender relations in the private 
sphere to re-emerge, thus providing one interpretation of the scope and limitations of the 
rights afforded to women in two countries of a region which is currently being heavily 
criticised for gender inequality. The examination of the effects of this history on 
contemporary developments in family law also reinforces the contemporary significance of 
this historically situated project.  
Through the examination of existing literature, memoirs and legal documentation this 
research will systematically address each of the questions outlined above. Whilst this 
research’s focal point is women’s rights, establishing men’s rights will provide another point 
of comparison. It will also enable a comparison of the institutionalisation of women’s rights 
and gender equality in the selected case studies. Secondly, establishing the rights of both 
sexes in marriage and divorce will further highlight any inequalities which were present and 
why this is significant.  
1.2 Context and Background 
Since 9/11, 7/7, and more recently the Arab Spring, Islam, the MENA region, and their 
relationship with terrorism have become increasingly prominent in academic and policy 
discussions. According to Göl (2011: 431) however, the foundations for this increase in 
Western interest are frequently formulated around the ‘(mis)recognition of the images of 
Muslims in the media and this has created a new set of problems of ignorance and 
misunderstandings of terrorism and the Islamic world.’ Within deliberations which have 
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taken, and continue to take place, gender equality and religious politics have also come to 
the forefront; subsequently raising questions about women’s rights and secularism in the 
region, outside of the emerging discourses surrounding Islamic fundamentalism and 
terrorism. 
Western typecasts of Islam, common in popular culture, depict it as a violent and intolerant 
religion with little or no respect for women, who occupy stereotypical gendered roles which 
are seen as oppressive, prevent them from gaining employment, and expect obedience to 
male relatives. ‘Modest’ dress is also a requirement. According to Qur’anic verses 2:282 and 
4:11 (Ali, 2000: 37, 61), women are also viewed as half as valuable as male witnesses and 
inheritors. However, not all Muslim countries adhere to the same interpretation of Islam 
with regard to rights and laws, with the primary schools being Sunni and Shiʾi: 
The Muslim world is divided into two camps: the Sunnis and the Shiites. The Sunnis, or 
orthodox, are so called because they follow the sunna, traditions having authority 
concurrent to and supplementary with the Koran. The Shiites are the partisans of the house 
of Ali, Muhammad’s disciple, cousin, and son-in-law. They reject the authority of the sunna 
and believe that the sovereign Imamat (‘the leadership of the faithful’) is vested in Ali and 
his descendants, the sons of his wife Fatima (the Prophet’s daughter). Consequently they 
regard the first three caliphs, Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman, as usurpers. They are found 
chiefly in Iran and India, but their influence has penetrated other parts of the Muslim world.  
(Mernissi, 1975: 186-7 ch.3 n.39) 
Other schools of Islam such as Hanafī2 and Wahhabi3 also affect interpretations; however, 
popular culture tends to generalise Islam and the MENA region, ignoring their diversity. 
Islam is also becoming increasingly prominent in other areas of the (Western) world and in 
some cases is being viewed as a threat, thus linking to the concept of Islamophobia.4 
                                                 
2 Hanafī Islam is one of the four schools of law within the Sunni branch of Islam. It is one of the oldest schools 
and has the largest number of adherents, with populations such as Egypt’s being majority Hanafī. 
3 Wahhabi Islam is understood in the post 9/11 world as the ‘major Islamic threat’ and the most fanatical 
school of Islam, however, it is also the ‘conservative creed’ of the ruling family of Saudi Arabia. Challenging 
these negative understandings, Wahhabi Islam is also recognised by 20th century reformers (Muhammad 
Rashid Rida, Egypt and Ismail Raji al-Furuqi, Palestine) as a model for re-forming and rejuvenating the religion 
(Delong-Bas, 2004: 3). 
4 This was made prominent in 2009 when Dutch politician Geert Wilders was banned from the UK following 
the release of his anti-Islamic film. The film showed statistical predictions regarding the expansion of the 
Muslim population in The Netherlands, and the potential threat they posed. 
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These discussions also raise questions about ‘othering’5 through an increase in Islamophobic 
attitudes and the creation of suspect communities. Seen to have close ties with xenophobia, 
Islamophobia has become a ‘shorthand way of referring to a dread or hatred of Islam and 
therefore a fear or dislike of Muslims’ (Runnymede Trust, 1997 in Sheridan, 2006: 317). This 
has assisted in shaping the lens through which the MENA region is viewed by the West and 
has arguably contributed towards the creation of suspect communities6 outside of MENA 
countries and a suspect region.7 The creation of such ‘suspects’ raised questions about the 
prominence of orientalism in contemporary debates and observations. This, along with the 
increased public visibility of women during the Egyptian uprising (2011) and their reluctance 
to renounce it in the chaotic period that followed, introduced questions about historic 
understandings of, and Western influences in MENA countries.  
The process of ‘othering’ and the construction of suspect communities or regions however, 
are not restricted to Western views of the Middle East, Islam or Muslims. Occidentalism8 is 
defined as the manner in which the East views the West, and these two forms of 
observation are key determinants in the complicated (and deteriorating) relationship 
between the two regions. It is arguable that this stance falls under the label of 
‘Westoxication’ (Gharbzadegi),9 which refers to the perceived threat of Western political 
and social reform within the Muslim world, which would eventually result in the erasing of 
the Muslim identity.  
                                                 
5 This term is placed within a post-colonial theoretical context and refers to specific social contexts and 
conditioning experienced by minority groups; for example ethnic minority groups (Jensen, 2011: 63–4). 
6 First coined by Paddy Hillyard in the early 1990s, this term initially referred to those arrested under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) throughout England, Scotland and Wales. Initial research related specifically 
to the experiences of those affected by this act through examination, arrest and detention. The initial study 
examined the impact of this suspect community on those residing in Ireland or those with Irish family heritage. 
Hillyard’s understanding of a suspect community refers to a process of threat identification, based on an 
individual’s nationality or place of origin, which illustrates and legitimises the politics of exception as 
implemented by the state (Hillyard, 1993: 7).  
7 Here the term refers to a broader understanding of the above concept, with specific reference to the 
generalising lens through which the Middle East is frequently viewed. 
8 Coined by Ian Buruma & Avishai Margalit, the term refers to the manner in which the West is perceived by 
non-Western observers as weak and (morally) bankrupt, thus creating an enemy which needs to be removed 
(Buruma, 2004: B10). 
9 Gharbzadegi in Persian, initially referred to the loss of Iranian cultural identity under the Pahlavi regime due 
to the intense adoption of Western models and ideas. The term was originally coined by Ahmad Fardid, a 
Professor at the University of Tehran, in the 1940s. The term was later made popular by Jalal Al-e Ahmad in his 
book Occidentosis: A Plague from the West (1962). (Cronin, 2004: 44). 
5 
 
The role of individual identities in the establishment of cultural dialogues has become an 
important variable in the analysis of international politics. Huntington’s (1992) The Clash of 
Civilizations puts forward the thesis that religion and culture would replace the state as the 
primary cause of conflict. It argues that with the effects of globalisation making the world 
smaller, cultural clashes are more likely to occur and cause conflict, whilst also proving to be 
more difficult to resolve than political and economic issues; subsequently cultural dialogue 
can be seen to disappear in this understanding, with a geographic region and a religion 
being put in conflict with each other. Huntington’s thesis not only argues that a clash 
between civilizations, namely the West and Islam, is inevitable, but it also highlights how 
labelling - ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’ - are based on cultural and religious (mis)understandings. 
Whilst this debate has had mixed responses, Huntington’s arguments reinforce the 
necessity of understanding historical occurrences so as to further contextualise current 
events. 
The attention of the international community has recently been drawn back to the Middle 
East following the increased presence of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The primary 
tenets which emerge from debates regarding the rapid territorial expansion, increased 
recruitment and execution methods of this group pertain to state sovereignty, human rights 
and gender equality. The violation of state sovereignty by ISIS in Syria and Iraq is argued by 
Mabon and Royle (2014: 2) to be a result of the fractured nature of the state following the 
US led invasion of Iraq (2003) and the Syrian Arab Spring (2011). They (2014: 2) further 
argue that the erosion of state sovereignty permits the emergence of ‘chaotic spaces’ which 
enables groups to ‘exercise autonomy over particular areas’. This erosion is also evident 
throughout various empires. It is thus arguable that through the erosion of state 
sovereignty, colonising powers were further able to enmesh their own cultures, traditions 
and politics into the societies of the countries they sought occupation of, as is currently 
being seen in the case of ISIS. Moreover, whilst increased secularisation was a characteristic 
of many colonised states, Esfandiari (2014: 1) notes the overtly religious nature of ISIS and 
the forced conversion of many Christian women. 
Whilst debates on ISIS are multifaceted and reports indicate concerning recruitment 
numbers of individuals from outside of Syria and Iraq, the most prominent absence, 
according to Esfandiari (2014: 1) is the lack of response to these actions. She further argues 
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that violations of women’s rights have occurred as a result of ISIS’s sexual jihad (jihad al-
nikah) and the exceptionally narrow interpretation of Islam being advocated. Forced 
marriage, child marriage, enforced veiling, rumours of FGM, trading of women, and 
restrictions on access to education and health care are amongst concerns resulting from the 
increasing encroachment of individual and state rights by ISIS. The strict reversion to these 
more traditional forms of control and essentially, the de-humanising of women, raise 
questions about motives for the dramatic reversal of rights and liberties which had 
previously been fought for. Not only does this raise questions about state sovereignty, but 
also about the sovereignty of the female body, irrespective of age. Moreover, it raises 
questions as to how ‘oppressive powers’ were previously overcome in order to establish 
increased gender equality in some aspects of life. Whilst Iraq and Syria will not be analysed 
in this project, the questions emerging as a result of ISIS have historic undertones, with 
some of these ‘traditional’ methods being prominent in this project.  
In 2014, gender discrimination came to the fore of two salient cases in Iran and the UAE. 
The case of Ghoncheh Ghavami emerged through media outlets following her arrest after 
attempting to seek permission for women to attend a volleyball match in Iran. In 1979 
women were prevented from attending ‘stadium football games’ and now, since 2012, they 
have been banned from attending volleyball games. Justification for this gender based 
segregation, according to government officials, was for women’s own benefit ‘as they need 
protection from the lewd behaviour of male fans’ (Amnesty International, 2014). Following 
her initial arrest, Ghoncheh was later re-arrested for crimes which her mother claims were 
recognised by the arresting authority as not relating to her peaceful protest (The Guardian, 
2014); she was subsequently released on bail in November 2014. Not only does this case 
raise questions about gender segregation within the public sphere of Iranian society, but 
also how governmental justifications have reinforced gendered stereotypes of women 
needing protection. This consequently results in the binaries of masculinity/femininity and 
strength/weakness being further enmeshed not only into society, but also into 
governmental justifications for the increased gender based segregation of its citizens.  
The UAE Lachaux custody battle has also emerged prominently in discussions relating to 
gender based discrimination within Shari’a law. Human Rights Watch (Roberts, 2014) have 
since become actively involved in increasing awareness pertaining to the potential 
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difficulties women could face if they suffer marital problems whilst living in the UAE. In 
2014, Afsana Lachaux was given a suspended prison sentence after being accused of 
kidnapping her son during a custody battle. Found guilty of not obeying her husband, and 
‘being careless in taking care of the child’ amongst other things, she is now not permitted to 
see her son until he is eighteen (Parmar, 2014; Roberts, 2014). What emerged from the case 
was that despite neither Mrs. Lachaux nor her husband being UAE nationals or Muslim, and 
that they had been married in England; it was possible for her husband, a French Christian, 
to request that Shari’a law be used in the divorce proceedings (Roberts, 2014). Since this 
case gained prominence, Human Rights Watch has ‘highlighted the use of Islamic law, which 
discriminates against women’, whilst simultaneously accusing UAE authorities of not taking 
reports of domestic violence seriously enough, a problem which has been frequently 
reported by British expats (Roberts, 2014).  
The first observation to be made from this case is the absence of any reference to a specific 
school of Islam, and the general reference to Shari’a law; thus omitting differing 
interpretations and stances adopted throughout the Muslim world with regard to areas of 
family law. Secondly, it raises questions pertaining to women’s rights, rather than solely 
Muslim women’s rights under Islamic law. This case has thus reinforced the necessity of 
further understanding family law – with specific reference to marriage, divorce and child 
custody - in the MENA region and the differing approaches which have been adopted, both 
presently and historically.  
From these contemporary observations, further questions arose about the impact Western 
influences had on women in the MENA region; how orientalist observations had affected 
the way in which they were externally perceived; and, what rights they had. One of the main 
criticisms made here of Orientalism is that it did not address women and their rights, rather, 
Said focused more on criticising the manner in which the West observed and conducted 
their research into the region; therefore raising the question of ‘what about women in the 
early twentieth century?’ This question narrowed the focus to countries where women’s 
rights movements were beginning to (or had) emerge(d), and that had also gained 
independence from Western occupation.  
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Finally, women have conventionally been restricted to the private sphere with men being 
able to move freely between the private and the public. This has occurred at a global level, 
with this societal distinction having been at the fore of feminist debates in the West, thus 
reiterating that parallels can be drawn between the condition of women in the Western and 
non-Western hemispheres. Furthermore, these parallels reinforce the prominence of 
patriarchy across borders. Traditionally, the family is seen as the crux of Islamic society (see 
for example Qutb, 2001: 25), and marriage provides the environment within which a family 
is started. Because of the position of the family in society, and the position of women within 
the family, women’s marital rights became the focal point for this research.  
1.3 Methodological Considerations 
Having historically situated this research puzzle and recognised contemporary relevances, 
the presentation of information about the MENA region indicates that gaps in knowledge 
remain. Through a historically focused political analysis, this thesis will address some of the 
remaining gaps which could potentially contribute to furthering our understanding of 
political developments in Egypt and Iran, especially with regard to family law. Moreover, the 
use of a comparative case analysis will emphasise the historic and political diversity of two 
countries in a region which has fallen into the orientalist trap of cultural, linguistic and 
religious simplifications and generalisations. Finally, the case study approach will highlight 
similarities and differences which occur with regard to women’s marital rights and the effect 
secularism can be understood to have had on them. 
Whilst the use of Western theories and debates, such as those of feminism and secularism 
may be questioned due to the focus of this research, this is partly due to my positionality. 
Bourke (2014: 1) argues that research ‘represents a shared space’ which is affected by our 
perceptions of others and ‘the ways in which we expect others will perceive us’. Kezar 
(2002: 96) posits that ‘within positionality theory, it is acknowledged that people have 
multiple overlapping identities. Thus people make meaning from various aspects of their 
identity…’. In order to recognise positionality and potential biases during the research 
process, reflexivity must occur. This involves the researcher engaging in ‘self-scrutiny’ 
(Bourke, 2014: 2) which results in ‘increased attention to researcher subjectivity in the 
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research process’ and recognition of how the role of personal understanding of the ‘self’ 
impacts data collection and the acquisition of knowledge (Pillow, 2003: 176).  
As a white, agnostic, Western woman, Freire’s (2000) cautioning against attempting to 
speak for ‘participants’ or attempting ‘to work on their behalf to help them rise up’ (Bourke, 
2014: 3) thus becomes crucial. It is therefore through recognising my racial, religious and 
geographic positionality that a detailed discussion on feminist debates is included (see 
section 3.2). Through the examination of these debates, and the criticisms which have 
emerged, recognition some of the weaknesses of Western feminist theories become 
apparent, thus reinforcing the adoption of a post-colonial feminist framework.  
In addition to my position as a researcher, theories such as feminism and secularism are 
discussed due to their strong roots in the Enlightenment, which subsequently results in 
them being understood as modern. Through discussions of these debates and other issues 
such as the public/private dichotomy, it becomes possible to understand gaps which remain 
in Western theory and questions which still need to be addressed. In order to avoid the 
eradication of identity, the relationship between these topics, Islam and the MENA region, 
as well as their relationship with women will be addressed. What this will achieve is a means 
by which my position as a researcher is not lost, nor will it overshadow the identities of the 
peoples being examined in this thesis.  
The issue of ‘truth’ and how this will be addressed thus becomes integral. Pillow (2003: 186) 
argues that ‘It is important, then, to explore how reflexivity acts in the interests of 
“discourses of truth” which “operate in relation to the dominant power structures of a given 
society” (McNay, 1992: 25). D’Costa (2006: 132) posits that truth telling is perceived as 
necessary for the processes of ‘peace-building, promoting democracy, striving for social 
justice, and transforming society more broadly’, but questions ‘whose truth is being told?’. 
Appleby et al. (1994: 7) posit that a certain amount of scepticism has become integral in 
searching for the truth as it ‘can encourage people to learn more and remain open to the 
possibility of their own errors’. The official mechanisms through which this truth is spoken 
is, however, frequently susceptible to manipulation by elites (D’Costa, 2006: 132), resulting 
in a selective truth being told. This speaks to the notion of relativism, whereby truth is seen 
as ‘relative to the position of the person making a statement’ (Appleby et al., 1994: 7). This 
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indicates that there is no whole truth, rather the subjective nature of experiences and the 
position of the researcher reinforces Appleby et al.’s (1994) assertion that no individual can 
be certain that their explanations are completely accurate, others must be listened to, and 
no one will have the final word on human histories; subsequently, ‘Telling the truth takes a 
collective effort’ (Appleby et al., 1994: 309). 
The research undertaken in this thesis is situated within the colonial era, thus different 
truths emerged. Through the analysis of colonial documents and newspaper reports, British 
representations of their position in Egypt and Iran, and the nature of the Egyptian and 
Iranian peoples emerge. Memoirs and autobiographies provide individual truths which 
reflect personal understanding and experiences. The selection of sources used in the 
analyses thus seeks to reflect the multifarious nature of ‘truth’ based on the individual 
writing, their position in society and their engagement with differing power structures. 
Subsequently, no single truth is obtainable. Rather, the intersecting nature of individual 
truths around similar experiences, alongside colonial ‘truths’, serves to reinforce the 
importance of identity and positionality in the recording of experiences and observation. 
Consequently, this thesis does not seek to provide a ‘truth’ about the effects of secularism 
on women’s marital rights; instead it seeks to provide a partial truth which will contribute to 
the broader historical and contemporary puzzles.  
The use of post-colonial feminism emerged as the most relevant theoretical framework for 
this thesis due to the period being examined, the theory’s roots in the de-colonisation 
struggle, and the position from which this research is being conducted. This framework will 
thus require a greater focus on the experiences and identities of the women being 
examined, alongside the intersecting fields of gender, class and location. This will be 
achieved through an interpretive textual analysis of memoirs and biographies of women in 
Egypt and Iran during this period; additionally, colonial documents pertaining to the public 
activities of women will also be analysed. This method of analysis will be adopted instead of 
discourse analysis as it permits increased interaction between language and context. Whilst 
Gill (2000: 175) writes that ‘As social actors, we are continuously orienting to the 
interpretive context in which we find ourselves, and constructing our discourse to fit that 
context’, an interpretive textual analysis enables recognition of divergent contexts and 
discourses, and permits a more reflexive relationship to occur with the underlying meaning 
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of the text becoming more prominent (see section 3.5.1). It is through this that an 
understanding of some women’s experiences can be established, whilst ensuring that their 
identities from a colonial perspective are also understood, thus providing a possible 
comprehension of the gendered nature of colonial attitudes toward the public presence of 
some women during this period.  
1.3.1 Contemporising History 
This thesis is situated in an historical context due to the importance of understanding the 
past and what has been learnt from it. The importance of history, especially with regard to 
feminist history, is supported by Burton (1992: 26) who argued that history is now, and that 
history is not simply what has happened, but is also ‘the kinds of knowledge about the past 
that we are made aware of’. This not only emphasises the importance of recognising the 
past, but suggests that history is not static and is still of great contemporary significance. It 
is argued that following the linking of science and history, ‘dramatically new forms of 
historical knowledge became possible’, with ‘explanatory history’ emerging in the 
nineteenth century (Appleby et al., 1994: 52). This ‘search for the laws of historical 
development’ is understood to have provided people with an analytical tool which would 
enable them to comprehend ‘where they had been and what they were becoming’ (Appleby 
et al., 1994: 52). 
The need to comprehend and (continue) learn(ing) from history emerges within the 
contemporary context which serves as this thesis’ point of departure. Through the 
examination of understandings in various contemporary contexts, gaps in knowledge 
become visible; thus an historic examination is required. Moreover, whilst this thesis is 
situated within the early twentieth century, it is being written almost a century later. 
Consequently, the use of contemporary issues as a point of departure for this research 
relates in part to my position as a researcher (see section 1.3.1), with homogenisations and 
gaps in knowledge which have been presented having contributed toward the formation of 
the research questions presented previously (see section 1.1). Appleby et al. (1994: 271) 
posit that to ‘Talk about the future of history pivots around the question of how best to 
deploy the passion to know’. Focussing this passion is the researcher’s understanding that 
‘the past can reveal an aspect of what it is to be human’; lived experiences are believed to 
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alter research questions and it is claimed that the ‘sensitivity of historians to the lived 
moment’ becomes increasingly apparent when significant historical changes occur (Appleby 
et al., 1994: 271). 
Badran (1988: 30) justifies her focus on late nineteenth and early twentieth century Egypt 
due to the inclusive nature of this period which incorporates ‘the emergence of women’s 
feminism and nationalism, their dual struggle against patriarchy in the form of indigenous 
male-dominated institutions and their nationalist militancy.’ She further argues that this 
positioned women to ‘generate their own construct of nationalism distinct from men’s 
nationalism’, with differentiations between the two being recognised by Badran (1988: 30) 
as ‘feminist nationalism’ and ‘patriarchal nationalism’.  
Nationalism, according to Kedourie (1993: 1), is a ‘doctrine invented in Europe at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century’ and it is (briefly) understood to present the division of 
humanity amongst nations as a natural occurrence. Joireman (2003:12) builds on this, 
arguing that it is ‘an ethnic group with a political agenda’ and is thus defined as ‘politicized 
ethnicity’. Whilst she (2003: 12-13) argues that all forms of nationalism ‘seek to promote 
the particular agenda of a nation’, it is recognised that movements seeking self-
determination ‘will indisputably be at odds with their existing state’. Building on Anderson’s 
(1983) assertion that ‘imagination’ is integral to the analysis of nationalism, Chakrabarty 
(2000: 150) posits that nationalism ‘presents the question of vision and imagination in ways 
more complicated than a straightforward identification of the realist or the factual with the 
political might suggest’. Moreover, nationalism required a ‘secular engagement with the 
world’ which went beyond ‘pure and narrow self-interest’ (Chakrabarty, 2000: 223). 
Seen across the world, arising within different contexts, Kedourie (1993:138-139) argues 
that the spread, political force and outcome cannot be predicted; and to narrate it is to 
‘provide a history of events, rather than of ideas’. Furthermore, within a modern context 
and the different means by which ideas can be diffused, Kedourie (1993: 141) states that it 
is more likely that national identity creates a nationalist doctrine than the doctrine being an 
expression of identity. Yuval-Davis (2013: 20) builds on this by highlighting works which have 
endeavoured to ‘classify the different kinds of nationalist movements and nationalist 
ideologies’ which occurred in the last two centuries. Subsequently, it is concluded that the 
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variations of nationalism which have been evidenced need to be recognised as part of the 
broader umbrella of ‘nationalist ideologies and projects which are combined in different 
ways in specific historical cases’ (Yuval-Davis, 2013: 21). 
In reference to religion, Ghanem (2014: 3) contends that liberal-nationalism stands in 
contradiction to the principles upon which Islamism is based. Subsequently, it is possible to 
view Egyptian political Islam as the ‘antithesis’ of Egyptian nationalism and possibly explains 
current divisions in national identity (Ghanem, 2014: 3). Moreover, specific religious 
institutions and beliefs can develop into ‘inflexible symbolic border guards of specific 
collectivity boundaries and cultural traditions (Yuval-Davis, 2013: 42). This is emphasised 
through recognising Durkheim’s (1915/1965) understanding of religion in ‘the most basic 
socially cohesive act’ which allows society to worship ‘its own collective conscience’ (Yuval-
Davis, 2013: 42). Simultaneously however, religions frequently present answers as 
pertaining to everyone not just those who belong to that collectivity (Yuval-Davis, 2013: 42).  
Ghanem’s (2014: 3) argument regarding the potential impact of Egyptian political Islam and 
Egyptian nationalism on contemporary identities thus reinforces the need to further 
understand historic occurrences. Subsequently, Burton’s (1992: 26) argument that history is 
now, is reinforced and further insight into the historic positioning of this thesis in the early 
twentieth century is required. 
Whilst this thesis shares Badran’s (1988: 30) justification, the examination of the 1920s and 
1930s is further justified as it was a critical juncture in the development of women’s rights 
across the globe. The differing historical trajectories of both Egypt and Iran further 
contribute to this as they permit a more analytical comparison to occur than one between 
cases with similar histories and the same cultural classifications. The beginning of the 
twentieth century was a crucial point for women’s rights in the West; the onset of first wave 
feminism and women’s enfranchisement being the most prominent events. In the UK, 
women over the age of thirty were granted the right to vote in 1918, with the age being 
lowered to twenty-one in 1928, and in the US white women were given the vote in 1920.10 
Whilst many countries in the MENA region did not enfranchise women until the latter half of 
                                                 
10 African Americans were not enfranchised in the US until the 1960s. 
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the twentieth century,11 this is also true of many Western European countries; and it is thus 
interesting to establish the rights which were being sought and the achievements made by 
women’s rights advocates in Egypt and Iran at this time.  
The period of the 1920s and 1930s was also chosen because of the internal and external 
struggles which occurred in both Egypt and Iran. Not only was the introduction of Western 
ideas an issue with regard to politics and culture in both states, but the early twentieth 
century proved to be a period of ‘firsts’ for both countries with regard to legal and political 
developments, as well as achievements made by women in areas such as the home and 
education. In addition to this, both countries had established their first written constitutions 
by the early 1920s (Iran in 1906, and Egypt in 1923), thus enabling an understanding of 
women’s position within society when such documents were introduced. These documents 
are also significant as they were not changed until each country experienced a revolution 
(Egypt in 1952 and Iran in 1979). It is also noted (Kholoussy, 2010: 3) that marriage emerged 
as the medium through which Egyptian men and women are believed to have understood 
their rights and duties, especially during the early twentieth century under British 
occupation. 
By bringing the history of Egyptian and Iranian women’s marital rights to the fore of this 
research, this thesis seeks to provide the foundations for more nuanced understandings of 
women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran. It will also provide analytical insights into this area 
of history so as to reinforce the contemporary relevance of history. 
1.3.2 Case Study Selection 
This project has adopted a comparative approach focusing on two case studies. Egypt and 
Iran emerged as the strongest cases for this project due to their positions as states in the 
early twentieth century, their different historical and cultural experiences (see Appendix 1 
for table of case considerations), and the wealth of sources available; thus permitting a 
more nuanced comparison to occur.  
In addition to Egypt and Iran; Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia were 
also considered as candidates for this project.12 Applicability of each country for this project 
                                                 
11 Women were enfranchised in Egypt in 1956 and in Iran in 1963. 
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was established through the inclusion of eight factors. These included whether the country 
had a history of colonialism or imperialism; the type of government they had at the time; 
whether they had experienced Western influences; whether feminist activities had emerged 
during the period of enquiry; the availability of documents of each case; the accessibility of 
data for each case; existing background literature; and the languages spoken in each 
country during this era. Within these factors were numerous sub-factors which were 
employed so as to ensure increased clarity on the suitability of each case considered for this 
project.  
The first sub-factors determined whether a country had experienced colonialism or 
imperialism and this emerged as the most prominent criterion for comparison as it provides 
important insights into diverging experiences with foreign power structures and secularising 
influences. The second clarified whether the country in question was under the rule of a 
religious or a secular government; the third specified whether Western influences in the 
country were cultural or linguistic; and the fourth group determined whether or not 
feminist activities were understood to have occurred by this period. The next three sets of 
sub-factors related to existing sources on each country, with the three options being 
provided for document availability, data accessibility and background literature being ‘yes’, 
‘limited’ and ‘no’. The final factor was languages spoken, and had seven sub-factors, with 
the most prominent languages from the considered cases being Arabic, Berber, English, 
French, Spanish, Italian, and Farsi/Persian. In order to establish the suitability of each case 
the number of sub-factors was counted, with those marked ‘no’ not being included as it 
removed that factor from consideration. 
Of the eight countries considered for this project, Saudi Arabia emerged as the least 
applicable. Whilst it had experienced imperialism, had a religious government, and the 
language spoken in the country was Arabic; it did not have strong cultural or linguistic 
Western influences, with influences of this nature becoming more prominent after 1938 
following an oil deal with the United States. Moreover, there was no evidence of feminist 
activities having occurred during this period and there was no apparent access to 
                                                                                                                                                        
12 Turkey was not considered for this project due to the voluminous amount of (comparative) research which 
has been done on gender, secularism and women’s rights. See for example Arat (2010), Başkan (2013, 2014) 
and Göle (1997). 
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documents, data or background literature which would be applicable to this project. Kuwait 
was the second least applicable case for this research, with similar criteria matches to Saudi 
Arabia. The primary difference between these two countries was that Kuwait experienced 
both colonisation and imperialism, and Western cultural influences. 
Kuwait was only just preceded in applicability by Libya. This marginal difference was 
attributed to the presence of Western cultural and linguistic influences and the addition of 
Italian to the languages spoken. Unlike Kuwait, Libya’s history appeared to deal with 
colonialism, rather than colonialism and imperialism. Morocco and Tunisia then emerged 
with equal applicability to this project. Whilst these countries both had religious 
governments, linguistic Western influences, and had Arabic as a spoken language; Tunisia 
emerged more prominently with regard to experiences of colonialism and imperialism and 
the presence of feminist activities. Morocco appeared to counter this with increased 
linguistic differentials, with Berber and Spanish accompanying the shared languages of 
Arabic and French. 
Algeria and Iran emerged in joint second place with regard to applicability for this project. 
Whilst Algerian history is shaped by colonialism, Iran’s is shaped by colonialism and 
imperialism. The Algerian government at the time was religious, with Iran’s proving to be 
both religious and secular during the period being examined in this thesis. Western 
influences in Algeria appeared to be restricted to language, whilst in Iran it was cultural. This 
is evident in the inclusion of French in the spoken languages of Algeria alongside Arabic and 
Berber, whilst Persian/Farsi remained the predominant language in Iran. Additionally, during 
this period, there were no apparent feminist activities in Algeria, whilst in Iran they were 
gaining momentum. Furthermore, documents, data and background literature were limited 
for the Algerian case and were more easily obtainable for Iran.  
Egypt emerged as the most suitable country for analysis with reference to this project. It 
had historic experiences of both colonialism and imperialism, a secular government, 
Western cultural and linguistic influences, an emerging feminist movement, good 
accessibility and availability of documents, data and background literature, whilst having 
Arabic, English, and French as its most prominent spoken languages. The determining factor 
in the selection of Iran as the second country for analyses were differentials between 
17 
 
Algeria and Iran regarding availability and accessibility of relevant sources. Further 
investigation into the two chosen countries reinforces the above results, with a deeper 
knowledge of the political history and development of each country being established. 
Egypt’s long history with colonialism can be dated back to the 525BC Persian and 642CE 
Arab conquests. Having become part of the Ottoman Empire in 1517, it was later colonised 
by the French under Napoleon (1798-1801). In 1882 Egypt was occupied by the British and 
became a protectorate in 1914; quasi-independence was then gained in 1922 however, 
British influence was maintained until 1952. 
During the 1920s and 1930s, Egypt was a secular monarchy under King Fuʾād I (1922) and 
King Farouk (1936); however, during this time there was a call for a return to Islam which 
resulted in later leaderships having more religious overtones. In 1923, the first written 
Egyptian constitution13 was introduced, and this was not changed until the 1952 Revolution. 
During this period there were numerous feminist groups and organisations present, 
including the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU; Al-Ittihad Al-Nīsa ʾi Al-Misri), Shaqiqat (junior 
EFU – 1933), New Women’s Society, Wafdist Women’s Committee, and the Muslim Ladies 
Association.  
The Iranian14 experience of colonialism can be dated back to the 636 Arab invasion that 
brought an end to the Sassarud dynasty and marked the beginning of Islamic rule. Later in 
1220 Genghis Khan invaded. In 1906 the first written constitution was implemented and was 
not changed until 1979 following the Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (IRI). Whilst Iran was not colonised in the post-Ottoman era in the same 
way as Egypt or Tunisia, it did experience foreign occupation, culminating in the 1907 
tripartite state partition by Britain and Russia.  
During the 1920s and 1930s the Iranian government was secular under the Pahlavi dynasty 
following Reza Khan’s seizing of power in 1921. He was later crowned Reza Shah Pahlavi 
(1926) and his son was recognised as crown Prince. Despite Iran’s differing history to Egypt, 
                                                 
13 The constitution was also known as Royal Decree No. 42/1923 Building a Constitutional System for the 
Egyptian State. 
14 During this time the country was known as Persia, and it was not until 1935 that ‘Iran’ was formally adopted 
as the country’s official name. However, for the purposes of this research, all references will be to Iran unless 
otherwise stated. 
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Western influence was prominent through the Shah’s modernisation of the country which 
involved the adoption of Western culture. During this time women’s movements were 
visible with the Women’s Revolutionary Association (1910), the National Ladies Society 
(NLS, 1910), The Sixth Majlis (1922), and the Patriotic Women’s League (1922) being 
amongst those established. 
Case study suitability was thus further established due to the shared historical experiences 
of European occupation. Although Iran was not formally colonised, as in the case of Egypt, 
the history of British, Russian and later American influences in the country is visible in its 
past with the secular reign of the Pahlavi’s, and the subsequent revolution (1979). The 
history of British and French occupation in Egypt is also prominent, with the establishment 
of the Muslim Brotherhood occurring in opposition to foreign presence and secularising 
influences. The group has since grown and spread across the MENA region with it being at 
the fore of current discussions in Egypt following their election to power and subsequent 
demise. Secondly, both countries have histories replete of women’s rights achievements, 
with both countries having strong feminist movements, and Iran’s being recognised as (one 
of) the largest in the region. Whilst they are both part of the MENA region, their geographic 
locations – Egypt in North Africa and Iran in the Middle East - allow for more culturally 
diverse histories to have occurred, than between Egypt and Algeria. Differences in cultural 
identity – Egyptians being Arab and Iranians being Persian - will also contribute to 
interpretations and understandings of women’s rights in these countries. Both countries 
also experienced similar political changes at the beginning of the twentieth century with the 
establishment of constitutions, thus enabling a comparison of legal approaches towards 
women’s marital rights during this era. Moreover, the marital bond between these two 
countries which occurred at the end of the 1930s, between Princess Fawzia (Egypt) and 
Muhammad Reza Khan (Iran) (Sabit, 1989: 117–118), further solidifies case suitability for 
this comparative-historical analysis of matrimonial equality. 
1.4 Key Concepts and Issues 
This thesis seeks to understand how the secular nature of the state affected women’s 
marital rights in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939. ‘Secular nature’ refers to the 
manner in which secularism was introduced to each state and the impact this can be seen to 
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have had on matrimonial equality through documents such as civil codes and subsequent 
acts. 
In seeking insight into how the secular nature of the state shaped the development of 
women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939, the term ‘secular’ 
subsequently lies at the heart of this thesis. Whilst definitional ambiguities arise (see section 
2.6), a working definition of ‘secular’ within the context of this research emerges as the 
outcome of a process whereby the procurement of power becomes possible through 
modernisation via the separation of religion from politics and/or the state. Differing 
frameworks within which power was gained are reflected in the cases of Egypt and Iran, 
with different power structures seeking the implementation of secularism. 
Diverging introductions of secularism in Egypt and Iran has resulted in the terms ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ secularism being used. ‘Internal secularism’ refers to the implementation of 
secularism in Iran through Reza Khan’s modernisation project. Whilst external influences 
such as British and Russian can be seen as influential in this process, Reza Khan’s adaptation 
of the state as a secularising moderniser permits its overarching implementation to be 
viewed through a different lens. Contrastingly, ‘external secularism’ refers to the 
introduction of secularism to Egypt through colonising powers. Unlike Iran’s stringent 
internal implementation, secularism in Egypt was less rigid and this is evidenced later in 
chapter two by fluctuations in the religious and secular nature of the state. 
The second aspect of this thesis’ research question is women’s rights. Whilst frequently 
referred to as feminism, its application to this project is queried. Al-Ali (2000: 4) justifies her 
use of the term ‘women’s activism’ rather than ‘feminism’ due to her interviewees 
‘pragmatic and ideological’ rejection of the term. As discussed later in chapter two, 
translation issues arise with some terms not having direct equivalents. Subsequently, the 
attribution of the terms ‘feminist’ and ‘feminism’ to individuals, groups and activities 
examined in this thesis may not accurately represent their (intended) identities. Whilst 
‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ will be used throughout this thesis, this is primarily due to the 
inclusion of feminist theory and the apparent absence of refutation to the application of 
these terms. This silence however, does not represent acceptance of the term as a form of 
identity. 
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1.5 Thesis Structure 
This thesis adopts a thematic approach, with a comparative-historical analysis being 
conducted throughout. Chapter two will examine gender equality, modernity and the state 
by critically reviewing a selection of the available literature on family law, women’s rights, 
gender equality, feminist movements and secularism. This critical review will begin with 
women’s rights within family law, focussing specifically on marriage, divorce, inheritance 
and child custody, throughout the MENA region and religious perspectives pertaining to 
them. To reinforce similarities and differences between religions, and recognise the 
diversity of a frequently homogenised region, Israeli marriage and divorce practices will be 
discussed in conjunction with diverging Muslim practices. It will then move to discuss 
women’s rights and gender equality in other areas of society, highlighting socio-political 
relations between women, the state, religion and secularism; thus permitting insight into 
areas where increased gender equality was sought through women’s rights movements and 
debates regarding the public/private dichotomy. 
Discussions pertaining to feminism then permit examinations of the current literature 
surrounding its development in both Western and non-Western contexts, as well as a more 
focused examination of literature regarding relations between Islam and feminism. A critical 
review of the literature surrounding the relationship between secularism and feminism will 
then occur, serving to highlight the interconnectedness of two distinct projects with roots in 
the Enlightenment. The discussion will subsequently move to examine the triangulated 
relationship between women, religion and secularism before moving on to examine 
secularism in more detail.  
This review will thus conclude with an examination of secularism. Definitional debates will 
highlight its flexible nature, with recognition of secularism’s divergent global history further 
emphasising the various forms it has adopted, and subsequently the absence of a rigid 
concept. It is through this critical review that remaining gaps in current knowledge are 
highlighted and the contribution of this thesis will be further reinforced. 
Chapter three serves to outline the theoretical framework and methodological approaches 
adopted for this project, whilst providing rationales grounded in the literature as to why this 
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thesis will be situated in a post-colonial feminist framework. It also serves to identify and 
justify the interpretive analysis which will occur throughout this qualitative small-N, 
comparative-historical project; as well as provide rationales for the chosen sources which 
will be used and the means by which they will be obtained. 
Chapters four and five serve as the historical background for the Egyptian and Iranian cases. 
The purpose behind presenting them as separate entities is ultimately to recognise the 
different histories these two countries have. The structuring of the chapters has occurred in 
a similar manner, with revolutions, wars, the more public emergence of the female voice, 
and the effects of foreign powers on each state permitting comparable insights into each 
case. This is designed to ensure greater clarity in the socio-political and international 
positions of each state independently in the two decades prior to the epoch being examined 
in this thesis.  
Chapter four provides the historical background for the Egyptian case through an analysis of 
the socio-political climate in the country between 1900 and 1919, the impact of colonialism 
on the country, the emergence of a politics of resistance, as well as the impact of war on the 
socio-political and economic landscapes of the country. The structuring of this chapter 
serves to provide a chronological approach to the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. Beginning with a discussion of the British occupation of Egypt, representations of 
Egypt and Egyptians by the British, and the discontent which emerged in all areas of society, 
the chapter then examines the impact of World War One and the effects of being a British 
Protectorate. It also emphasises the increased attempts by Britain at ensuring control of 
Egypt, whilst highlighting how this forced entry into war by the British was deemed 
responsible for the economic decline which was experienced. 
The discussion then moves to examine the effects of economic decline on marriage rates as 
well as the perceived threat of mixed marriages between European women and Egyptian 
men, not only on the marriage prospects of Egyptian women, but also on Egypt in future 
generations. This links, in part, to the politics of resistance, which is argued to have 
culminated in the 1919 Revolution. This aspect of Egypt’s history was not simply in response 
to British occupation, but also in response to oppression, and this is argued to have been 
accompanied by the increased public presence of women. 
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Chapter five serves as the historical background for the Iranian case examining the socio-
political climate of the early twentieth century. Structured in a similar manner to chapter 
four, it seeks to provide chronological insight into the socio-political climate of Qajar Iran, 
the effects of the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, the role of women in the revolution and 
the emergence of a female voice in written works as a form of resistance. It then analyses 
the constitution, its various periods of implementation and the Supplementary Fundamental 
Laws which were initially enacted in 1907. The analysis then examines foreign partitions 
within the country with regard to the triangulated relationship between Britain, Russia and 
Iran; in which Iran appeared to play a third wheel in determining its own future. It also 
examines the motivational effects of the Japanese defeat of Russia, the effects of World 
War One on Iran, and the role of foreign powers in the rise of the Cossack Brigade.  
This chapter concludes with an examination of the monarchical transition from the ruling 
Qajars to the new force of Reza Khan. Examining the political tensions which existed 
throughout the final years of the Qajar dynasty and the oppositional stance of the Cossack 
Brigade from which Reza Khan emerged; it becomes possible to see the effects of foreign 
powers in Iranian politics as well as the continued discontent amongst the Iranian 
population. 
Chapters six and seven serve as the primary discussion chapters for this thesis, focussing on 
women’s rights with regard to marriage and divorce respectively. Interpretive textual 
analysis will serve as a mode of enquiry through its application to sources such as the 1928 
Iranian Civil Code (Naqvi, 1968a, 1968b, 1968c; Taleghany, 1995), the Iranian Marriage Act 
(Naqvi, 1968a), Egyptian laws 25/1920, 33/1926 and 25/1929 (The Egyptian Gazette, 12th 
March, 1929; NWRO, n.d.), memoirs of Huda Shaarawi (1987), Taj al-Sultana (n.d./2003) and 
Sattareh Farman Farmaian (1993); and the biography of Doria Shafik (Nelson, 1996). 
Analyses of these sources will be accompanied by examinations of British documents 
pertaining to the political situation in Iran and the activities of Egyptian women, thus 
permitting insight into colonial British attitudes, representations and understandings of 
economic, political and social situations in each country; as well as enabling insight into 
British representations of individuals. The purpose of these two chapters is to assess the 
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extent to which the predominantly masculine nature15 of marriage and divorce are shaped 
by the state, therefore contributing a new analysis of women’s marital rights in Egypt and 
Iran through an historical lens.  
Chapter six emerges as the first chapter of analysis. Focussing solely on marital rights in 
Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939, the interpretive comparison comes to the fore of 
this chapter, thus permitting insight into the various rights women were (not) afforded with 
regard to the establishment of the familial structure. It also seeks to highlight feminist 
demands which were being made with regard to matrimonial equality. This chapter will 
subsequently push this research further by demonstrating the rights which women were 
(not) afforded following these demands.  
This chapter is structured around the process of contracting a marriage. The discussion 
begins with the notion of politicising the private. Through this it becomes apparent that this 
politicisation was multifaceted; with it becoming evident through increasingly rigid laws 
pertaining to marriage and familial relations, the use of homes for political meetings, and 
the politicisation of the individual identity through political actions or male relations. It then 
moves to discuss the ‘method’ of choosing a partner, highlighting the removal of women 
from this process. This chapter also includes discussions on the wali (guardian), mahr 
(dowry), and examines areas of concern with regard to the contracting of marriage. Within 
this latter section, concerns and demands relating to child marriage, specifically between 
girls and men, in both countries, and the more specified health concerns and requirements 
which became legalised through Iranian law will be examined. It is through these discussions 
that it becomes apparent that the process of getting married is deeply entrenched in law, 
with one result being that the familial structure was drawn into the political realm. 
Chapter seven serves as the second discussion chapter, and it is here that gender equality 
with regard to divorce and inheritance will be discussed. Drawing on the aforementioned 
documents, this chapter will examine the legalities of divorce and inheritance in both Egypt 
and Iran. Structured in a similar manner to chapter six, this chapter is arranged 
chronologically according to the process of ending a marriage. Beginning with a discussion 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that, by masculine nature, it is meant the traditionally perceived role of male relatives in 
choosing partners, negotiating dowry, the ability to initiate a divorce or marry more than one woman. 
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on the right to initiate divorce, this chapter analyses laws pertaining to the conditions under 
which men can divorce their wives and women may seek a divorce from their husbands. It 
then examines different types of divorce, for example, revocable and irrevocable. Polygamy 
and temporary marriage then come to the fore of the discussion, before turning to the 
financial responsibilities of the husband and the rights of the wife in the cases of 
maintenance, alimony and inheritance. The chapter concludes with a discussion on child 
custody, parental rights, and remarriage. 
By structuring the two discussion chapters in this manner, it has been possible to move 
through the process of contracting and dissolving a marriage whilst permitting a 
comparative analysis to occur throughout. It has also allowed a comparative analysis to 
occur between the rights of men and women in both countries in parallel with the 
comparison between Egypt and Iran. 
This thesis concludes with a chapter analysing the findings of this interpretive comparative-
historical analysis. Modernity, history and secularism are initially brought together within 
the context of this thesis, with similarities and differences in their early twentieth century 
histories prior to 1920 and the multifaceted resistance which emerged in both countries is 
reinforced. The chapter then discusses the findings of chapter six, comparing the rights of 
men and women throughout whilst also comparing rights in Egypt and Iran. Findings from 
chapter seven are then discussed through the same dual comparison as is conducted for 
chapter six. The chapter and the thesis then conclude with a final discussion on women, 
modernity and the state in Egypt and Iran. It argues not only that both states are equally 
restrictive with regard to matrimonial equality, but also that increased references to women 
and a breakdown of their rights within the Iranian legal framework served to provide a 
façade of increased gender equality. This is thus understood to have further entrenched 
marriage and divorce within the patriarchal nature of the state.  
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Chapter Two 
Gender Equality, Modernity and the State 
2.1 Introduction 
Women’s rights in the MENA region have served as a point of contention amongst 
politicians, activists, scholars and the wider observing audience for numerous decades. 
Debates pertaining to oppressive governmental regimes and Islam have provided a lens 
through which gender equality in the region has been critically viewed. Moreover, increased 
calls for democratic governance and the secularisation of the state have argued that the 
Western model would better serve citizen rights and subsequently gender equality. 
However, the majority of these calls (un)intentionally fail to recognise divergent historical 
trajectories of the countries which comprise the MENA region, as well as the divergences in 
religious interpretation which occur within the multifaceted nature of Islam.  
This thesis’ point of departure within the broad spectrum of women’s rights is family law, 
with specific insight being sought into the effects of secularism on matrimonial equality 
between 1920 and 1939, in Egypt and Iran. Thus, this chapter reviews literature of the 
intersecting fields of gender equality, religion and secularism in the MENA region. 
Commencing with family law it then moves to examine the broader spectrum of gender 
equality as a means of further situating this research within the current literature. From this 
emerges a discussion on the public/private dichotomy, its continued entrenchment in some 
aspects of society and how this binary has been challenged through the establishment of 
women’s rights movements, a growing feminist consciousness and scholarly debates.  
The discussion then examines the feminism-modernity relationship, successively directing 
discussions to discourse surrounding the highly contested notion of Islamic feminism. This 
examination of the relationship between feminism and religion, and religious feminism thus 
provides a point of transition to secularism as the final area of inquiry. Through an 
examination of the literature pertaining to the conceptualisation of secularism, it will 
become evident that there is little clarity on what it means to be secular, as well as 
contention surrounding the application of its numerous suffixes. Following this, a discussion 
on the rise and fall of secularism will further assist in understanding its application and 
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relationship with religion. This chapter will then conclude by reiterating some of the 
remaining gaps in current knowledge and thus, within an academic context, emphasise how 
this research will fill some of these crevices.  
2.2 Women, Family and the Law 
Remaining firmly in the religious jurisdiction of Shari’a, family law and matters of personal 
status have proven to be controversial issues, internationally and domestically. Within 
debates which emerge from the continued predominance of religion within the domestic 
realm, the secular/religious binary has further developed. Within this dichotomy, debates 
continue as to whether Islam advocates gender inequality and whether the secularisation of 
family laws would culminate in greater civil rights and increased democracy in the MENA 
region. The apparent uniqueness of the MENA region is however, questioned by Moghadam 
(2013: 6), who enquires whether the roles and rights of women can be understood solely ‘in 
terms of the ubiquity of deference to Islam in the region?’ Clarifying her position, 
Moghadam (2013: 6) argues that women’s situation cannot be exclusively located in the 
‘intrinsic properties of Islam’; moreover, she argues that Islam is no more patriarchal than 
other major religions such as Hinduism, Christianity and Judaism, which all view women’s 
primary roles to be those of wife and mother. 
The family, according to Asad (2003: 227), is the societal entity in which individuals are 
‘physically and morally reproduced’ and where the foundations of individuals as ‘private’ 
beings are formulated. Designation of the family is further clarified by Moghadam (2013: 8), 
who notes that it is commonly understood as a unit whose laws serve to reinforce 
‘patriarchal gender relations’. Furthermore, it is understood to represent the proper 
framework for sex, thus ‘ensuring legitimate filiation’, with social hierarchies being 
maintained through ‘marital alliances amongst families’ (Dunne, 1998: 9). Frequent 
assumptions indicate the reluctance of colonial authorities to interfere in matters of family 
law due to perceptions that ‘it was the heart of religious doctrine and practice’ (Asad, 2003: 
227). Diverging from this view, Asad (2003: 227–228) posits that this understanding of 
Shari’a served as a ‘secular formula for privatizing “religion” and preparing the ground for 
the self-governing subject.’ Moreover, he (2003: 230) argues that the ‘reform’ which served 
to translate Shari’a as family law can be situated within this perspective. 
27 
 
Joseph (1996: 7) understands family law as remaining one of the most fundamental legal 
realms, serving as an environment within which religious sects, as a form of subnational 
community, can officially be assimilated into ‘juridical communities.’ Additionally, Joseph 
(1996: 7) notes that with the exceptions of Tunisia and Turkey, all MENA states submit 
issues of family law to ‘legally recognized authorities’, thus enforcing patriarchal control by 
male relatives and clerics onto women. Whilst this observation highlights patriarchal 
tendencies of religious authorities with regard to women and family law, the exclusion of 
Turkey and Tunisia indicates a reorientation of approaches to family law in some countries.  
For Qutb (2001: 25), who is recognised for his meticulous interpretation of the Qur’an, the 
family is the foundation of society and it is formed through the marriage of God’s two souls. 
His (2001) interpretation of gender equality in the Qur’an however, appears paradoxical in 
comparison to frequent accusations of gender inequality in Shari’a based family law. He 
(2001: 25) argues that Islam sought to ‘elevate women to a position of dignity’ through the 
removal of cruelty and degradation experienced by women in every ‘ignorant society’ so as 
to ensure the necessary solidity in the foundations of the family.  
Acknowledging Tunisia and Morocco’s more liberal family laws and Egyptian developments 
in 2004 which granted women more rights in divorce, Nazir (2005: 36) highlights that gender 
discrimination is still prevalent across the MENA region despite liberalising reforms. Abu-
Odeh (2004: 1049) however, recognises interpretational differentials between schools of 
thought and reform potential by way of a spectrum. She (2004: 1049) argues that Tunisian 
legislative reform presents itself as the most liberal, with Hanafī, which Lombardi (1998: 94) 
notes ‘claims the nominal allegiance’ of sixty percent of the world’s Muslims – including the 
majority of Egyptians, and upon which Egyptian family law is based - being the most 
conservative (Abu-Odeh, 2004: 1049). Despite Hanafī’s strictly conservative nature, Abu-
Odeh (2004: 1049) situates Egypt centrally on the spectrum alongside Jordan and posits that 
they represent ‘centrist reforms’. Moreover, she (2004: 1049) argues that the primary 
difference between Tunisian and Egyptian family law reforms is that the former introduced 
liberalism into its family code in a manner which appears to be unrivalled in the Arab world, 
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whereas the latter preserved gender reciprocity as inherited from Taqlid16 law whilst 
simultaneously chipping away at the husband’s ‘surplus powers in the family’.  
In 2003, Morocco announced reform recommendations to family law which were 
subsequently ratified in 2004 (Moghadam, 2013: 8; Weingartner, 2004: 687). These reforms 
were understood to correlate more closely with modern notions of women’s rights and 
privileges in an increasingly democratic society (Weingartner, 2004: 687), allowing them 
rights and opportunities in both spheres (Moghadam, 2013: 8). Concurrently, Iraq’s Interim 
Governing Council passed Decree 137, abolishing their Personal Status Law and re-placing all 
matters into the religio-legal jurisdiction of Shari’a and religious authorities (Efrati, 2005: 
577). 
Progressions in increased gender equality in Iraqi family law commenced in 1959; with 
continuous reforms occurring under a sequence of secular governments (Efrati, 2005: 578). 
The decision to re-locate family law proved unpopular amongst women and activists, with 
the latter representing approximately eighty women’s groups, both carrying out a series of 
organised protests bearing the slogans: ‘“No Discrimination Between Women and Men in 
Our New Iraq,” “We Reject Decree 137 Which Sanctifies Sectarianism and Division in Iraqi 
Society and Family”’ (Efrati, 2005: 577). The decision to revoke the Iraqi Personal Status 
Laws at the same time as Morocco enacted progressive modifications indicates that reform 
in the region is not uniform. Moreover, it raises questions as to whether Western influences 
impacted on these choices, with the deciding council in Iraq at the end of 2003 having been 
US appointed.  
Whilst Muslim countries in the MENA region have been criticised for gender inequality and 
religious laws, Strong (1997: 154) postulates that Israel is no exception. The overtly religious 
nature of family laws results from their almost exclusive prerogative in religious courts in 
accordance with the Status Quo Agreement (Strong, 1997: 154). Moreover, without a 
                                                 
16 Taqlid law is inherited from the ‘pre-modern Islamic legal system. With regard to marriage, both Taqlid law 
and general Islamic law stipulate that women ‘retain both their juridical personality as well as whatever 
property they own when they enter marriage.’ Additionally, they are not required to ‘maintain the marital 
household except under limited circumstances when the husband is in need.’ These rules defined the manner 
in which the family was expected to operate, and their significance not only assists in further understanding 
historical patriarchal relations, but also contemporary family legal dynamics as they ‘are the precursor to 
family law in the Arab world (Abu-Odeh, 2004: 1051; 1062–1063; 1067).  
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religious affiliation, individuals are unable to marry or divorce (Strong, 1997: 139), thus 
emphasising the prominence of religion over matters of family law in the case of a non-
Muslim, Middle Eastern state. Furthermore, Strong’s (1997) comparative analysis iterates 
similarities between the Israeli and Iranian states with regard to religious and legal 
imperatives.  
One perception of the re-Islamisation of the Iranian household following the Shah’s demise 
was that safeguarding the family ‘required the strengthening of male privilege’, with the 
Family Protection Law being replaced with the reinstated 1936 Civil Code (Paidar, 1996: 58–
59). This reversion is understood to have revoked rights afforded to women in areas such as 
abortion, divorce, marriage and child custody almost instantaneously. Additionally, 
compulsory hijab and extensive gender segregation were implemented, alongside methods 
for regulating family integrity. These policies fell under the umbrella of the ‘anti-corruption 
crusade’ (Paidar, 1996: 59). These legal alterations are thus understood to represent similar, 
if not more invasive, policy reversals to those seen in Iraq. Moreover, the reestablishment of 
a rigid public/private dichotomy reinforced gender differences and the regulating of family 
integrity contributing towards politicising the private sphere.  
According to Higgins (1985: 480), the most far-reaching effects of the later revoked Family 
Protection Law was increasing marriage ages to eighteen and twenty for women and men 
respectively. The ease of male divorce was mired by the compulsory use of a court rather 
than simply declaring divorce with two witnesses (Higgins, 1985: 480). The grounds for 
female divorce were broadened and they were permitted to seek custody of children; 
however, to women’s detriment, the revocation of the law resulted in lowering marriage 
age to thirteen. It also resulted in increased constrictions to female divorce and greater ease 
of male divorce, with comprehensive reforms of family law being unlikely due to the 
continued reliance on Shari’a (Higgins, 1985: 480-481). Subsequently, fluctuations are 
demonstrated in the liberal nature of state policies in very specific areas of family law. 
Whilst the pre-revolution era was shaped by rigid policies of secularism and state 
modernisation, family law remained virtually untouched, with state power over the private 
sphere being ensured.  
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Contrastingly, modifications have continued with Tunisia reforming family law in the 
immediate post-independence period, 1993 and then in 2011 when the country’s remaining 
CEDAW reservations were removed (Moghadam, 2013: 17). Divergently, Turkey’s family law 
was not rooted in Islam yet was reasonably conservative until the government made 
involuntary changes in 2001 following the vigour of the women’s movement (Moghadam, 
2013: 17). The conservative approach to contemporary Turkish family law can thus be 
understood as conflicting with Atatürk’s initial efforts following the Turkish Republic’s 
establishment (1923), with objectives including family law reform with regard to gender 
equality and the adoption of Western standards (Abadan-Unat, 1991: 178). Silences remain 
however, with regard to the potential of gender egalitarian family laws in state 
strengthening, as well as the impact of external influences on further entrenching family 
laws within the patriarchal framework. 
2.2.1 Marriage 
The rules of establishing and dissolving a marriage is the area of Islamic law where gender 
rights are most prevalent (Mir-Hosseini, 2009: 28), with marital rights serving as one of the 
most significant gauges of a woman’s general societal status (Engineer, 2008: 116). Arguing 
that in most societies and religions women’s rights to enter into a marriage have been 
revoked due to their perceived incapability of choosing a partner, Engineer (2008: 116) and 
Ahmed (1992: 64–64) recognise the oppositional view of Sūrah 33:35 (Pickthall, 2012: 247) 
in which women are represented as being mentally and morally equal to men. Furthermore, 
Engineer (2008: 118) interprets the Islamic view on marriage as being the foundations for 
the family, a framework within which the survival of the human race and social stability are 
ensured and ‘a dignified existence’ is guaranteed for both men and women. Secondly, 
marriage is more than a framework for licit sexual relations, with it also representing a 
‘relationship of trust and mutual respect’ (Engineer, 2008: 119). Eaton (1994: 188) further 
contributes to the understanding of marriage, arguing that the individual strands of ‘the 
great web of relationships’ are interwoven through marriage; representing one of the 
rationales for the Prophet saying that ‘marriage is half of religion’. The expansion of family 
through marriage is positively represented in Eaton’s (1994) work, however, he then 
proceeds to justify its further expansion through polygamous relationships. He (1994: 189) 
argues that the extension of the family in this manner ensures the absence of breaks in this 
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‘web’ and that polygamous relationships are ‘complementary to the close-knit communal 
life of the city’. 
Polygamy, according to Engineer (2008: 187) is ‘contextual whereas monogamy is 
normative’. Throughout the MENA region, governmental attitudes towards polygamy have 
varied, with opposition to its practice being echoed in Iraq throughout the 1920s and 1950s, 
and strict limitations being implemented in the 1959 reforms (Efrati, 2005: 585). A primary 
argument against polygamy was detailed in Article 13 of the 1959 law, which stated that it 
‘contradicted the notion of modern marriage, offended a woman’s dignity and created a 
multitude of problems’ (Efrati, 2005: 585). However, a loophole in this law was highlighted 
by Budur Zaki, who noted the futility of punishing polygamous husbands when the 
registration of marriage was not compulsory, with Article 11 stating that acknowledgement 
and confirmation from the man and woman respectively would serve as proof (Efrati, 2005: 
586). 
Concurrently, Strong (1997: 148) notes the expansion of the Israeli prohibition on polygamy 
by the Knesset for (non) Jewish men. This amendment resulted in claims that it encroached 
on religious rights; this is evidenced by the case of a Muslim man who believed that his 
‘religious freedoms’ as determined by the Proclamation of Independence, had been 
infringed upon (Strong, 1997: 148). The court’s response was that ‘[f]reedom of religion is 
not to be interpreted as freedom to do what  the religion permits but freedom to fulfil what 
the religion commands…’ noting that polygamous relations fall into the former (Strong, 
1997: 148). Simultaneously, Tunisia’s first complete reforms in the 1950s post-colonial era 
resulted in the abolition of polygamy (Abu-Odeh, 2004: 1123; Moghadam, 2004: 146); 
moreover, it is the only country other than Turkey to have completely prohibited the 
practice, with Moroccan reforms (2003-2004) making it more difficult (Moghadam, 2013: 
109).  
Contrastingly, polygamy was rare in Iran, with approximately one percent of men having 
polygamous marriages in 1966 (Higgins, 1985: 485). Qutb (2001: 32) argues however, that 
upon its advent, Islam restricted the limitless number of wives men were permitted in pre-
Islamic times to four, and implemented criteria – primarily financial ability and the equal 
treatment of all wives. He (2001: 38) further postulates that the reason Islam restricted 
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rather than abolished polygamy was to ‘solve some problems in human life and to satisfy 
the needs of human nature’. Conversely, Ahmed (1992: 37) contends that some women 
throughout the Middle East had been better off during pre-Islamic times. She (1991: 58) 
posits that Orthodox Islam chose to interpret Muhammad’s ‘regulations and practices’ as 
‘binding on all Muslims’, which stands in contrast to other sects which gave importance to 
the ethical dimension of Islam’s message and placed an increased emphasis on social 
contexts and periods rather than making them binding on all. Disparities in women’s marital 
rights emerged between regions, with women in Medina not being able to contract her own 
marriage and women in Kufa being able to contract a marriage without a guardian (Ahmed, 
1991: 59). Moreover, it is posited that in the pre-Islamic era, women were permitted to 
remain within their ‘kin family circles after marriage’ and should the husband not be related 
to her, then he would visit (Karmi, 2005: 173). Stern (cited in Karmi, 2005: 173) argues that 
polygamy did not occur during this time, although its absence may have been due to the 
contracting of temporary marriages instead. Furthermore, women are understood to have 
remarried immediately after divorce, and polyandry17 existed (Karmi, 2005: 172-173). The 
independence women experienced during this era can be seen to have resulted from two 
things. Firstly, the prominence of esteemed women in early Islamic history; and secondly, 
the matrilineal and patrilineal backdrops against which Islam was born, with both standing 
in opposition to the other in regard to women’s position and societal structuring (Karmi, 
2005: 173). 
Age is another area of marriage which has proven to be a point of contention for many 
women’s rights advocates. Child marriage, under classical notions of patriarchy, results in 
girls residing in households under the authority of their father-in-law whereby they are 
subordinate to senior women as well as all men (Kandiyoti, 1991: 31). By the beginning of 
the twentieth century however, an increasingly critical view of child marriage was forming in 
Egypt, with women such as Malak Hifni Nasif arguing that it was detrimental to female 
health (Baron, 1991: 281). This practice was also prominent in Iran, with child marriage 
representing a huge problem in less wealthy rural areas. What emerges is the apparently 
waning prominence of religion in motivations to marry girls at a young age, but its 
exacerbation was due to environmental concerns such as drought, financial concerns and 
                                                 
17 This refers to a woman having more than one husband at a time. 
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the social implications of increasing links between family and loyalty (Bahramitash & 
Kazemipour, 2006: 113). 
During the 1950s, Iraqi marital customs were criticised by leader of the League for Defence 
of Women’s Rights, Naziha al-Dulaymi. Her primary criticism, according to Efrati (2005: 581), 
was the manner in which peasant women especially, appeared to have become synonymous 
with business, working for their fathers at a young age, women being ‘bought and sold like 
animals’, and paternal ambitions to profit from his daughter’s dowry once she reached 
puberty. Moreover, drought and economic recessions served to increase the likelihood of 
child marriage so as ‘to absolve the burden of supporting them’ (Efrati, 2005: 582). Efrati 
(2005) and Bahramitash and Kaziempour’s (2006) arguments are reflective, emphasising the 
significance of external factors on young women and the age at which they were married. 
What remains unclear however, is the potential impact of increasingly secularised politics 
on matrimonial equality. 
2.2.2 Divorce 
From the above discussion it is apparent that marriage was traditionally entrenched in a 
patriarchal framework; the same can be argued for divorce. The ease of male divorce is 
demonstrated by the ‘legally accepted formula’ which men could speak within certain 
contexts (Abu-Odeh, 2004: 1065; Strong, 1997: 168). During her ʿidda (waiting period), the 
wife remains in her husband’s home and he is still responsible for her maintenance. Once 
the ʿidda ends and the divorce is finalised, the husband no longer has any financial 
obligations to her unless children are involved, in which case they continue until paternal 
custody commences (Abu-Odeh, 2004: 1065–1066). Alternatively, Osanloo (2009: 118) 
posits that in some cases this is a ‘quid pro quo’ response to the ‘wife’s offer of marriage’. It 
is within this context that an explanation for male predominance over initiating and 
permitting divorce becomes possible (Osanloo, 2009: 118).  
Despite notions that divorce should be avoided due to its destructive effects on a 
relationship between two individuals (Engineer, 2008: 143), it is underscored by 
Bahramitash and Kaziempour (2006: 123) that following its decline in Iran in the 1980s and 
1990s, divorce rates had increased by 2000. By 2001, approximately ten percent of 
marriages culminated in divorce and by 2002 an average of 1.9 percent of women aged 
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between thirty and thirty-four were divorced (Bahramitash & Kaziempour, 2006: 123). 
Paradoxically, divorce became ‘a weapon’ used by the Iraqi regime throughout the 1980s 
during the Iran-Iraq War, and into the 1990s, with financial incentives being offered by the 
government to men who divorced their Iranian wives (Efrati, 2005: 589). Additionally, 
women were encouraged by the government to divorce husbands who had avoided or 
abandoned military service, had been found guilty of treason, or had foreign citizenship and 
were unable to return to Iraq for three years or more (Efrati, 2005: 589).  
Alternatively, Strong (1997: 158-159) understands Israeli divorce to be almost as difficult as 
marriage, moreover without a get a divorced woman is unable to remarry.18 Conversely, the 
Iranian struggle over the ease of male divorce is understood by Keddie (2001: 6) to have 
accounted for the increased number of divorces in the 1980s, which contradicts 
Bahramitash’s and Kaziempour’s (2006: 123) previous argument. A response to concerns 
emerged in 1989 in the form of limited alterations to divorce proceedings, with all divorces 
requiring court approval prior to their registration; later in 1994 women were granted 
twelve criteria by which they could obtain a divorce whilst increasing costs for men (Keddie, 
2001: 6–7). Despite this, Higgins (1985: 485) notes geographical differentials, with urban 
women being more likely to obtain a divorce than rural or tribal women. Contrastingly, Abu-
Odeh (2004: 1128) views Egyptian Law 100/1985 as indicating the close proximity women 
have achieved to no-fault divorce due to it instructing judges to grant a divorce upon the 
wife’s insistence, regardless of whether she can prove harm. 
2.2.3 Inheritance and Child Custody 
Other areas of family law where gender inequality is prominent are inheritance and child 
custody. According to Qutb (2001: 44), pre-Islamic women were excluded from inheriting. 
He (2001: 46) argues that the advent of Islam resulted in all peoples being entitled to 
inheritance depending on their degree of kinship to the deceased. Therefore, a husband 
inherits half from his wife, and a wife one quarter from her husband unless there are 
(grand) children, in which case the amount is halved (Qutb, 2001: 56–57).  
                                                 
18 Jewish law requires the wife to obtain necessary permissions from her husband for a divorce, alternatively, 
she is expected to submit to the husband’s conditions or remain unhappily married  (Strong, 1997: 159). 
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Strong (1997: 161) emphasises conditions to gender discrimination in Israeli inheritance 
according to the Women’s Equal Rights Law (1951). Should the deceased have ‘died testate’ 
then gender biased religious laws will be upheld, should it be a case of ‘intestacy’ then the 
law will protect female family members from gender discriminatory laws (Strong, 1997: 
161). Therefore, Israeli inheritance laws determine gender discrimination on the absence or 
presence of legal documentation as provided by the deceased. In the Iraqi case however, 
disagreement of interpretation resulted in continuous reform appeals throughout the 
1970s, with Budur Zaki arguing that gender differentiation in inheritance was not ‘suitable 
for a progressive society’ (Efrati, 2005: 593). A superficial amendment in 1978 resulted in 
women inheriting the remainder of an estate after her parent(s) should she not have a 
brother, thus leaving women in the same position should a male sibling be present (Efrati, 
2005: 593); subsequently reinforcing patriarchal family law and the perceived inferiority of 
women. 
This notion is furthered through child custody, which has traditionally been awarded to the 
father following a brief period of maternal custody until the child reached a certain age. 
Prior to 1958, Iraqi law, which was established on the Hanafī school, permitted maternal 
custody of sons until the age of seven and daughters nine (Efrati, 2005: 590). Amendments 
by the 1959 law permitted women preferential rights unless she was ‘a minor, insane, 
untrustworthy, unfit for the task, or if she married a stranger to the child…’ (Efrati, 2005: 
591). However, maternal custody remained restricted until the child reached the age of 
seven unless a court deemed an extension necessary for the child’s wellbeing. A prominent 
argument against paternal custody was that in Iraq, childcare was primarily the mother’s 
responsibility, thus a closer bond developed between mother and child than between father 
and child (Efrati, 2005: 591). Subsequently, Budur Zaki recommended the removal of age 
constrictions on maternal custody, with only visitation rights being afforded to the father 
(Efrati, 2005: 591). Whilst this recommendation removed impingements on women’s rights 
to child custody, it did not serve to resolve the problem of gender inequality within family 
law. Rather than ensuring more gender egalitarian custody policies, it reverses the 
inequality by placing strict infringements on paternal rights. Moreover, it does little to 
bridge gender divides within this aspect of family law, rather it serves to reinforce them, 
thus questioning the deeper implications of policy reform on gender equality.   
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Comparatively, Tunisia is considered (one of) the most liberal countries with regard to 
gender equality in family law. Stipulations in their laws have led Abu-Odeh (2004: 1116) to 
note some ‘peculiarities’ in their approach to equality. These instances include the 
embedded patriarchal nature of family finances, for which the husband/father is still 
responsible with the wife/mother providing a supplementary contribution should she have 
the means by which to do so. In return for this contribution, she receives the rights to 
guardianship over any children upon the condition that the father is absent or deceased 
(Abu-Odeh, 2004: 1116). The requirement of a supplementary financial contribution of the 
wife to the family finances as a means of guaranteeing her guardianship of children in the 
permanent absence of her husband implies the purchasing of rights. Moreover, it 
establishes conditions pertaining to gender equality in child custody as well as reinforcing 
the continued perception of women being secondary to men. It is thus through the meeting 
of these criteria that that the increase in equal opportunities for women in relation to this 
specific aspect of family law can be established. However, not all women will have the 
economic means to contribute, thus it can be understood to reinforce positions of equality 
based on class. The prominence of superiority of one sex over another is further reinforced 
when Abu-Odeh (2004: 1118) writes of the re-positioning of women following their 
obtaining of guardianship rights as becoming ‘the husband’s “father.”’. Because of the 
‘peculiarities’ outlined above with regard to financial contributions and child custody, the 
relocating of women within the family structure can thus be understood through the 
continuation of traditional patriarchal roles. 
Contrastingly, Strong (1997: 162) notes how Israeli policies on child custody can ‘seem ideal 
in terms of gender equality’. Despite this, discrimination prevails on other grounds, with 
religion being prominent. Strong (1997: 162) evidences this with reference to child support 
as a government incentive for high birth rates, however, Jewish families are understood to 
automatically receive preference over Arab families. Strong (1997: 162) understands this to 
represent the ‘persona non grata’ status of non-Jewish persons in the state and can 
contribute to inter-religious strife. In parallel with Israel, Iranian children ‘appear to have no 
legally recognized rights’, with Islamic law and tradition influencing these rights and 
paternal custody being automatically allocated once the child has reached a certain age 
(1997: 170). This paternal right however, was vehemently challenged by Iranian women as a 
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result of the Iran-Iraq war, with Khomeini being seen to break from Shari’a and permitting 
custody of minors to widows, despite conservative opposition (Keddie, 2001: 6).  
Whilst the impact of war on custodial issues was recognised in Iran, it remains unclear as to 
whether similar recognition occurred in Iraq. Despite gender equality in Israel being viewed 
in a positive manner, the primary consistency between all of the aforementioned cases is 
religion. Whilst family law remained entrenched in the religiously influenced private sphere, 
there is no insight into the possible effects of secularism, despite other areas of society 
reflecting secularised trends; therefore reinforcing gender based segregation and 
divergences between public/private reforms. 
2.3 Dividing the State 
Predominantly, state divisions have taken the form of the public/private dichotomy, with 
the latter being the realm within which family law is situated. Further insight into its 
formation and consequences thus becomes integral to this thesis. Sex is understood to have 
been inescapable in medieval Islamic societies, with the public/private dichotomy serving to 
reinforce the oppositional nature of men and women, its perceived importance in ensuring 
an ordered society, and understandings of rights inequalities (Entelis, 1996: 1268; 1272; 
Sanders, 1991: 74). Interaction between unrelated men or women was understood as an 
inevitability; however, the segregation of the two sexes meant that these interactions would 
remain licit, with marriage being the most common representation of this (Sanders, 1991: 
74). A second representation is zina, which refers to illicit relations between men and 
women, with medieval jurists understanding the latter as the primary agents of fitna (social 
disorder) due to the possibility of their unlawful associations with men (Sanders, 1991: 75). 
Within this context, the public/private dichotomy represents a form of female protection 
through the relegation of women to the private sphere and the scrupulous monitoring of 
their behaviour. However, by locating women as the focal point of illicit relations two points 
of contention arise. The first pertains to the perceived untrustworthiness of women within 
the public sphere, and the second refers to the gendered lens through which illicit relations 
are viewed. Whilst representing a protection mechanism for women’s honour, little concern 
appears to have been raised about men’s illicit relations with women. This dichotomy 
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therefore reinforces gendered hierarchies present in both spheres, whilst accentuating 
gendered behavioural stereotypes. 
This dichotomy, for Mernissi (cited in Lewis & Mills, 2003: 15), is an ‘experiential and 
ideological divide in Muslim society’ which occurs between the male space of the umma and 
the domestic, female space within which the family is situated. It is within this context that 
she views the veil as a means of ensuring this divide, women are permitted to pass through 
the public sphere without losing the security of seclusion, and the public sphere is protected 
from the anarchy of fitna (Lewis & Mills, 2003: 15). Whilst this understanding of the 
dichotomy-veil relationship provides insight into how the veil is perceived as a protective 
mechanism for both men and women; the notion of it shielding society against fitna 
reinforces the aforementioned behavioural stereotypes.  
Within the colonial context, Shakry (1998: 128) advances that the ‘discourse of uplifting an 
entire population onto a higher plane of material and moral well-being’ overlapped with 
depictions of ‘gender and segregation’. It is within this discourse that secluded women 
became equated with ‘backwardness’ and colonial policies sought to infiltrate the private 
sphere (Shakry, 1998: 128). This perspective enables the reinforcement of the public/private 
dichotomy through colonialism to be discerned; however, Shakry (1998: 129) furthers this 
understanding by emphasising fluctuations in colonial successes based on their ability to 
enter and rebuild the private sphere. Furthermore, Hafez (2011: 15) perceives the colonial 
construction of this dichotomy as a ‘conceptual tool for ordering society’ through which the 
social and the personal can be controlled; with the establishment of a public, political 
sphere permitting secular governance to occur. It is thus within this milieu that Mitchell 
(1991) is understood to have warned against regularising state-society divisions and 
advocated the state as “an effect’ rather than a separate entity’, therefore permitting a 
more critical understanding of social process reproduction within the framework of state 
authority (Hafez, 2011: 16). 
In continuation, Asad (2003: 183) argues that criticisms of the exclusionary nature of the 
modern, liberal public sphere emerged following Habermas’ (1962/1989) advocation of its 
importance. For Habermas (1962/1989: 27), ‘the bourgeois public sphere may be conceived 
above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public’. Asad (2003: 183) 
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evidences its exclusionary nature by drawing on the works of Ryan (1992) and Eley (1992) 
who posit that the liberal public sphere as always been exclusionary to certain people such 
as ‘women, subjects without property, and members of religious minorities’. Susen (2011: 
43) builds on this, positing that the public sphere is ‘composed of private individuals whose 
social interconnectedness transcends the bourgeois of their personal lives; subsequently, it 
is argued that the public and private ‘can be considered mutually exclusive, rather than 
mutually exclusive social realms’. Moreover, the ‘public persona’ is understood to reflect 
the private person because ‘every public persona is embedded in the background 
subjectivity of a private person’ (Susen, 2011: 43).  Eickelman and Salvatore (2002: 94) 
expand on this by recognising that the public sphere is not exclusive to modern societies, 
rather  
It is the site where contests take place over the definition of the ‘common good’, and also of 
the virtues, obligations and rights that members of society require for the common good to 
be realized. 
Habermas however, is criticised by Eickelman and Salvatore (2002: 96) for neglecting the 
role of religion in his early work. Subsequently, they (2002: 102) highlight how in societies 
where religious practice and expression are heavily controlled, such as ‘secular Turkey’ and 
‘Baʿthist Syria’, they are a pivotal aspect ‘of the background understandings for most 
members of society’. The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood (1920s) is used to evidence 
this, emphasising how they adopted this understanding; with Hezbollah (Lebanon) and 
Hamas (Palestine) later being seen to have ‘adapted themselves to play a role in their 
respective public spheres’ (Eickelman and Salvatore, 2002: 102-103). Identity is thus 
recognised as more than political, with the ‘Muslim public’ being ‘grounded in practices that 
emerge through the complex process of ingraining of Muslim traditions into modern social 
life’ (Eickelman and Salvatore, 2002: 112).  
The exclusionary nature of the public sphere is thus perceived by Asad (2003: 184) to reflect 
that it is  
a space necessarily (not just contingently) articulated by power. And everyone who enters it 
must address power’s disposition of people and things, the dependence of some on the 
goodwill of others. 
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Moreover, he (2003: 185–186) questions the secularist fear of religion in the realm of 
personal choice, and posits that this is partially because of  the confining and dominating 
nature of religious recommendations. In an attempt to depart from Western notions of the 
public sphere, Thompson refers to it as a ‘civic order’ (Landes, 2003: 29). She is also 
understood to have accentuated the significance of economics in accompaniment to state 
structures as a means by which new formulations of both spheres can be endorsed (Landes, 
2003: 29).  
This stance is also advocated by Olsen (1993: 158) who positions the market/family binary 
as a second public/private dichotomy which is of particular significance to women. The 
paralleling of the market and the family however, was a particular point of contention for 
Locke who perceived the family to be founded on inequality between parents and children, 
whilst ‘political society must be organised around the equality of individuals in their activity 
in the market’ (Eisenstein, 1981: 39). Whilst Locke recognises the needs for a familial 
hierarchy founded on the parent-child relationship, his argument against the paralleling of 
the family and politics can be understood in two ways. Firstly, public equality is un-
transferrable to the private due to the parent-child hierarchy. Secondly, equating the two 
spheres could result in their overlapping, thus potentially enabling the participation of 
women in the open market. This suggests that the political will remain superior to the 
domestic, thus maintaining a hierarchy of societal spheres. It will be demonstrated later, 
within the context of Egyptian and Iranian family law, that whilst they are not paralleled, the 
political and the domestic converge. Moreover, Locke’s understanding will provide a lens 
through which the hierarchical structure of the patriarchal family can be further 
comprehended.  
The continued dichotomisation of societies is however, disregarded by ‘third-wave’ 
feminists whose point of contact is diversity, seeking instead to query binaries and ‘further 
develop theories from women’s situated and embodied perspectives’ (Mack-Canty, 2004: 
158–159). In furtherance, Gal (2002: 77–78) notes that the ‘doctrine of “separate spheres”’ 
has resulted in many Western analysts assuming that the social world is founded on 
binaries. Contrastingly, feminist scholarship is observed to have taken to the fore of its 
critique, focussing on issues such as irreconcilable ‘moral values’ and succeeding in 
accentuating mistakenly assumed stable boundaries (Gal, 2002: 78). The notion of this 
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dichotomy being an ideological divide, as posited by Mernissi, thus reverberates within 
feminist theory, and is therefore essentially immune to ‘empirical counterevidence’ (Gal, 
2002: 78). 
Whilst debates have emerged as to whether or not this dichotomy serves to uphold 
religious societal morals, this thesis examines the impact of a predominantly public concept 
(secularism) on an area of law entrenched in the private sphere (the family). With the 
notion of the two spheres converging, it has become possible to question how the 
increasingly modern, secular public affected religious family law.  
2.4 Feminism and Modernity 
Modernity is understood to emerge from ‘a culture of “stability, coherence, discipline and 
world-mastery”’ and thus represents ‘progress, reason and democracy’ (Felski, 1995: 11). Its 
masculine identification, according to Felski (1995: 16) is not a contemporary occurrence 
with emblems of the nineteenth century, including the public sphere, being considered 
responsible for this association and locating of women outside of the public experience. 
Expanding on this, Werbner and Yuval-Davis (1999: 6) highlight the paradoxical nature of 
modernity as it simultaneously represented the ‘the moment of ‘universal’ emancipation’ as 
well as the exclusion and subordination of women. Additionally, Hallaq (2005: 206) positions 
the rise of dictators in the modern MENA state in succession to colonial experiences, 
labelling it as ‘merely one tragic result of the process in which modernity wreaked violence 
on venerated traditional culture.’ What remains unclear however, is whether modernity is 
referring to secular policies, attempts at state building, or the imposition of alternative 
cultures and traditions which occurred alongside other modernising reforms under 
colonialism; therefore questioning whether it was modernity itself which can be understood 
as problematic, or its method of implementation. 
Within discussions on modernity emerges ‘political modernity’ and it is this strand of 
thought which Chakrabarty (2000: 20) seeks to conceptualise within a non-Western context 
with the intent of exploring the strengths and weaknesses of specific European social and 
political classifications. The effects of European influence have thus become so prominent, 
that it ‘is impossible to think of anywhere in where in the world without invoking certain 
categories and concepts…’ all of which have strong roots in European thought (Chakrabarty, 
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2000: 4). Consequently, political modernity is inseparable from the Enlightenment and the 
nineteenth century due to its intrinsic link to concepts such as citizenship, the public sphere 
and the public/private dichotomy (Chakrabarty, 2000: 4). 
Emerging prominently as the means by which constructions of modernity and European 
thought were disseminated throughout the non-Western world is colonialism. Chakrabarty 
(2000: 216) posits that colonialism brought with it ‘many of the desires and institutions of 
European bourgeois modernity but without, it would seem, the family romance of bourgeois 
Europe’. The construction of Europe within this work however, is as mythical and as the 
home of modernity when seeking to explain capitalist transitions in a non-Western context. 
This has implications on perspectives of the level of transition within these countries, with 
their comparison to this mythical counterpart resulting in the notion that this transition is 
unfinished. Subsequently, Charkrabarty (2000) argues that this conversion should be 
recognised as translation within individual contexts.  
Representations of Europe, European thought and modernity are not alone in being 
critiqued. Modernity’s relationship with the Enlightenment has also been critiqued by 
feminists due to its inconsistencies (Moghissi, 1999: 78). Individual freedoms which are 
understood to have resulted from the Enlightenment relied on state perceptions of the 
individual, with dichotomies remaining, modernity has subsequently been understood as 
liberating for men and restricting for women (Moghissi, 1999: 78-79). Postmodernists are 
understood to have argued that the continuation of such binaries have simply replaced pre-
modern typologies; with Moghissi (1999: 83) noting that modernisation in the MENA region 
over the last century omitted ‘genuinely transformative changes’ to gender equality. 
The Enlightenment’s paradoxical nature is advanced by Ramazanoğlu (2002: 24) through its 
shaping of and oppositional nature toward Western feminism. The predominance of 
masculine thinking in the Enlightenment, against which feminists have struggled to become 
vocal, is represented by Ramazanoğlu (2002: 24) as one of feminism’s prevailing critiques of 
it. The centralisation of the West within the Enlightenment can also be seen to have 
contributed to (colonial) assumptions of Western superiority. Additionally, the underpinning 
by Enlightenment thinkers of the association of the West with truths of the natural and 
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social worlds (Ramazanoğlu, 2002: 25) can be understood to have contributed to what 
Yeğenoğlu (1998: 95–96) has discerned as one history.  
Tensions in the values and ideas espoused by the Enlightenment tradition also emerge. 
Whereas this tradition sought the promotion of individual rights, it also hinges upon highly 
gendered values, with the focus on rationality and the quest for objective truth feeding into 
the dominant gender paradigm (Guerrina, 2005). The Enlightenment’s quest for scientific 
knowledge was predicated on a hierarchical structure whereby rationality can come to 
dominate nature. In this context, men’s presence in the public sphere was to be aligned 
against women’s role in the private, with mothering and reproduction bringing women 
closer to nature and thus being used as symbols of ‘irrationality’. Whilst criticisms of 
universalising assumptions of feminist movements have emerged within post-colonial 
feminist literature, challenging the binaries of rational/irrational, subject/object, 
masculinity/femininity has emerged prominently within movements across the MENA 
region due to their entrenched nature in areas such as family law. 
What emerges from this however, is the manner in which the underlying binary of secular 
feminism (religious/secular) is being challenged and consequently, debates pertaining to 
religion’s role in the public sphere have re-emerged. Feminist criticisms of the 
‘Enlightenment Critique of Religion’ (ECR) have sought to interrogate the coherence of this 
binary, both inclusive and exclusive of religious studies, through the use of postmodern 
insight. Contrastingly, sociological criticisms have philosophically and empirically questioned 
the secularisation thesis with ‘a narrative of a single modernity wherein religion is expected 
to become a much diminished and private aspect of people’s lives’ (Reilly, 2011: 7).  
Whilst scholars such as Badran (2007) and Mernissi (1991) emphasise points of contact 
rather than tensions between Islam and feminism, and Al-Ali (2000) reconceptualised 
secularism in the MENA region with specific reference to the Egyptian women’s movement; 
both secularism and feminism are still considered to be Western. Furthermore, recognition 
of the global development of feminist movements in particular places and at specific times – 
as documented by Jayawardena (1986) – has done little to challenge this view. Moreover, it 
is suggested that this is due to a lack of historic understanding or its perceived use as a tool 
of delegitimisation. Jayawardena’s (1986: Preface) work speaks to this particular tension: 
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‘those who want to continue to keep women of our countries in a position of subordination 
find it convenient to dismiss feminism as a foreign ideology…’ The continued stagnant, 
Western depiction of feminism therefore accentuates the occidentalist nature of those 
seeking to delegitimise current movements and the concept (Badran, 2007: 24). This 
indicates that the interpretation, change and reinvention of feminism has occurred in line 
with other religions, cultures and regions by gender equality advocates. Conversely, these 
trends appear to have been dismissed by those aligned against feminism, as evidenced by 
Badran.  
Jayawardena’s (1989) work, according to Yuval-Davis (2013: 118), represents a potential 
break in the ‘deadlock’ between feminists and nationalists as it simultaneously highlights 
that feminism is not a phenomenon restricted to the West, nor does loyalty to a national 
liberation movement eradicate the fight for gender equality. Additionally, it is posited that 
‘collectivities of the state and the role of women’ are inextricably intertwined (Anthias & 
Yuval-Davis, 1989: 1). This relationship however, is complex. They are recognised as 
members of collectivities and ‘participants in the social forces that give the state its given 
political projects in any particular social and historical context’; whilst also being a ‘focus for 
state concerns as a social category with a specific role’ (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989: 6). 
Whilst this highlights diverging lenses through which women are viewed, it is reinforced that 
neither of these representations can be understood in direct relation to the reproduction of 
the state, and that complete control is unachievable because these multiple identities 
permit women to engage ‘within civil society and the economy’ through engagements with 
groups at different societal levels (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989: 6). 
The relationship between women and nationalism is also seen to move beyond participation 
in groups, with women being considered responsible for imparting knowledge of ‘cultural 
and ideological traditions’ to future societal participants (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989: 9). 
Moreover, they often represent nationalist symbols, with the nation being presented as a 
‘loved women’ (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989: 9) (see Baron, 2005 in section 6.6). 
The role of women in anti-colonial, nationalist movements for independence thus becomes 
integral. In this context, nationalism is broadly defined as ‘an emancipatory movement for 
autonomy, popular sovereignty and universal citizenship’ (Werbner & Yuval-Davis, 1999: 1). 
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Jayawardena (1986: 3) states that the ‘movement towards women’s emancipation 
described and analysed in this book was acted out against a background of nationalist 
struggles aimed at achieving independence, asserting a national identity, and modernising 
society.’ Building on this, Werbner and Yuval-Davis (1999: 1) argue that these women 
understood nationalism to represent ‘an emancipatory movement for autonomy, popular 
sovereignty and universal citizenship’. However, after independence women frequently 
remained excluded (Werbner & Yuval-Davis, 1999: 1), and dissatisfaction was articulated in 
Iran (post-1906) and Egypt (post-1919) (see sections 4.5 & 5.3). 
The gendered, exclusionary nature of politics which resulted in the continued ‘denial of 
women’s roles as equal citizens in the public sphere’ not only arose from their seclusion in 
the private sphere, but also from their ‘simultaneous elevation as reproducers of the nation’ 
(Werbner & Yuval-Davis, 1999: 12). Consequently, women were seen to ‘bear a double 
burden of representation: as national cultural icons and as mothers of citizens’ (Vogel, 1991: 
63 cited in Werbner & Yuval-Davis, 1999: 14). Subsequently, whilst women publicly fought 
for independence at two levels, the result was that their private status and public 
symbolism in the national liberation struggle resulted in their position as national subjects 
remaining the same through denying them an equal role as citizens. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, women and the family became one of the focal points 
in countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Iran, with ‘feminist’ topics such as family law and 
clothing becoming subjects for social reform enthusiasts (Abu-Lughod, 1998: 4). In the 
Egyptian case, Mitchell is understood to have ‘traced Egyptian nationalist reformers’ 
responsive calls to make women into modern wives and mothers to the general demand to 
train the population…’; moreover, most readings of nationalism and women in the MENA 
region have recognised nationalism as failing women, rather than as a ‘cultural and 
discursive project in which ideals of womanhood and notions of the modern were key 
elements’ (Abu-Lughod, 1998: 10; 17).  
Generally, Sharabi (cited in Moghissi, 1999: 84) argues that throughout developing countries 
‘the marriage of imperialism and patriarchy produced not a genuine modernity but helped 
instead to create a hybrid sort of society/culture, a kind of “modernized” patriarchy, namely 
neopatriarchy’. Mernissi (cited in Moghissi, 1999: 84) echoes this and identifies it as a 
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‘mutilated modernity, void of great democratic advances’. Similarities have also been 
identified in the Iranian process, whereby appropriate structures were not developed to 
accommodate reforms in gender equality. Subsequently, the modernising Iranian state 
represents ‘the big patriarch’ reinforcing class separation amongst women and 
disintegrating activists (Moghissi, 1999: 84). 
2.5 Islamic Feminism or Feminist Islam?19 
Islamic feminism has emerged as both points of contact and contention with Badran (2007: 
23) defining it as a discourse and practice situated within the Islamic paradigm and informed 
by the Qur’an. Feminism, however, is not to be understood as monolithic, with divergences 
occurring across countries and regions. It is argued however, that the interlinking thread 
through these various discourses is the focus on more gender egalitarian rights and 
participation, in addition to women’s reproductive roles (Moghadam, 2013: 252). One area 
where differences occur is the use of ‘feminist’ with some women rejecting it due to 
‘ideological and pragmatic reasons’ as well as its frequent association with colonialism, ‘the 
global North’, or disadvantageous perceptions (Al-Ali, 2000: 4–5; Moghadam, 2013: 252). 
This repudiation of ‘feminist’ is evident in countries such as Egypt and Jordan. Divergently, it 
is defiantly used in Iran whilst also incorporating ‘secular’ into their identity despite the risks 
this carries with religious authorities. This has also been evident in the Association 
Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates and numerous Algerian groups (Moghadam, 2013: 
252).  
For Winter (cited in Badran, 2001: 47), all aspects of Islam - be they political, religious or 
Islamist - are considered detrimental for women. In continuance, Badran (2001: 49) 
advances the dangers of collectivising religious and political Islam, whilst simultaneously 
advocating the examination of feminist discourses externally of the frameworks of 
orientalism, pluralism and multiculturalism. Generalisations of feminist theories which cross 
cultural and geographic boundaries are also warned against by post-modern feminists, with 
feminist critics of post-modernism conversely arguing that the omission of these 
intersections could result in relativism and political paralysis. However, Afary (1997: 89) 
                                                 
19 This question arose in Moghissi’s (1999:126) work when she wrote ‘…if Islam and feminism are compatible, 
which one has to operate within the framework of the other?’  
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suggests that these two concepts are not always as ‘diametrically opposed as they seem to 
be.’  
Within (Iranian) debates on Islamic feminism emerge two opposing camps. On the one 
hand, there are those who explore various possibilities within Islam and the IRI with regard 
to women’s interests; and on the other there are those who argue against the employment 
of Islamic feminists as a descriptive category for those working within the Islamic 
framework. Prominent amongst this first camp are Afsaneh Najmabadi (1991, 2000), 
Nayereh Tohidi (2003), and Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2006, 2009, 2012) who were all educated in 
Iran and the West, with two of them being understood to have strong ties to the women’s 
movement and the Iranian Left (Saliba et al. 2002: 24–25). Najmabadi’s work is recognised 
for its exploration of Islamic feminist beliefs that gender inequality is societal rather than 
religious, thus providing potential openings for future social transformations (Saliba et al. 
2002: 24–25). However, Mir-Hosseini takes her analysis one step further by examining the 
emergence of new gender discourses among theologians which incorporate challenges to 
family laws by ‘ordinary women’ and the appearance of reform minded feminists (Saliba et 
al. 2002: 24–25).  
Prominent within the second camp are Haideh Moghissi (1999, 2005), Shahrzad Mojab 
(2001), and Hammed Shahidian (2002). According to Cooke (2001: 57), Moghissi argues that 
Islamic feminism is an oxymoron, with her assessment being based on an interpretation of 
Islam which is formed on gender hierarchies and is thus incompatible with the kind of social 
transformation inherent in feminist claims. Moreover, she is understood to argue the 
oppositional nature of the Qur’an to gender equality and its incompatibility with Shari’a. Her 
stance is further accentuated when she writes that ‘Islamic feminism has no ‘coherent, self-
identified and or easily identifiable” ideology or movement and that its advocates are not 
women from within Muslim societies but rather ‘diasporic feminist academics and 
researchers of  Muslim background living and working in the West’ (Cooke, 2001: 57). 
A point of contention for Moghissi (1999: 17) is the notion of a cultural reaction to 
colonialism being posited as the rationale for Islamic societies resistance to reforming 
women’s status within the family. She (1999: 17; 125) argues that this overarching 
generalisation is as contentious as homogenising approaches which explain female 
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observation solely through the Qur’an and Shari’a, whilst simultaneously highlighting lexical 
generalisations within the term Islamic feminism itself. Hafez (2011: 8) notes Kandiyoti’s 
(1996) support of Moghissi’s argument that one ‘cannot be both feminist and religious’ 
through her examination of the ‘futility of theory that attempts to join feminism and Islam’. 
This rationale pertains to differentials in historical and ideological trajectories which results 
in an inability to streamline them both (Hafez, 2011: 8). 
In Egypt, the family is integral to social organisation, thus women can be understood as 
intermediaries between the family and secular projects, and activist women may face a dual 
predicament due to their religious agenda and their gender (Hafez, 2011: 59). Moreover, the 
emergence of the Egyptian women’s movement is understood to have been viewed through 
a dual lens, with Egyptian feminists being labelled as Westernised (Huda Shaarawi) or 
‘authentically Egyptian’ (Malak Hifni Nasif) without the authenticity of either possibility 
being clarified within the Egyptian context (Hafez, 2011: 65). The Turkish case however, 
evidences a clash between  secular and religious identities of the female population which 
was enhanced by ‘a loud public voice’ (Göl, 2009: 800).  
For Moghadam (2013: 68), Algeria serves as the best illustration of controversy between 
Islamism and feminism, with the first feminist upsurge occurring after President 
Boumediènne’s death (1978). Two months subsequent to this, the establishment of a 
commission tasked with drafting a family law was announced which was recognised by 
women as a means of pacifying the growing Islamist voice through the institutionalisation of 
women’s second class citizenship (Moghadam, 2013: 68). The later opposition to the Front 
Islamique du Salut (FIS) resulted in the representation of anti-fundamentalist women as 
‘one of the greatest dangers threatening the destiny of Algeria’ equating them as ‘the avant-
garde of colonialism and cultural aggression’ (Moghadam, 2013: 68). Anti-fundamentalist 
women were however, shocked in 1989 when approximately 100,000 women supported 
gender segregation and fundamentalism, thus resulting in the second wave being aligned 
against fundamentalism. Despite their aversion for the new authoritarian government, 
Algerian feminists did support the banning of FIS (1992), continuing to position themselves 
against a state founded on religious laws, instead advocating one based on rights 
(Moghadam, 2013: 69–70). 
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The Iranian case however, can be understood to have longer historical roots, with Paidar 
(1996: 51) locating it within the early twentieth century constitutional movement where the 
‘woman question’ was most overt. It is within this context that the relationship between 
feminism and nationalism originated and is understood to have had continuous effects on 
Iranian feminism since, with secular deliberations on women never directly opposing Islam 
(Paidar, 1996: 52–53). Prior to the advent of ‘Shi’i modernism’ (1970s) Iran’s feminist 
movement was predominantly secular however, in the post-revolutionary era both secular 
and religious women emerged dissatisfied with newly imposed reforms (Paidar, 1996: 57; 
Keddie, 2001: 5). Cooperation between groups, without a separate feminist group, was thus 
believed to be conducive towards addressing these issues, with convergences occurring in 
the belief that with their party in power women’s problems would be resolved. Keddie 
(2001: 4) thus posits that liberals supported secular liberal changes, Marxists grounded 
gender inequality within the frameworks of class and imperialism, with Islamists stipulating 
that a return to (their understanding of) Islam would eradicate gender inequalities which 
prevailed in a Westernised system.  
What emerges from this is the controversial nature of Islamic feminism, how feminism has 
in some instances become synonymous with Westernisation, and the prominence of the 
religion/secularism binary. One of the problems Moghissi (1999: 135) raises with the term, 
is the reductionist effect of Islam becoming the sole means of identification within which 
both men and women are situated. Similar effects can be observed with ‘secularism’ due to 
lexical confusions and homogenising understandings. Subsequently, whilst oppositionally 
aligned within binary discourses, Islam and secularism appear to have fallen into the same 
lexical trap.  
2.6 Secularism: Theory and Reality 
Emerging prominently from previous discussions is the religious/secular dichotomy, with the 
latter serving as a point of contention due to definitional and contextual ambiguities. This 
links directly to the public/private dichotomy, with secularism often being used to refer to 
the separation of public and political matters from religious understandings which were 
traditionally positioned in the private sphere. The term secular is accompanied by suffixes 
such as secularisation, secularity and secularism(s) all of which are commonly confused with 
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each other (Fokas, 2010: 163), thus indicating an absence in definitional clarity. This 
observation is supported by Gellner (2001: 337) who advocates the development of a 
‘contextualized and reflexive understanding of the idea of secularism.’ Başkan (2014: 2) 
reinforces this by detailing the discernible confusion crossing into academia’s parameters. 
For Başkan (2014: 2), this confusion can be attributed to the intangible elasticity of these 
terms and ‘their indiscriminate application’ within various contexts. Moreover, Başkan 
(2014: 3) observes the attribution of secularisation to individual, societal, organisational, 
public, political, polity and international political variants.  
Subsequently, secularisation can be seen to refer to the transformation of a society which 
strongly identifies with religion, to one which associates itself with non-religious or secular 
values and institutions. Secularisation is thus ‘generally thought of as the name of some kind 
of decline of religion’ (Taylor, 2007: 427). Building on this, Taylor (2007: 423) posits that 
‘secularization theory’ is predominantly focused on explaining the multifarious nature of 
secularity. He (2007: 1-4; 423) argues that there are three types of secularity. The first refers 
to ‘the retreat of religion from public life’; the second is a ‘decline in religious belief and 
practice’; and the third pertains to ‘the change in the conditions of belief’ (Taylor, 2007: 
423). Whilst the secularisation theory is believed to focus primarily on the first two types of 
secularity, Taylor (2007: 423) recognises the inevitable overlap between all three facets. This 
has resulted in the questioning of religious decline or the amount of space religion originally 
occupied, thus resulting in understanding being based on questions of interpretation 
(Taylor, 2007: 427).  
Expanding on this Ferrara (2009: 77) posits three narratives pertaining to the meaning of 
secularism. The first is political secularism which refers to the ‘exercise of legitimate state 
power’ within a secular environment where religious freedoms are respected and the 
church and the state ‘are neatly separated’ (Ferrara, 2009: 78). The second is social, 
referring to the cessation of religious communities influencing laws, and the reduction of 
religious symbolism and rituals to mark events, amongst other things; with the 
‘phenomenological transformation of the experience of believing’ being the final narrative. 
Differentials between the first two, according to Ferrara (2009: 78–79), permit the 
identification of irregularities in multifaceted processes of secularisation influenced by 
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historical trajectories; thus in some instances, societal secularisation may occur at a slower 
rate than political. 
From this it becomes possible to further understand the relationship between secularism 
and the public/private dichotomy, with Ferrara’s (2009) understanding reinforcing the 
public, political nature of secularism. This indicates that an understanding of secularism is 
that public activities and decisions, with specific reference to political ones, should not be 
religiously influenced. This perspective, alongside Ferrara’s (2009: 78-79) social secularism, 
thus reinforces notions of the privatisation of religion. This understanding and the 
differentiation between the secular nature of the Egyptian and Iranian state thus re-
emphasises the separation of the public and private spheres and provides an insight into 
how religious law has continued in the private sphere, and therefore questions how the 
secular nature of the state shaped the development of women’s marital rights in Egypt and 
Iran between 1920 and 1939. Despite divergences in the implementation and stability of 
secularism in each state, those involved in the secularisation process in both states shared 
concerns about the relationship between religion and the state; their reasons for such 
concerns and the development of a secular state did however, vary and this was partly due 
to understandings of what ‘secular’ meant. 
For Keddie (2003: 14), ‘secular’ originally ‘referred to clergy who were not bound by 
religious rules of a monastic order’, with its Middle English meaning being understood as 
oppositional to the Divine. Contrastingly, Al-Ali (2000: 4) posits that ‘secular’ denotes an 
acceptance of the separation of religion and politics, but not necessarily anti-religious 
sentiments. This is echoed by Asad (2003: 25) who understands ‘secular’ to represent the 
convergence of particular ‘behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life’. Asad 
(2003: 23) however, positions the emergence of these terms in the mid-nineteenth century 
so as to avoid accusations of atheism. Offering an alternative interpretation, Reilly (2011: 8-
9) posits that secularism is an unavoidable response to the form of modernisation according 
to Herbert’s four criteria, which echo Ferrara’s (2009) narratives with the primary difference 
being the prominence of scientific knowledge throughout Herbert’s.  
The secular state also emerges with clarification discrepancies however, Başkan (2014: 3) 
highlights that there is a more general consensus on its primary features as outlined by 
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Smith fifty years earlier. It is within this understanding that the secular state emerges as 
guarantor of religious freedom without discrimination against groups or individuals on the 
‘basis of their religion, and neither promotes nor intervenes with religion’ (Başkan, 2014: 3). 
This definition was then similarly employed by Ferrari and Taylor. Kuru however, provided a 
more restricted definition whereby state legal institutions are not under religious control 
and ‘constitutional neutrality toward religions’ has been declared; subsequently resulting in 
a state being neither atheist, nor having an official religion (Başkan, 2014: 3).  
Paradoxically, Agrama (2010:502) characterises secularism as ‘…not a separation between 
religion and politics, but an ongoing, deepening, entanglement in the question of religion 
and politics, for the purpose of identifying and securing fundamental liberal rights and 
freedoms.’ Therefore reinforcing that whilst there are convergences on the basic tenets of 
the secular and secularism, there is no resounding definition; thus as with religion, it has no 
uniform representation. In an attempt to further clarify secularism, Kosmin (2007: 3) 
developed a spectrum within which states have been situated. Hard and soft secularism 
represent polarities and signify divergences in ‘attitudes towards modes of separation’ 
(Kosmin, 2007: 2). He (2007: 3; 7) defines ‘soft secularism’ as primarily consisting of liberal 
religionists (Locke), who believe religion is a ‘private lifestyle option’; and it is within this 
that countries such as the UK, Denmark and Israel are positioned. ‘Hard secularism’ is thus 
understood to represent countries such as the USSR and China, where atheism is more 
prominent; for a theocracy such as Iran however, there is no secularism (Kosmin, 2007: 3). 
Having evidenced the lack of cohesion on definitional attributes of secular and secularism, it 
becomes more complex as it emerges in the MENA region. The Arabic term for secularism is 
ʿalmāniyya (Badran, 2005: 10; Hashemi, 2010: 330; Najjar, 1996:2), and it is posited that it 
was not until the term was coined in the nineteenth century that the concept emerged in 
the region (Badran, 2005: 10). It is important to note however, that in Arabic, Persian, or 
Turkish, there is no corresponding translation for secularism and Hashemi (2010: 330) 
underscores that this is not due to the incompatibility of Islam and secularism, rather it 
pertains to semantic absences in these languages; with the Turkish ‘laiklik’ being based on 
the French ‘laïcité’.  
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Since its introduction, Badran (2005: 10) writes of definitional alterations which have 
occurred, primarily since the 1970s, and this is understood to reflect the negative lens 
through which non-Islamic ideas and influences are viewed; subsequently becoming 
synonymous with ‘Westoxication’. This is fostered by Ismail (1998: 210) who posits that the 
recognition of secularism as a Western concept has resulted in its representation as ‘alien’ 
and being ‘inserted into the narrative of confrontation with the Other.’ Badran (2009: 27) 
builds on this by recognising the contentious nature of secularism in Egypt. She (2009: 27) 
highlights the use of ‘secular’ by fundamentalist women as a form of identification when 
referring to Egyptian feminism, thus indicating that it was external to Islam. However, it is 
argued that those who fell under this classification ‘distinguished their feminism, which they 
based on Islamic principles, from the “secular” basis of Turkish feminism’ (Badran, 2009: 
27). An article in al-Misriyya, the EFU’s journal, outlined the manner in which Turkish 
women were perceived to have gained their freedom through the implementation of 
foreign laws,20 whereas ‘the Egyptian woman will never ask for her rights except by basing 
her requests on the Islamic Shari’a’ (Badran, 2009: 27). Subsequently, the EFU and later 
feminists refrained from adopting a form of secularism which ‘severed all links with religion’ 
(Badran, 2009: 27). 
In furtherance, Badran (2009: 4) recognises the emergence of ‘secular feminism’ in some 
Muslim-majority countries within a nationalist rather than a religious framework, with 
religious principles remaining prominent. In this context, ‘secular’ represented national 
(Badran, 2009: 4). The emergence of an Egyptian nationalist movement in response to the 
1882 British occupation resulted in the nation being constructed around notions of territory 
rather than the millet system, which had prevailed under Ottoman rule, whereby it was 
constructed around religion and ethnicity (Badran, 2009: 225). ‘Secular’ in reference to the 
nation is thus seen to indicate a ‘shared territory’; resulting in the nation moving from being 
a religious community to a community inclusive of all religions (Badran, 2009: 304), yet 
female seclusion remained. 
Whilst women were traditionally restricted to the private sphere, methods for increasing 
female visibility and challenging patriarchal laws saw the two spheres converge. Women 
                                                 
20 This referred to the 1926 Civil Code being based on a Swiss model rather than Shari’a.  
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have also been perceived as ‘property’ which enabled married men of all classes to become 
‘active citizens in the public sphere’ (Werbner & Yuval-Davis, 1999: 6). Additionally, they 
(1999: 25) argue that by denying this divide the public sphere no longer has ‘specific spaces 
or places’ to occupy it. Whilst it is seen to reflect and re-present the liberal civil society, its 
strengths are seen to arise through ‘privileging the dialogical openness and porousness of 
the public sphere and its responsiveness to inequality and difference’ (Werbner & Yuval-
Davis, 1989: 26). In furtherance, this dichotomy is specific to culture and gender and is 
determined by history and context, with women fighting to ‘reclaim civil rights to privacy, 
protection and autonomy vis-à-vis the state’, whilst simultaneously challenging welfare 
reforms which have undermined the achievements of previous generations of women’s 
rights activists (Werbner & Yuval-Davis, 1999: 29). Moreover, secularism was introduced 
into each state at the governmental and societal levels of the public sphere, with there 
having been no formal implementation in the private sphere; rather, it emerged through 
literature, observation, conversation and in some instances, the changing opinion of 
individuals. This has not removed the possibility of secular influences becoming apparent in 
the private sphere; rather it has resulted in is dispersal from the public into the private. 
In post-colonial Egypt, the reduction of religion in the public sphere required the 
reconceptualisation of the private sphere so as to accommodate the modern Egyptian 
family and the ‘privatized religion’ (Asad, 2003; Hafez, 2011: 15). The Nasserite period 
(1952-70), according to Hibbard (2010: 58), was defined by Arab nationalism and Arab 
socialism, with the latter representing state-led modernisation and social reform which was 
not supposed to imitate Soviet hostility to religion but instead adapt to an Arab framework. 
Conversely, it was the anti-imperialist, secular movement of Arab nationalism which defined 
this period of Egyptian history (Hibbard, 2010: 59). Furthermore, Hatem (1994: 661) posits 
that secularism was not to be identified solely as state labelling, rather it was to be 
recognised as describing policies which have resulted in the marginalisation of religion in 
politics since the 1950s. This was arguably most obvious in the definition of women’s rights 
in the post-colonial society, with the right to vote (1956), maternity leave, child care and the 
right to employment being amongst those they were granted under Nasser (Hatem, 1994: 
661). 
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Despite the prominence of secularism in Egyptian history, Agrama (2010: 520) recently 
posed the question of whether Egypt represents a religious or a secular state, subsequently 
concluding that that it is not an answerable question. Rather it serves to reinforce the fine 
line between religion and politics and question its positioning, thus reinforcing the unstable 
nature of secularism. Additionally, Agrama (2010: 519) reiterates the historical ties between 
state sovereignty and the family which serves to continue the embroiled nature of religion 
and politics.  
In reference to Iran, which has experienced both a secular and a religious state, Feldman 
(2008: 147) iterates the potential for a secular state to be equally authoritarian, corrupt and 
unpopular as one established in the name of Islam. Paradoxically, Israel is recognised as 
both secular and something akin to a theocracy (Strong, 1997: 122), with those who identify 
as secular being unique due to the formal relationship between the state and religious 
institutions (Beit-Hallahami, 2007: 157). 
Contrastingly, Turkish secularism occurs at the state level and religious identities are 
maintained at the social level, with perceptions of incompatibility between Western 
modernity and the religious character of the state being disputed by Göl (2011: 109). 
Following Atatürk’s abolition of the Caliphate (1924), Najjar (1996: 2–3) writes of the ‘anti-
religious political system’ which replaced it and subsequently resulted in secular becoming 
synonymous with irreligion. Furthermore, Başkan (2013: 166) advocates religious services 
remaining under state control and strict secularity, as has occurred in Turkey, as a means of 
religious and secular groups overcoming ‘mutually shared fears and suspicions’ resulting in 
the formation of alliances. From this emerge queries pertaining to state fluctuations in 
religious and secular affiliations and the potential implications this had on gender equality. 
2.7 Rising and Falling: The Secular and the Religious State 
The demise of empires, according to Feldman (2008: 1) is generally permanent, with the 
gradual disinclination towards monarchy and the end of communism being amongst his 
examples. Instances where this norm is challenged however, are democracy and the Islamic 
state, with the latter being adopted through the replacement of secular procedures with 
governmental foundations being influenced by Shari’a (Feldman, 2008: 1–2). Divergently, 
Feldman (2008: 85) accentuates that religious decline in the Muslim world cannot be 
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attributed to a (European) colonial perspective due to the previous Ottoman colonisation of 
many countries. Nasr (cited in Yom, 2002: 96) contradicts this by stating that secularism in 
the MENA region never overcame its colonial roots and the post-colonial struggle.  
During the formative years of the 1920s, Atatürk sought Turkish re-orientation through a 
rigorous secularising project. Subsequently, the period between 1918 and 1921 have come 
to represent a transformational period from ‘Islamic empire to a modern nation-state’ (Göl, 
2013: 1). As a means of reinforcing absolute sovereignty, Turkish secularisation was 
inclusive of religion with religious institutions serving to supplement the abolition of 
religious law (Başkan, 2014: 58). Correspondingly, the 1920s and 1930s also bore witness to 
the Iranian adoption of secularism which resulted in the detachment of religious institutions 
from the state; at the time the religious community are understood to have been 
disconnected, thus enabling neutrality towards those advancing the secularisation project 
(Başkan, 2014: 73).  
Focussing on differentials in state secularisation, Başkan (2014: 147–148; 159) posits that 
Iran was separationist with the transformation of religion not being included in the project, 
with the Turkish model of accomodationism reforming religion within the state. Whilst the 
rise of the secular Turkish state represents success within modernisation theory, Başkan 
(2014: 159) states that this success occurred at the expense of minority religious groups due 
to the focal point of this transformation being one religion. Diverging from the Turkish 
approach, Iranian reforms occurred following a consolidation of power; the successive form 
of the Iranian project can thus be understood to have influenced the secular nature of the 
state (Başkan, 2014: 99; 101). Another distinguishing feature according to Başkan (2014: 
102; 147) was the apparent absence of competition between rulers as was observed in 
Turkey. Subsequently, it became possible to define state secularisation within these 
differing contexts as the unabashed safe-guarding of state sovereignty which resulted in 
different methodologies for the suppression of religion within the public sphere.          
It was also during this period that the effects of Egyptian secular nationalism could still be 
felt. However, the 1950s and 1960s came to be recognised as a period of independence for 
countries such as Algeria, accompanied by secular excitement of Western observers about 
the spread of nationalism (Juergensmeyer, 1993: 11). It was also marked by Egyptian 
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development at the social and state level, with modernity becoming representative of 
secularism. This model however, did not involve the complete removal of religion from 
public life, rather it employed secularism as the foundations of citizenship, thus removing 
specific religious privileges (Hibbard, 2010: 7). The gradual rise of the Egyptian secular state 
continued under Nasser who believed repression rather than removal of the ʿulamāʾ would 
assist in the development of a ‘state-controlled monopoly on religion’ and thus his 
protectionist project (Hibbard, 2010: 63). Nasser’s Egypt can thus be understood to have 
attempted to follow a similar path to Turkey, with religious influences rather than 
commitment being prominent; subsequently resulting in calls for a return to Islam from the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the mid-1960s (Hibbard, 2010: 64).  
Whilst Nasser is understood to have advocated national identity derived from Arab identity, 
Sadat is recognised for his undermining approach to previous reforms and re-accentuating 
religious divides, thus raising questions as to whether Egyptian public identity should be 
religious or secular (Hibbard, 2010: 75). The overarching effects of the Sadat epoch can thus 
be understood to have created a religiously infused atmosphere within which the rise of a 
religious state and the decline of a partially risen secular state could occur.  
In contrast to Sadat’s (unintentional) upending of Egyptian secularisation, 1960s Iran saw 
the continuation of Reza Khan’s stringent secularising reforms by his son with increased 
gender equality emerging following the enfranchisement of women and increased literacy 
training (Strong, 1997: 133). The construction of ‘Pahlavism’ is however, perceived by Adib-
Moghaddam (2013: 283) to have been founded on romanticised notions of Iranian identity 
and the methodology employed in modernising the state. The absence of Islamic 
characteristics in the formation of this identity is understood to have been portrayed by the 
Shah in an article in which Iran is situated ‘at the crossroads of East and West’, with an 
Islamic discourse re-emerging in the immediate pre- and post-revolutionary eras (Adib-
Moghaddam, 2013: 283). It is from this geo-political portrayal of Iran that it becomes 
possible to argue that an attempt to (re)position itself in a similar manner to Turkey had 
occurred.  
The secular rule of the Shah was however, met with resistance which culminated in the 
1979 revolution, thus resulting in the demise of the secular Iranian state and the creation of 
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the IRI. This dramatic alteration in national identity and policy reform indicates public 
dissatisfaction with the tyrannical Pahlavi rule as well as the increasing Western influences 
which accompanied it. Moreover, the demise of Pahlavi rule is partly attributed to already 
established ‘secular opposition forces’ (Halliday, 2003: 57). In continuance, Mirsepassi-
Ashtiani (1994: 51–52) posits that the revolution can be viewed as pivotal in the secular 
crisis which occurred under Pahlavi rule, and the call for an Islamic revival can be seen as a 
response to the crisis of the ‘modern secular state’ but also as possible state exhaustion.  
Consequently, the 1980s were marked by a rise in religious sentiment following the Iranian 
Revolution and the Afghan-Soviet war, with political Islam establishing itself as the 
predominant method for challenging current state orders (Hibbard, 2010: 82). With Iran 
serving as the initial challenger to Western cultural superiority and secular politics, 
Juergensmeyer (1993: 1) understands the immediate post-Cold War era to have been 
characterised by this and the reestablishment of ethno-religious allegiances. Moreover, the 
increased religiosity of the Egyptian state continued under Mubarak’s rule. Whilst 
understood by Hibbard (2010: 94) to have been superficially opposed to an Islamist society, 
the efforts of Sadat and Mubarak to ‘coopt the discourse of conservative Islam’ instead 
reinforced Islamist advocated visions.  
Since 2000, Mubarak’s indecisiveness over religion and secularism in public life resulted in 
an environment within which ‘a Saudi influenced version of Islam’ was able to flourish with 
Islamic orthodoxy also being promoted by the government (Hibbard, 2010: 110–111). 
Following a prolonged period of British colonial rule, the policies of contemporary Egypt, 
whilst adopting more liberal principles, are still influenced by religion which has not been 
isolated from the ‘secular public debate’ (Hafez, 2011: 56). Following Mubarak’s overthrow 
(2011) and the failure of Morsi (Muslim Brotherhood), the religious nature of the Egyptian 
state currently remains uncertain. 
Emerging prominently however, are observable fluctuations across the MENA region with 
regard to the religious or secular nature of the state. They are not however, observable 
within the state, rather transitions between the two appear to have adopted a cyclical 
nature. In Turkey, the strict and structured implementation of secular policies and the 
inclusion of religion within this transition appears to have served the country well with 
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regard to stability. However, the employment of the majority religion in this drastic state 
overhaul has resulted in the modernisation of the Turkish state being exclusionary in 
practice. The Egyptian experience however, was more prolonged and this can be partially 
attributed to its colonial history. Moreover, the indecision of governments as well as 
between them resulted in a potentially inadvertent directionality becoming possible. In the 
Iranian case, the cyclical nature of the religious and secular state can be seen to have 
occurred as a response by a dissatisfied public. The overwhelming presence and absence of 
religious authorities in the state potentially affected its directionality, with both types of 
authorities emerging as equally restrictive.  
2.8 Conclusion: Women, Religion and Secularism 
The relationship between women, religion and secularism in the MENA region has 
conspicuously emerged in national, regional and international discussions as debates 
continue to circulate about the (in)authenticity of women’s rights within (less) religious 
contexts. Prominent amongst them are calls from Western observers for the increased 
secularisation of policies. Halliday (2003: 153) posits however, that in areas such as family 
cohesion and female exploitation ‘there is plenty for the West to be self-critical about’; 
further emphasising that this emerges from an increasing awareness of the failures of 
human rights advocates to adhere to their universalising and secular principles rather than 
the pre-eminence of Islamic thinking. The almost global history of gender discrimination is 
recognised by Baderin (2001: 271) who writes of pre-eleventh century English men being 
permitted to sell their wives. Moreover, it is argued that in pre-Islamic Arabia women had 
no rights (Baderin, 2001: 271), subsequently contradicting Ahmed’s (1992: 37) 
aforementioned argument. In an attempt to emphasise the dangers of generalisations, 
Moghadam (2013: 9) argues against gender being monolithic within the MENA context 
through the recognition of diverging socio-economic and political environments. Moreover, 
the absence of normative gender relations in the region is evidenced through variables such 
as education, political participation, employment and legal status (Moghadam, 2013: 19). 
Within discussions on the oppression of Muslim women, several voices emerge. One 
represents those seeking to address preconceptions of Islam whilst recognising gender 
related issues; another denies divergences in oppression between Muslim and non-Muslim 
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women or posits that in some instances they had more rights. One group argues that it is 
external to Islam, but peripheral factors challenged Qur’anic intentions, with another group 
contradicting this (Keddie, 1991: 1–2). This reinforces quandaries over the relationship 
between and interpretation of women’s rights and religion. Moreover, the inclusion of 
gender rather than its affixation in the secular/religious binary is understood to have been 
successfully embedded in Jakobsen and Pellegrini’s (cited in Fokas, 2010: 166) work, thus 
cutting through generalisations of secular contexts liberating women and religious contexts 
oppressing them.  
Ahistorical generalisations are another contention according to Najmabadi (2000: 29), due 
to their removal of individual characteristics of countries as diverse as Algeria, Turkey, 
Afghanistan and Indonesia. Torstrick (2003: 161) reinforces this position through references 
to the works of Al-Ali and Joseph, and how they remind the reader that concepts such as 
secularism and democracy, which are understood as improving Western women’s lives, are 
the result of specific historical trajectories. The importance of trajectories is also 
emphasised by Moghadam (2013: 8) who writes of the presence of ‘gender asymmetry’ in 
(non)Western contexts and  deviations in legal codes throughout the MENA region resulting 
in different applications. She furthers her argument by drawing on Tunisian sociologist 
Boudhiba, who demonstrated the ‘“plastic”’ nature of Islam. This is evidenced through 
Tunisia’s long history of female judges; approximately fourteen percent of Syrian judges 
between 1975 and the Arab Spring being women; Iran not permitting female judges; and 
Saudi Arabian women not having these rights (Moghadam, 2013: 9). 
In the early twentieth century, Turkish reforms included the drastic transformation of 
gender equality within the state following the implementation of a modified version of the 
Swiss Civil Code (1926) (Abadan-Unat, 1991: 179). Not only did equality for men and women 
fulfil Atatürk’s earlier promise, but it represented determination in achieving ‘a level of 
contemporary civilization’ as well as echoing the beliefs of advocates that ‘monogamy and 
the right to divorce are principles required for a civilized world’ (Abadan-Unat, 1991: 179). 
Whilst it is observed that these reforms occurred primarily through ‘the unrelenting efforts 
of a small revolutionary elite rather than of large-scale demands by Turkey’s female 
population’ (Abadan-Unat, 1991: 179), increased gender equality only emerged in a small 
area of family law. Following an increased public female voice, amendments were made to 
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the constitution which permitted female participation in local elections (1931), and gave 
women the right to vote and be elected at general elections (1934) (Abadan-Unat, 1991: 
179). 
Atatürk’s Turkey also proved to be influential in many respects, with the Iranian Shah 
interpreting the path to modernity as reflecting the need to extricate secular politics (civil 
law) from Shari’a; however, the modernisation of the Iranian state was sought through 
oppressive measures and consumerist ‘Western’ culture (Sullivan, 1998: 223). Whilst Pahlavi 
rule saw increased access to education for village women (1970s), the enforced abolition of 
the veil became symbolic of modernisation (Sullivan, 1998: 223); however, impediments 
remained to female access to resources and male economic power prevailed (Friedl, 1991: 
195). The Shah’s obsession with Western culture was subsequently criticised through a 
gendered lens by Khomeini who viewed Iranian women as transforming into ‘pretty western 
dolls’, thus using this as a framework within which his Islamic project could be situated 
(Rahnema & Nomani, 1990: 11). 
Contrastingly, secularism and religion in Egypt have fluctuated more than in the cases of 
Turkey and Iran. Attempting to understand predominantly religious legal alterations, Asad 
(2003: 205-256) enquires into facets of secularisation which are usually overlooked, 
stressing the transformative effects it can be understood to have on areas such as family 
law. Accentuating women’s differences, Sadat (1970-81) is understood to have sought a 
‘paternal arm and/or protective arm of the state’ to ensure women were adequately 
represented, individually and collectively (Hatem, 1994: 664). With the state traditionally 
embodying male traits, the notion of a ‘paternal arm’ or state protection reinforces 
perceptions of female weakness and lexically reinforces the patriarchal hierarchy of the 
state. Divergently, Mubarak (1981-2011) was understood to emphasise ‘sameness’ as a 
means of achieving a similar purpose (Hatem, 1994: 664).  
Complexities surrounding gender related policies are reinforced by Htun and Weldon (2010: 
208) due to different fields and numerous actors. Some of these fields have been examined 
by Nazir (2005) who surveyed sixteen states and one territory as a means of understanding 
progression in gender equality. The survey, according to Nazir (2005: 31), evidences 
progress in some countries however, a ‘substantial deficit in women’s rights’ is observed in 
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all countries and almost all societal institutions. Whilst the survey provides valuable insight 
into gender equality progress in these countries (Nazir, 2005: 42), there remain areas 
requiring further expansion.  
Emerging from this is the multifaceted relationship between women, secularism and 
religion, and how this has been affected by state behaviour. Moreover, Asad’s (2003) insight 
into the effects of secularism on Egyptian law and ethics provides the foundations for 
further exploration into secularising effects in MENA countries. Additionally, following these 
discussions, Taylor’s (2007:247) first comprehension of secularity as ‘the retreat of religion 
from public life’ is thus employed for understanding the issues being treated. However, due 
to the primary focus being how the secular nature of the state shaped the development of 
women’s marital rights, a concise definition of ‘secular’ is required.  
Having discussed the complexities of ‘secular’ and its accompanying suffixes, the 
development of a working definition can be understood (see section 1.4). Drawing on 
Western theoretical understandings, applications and perceptions in the MENA region, and 
contextualisations of the period in question, ‘secular’ within the context of early twentieth 
century Egypt and Iran can be defined as the acquisition of power through modernisation by 
way of the separation of religion from politics and/or the state. Secularisation can therefore 
be seen as a process, secularism is the separation of religion from politics or the state, 
secularity is the type of separation (political/social), and secular is the outcome of the 
process and how it has manifest itself. The rationales and specific understandings of this 
definition, however, vary and this is evidenced in the adoption of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
secularism (see section 1.4) when exploring how the secular nature of the state shaped the 
development of women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939.  
Whilst the secularisation of Egypt and Iran has not been a permanent feature, this does not 
mean that secularism has failed. Rather, it indicates that the methods of implementation 
have failed. When examining the secular nature of these states, it became apparent that, 
unlike in Turkey where secularism was implemented at society’s roots, it was implemented 
in a more superficial manner. Whilst aspects of law and customs became more secular, 
there was no overarching attempt to secularise either state. Instead, Egypt experienced 
attempted social, political and legal secularisation through colonial powers and Iran had 
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similar experiences following Reza Khan’s rise to power, which resulted in an international 
façade of a modernising, secular state. Whilst secularism and modernity are considered to 
be synonymous, the failure of the implementation of secularism does not mean that Islam 
and modernity are to be considered antonyms, or incompatible. Rather, it indicates that a 
more rigorous implementation needs to occur through the state in question, and for the 
benefits of the state instead of external appearances or to benefit another state.  
The religious nature of the Egyptian state, as Agrama (2012) has indicated, is not clearly 
determinable, unlike Iran following the development of the IRI. Fluctuations in state 
secularism (see section 2.7) and instabilities which have occurred following the advent of 
the Arab Spring thus make predictions difficult, thus the future of these societies with 
regard to secular and religious identities is unknown. What did emerge throughout chapter 
two however, was the subjective nature of religion and secularism, and the impact 
implementation styles can have on their apparent ‘compatibility’ with gender equality, 
therefore the future of these societies does not necessarily rest on whether the 
transformation from religious to secular has occurred, but how authorities interpret these 
terms and what they mean for the state and the individual. 
This chapter reviewed literature on gender equality, women and the MENA region. 
Commencing with women, family and the law, and moving to address various areas of 
family law, it becomes apparent that whilst similar points of contention have emerged 
throughout the MENA region, governmental responses have varied greatly. Moreover, it 
accentuates the absence of a monolithic Islam and MENA region, thus serving to critique 
generalisations which provide homogenising insights into both. Subsequently, questions 
emerged about the relationship between feminism and modernity, with insight being 
provided into this relationship from both Western and non-Western contexts whilst 
simultaneously recognising occidentalist assumptions about the Western nature of both 
feminism and secularism.  
Prominent amongst these topics was the gendered division of the state. Within this context 
it became possible to query the emergence of a public female voice in opposition to the 
patriarchal nature of the state, gendered policies of the state, and state responses to the 
public emergence of women. Through an examination of the literature surrounding Islamic 
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feminism, it became apparent that, as with many of the other concepts addressed in this 
research, there is no single definition. Moreover, absence in clarity surrounding the 
possibility of its existence has resulted in it becoming a controversial topic and thus 
questioning whether it is feminist religion or religious feminism which is being seen.  
This chapter concluded with two sections examining the theoretical and realistic 
implications of secularism, within which definitional ambiguities were addressed, as well as 
fluctuations in the religious and secular nature of various states. From these intersecting 
fields it becomes apparent that the prominent aspects which have been discussed are not 
stable concepts, and are thus equally susceptible to change. Conspicuous amongst this 
however, is the absence of exploration into the effects of secularism on matrimonial 
equality, and points of convergence and divergence between gendered family laws. 
Therefore further insight into the politics and power of a state with regard to gender 
equality in the (dis)establishment of a marriage can be sought. 
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Chapter Three 
Feminism, Post-Colonialism and Power 
3.1 Introduction  
Women’s rights and movements in the MENA region have received vast scholarly attention 
(see for example Abu-Lughod, 1998; Al-Ali, 2000; Sedghi, 2007). As the previous chapter has 
shown, great attention has been dedicated to religious imperatives and their diverging 
interpretations, legal obligations in family law, activities and demands of feminist 
movements, and the effects of religion and secularism on governmental policies. Drawing 
on silences which remained with regard to secular influences and family law, this thesis 
endeavours to establish how secularism affected women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran 
between 1920 and 1939.  
Emerging prominently from the previous chapter are concepts of feminism, post-colonialism 
and power structures. The theoretical foundations of this thesis are thus situated within a 
feminist paradigm, focusing on understandings of gender equality, the family and power. 
Due to the primary tenets of this thesis being gender equality, family law, and the effects of 
secularism on matrimonial equality, it is justifiable to employ feminist proclamations as an 
analytical framework.  
This chapter therefore situates this research within feminist theory. Beginning with insight 
into feminism and its polygonal nature, the applicability of this strand of theory to this thesis 
will become visible. The theoretical focus of this thesis will then enable comprehensions to 
occur as to why post-colonial feminism has specifically been chosen as the analytical 
framework. Following these theoretical insights, the chapter will then engage with 
theoretical discussions surrounding gender, politics and power structures; it is within this 
that the intersecting fields of (post-)colonialism, patriarchy and the family can be further 
understood within a feminist context.  
The chapter then examines the significance of history, providing rationales for the historical 
location of this thesis and the importance of history in regard to feminist theory, gender 
equality, the MENA region, and understanding the scaffolding surrounding gender equality 
and family law in the contemporary MENA region. This also serves as a point of transition 
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between theoretical insights and methodological considerations. This second part of the 
chapter will begin by establishing the qualitative nature of the comparative-historical 
analysis which occurs throughout this thesis and how this relates to the theoretical 
framework. Within this section, attention will be paid specifically to historical analysis, 
archival research and the use of case studies so as to further align methodological decisions 
with post-colonial feminism and this research. Subsequently, as will be evidenced in this 
chapter, intersections between a feminist approach, historical analysis and comparative 
cases provide a strong rationale for the approaches adopted in this project. 
3.2 Feminist Insights  
It is widely recognised that feminism is not a uniform concept; rather it serves as an 
umbrella term for a specific lens through which the world is perceived. It is also emphasised 
that it is not a ‘monolithic form of opposition’, with there being significant anguish over 
various priorities which are recognised as necessary for addressing ‘the historical limits and 
appropriations of specific feminist theories, strategies, and practices’ (Ebert, 1991: 888–
889). It is from this that Ebert (1991: 889) defines feminism as a ‘dynamic ensemble’ which 
develops different methods for transmuting patriarchal social relations through written 
challenges of patriarchy and various forms of feminism. For Spivak (1987: 102) however, 
speaking of an overarching feminism is difficult, rather she speaks of her role within literary 
criticism as a woman, with her understanding of ‘woman’ being influenced by ‘man’ as 
presented in the literature she examines. From her (1987: 103) deconstructivist position, 
she argues that ‘no rigorous definition of anything is ultimately possible’, subsequently 
arguing that if one should continue deconstructing man and woman as binary opposites, it 
will eventually present itself as a self-displacing dichotomy. It is because of this that Spivak 
(1987: 103) feels that she is unable to advocate such a dichotomy, nevertheless, she 
perceives definitions as important in enabling stands to be taken, thus she restricts her 
definitional attributions to provisional ones. 
Contrastingly, Offen’s (1988: 152) understanding of feminism contributes to a 
comprehension of feminists being any individual, irrespective of sex, whose actions and 
understandings meet three criteria which result in those falling into the category ‘feminist’ 
being ‘at odds with male-dominated culture and society’. Diverging from this more 
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constricted view, hooks (1984: 68) purports that when defined as a movement seeking to 
end sexist oppression, feminism permits equal participation in ‘revolutionary struggle’ for all 
members of society. Further expanding on this, hooks (1984: 68) notes that the 
contemporary feminist movement has primarily been shaped by women, recognising that 
this is not solely to be attributed to anti-feminist sentiment, rather it can be partially 
ascribed to the equation of women’s liberation with social equality of the sexes. Emerging 
from this is the creation, by liberal feminists, of the labelling of the feminist movement as 
‘women’s work’ by women rather than men (hooks, 1984: 68). Whilst those advocating 
women’s liberation called on women to join the movement, the call on men to assist in 
ending sexist oppression was intermittent with the rhetoric of men as oppressors and 
women as oppressed reinforcing sexism and implying that female empowerment would 
occur ‘at the expense of men’ (hooks, 1984: 68).  
Emphasising the concept of difference, feminism is also recognised as contesting gender 
status and representing women as the ‘sexual ‘other”, with recent debates orbiting 
difference and identity, with the two intersecting within postmodernism (Ebert, 1991: 889). 
However, in order for equality to be established between the two sexes, the needs of 
women need to be broken down so as to be representative of diverging biological and social 
aspects. Ebert (1991: 890) evidences this with the example of economic equality, noting that 
it is not simply access to employment which would enable this, but also recognition of 
required provisions in areas such as maternity leave and child care. Despite diverging 
interpretations of ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’, it is argued that an overarching commonality 
between all strands of feminist theory is that women are oppressed, and it is from this 
shared observation that feminism arises (Hegde, 1998: 273; Stanley & Wise, 1993: 61). 
Another area of mutual agreement, according to Stanley and Wise (1993: 61–62) is that this 
oppression is not stagnant, rather the causes of oppression and the means by which it is 
believed to be alterable varies between feminist theories. 
For Stanley and Wise (1993: 118), feminism contends that female experiences should be 
recognised and interpreted, with women also re-interpreting things which have previously 
been defined by men. Moreover, they (1993: 118) claim that feminism presents the 
personal experience as significantly political, with these tenets standing oppositionally to 
positivism. Whilst divergences in experience and feminist theories are recognised, first 
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world, or Western feminism has been heavily criticised by those excluded from preferences 
which emerge within this overarching feminist label. This critique has resulted in some 
scholars referring to various feminist theories as hegemonic, noting the invaluable insights 
women of other racial, social or geographic groups bring to feminism (Agathangelou & 
Turcotte, 2010: 50). In relation to notions of hegemonic feminisms, the use of related 
vocabulary has frequently conjured hostile reactions and this is partially due to the 
geographic locating of feminism in the West and has resulted in misperceptions arising in 
non-Western contexts (Jayawardena, 1986: 2). Accompanying these confusions is the notion 
that feminism outside of the Western hemisphere is imported. This is contested by 
Jayawardena (1986: 2) who seeks to refute this notion through multiple cases which 
illustrate the effects of different historical developments, including colonialism, on women. 
The emergence of feminist movements in non-Western countries cannot however, fall into 
the homogenising trap that many theories continue to encounter. Using the case of Egypt, El 
Guindi (2003: 591) recognises Badran’s labelling of the Egyptian feminist movement as 
secular, providing a medium whereby women of upper and middle classes who identified 
with their nationality were able to come together. Ahmed goes one step further, removing 
the monolithic structuring of the movement, indicating that within the overarching Egyptian 
feminist movement, two different types of feminism were espoused. The first is understood 
to have a Western focus (Huda Shaarawi), and the other is recognised to be independent of 
Western influences (Malak Hifni Nasif) (El Guindi, 2003: 591). 
Despite the recognition of the Egyptian movement as secular, Lazreg (1988: 84) claims that 
work on women in the MENA region by academic women is subject to the religion/tradition 
archetype. Whilst confining research to this paradigm is problematic, the continued location 
of the family and the private sphere within a religio-legal jurisdiction can be seen to present 
an automated framework within which women can be situated. This thesis however, seeks 
to break out of this paradigm by examining the effects of secularism on family law in Egypt 
and Iran, yet due to its location, it is impossible to remove religion from it.  
It is because of this dislocation of the traditional religious paradigm in which family laws in 
the MENA region are situated that this thesis endeavours to provide alternative 
perspectives to the effects of patriarchal power structures on gendered areas of law. 
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Situating this historically focused project within the contemporary world however, relates in 
part to the effects of globalisation and construction of new locales of critique by feminist, 
poststructuralist and post-colonial thought (Hegde, 1998: 272). Moreover, recognising the 
intersecting nature of local and cross-national feminism is also of paramount importance, 
with Alexander and Mohanty (cited in McEwan, 2001: 106) being recognised for their call for 
a ‘comparative, relational feminist praxis that is transnational in its response to, and 
engagement with, global processes of colonisation’; which thus require the dejection of 
Western universalisms and encourage a new perspective of global diversities. 
Despite new insights emerging from more inclusive strands of feminist theory, lexical 
concerns surrounding ‘gender’ and ‘woman’ are still prominent, along with homogenising 
tendencies which occur both within and about feminism. Aspects of these concerns have 
been echoed by Mohanty (2003: 67) who states that an issue with the term ‘women’ is that 
it frequently denotes a single category, ‘the oppressed’, and this is a common assumption 
made by predominantly radical and liberal feminists. This representation of women is 
further enhanced by the radical feminist portrayal of man which, according to Bethke 
Elshtain (1981: 205), is ‘in some ways an inversion of misogynist views of women’, and 
forms an image of a relentless and exacting male harshness. It is from this that male and 
female nature as the central tenet of radical feminist thought becomes increasingly visible, 
with ‘male and female being’ assuming ontological priorities (Bethke Elshtain, 1981: 205). 
Contrastingly, liberal feminists are recognised as having paid less attention to areas such as 
human nature, and male and female; rather they project a more malleable understanding 
whereby individuals are shaped by their surrounding social environments (Bethke Elshtain, 
1981: 240). 
The emergence of the public female voice has been associated with three specific periods of 
time and have fallen under what Valassopoulos (2007: 200) has labelled the ‘wave 
metaphor’. The second wave of the 1960s and 1970s espoused theoretical and practical 
assumptions of a shared female identity, ‘a united global sisterhood’ which preferentially 
served white, middle class women as representative of ‘the female experience’, thus 
excluding concerns of women marginalised because of factors such as class, race and 
religion (Ang, 2003: 191; Kapur, 2002: 6). Additionally, this second juncture in feminist 
history served to move beyond universal political inclusiveness as sought by the suffragists 
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and concentrate on areas such as reproduction and domestic labour, which had more 
centralised effects on their lives (Gillis et al., 2007: xxi). However, the homogenisation of 
‘woman’ indicated the fragility of the term in having so many connotations attached to it; 
subsequently questions pertaining to identity and unanimity were raised in relation to this 
single word (Gillis et al., 2007: xxi). 
From the questions which arose during and immediately after the second wave, a more 
inclusive engagement with post-colonial feminist experiences was advocated 
(Valassopoulos, 2007: 199). Moreover, it is posited that the metaphor of ‘third wave’ also 
serves to question the continued influence of Western feminism over post-colonial and 
Third World feminist practices, whilst also providing an increased flexibility which follows 
changing and newly established contours (Valassopoulos, 2007: 200).  
Resulting from the privileging of a specific group of women arise criticisms from those 
marginalised by it, as well as an inability to identify with feminist theory (Strickland, 1994: 
265). Based on the understanding that feminists are apprehensive about problems arising 
from essentialism and universalism, Strickland (1994: 266) argues that it becomes possible 
to understand the appeal of postmodernist theory. However, she (1994: 267) posits that this 
appeal is mistaken due to the initially superficial commonalities with feminism surrounding 
critiques of Enlightenment thought, with postmodern notions of ‘difference’ being 
understood as a means of eluding it and its threat to prevailing world views. Crucial in this 
understanding of homogenisation and the Enlightenment is the conflation of male 
experiences (Strickland, 1994: 267), thus indicating that the universalisation of experiences 
within theoretical paradigms was not exclusionary of men.  
The predominant recognition of women’s exclusion therefore reverberates throughout 
feminist theories, with the refutation of political silencing as a result of generalised 
experiences being paramount to feminist political theory (Bethke Elshtain, 1981: 303). These 
universalisms do not however, stand alone; rather they contribute to the broader 
understanding of gender essentialism which involves the attribution of certain 
characteristics to women (Kapur, 2002: 7). In this context differentiations between sex 
(biological) and gender (psychological and cultural) become increasingly prominent, with 
traits such as fashion and occupation being understood as equally significant as biological 
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determinants (Oakley, 1972: 158). In turn, feminist analyses of gender as a system of 
meaning is believed to provide a new perspective to understandings of function formations 
which, according to Cohn (2013: 15), requires locating individuals within the intersecting 
societal spheres of race and ethnicity as well as gender.   
This ‘gender-sex system’, as Benhabib (1985: 405) has labelled it, contributes to feminist 
theorising in two distinct ways. The first pertains to its essential role in the development of 
social reality and subsequently the creation of embodied identities; secondly, in its historical 
form, this system has contributed to female oppression and exploitation, with feminist 
theory serving to uncover this fact and develop a process which enables the emancipation 
of women from such constrictions (Benhabib, 1985: 405). However, the diversity of feminist 
theories does not permit the establishment of a single means by which oppression can be 
overcome, and this absence of homogeneity within feminist theory is seen as reflective of 
the social relations complexities it addresses (Walters, 2011: 13). Moreover, the primary 
tenets of diverging feminist theories contribute to certain aspects of society receiving 
increased attention over others.  
Whilst there is no universal feminism, Fricker (1994: 95) questions what can be derived from 
a feminist epistemology. This quandary is partially addressed by Lennon and Whitford 
(1994: 1) who claim that the most convincing perception provided by feminism lies in 
connections between power and knowledge and is believed to have resulted in an 
epistemological shift from ‘esoteric philosophy’ to the core of contemporary culture. Within 
this emerge shared focal points with other prominent strands of theoretical thought such as 
Marxist and critical theorists who have a strong history of arguing the reflection of 
bourgeois interests in most of contemporary culture (Lennon & Whitford, 1994: 1). 
Additionally, feminist work in epistemology is understood to share obligations to 
emancipatory struggles with other intellectual movements, which has resulted in presently 
visible tensions in feminist theory (Lennon & Whitford, 1994: 1). What is surmised from 
Lennon and Whitfield’s (1994: 13) edited volume however, is that at time of writing, 
feminist epistemology was not a ‘female way of knowing’, nor a means of simply presenting 
femaleness as opposite to patriarchy; rather it refers to epistemological concerns which 
arise from feminist projects, requiring reflection on ‘the nature of knowledge and our 
methods for attaining it.’ 
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Divergences in epistemological perspectives as devised by Harding, are recognised by 
Hansen (2010: 18) who notes their coupling with three ontological perspectives adopted by 
feminist approaches to international relations – standpoint, empiricist and post-
structuralist. Standpoint feminism is recognised as emerging from a post-Marxist tradition, 
perceiving women as defined by physical traits whilst arguing against uniform constructions 
of masculinity and femininity at various epochs and locations (Hansen, 2010: 18, 22). This is 
furthered by Oakley (1972) who discusses divergences in gender roles and attributions of 
gendered characteristics within numerous societies, not only does this serve to reinforce 
cultural and societal differences, but it also assists in dispelling homogenous notions of 
gendered characteristics. 
Empiricist feminism is situated in Keohane’s ‘rationalist approaches to IR’ and focuses more 
on positivist analyses which produce explanatory, causal theories pertaining to state and 
institutional behaviours (Hansen, 2010: 18). Post-structuralist feminism however, shares 
with standpoint feminists the ontological belief that the public/private dichotomy has 
served in the marginalisation of women in numerous areas of society; conversely, they 
argue that if gender is to be introduced then women cannot simply be represented as 
marginalised (Walker, 1992 cited in Hansen, 2010: 23). Through the conjunction of ontology 
and epistemology, Hansen (2010: 22) advances that marginalised women become 
acknowledged for divergent understandings to those of men or privileged women, therefore 
contributing towards the development of a more rounded picture of global politics. 
Methodologically, Western works on women in non-Western locations are seen to have 
adopted multiple means to demonstrate the homogeneity of patriarchy, with one such 
method positing that the higher number of women who have experienced something, the 
more universal it is (Mohanty, 2003: 62). From this emerge multiple problems regarding the 
absence of location, culture, religion and personal choice in aspects, such as veiling, which is 
frequently recognised as a universal sign of female oppression. Alternatively, self-
documentation has emerged as a methodological possibility, adopting a more 
anthropologically ethnographic style alongside other interpretive and hermeneutically 
related methods (Tickner, 1997: 615; 2005: 19 cited in Hansen, 2010: 22). However, within 
these various ontological, epistemological and methodological concerns remains a 
prominent silence pertaining to men unless referring to them through a patriarchal 
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paradigm. It is partially because of this in parallel with other problems, that Stanley and 
Wise (1993: 8) advocated a ‘feminist sociology’ which would occur through the repositioning 
of the field within feminist terms. From this they posited an epistemological position 
comprised of ten criteria. The second of these relates to the aforementioned silence and 
requires both men and women’s behaviours and experiences to be researched (Stanley & 
Wise, 1993: 8). Referring back to chapter one where the supplementary research questions 
have been outlined, it is evident that this approach will be adopted in this research. This 
does not serve to reinforce male predominance in family law, rather it seeks to understand 
restrictions which were also placed on men in parallel to those placed on women, thus 
resisting the exclusionary trap which has frequently arisen.  
Prior to the examination of power structures however, clarification over perceptions of 
power needs to be established. As has previously been mentioned, Second Wave feminism 
sought to move beyond the parameters of political and economic emancipation, advocating 
shifts in focus to examine the private sphere within which gendered identities are 
reproduced (Benhabib, 1985: 418). It is within this sphere that power is understood to 
reside in ‘symbols, myths, and fantasies that entrap both sexes in the unquestioned world of 
gender roles’ (Benhabib, 1985: 418). However, the most common form of power recognised 
in feminist works and activities is patriarchy, with the potential threat of the ease of the 
entanglement of the male feminist voice with ‘patriarchal rhetoric’ being recognised (Shail, 
2007: 88). An instance where this arises is the recognition of Qasim Amin as the father of 
Arab feminism, whose controversial works (1899, 1900) advocated legal reforms of 
polygamy and divorce laws (El Guindi, 2003: 593). However, this recognition is disputed by 
some (see for example Ahmed, 1992), due to perceptions that women’s rights as addressed 
by his works ultimately served to improve male experiences and were heavily influenced by 
European thought.  
The perceived prominence of European thought in Amin’s work can be primarily attributed 
to the influence of Islamic modernist thinkers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. An Islamic modernist himself, Amin was heavily influenced by Muhammad ʿAbduh 
who is recognised as one of the most prominent figures, alongside Jamal ad-Din al-Afghānī, 
of modernist Islam (Kurzman, 2002: 103). They believed that orthodox Islam and its 
teachings on social matters were unable to face the ‘challenges of modernity and rationalist 
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discourse’ (Moaddel, 1998: 120), and sought an alternative method of responding to 
Western criticisms whilst simultaneously avoiding allegations of ‘disloyalty’ and remaining 
‘committed to the basic Islamic tenets’ (Moaddel, 1998: 120). Within this context and 
building on the emergence of increasing support for women’s rights, Amin’s work The 
Liberation of Women, is understood by Moaddel (1998:121) to have ‘represented one of the 
most systematic efforts to defend the compatibility of Islam with modern views on women’. 
In endeavouring to respond to Western criticisms, advocate Egyptian independence, and 
ensure the primary tenets of Islam are recognised, the Islamic modernist movement can be 
seen to have provided a framework within which advocation of women’s rights was able to 
become more prominent; whilst simultaneously emphasising the concept of Islam as 
resistance and challenging the British colonial power structure. 
Initially, racial differences served as the focal point for analyses of colonial discourses, 
however, the inclusion of gender has been advocated by feminist theorists (Mills, 2005: 47). 
Since this interruption, increased assertions have arisen regarding the intersectionality of 
race and gender as a means of examining relations of male/female, coloniser/colonised, and 
more recently class differentials (Mills, 2005: 47). Raven-Roberts (2013: 38) further expands 
on this by noting the importance of post-colonial feminism in understanding colonialism and 
locations affected by war due to the majority of conflicts occurring in the global south. This 
framework of analyses thus results in a more nuanced examination of the intersectionality 
of variables such as gender, race and class, and how colonial dynamics affected them. It also 
serves to counter the ‘add women and stir’ approach which is criticised by Mohanty (2003: 
518) for using non-Western women and cultures as supplementary examples to an 
unchanged Western-centric mode of analysis; consequentially resulting in prominent 
differences founded on geographic locations and the exclusionary nature of power 
structures due to their reproduction within a Western framework (Mohanty, 2003: 518–
519).  
This echoes Jayawardena’s (1986: 6) observation of Western secular thought contributing to 
the development of structures and perceptions which made Western power inescapable. 
The continued prominence of Western-centric thinking has resulted in calls for the West ‘to 
learn how to step out of its colonial boots’ and recognise the reality of those (who continue 
to be) subjugated by them (Schutte, 1998: 69). It is this critical observation that serves as a 
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point of departure for this thesis, with the effects of secularism on matrimonial equality 
being sought through examinations of the intersecting spheres of gender, class and lived 
experiences. However, historical identification with colonialism as a point of contact 
highlights tensions with feminism outside of the Western hemisphere due to perceptions of 
it as foreign importation (Sa’ar, 2005: 686). 
It is not only power situated within the public sphere which serves as a point of contention 
within feminist theories, with the family presenting as crucial. Its prominence within 
feminist works has been considered insufficient, with this argument being grounded in the 
notion that personal experience should be predominant (Stanley & Wise, 1993: 92). Walters 
(2011: 18) partially addressed this through an examination of experiences within marriage. 
The premise of this argument is that such institutions epitomise the organisational powers 
of patriarchy, evidencing this with the traditional giving of a bride by her father, whilst her 
mother remains excluded from the process (Walters, 2011: 18). Although recognition of 
changing traditions, such as the woman’s right to choose her surname and the absence of 
dowry, are evidenced in this example, Walters still provides homogenising insights into the 
institutional power of marriage rather than reflecting diverging experiences between 
individuals and locations. 
Power within the familial structure expands beyond the institution of marriage into feminist 
understandings of individual/society relations, with the family representing the parameters 
within which values and norms are assumed (Stanley & Wise, 1993: 93). It is thus within this 
framework that women’s roles are seen as integral in continuing ‘the system’, however, the 
weakness Stanley and Wise (1993: 118) emphasise in this case is that women appear to be 
‘added’ into pre-existing understandings and a more nuanced engagement with the roles 
and the absence of women in some instances is thus not provided. In addition to this the 
perceived importance of women within the socialisation process can be understood as 
paradoxical when examined through an historical lens due to constraints of the historically 
ubiquitous public/private dichotomy which has been amply critiqued by feminists (Mills, 
2003: 698); with scholars such as Milroy and Wismer (1994, cited in Mills, 2003: 698) 
advocating a dislocation of the amalgamation of gender and these spheres.  
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The positioning of the family in the private sphere has also been a point of contention for 
feminists due to anomalies as to what should be situated in each sphere. Anthias (2002: 
280) evidences this confusion with the relegation of religion to the private sphere whilst 
disregarding the continued public role of religious institutions such as the Christian church. 
This indicates convergences between the two spheres which appear to have gone 
unrecognised in some instances. It is however, noted that should these distinctions be 
eradicated, ‘no differentiated activity or set of institutions that are genuinely political, that 
are, in fact, the bases of order and purpose in a political community, exist’ (Bethke Elshtain, 
1981: 217); indicating that a restructuring of said community would be required as a result 
of this. This perspective is articulated by radical feminists who essentially seek to conflate 
public and private identities through the removal of this binary, successively resulting in the 
private being located under political definition (Bethke Elshtain, 1981: 217).  
Contrastingly, liberal feminists do not seek the erasure of this divide, rather they endeavour 
to expunge the detrimental effects they understand it to have had on women (Bethke 
Elshtain, 1981: 241). Liberal feminism is understood to share strengths and weaknesses with 
liberalism, which include a divide between the public and the private spheres (Bethke 
Elshtain, 1981: 229); conversely, the term itself is understood by Eisenstein (1981: 14) to be 
paradoxical due to liberalism’s patriarchal bias. Divergently, Marxist feminism does not use 
the basic tenets of this distinction as a form of guidance; instead the majority of cases 
modify these spheres and are re-presented as ‘spheres of production and reproduction’, 
with a common view presenting class and sex as crucial factors in women’s positioning 
(Bethke Elshtain, 1981: 256). It is from these diverging lenses that it becomes apparent that 
a theoretical perspective more inclusive of gender, class, location, and experience is to be 
sought for this research.  
3.2.1 Post-Colonial Feminism 
Western theory and knowledge have been critically scrutinised by post-colonial theorists 
with regard to their approach to voices and knowing situated outside of mainstream 
understandings and thus stand as significant challengers to development theories (Briggs & 
Sharp, 2004: 661). Concurrently, Munck (1999 cited in McEwan, 2001: 96) is recognised for 
acknowledging the interaction between post-colonialism, feminism, and development as 
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the most extensive and ‘exciting’ theoretical and practical collaboration. Central to post-
colonial theory is the analysis of the conjunction of power and knowledge as a means of 
understanding how ‘Western knowledge systems have become bound up with the 
construction of the colonial and postcolonial ways of knowing and acting’ both in the West 
and at a more global level (Said, 1978 cited in Briggs & Sharp, 2004: 663).  
A primary tenet of post-colonial theory is the ontological and epistemological positioning of 
‘subaltern’ voices within Western systems of knowledge (Briggs & Sharp, 2004: 664). It is the 
situating of these voices within the Western paradigm which has proven to be of great 
concern for many and it is the intersecting nature of feminism and post-colonialism which 
serve as a point of departure for challenging dominant Western representations (McEwan, 
2001: 96). It is these adjoining spheres which permit challenges to arise in opposition to 
political claims which reject individual understandings of global politics and permit more 
rigorous frameworks for the examination of questions emerging through international, 
transnational and global lenses (Agathangelou & Turcotte, 2010: 53). Additionally, post-
colonial theorists have queried the extent to which Western academics want to engage with 
people in different locations which consequentially required the de-centralisation of 
Western academics as experts (Briggs & Sharp, 2004: 664).  
It is because of this that post-colonial theory is observed to interrupt normative discourses 
of hegemonic Western portrayals, subsequently seeking to de-centralise Europe (Hegde, 
1998: 281). The centralisation of the West, and more specifically Europe, emerged as a 
result of the Enlightenment and its objective of ‘universalizing knowledge’ which 
subsequently ‘spilled over easily into the one-dimensional colonial representation of the 
other’ (Hegde, 1998: 283). Post-colonial criticism thus endeavours to offset the 
oversimplification of cultural portrayals through the recognition of socio-political variables 
which construct culture (Hegde, 1998: 283). Additionally, Hegde (1998: 283) posits that the 
deconstruction of homogenous Western representations allows post-colonial theory to 
argue against notions that the centre and the periphery are positioned in opposition to each 
other.  
Post-colonial feminism however, goes one step further and narrows the point of 
examination to the representation of women and the intersecting spheres within which 
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they are present. Consequentially, it critiques Western constructed knowledge about non-
Western women which omit variables such as race, class and location (Tickner & Sjoberg, 
2013: 212). Ang (cited in Chakraborty, 2007: 106) furthers this by contending that 
‘mainstream Western feminism operates like a nation with boundaries defined through the 
binaries of inclusion and exclusion, insider and outsider…’ therefore the ‘racially 
experiencing subject’ can only be a representation of difference. The exclusion of socio-
political variables and non-Western women’s concerns by Western feminists was a 
prominent criticism made by Nawal El Saadawi, evidencing this with apparent fixations on 
concerns pertaining to sexuality and patriarchy whilst omitting class and colonialism 
(Amireh, 2000: 220). Building on such criticisms, post-colonial feminists seek to dislocate 
powers of naming, representing and theorising by challenging the centrality of Western 
knowledge, with arguments being put forward that Western feminist representations of 
non-Western women has not altered since the colonial era, with black women also being 
labelled as ‘other’ (McEwan, 2001: 100).  
Against the backdrop of Western colonialism, post-colonial theories investigate issues of 
language, class and gender differences amongst other things, with post-colonial feminism 
specifically focussing on women’s lives and pressures impacting on women whose ‘voices 
appear in national narratives’ (Schutte, 1998: 54). Despite this recognition of gender 
differences emerging as a point of inquiry within post-colonial theory this is not necessarily 
achieved (Khan et al., 2007: 231), and Lewis and Mills (2003: 2) contend that contemporary 
post-colonial feminism continues to apply pressure on mainstream post-colonial theory due 
to lingering recapitulations regarding the consideration of gender concerns. Additionally, 
post-colonial feminism is observed to take experiences of Western colonialism and its 
contemporary effects in formulating ‘a standpoint of cultural, national, regional, or social 
identity’ whilst diverging from traditional critiques of imperialism by seeking to avoid ‘rigid 
self-other binaries’ (Schutte, 1998: 65–66). 
Post-colonial feminism is situated at the intersecting junction of gender, class and race with 
its predominant focus being on the ‘gendered effects of transnational culture and the 
unequal division of labour in the political economy’ at a global level (Baylis & Smith, 2005: 
284). Consequently, demands pertaining to gender equality in a Western style democracy as 
echoed by liberal feminists is not adequate due to its Western-centric nature (Baylis & 
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Smith, 2005: 284) and the omission of many crucial variables and individuals in its analysis. 
Lewis and Mills (2003: 3) thus contend that post-colonial feminism is involved in a dual 
project with the first aspect being the racialising of mainstream feminism, and the second 
being the insertion of ‘feminist concerns into conceptualisations of colonialism and 
postcolonialism.’ The insertion of these concerns to any variable however, can be 
problematic due to the risks which emerge regarding ‘add women and stir’ which has been 
criticised by Mohanty (2003: 518). Nonetheless, Sa’ar (2005: 683) posits that post-colonial 
feminists promote the incorporation of ‘exclusionary mechanisms’ into  gender analysis as a 
means of countering mainstream feminisms apparently exclusionary nature.  
From this the objective of post-colonial discourse can be seen to be the emphasis of 
‘difference’ as pivotal in political relations (Olson, 1998: 47). Further expanding on the role 
of post-colonial feminism Khan et al. (2007: 231) endorse four elements they consider to be 
indispensable to the role of this theory as methodology. First is the analytical framework 
which permits concurrent analyses to occur between intersecting spheres; second is the 
fusion of ‘micro and macro levels of analyses’; third is knowledge constructed from the 
perspectives of those who have been marginalised; and fourth is the use of this knowledge 
‘to correct inequities and injustices’ (Khan et al., 2007: 231). Whilst methods employed in 
post-colonial feminist research, such as textual analysis appear similar to other approaches, 
Khan et al. (2007: 231) posit that the researchers knowledge of post-colonial feminism in 
understanding narratives pertaining to class, race and gender against colonial histories 
whilst also maintaining awareness of their own socio-economic and historic positioning in 
relation to those providing the narrative, permits more nuanced insights to occur. 
Within discussions on post-colonial (feminist) theories are power and knowledge. For 
Foucault (1980) the creation of understanding and discipline never being faultless; with 
knowledge being a construction of power which demarcates specific variables for inclusion 
whilst also serving as exclusionary. Within post-colonial scholarship, power functions as a 
point of contact when examining (non) violent resistance (Baylis & Smith, 2005: 290). When 
transferred to post-colonial theoretical endeavours however, power is transformed and 
consequentially accommodates new, deconstructed insights to be formed in regards to 
understanding the identities of those who have been marginalised and ethical dilemmas 
emerging from prominent Western myths ‘which Derrida (1982) describes as “inscribed in 
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white ink,...”’ (Hegde, 1998: 284). Still, a prominent criticism which emerged from post-
colonial feminists is the absence of individual experiences, and this was argued by hooks 
(1984: 59) in relation to race who found that ‘they varied even among those of us who share 
common ethnic backgrounds.’ hooks argument thus reinforces the inescapable importance 
of individual experiences and serves as a form of justification for the inclusion of individual 
experiences and identities throughout this thesis.  
Despite the explanatory potential post-colonial feminism provides, a prominent concern is 
the allegation of its institutionalised nature and situatedness in Western academia which 
subsequently functions to propagate the exclusion of those who have been subjugated 
(McEwan, 2001: 102). Additional concerns surrounding this approach are that its 
‘theoretical sophistication has created greater obfuscation’, with the focus on discourse 
proving problematic with regard to the material continuation of colonial relations (McEwan, 
2001: 102). Moreover, in its current form, post-colonial feminism is seen to be enthusiastic 
in reproducing ‘a recognisable and authoritative line-up of contexts and interpretations.’ 
Subsequently, Lewis and Mills’ (2003) anthology is criticised by Valassopoulos (2007: 199) 
for providing little discussion surrounding the various fields colonial and feminist theories 
are in communication with and where they traverse; additionally, she posits that a more 
flexible way of understanding collaborations within feminist thought might be through 
Shohat’s (1998) ‘multicultural feminism’ which questions Euro-centrism within the field. 
Despite these concerns, post-colonial feminism is recognised for its cautioning against 
simplifying and pluralising feminisms which orbit homogenised notions of cultural and 
national differences (McEwan, 2001: 104). The deconstructive focus of post-colonial 
feminism on the intersecting spheres which affect women’s lives, including colonialism, 
permit new insights to be provided about the identities of those who have been subjugated; 
this therefore serves as rationale for the situating of this thesis within this framework as it 
endeavours to understand how secularism shaped women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran 
between 1920 and 1939. 
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3.3 Gender, Politics and Power Structures 
Within post-colonial feminism gender, politics, power structures, and history emerge as 
prominent factors, all of which intersect on several levels. One commonality is the 
prominence of power, the relations of which are understood as ‘a pattern of constraint on 
social practice’ which broadens to the pivotal question of survival (Connell, 1987: 107). 
Expanding on this, Foucault (1982: 794) contends that power relationships are ‘a strategy of 
struggle’ within which confrontation occurs. It is within this context that power relationships 
can be viewed in forms such as the coloniser/colonised and gender differences, within 
power structures, however, power relations can be seen to form around notions of 
hegemonic masculinity. Commonalities between these relations hinge on concepts of the 
powerful and the powerless and it is here that Scott’s (1985) ‘weapons of the weak’ 
emerges from “hidden transcripts’ of resistant action of the apparently powerless’ (Briggs & 
Sharp, 2004: 666). Within this milieu it becomes possible to recognise diverging formations 
of these ‘weapons’ which are dependent on the power relationship under examination and 
these will become increasingly apparent in the succeeding chapters. Before these can be 
discussed however, different power formations, such as gender differences, the family and 
colonialism, need to be recognised in relation to this thesis’ enquiry into the effects of 
secularism on marital rights, as well as post-colonial feminism.  
One of the key tenets of feminist deconstructionist arguments are the deviating experiences 
of women who have fallen under the homogenising umbrella term ‘women’ which is 
traditionally positioned as a binary opposite to ‘men’ and thus forms part of a hierarchical 
relationship (Stanley & Wise, 1993: 204). It is within this binary that normative behaviours 
associated with men and women are prescribed into society (Stanley & Wise, 1993: 204) 
and these characteristics and other socially endorsed attributes become labelled as 
masculine and feminine. As a means of ensuring the continued centrality of power within 
gender focused discussions, Cohn (2013: 4) contends that ‘gender subordination’ is used by 
analysts due to its emphasising the gender binary as well as gendered hierarchies. 
For radical feminists, power saturates the entirety of the social environment; subsequently 
the personal is political, ‘politics is power’, and ‘power defines all relationships’ (Bethke 
Elshtain, 1981: 217). This premise is expanded by Stanley and Wise (1993: 63) who contend 
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that power and its implementation can be evidenced in personal life; consequently, feminist 
arguments echo the sentiment that various systems and social structures can be 
comprehended and analysed through ‘an exploration of relationships and experiences 
within everyday life.’ For hooks (1984: 84), power emerges as aligned with domination and 
control over something or someone, highlighting indecisive responses from women involved 
in feminist movements. The message being expressed by these women appeared 
contradictory, with one argument condemning the role of male domination in female 
powerlessness, and the other advocating equal rights to men (hooks, 1984: 84). However, 
the vulnerability of ‘power’ to homogenising lexical concerns is recognised by Mohanty 
(2003: 66) and is seen as restricting forms of resistance within the confines of the 
powerful/powerless binary.    
It is because of this potential confinement and post-colonial feminist endeavours to avoid 
such binaries that power needs to be examined through a more critical lens. McEwan (2001: 
93) accentuates the prominence of power within development studies and its centrality to 
more nuanced understandings, with post-colonial and feminist theories playing crucial roles 
in conceptualising this field. Recently, the conjunction of development studies and gender 
emerged more prominently and has resulted in more critical inquiries being conducted. 
Whilst development studies pertains predominantly to changes occurring within the global 
south, its examination of gender, class and social movements, among other things, provides 
a forum within which perspectives into legal developments and personal experiences can be 
examined. Moreover, the prominence of post-colonial feminism within this field enables 
further engagement to occur between the family and factors such as social movements, 
which may have originally been considered external to it. Justification for the situating of 
this research within a post-colonial feminist framework is thus established due the power it 
possesses in transcending fields of inquiry.     
Power however, is not a static construction. Yoder and Kahn (1992: 382-386) advance three 
types of power; power-over, interpersonal power-over, and power-to. The former, as 
theorised by Goodrich (1991b cited in Yoder & Kahn, 1992: 382), relates to the authority of 
a person or group over another and incorporates Johnson’s (1976) distinctions between 
direct and indirect power. Power-over also expands across four levels of analysis comprising 
of the ‘societal, organizational, interpersonal, and individual’ (Yoder & Kahn, 1992: 382). The 
83 
 
first occurs in reference to women and power, ranging from the overarching context of 
patriarchy to social, political, and sexual inequalities within it; the second focuses more 
specifically on binary relations whereby ‘one person has the power to influence another 
within a specific relationship such as marriage, and at its lowest level can be analysed as a 
personality trait (Yoder & Kahn, 1992: 382–384). The final type is also referred to as 
‘personal empowerment’ and it pertains to ‘the control one feels over one’s own thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors…’, and thus stands in contrast to power-over someone else (Yoder & 
Kahn, 1992: 384). It is however, contended that when examining power and gender, 
researchers need to avoid homogenising perceptions of gender differences as explanatory 
(Yoder & Kahn, 1992: 386). 
Emerging within dialectics of power and gender is hegemonic masculinity, which Connell 
(cited in Cohn, 2013: 4) perceives as a legitimising aid in reinforcing some men’s power over 
women and other men. Further expanding on this, Connell (1987: 183) advances that the 
interaction between diverging forms of masculinity is pivotal in the functioning of a 
patriarchal social order. Concurrently, Kaufman (1994: 59) contends that when examined at 
an individual level, what is commonly associated with masculinity fulcrums on ‘a man’s 
capacity to exercise power and control.’ He (1994: 63) further contends that it is the 
historical reckoning of power and masculinity which has culminated in its conforming to and 
subsequent justification of male predominance over women. Connotations of ‘“normal” 
manhood’ thus emerge from social processes which occur within patriarchal family 
relationships (Kaufman, 1994: 63). Within this milieu it is possible to recognise the family as 
a power structure, not simply in its traditional patriarchal structuring but also in its role as 
reproducer of said formations, and it is within the legalities regarding the establishment of 
this power structure that this thesis is situated. 
Within the concept of hegemonic masculinity, the term hegemony can be seen to stand 
alone. Borrowing from Gramsci, hegemony represents social superiority which surpasses 
‘contests of brute power’ and infiltrates the structural organisation of ‘private life and 
cultural processes’ (Connell, 1987: 184). Additionally, Connell (1987: 183) advances that 
there is no feminine equivalent to hegemonic masculinity and that at levels ‘of mass social 
relations…forms of femininity are defined clearly enough.’ Contrastingly, Chakraborty (2007: 
102) contends that ‘hegemonic feminism’ has proven useful in historicising what has been 
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labelled white or Western feminism. Through engaging with post-colonial and critical 
feminisms more nuanced insights into hegemonic power relations have been provided 
(Agathangelou & Turcotte, 2010: 44); and it is subsequently through the recognition of 
diverging levels of male and female power that patriarchal power structures can be viewed 
through a different lens.  
A traditionally recognised sphere where man’s empowerment over women is frequently 
acknowledged is the family. As a power structure the family provides the foundations for 
socialisation skills, with traditionalist ideologies presenting it as the ‘foundation of society’ 
(Connell, 1987: 121). Within the familial structure, power is perceived in numerous ways, 
with ‘influence in decision making’ being critically viewed as an insufficient definition, with 
Bottomley’s research indicating that environmental support was also a prerequisite 
(Connell, 1987: 123–124). Supporting this, Urry (2011: 104–105) contends that the family 
not only reflects social order, but also assists in maintaining the social structure; moreover, 
familial relationships are not organisable by those engaged in them, rather they are 
influenced and constrained by social norms. This  has potentially resulted in many feminists 
perceiving the family as pivotal in comprehending female oppression (Stanley & Wise, 1993: 
75). 
Those residing within this camp advance two prominent variables in the family’s role in 
female subjugation. One pertains to women’s roles as wives and mothers which confine 
them to a ‘service and domestic mode of behaviour’; the other relates to the role of the 
family in the socialisation of children, with one aspect including ‘socializing them into 
sexually stereotyped ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ attributes which result in the perpetuation 
of unequal gender relations (Stanley & Wise, 1993: 75). Within the context of developing 
countries, Jayawardena (1986: 46) moves beyond the confines of the family in examining 
the reproduction of gendered stereotypes and posits that, whilst predominantly restricted 
to girls of ‘urban bourgeois families’, female education was designed to assist in their 
preparation to be proficient mothers and wives. Therefore, whilst the family can be seen as 
central to the perpetuation of gendered social norms, it was not the only contributing 
factor.  
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Moving beyond negative representations of the family as an oppressive power structure, 
hooks (1984: 37) emphasises the significance of the family as a ‘kinship structure’ within 
which those needing care are assisted, and it is this positive function which is overshadowed 
by sexist oppression. It is further argued that the prominence of the ‘devaluation of family 
life in feminist discussion’ is commonly reflective of class structures and those prominent 
within the movement. 
The bourgeois woman can repudiate family without believing that by so doing she 
relinquishes the possibility of relationship, care, protection. If all else fails, she can buy 
care…Their devaluation of family life alienated many women from feminist movement. 
Ironically, feminism is the one radical political movement that focuses on transforming 
family relationships.  
(hooks, 1984: 39) 
Subsequently, through challenging Western philosophical norms which inform the concept 
of the family, feminism is understood to have sought to liberate the family repositioning it 
within the positive framework of kinship without oppressive gender relations being present 
(hooks, 1984: 39). Contrastingly, Cowie (cited in Mohanty, 2003: 57) is recognised for her 
emphasis on the political nature of kinship, which she claims needs to be examined as 
‘ideological practices’ due to its function within the family as perpetuator of gendered 
norms. This homogenising trap is recognised by Mohanty (2003: 57) who claims that 
Minces’ assertion that the patriarchal family is ‘the basis for ‘an almost identical vision of 
women’ that Arab and Muslim societies have’ falls directly into it due to the absence of 
references to specific histories and ideological power structures in this imagery. 
Additionally, Mohanty (2003: 57) contends that ‘in merely describing the structure of the 
marriage contract, the situation of women is exposed.’ Acknowledging this criticism, the 
examination of marriage laws, gender equality, and the experiences of key women in both 
Egypt and Iran and the effect secularism had on them is justified as a means of developing a 
more nuanced understanding of women’s marital rights.  
This research however, is situated within the contexts of colonialism in Egypt and 
imperialism in Iran. Consequentially, these power structures play crucial roles in the 
introduction of secularism into each country and therefore on the legal and political 
structuring of the country which in turn impacts upon family law and perceptions of gender 
equality. Within this environment emerged a system which ‘empowers some categories of 
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people at the expense of others’ with the powers of colonisers often being justified on the 
grounds of that those being colonised are ‘racially inferior’ (Cohn, 2013: 5). Fanon (1963: 22) 
evidenced this by writing that on ‘the other side of the ocean there was a race of less-than-
humans who, thanks to us, might reach our status in a thousand years…’. Secondly, he 
(1963: 127) recognised that colonialism expressed regional preferentials and consequently, 
the entirety of a country was rarely ‘exploited’; thus a homogenous history of the effects of 
colonialism cannot be identified with by those residing in regions which were not specifically 
affected. It is this universalised, historical, Western-centric experience that post-colonial 
approaches seek to disrupt; additionally, it endeavours to ‘re-write the hegemonic 
accounting of time (history) and the spatial distribution of knowledge (power) that 
constructs the Third World’ (McEwan, 2001: 94-95).  
One of the most prominent literary attempts to destabilise generalising assumptions 
regarding colonialism and its effects is Orientalism (Said, 1978),21 however, one of the 
conspicuous omissions within his work was women. The presence of the female figure for 
Spivak (2010: 61) is seen to disappear in the subject formation which occurs in the 
patriarchy-imperialism relationship, resulting in homogenised depictions of the ‘third-world 
woman’ who is caught at the junction between tradition and modernity. Additionally, power 
is perceived as habitually male, with MacKinnon (cited in Kapur, 2002: 9) being recognised 
for her claim that ‘all women experience oppression at the hands of patriarchal power’ 
through male laws and male justice systems; what she fails to consider however, are the 
effects of social, economic, and historical trajectories and the impact this had on men and 
women. It is the importance of these spheres and the subjugation of both men and women 
which are most clearly articulated in Fanon’s (1963) work. From his observations of 
colonialism in Algeria where both men and women were ‘called upon to fight against 
oppression’, Fanon (1963: 74, 129) recognised the position of the colonial forces as a 
puppeteer, ensuring that divides occurred not only between coloniser and colonised, but 
also between those being subjugated. Secondly, the simplification of colonialism not only 
occurred within academic discourses, with Fanon (1963: 190) postulating that the 
simplification of culture amongst other aspects of life resulted in the disruption of the lives 
                                                 
21 Highlighting the diversity of orientalism is Lisa Lowe whose work highlights its presence in American society 
in reference to the increasing Asian population (1998), and challenges eighteenth century French orientalism 
(1990).   
87 
 
of those colonised; moreover, the colonisers can be observed to have obtained the culture 
they desired (Stimpson, 1988: 226). 
Further expanding on this, Lazreg (1988: 83) draws on continuities ‘between the traditional 
social sciences modes of apprehending North African and Middle Eastern societies rooted as 
they are in French colonial epistemology and academic women’s treatment from these 
societies.’ The most prominent of these was considered to be religion which thus receives 
‘privileged explanatory power’; this framework is also the most frequently adopted within 
feminist research, with Islam being the most prominent within studies on the MENA region 
(Lazreg, 1988: 83). It is this paradigm that this thesis seeks to break away from, achieving 
this through the examination of the effects of secularism on women’s marital rights. Whilst 
the positioning of family law within a religio-legal jurisdiction prevents the complete 
removal of Islam from the analysis, the focus on the effects of other forces on this aspect of 
women’s lives and law thus alters the trajectory frequently adopted.  
Prominent throughout the various power structures which have been addressed in this 
section is patriarchy, which in itself is a power formation. Addressing this, Bethke Elshtain 
(1981: 212) articulates the importance of remembering that the historic, patriarchal way of 
life was ‘a precapitalist social form’. Connell (1987: 130) magnifies this by stipulating that 
the patriarchal state can be viewed as the outcome of ‘a reverberating set of power 
relations and political processes in which patriarchy is both constructed and contested’; 
therefore the historical direction of the state is pivotal in comprehending its role in sexual 
politics. 
Understandings of what patriarchy is have altered over time and this is evidenced by 
Weber’s (1947) adoption of the term to refer to a ‘system of government in which men 
ruled societies through their position as heads of households’ (Walby, 1989: 214), with 
Walby (1989: 214) arguing that this indicated that domination over younger males who did 
not hold the position of head of household was equally or more important than male 
domination over women. Liberal feminists are recognised for situating female subordination 
in ‘the customary and legal constraints blocking women’s access to the public domain and in 
prejudices (sexism) and stereotypes concerning their capabilities’ (Kandiyoti, 1996: 4). 
Whilst this understanding has resulted in invaluable empirics on domestic and work lives, it 
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has been criticised for failing to recognise the universal and ‘deep-rooted nature of gender 
subordination’ and thus failed to provide an explanatory framework for it (Kandiyoti, 1996: 
4). Seeking to rectify this, radical feminists, who Walby (1989: 214) posits have been 
prominent in the advancement of the term, presented patriarchy as a ‘timeless’ and 
‘universal system’ whereby male domination propagates female oppression ‘through the 
control of their sexuality and procreative capacity’ (Kandiyoti, 1996: 4). Theoretical 
standpoints also became prominent through the primary points of analysis being domestic 
violence, motherhood, and sexual assault, amongst others (Kandiyoti, 1996:4). What 
emerges from these criticisms is recognition of the over-arching, boundary crossing, and 
multifarious nature of patriarchy; with the notion of ‘multiple patriarchies’ being supported 
by Holt (2010: 398).  
In reference to Islam, Eshkevari (2013: 195) recognises how the importance and integrity of 
the family has been stressed. He (2013: 195) posits however, that the ‘archaic traditions’ 
which are practiced cannot ‘have a reasonable Islamic defence’ as they are incompatible 
with ‘neither our theological and epistemological assumptions nor contemporary notions of 
justice’. He (2013:195) emphasises the pyramid structuring of seventh century Arabian 
families with men at the top, and highlights how rights were ‘naturally assigned’ based on 
‘the patriarchal ethos on which social order was based’. Arguing in favour of the need for 
laws and regulations for the family, Eshkevari (2013: 195-196) puts forward the notion of 
recognising the family as a ‘joint enterprise’, whereby no member has superiority based on 
natural rights; rather rights of familial members should be determined by ‘what is accepted 
as good practice in our time..’ and in accordance ‘with a definition of justice that is both 
local and contemporary’. 
He (2013: 196) builds on this by arguing against the elevation of a ‘best practice’ and in 
favour of laws and systems across different societies reflecting ‘the sum of collective 
knowledge and accumulated experience of successive generations’. The historic legacy of 
patriarchy or ‘right of dominion’ is also highlighted and it is suggested that if this were 
perceived as unnatural, then the emergence of organisations based on superiority, such as 
the family, is avoided (Eshkevari, 2013: 196-197). He (2013: 196-197) reinforces this by 
highlighting how Abrahamic and monotheist religions emphasised this, and iterates that ‘In 
Islamic thought, any submission apart from submission to God is a heresy’. Islam is believed 
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to have made significant alterations to the familial structure and customs surrounding it. 
Whilst it is seen to have imposed restrictions on promiscuous behaviour between men and 
women, it is also understood to have removed some restrictions (Eshkevari, 2013: 195). The 
consequences of this are understood by both Eshkevari (2013: 195) and Qutb (2001: 25, see 
section 2.2) to be the enhancing of women’s domestic and social positions and increased 
rights. Subsequently, the frequently assumed ‘patriarchal nature of Islam’ which was 
previously referred to (see section 1.1) comes into question as the subjective nature of 
religion once again comes to the fore of debates.        
In seeking to understand perspectives on the relationship between gender equality, 
patriarchy and Islam, Mir-Hosseini et al. (2013: 24) posit that many Muslim, activist women 
conflated Islam with patriarchy during the (post-) colonial era, with a growing fear that the 
latter could not be removed under a regime which was heavily influenced by Islam. They 
argue (2013: 24) that as a consequence of this ‘…wherever Islamists gain power or influence 
– as in Iran, Sudan, Pakistan and Malaysia – their policies proved the validity of the activists’ 
fears’. Moreover, by arguing that patriarchy forms part of an authentic ‘Islamic’ life, 
attempts have been made to reverse some of the rights acquired by women in the early 
twentieth century (Mir-Hosseini et al., 2013: 25). 
The issue of patriarchy has been a constant concern throughout twentieth century Iran and 
has continued into the twenty-first century. Badran (2014: 48) supports this within the 
Egyptian context, arguing that such concerns became increasingly prominent during times 
of revolution ‘whether masculinist power over women, or the power of one class over the 
other, or one generation over the other, and with that pinnacle of patriarchal power, the 
state’. De Groot (1996: 41) evidences this when she argues the need to understand the 
historical context surrounding the importance of sexual morality and gendered behaviour. 
She (1996: 41) writes of how, in Iran, they were placed on the ‘political/ideological agenda’ 
following events such as the Constitutional Revolution, social movements in the 1940s and 
the establishment of the IRI. Similar observations can be made in Egypt, with the concerns 
which have been articulated serving different purposes within both states, with some 
seeking to reinforce more traditional frameworks within which women operate, and others 
seeking to further enable female participation and choice in society. 
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Moghadam (2013: 206) reinforces this and argues that gender politics of the IRI may be 
‘characterized as sometimes erratic and confounding, appearing to take one step forward 
and two steps back’. Evidencing this, she (2013: 206) highlights how Khomeini issued fatwas 
(religious rulings) which would permit female divorce and encouraged them to include 
stipulations in the marriage contract. Throughout the 1990s amendments to family law 
following advocacy of women’s rights occurred under Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami 
(Moghadam, 2013: 206). Similarly, amendments to Egyptian family laws in 1979 granted 
women the right to divorce should polygamy occur, however, in 1985, this was reversed and 
women lost their automatic right to divorce in this situation (see section 8.5). In both 
instances, the prominence of the patriarchal power structure emerges, reinforcing 
fluctuations in the patriarchal nature of the legal and domestic frameworks within which 
women operate.  
Seeking to explain how subjugated women sought to maximise their options, Kandiyoti 
(1988) introduced the ‘patriarchal bargain’; it is through this lens that she was thus able to 
evidence patriarchy’s diverging nature and differing female responses, highlighting how 
some women were able to benefit from a system which has traditionally oppressed them 
(Sa’ar, 2005: 680-681). Kandiyoti’s (1988) insight can therefore be seen to dispel 
homogenised experiences of patriarchy; the coherent groups of women which have been 
established on location, race, and the all-encompassing label of woman can thus be 
fractured and understood in reference to more specific variables. Encompassing the 
intertwined relations between gender, the family, patriarchy, colonialism and imperialism, 
and power, the significance of further historical examinations becomes apparent. It is 
therefore through recognising the significance of history that post-colonial theories 
endeavour to re-construct history and its voices through a lens which is not orientated 
towards the West (McEwan, 2001: 95). 
Within discussions on gender, politics and power structures emerge questions pertaining to 
the notion of agency. This has emerged within feminist theory, primarily through a 
‘thematization’ of gender identity, whereby it becomes less about externally imposed, 
constraining norms and more about embodied potentialities (McNay, 2000). The notion of 
feminist agency however, can be understood as paradoxical if feminist understandings of 
social structures and oppression are adopted (Issacs, 2002: 129). This arises due to 
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perceptions that it is compromised by sexist oppression, and agency is thus ‘diminished in 
ways that interfere with their capacity for feminist action’ (Issacs, 2002: 129-130).  
Whilst it can be understood to represent the ability of individuals to think and act 
independently, this is often restricted by structures such as the state or organisations, to 
gender, class and race. According to True (2013: 255), feminist scholars view the state as 
playing a crucial role in (re-)producing violence against women, with an example of this 
being ‘non-intervention in the private ‘family’ or community religious or cultural group’. 
Pateman (1989) reinforces this when she speaks of the manner in which the justice system 
has employed ‘legal definitions of rape and victimhood from a male stand-point’ (True, 
2013: 255).  
This gendered lens has also been identified in the broader field of International Relations 
(Grant and Newland, 1991: 1). A female model of agency has been suggested as a means of 
counteracting this, however, Bethke Elshtain (1985: 41 cited in True, 2013: 255) posits that 
most scholars of feminist International Relations caution against this ‘nurturing account of 
feminine nature’ as a response to this gender bias. Tensions surrounding agency thus 
become visible and according to Clegg (2006: 312), they have been seen repeatedly with 
regard to political activism. 
Tensions have also become visible with regard to forced marriages and domestic violence. 
Within the context of the UK, Wilson (2007: 32) argues that rationales provided for 
problems experienced in South Asian families and cultural communities, reinforce existing 
power structures whilst presenting parents as having a ‘brutal approach’, and women as 
victims in need of ‘saving’ who are thus without agency. Wilson (2007: 33) further argues 
that in the last twenty years (at time of writing), that the focus of ‘state interventionists has 
not been on women’s attempts to resist oppression’, rather a neo-liberal line has been 
followed whereby the absence or lack of choice is more concerning.  
Agency thus becomes more pertinent in the analysis of action as demonstrative of the 
underlying intent or problem. It is also centred on roles and subsequently, in order to 
outline agency, roles must be attributed and distinguished between. Consequently, a 
primary issue which arises from the notion of agency is the implied reliance on dichotomies 
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of subject/object and powerful/powerless which emerges from the required attribution of 
roles.  
Due to post-colonial feminism’s avoidance of such binaries, the notion of agency will not be 
directly engaged with. By not engaging with agency within the key arguments, binaries of 
strength/weakness and superiority/inferiority are not reinforced, and the development of 
identities and interests rather than strategies for achieving goals come to the fore of this 
thesis. Subsequently, this permits a more thorough engagement with the cases of Egypt and 
Iran, their histories and key individuals. Consequently, history, identity and capabilities 
within the intersecting spheres of gender, class and location emerge more prominently than 
pre-determined binaries through which identities are created, capacities are weakened, and 
they are presented as norms. 
3.4 The Significance of History  
The historical situatedness of the previously presented research questions not only 
emphasises the significance of history, but also ensures its inclusion within methodological 
and theoretical considerations. This thesis endeavours to understand how secularism 
affected women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939. It asserts that 
both states were equally restrictive with regard to matrimonial equality, with divergences 
occurring around the implementation of secularism within each state and the manner in 
which political smokescreens emerged with regard to the appearance of increased gender 
equality within family laws. In chapter one, the contemporary significance of history was 
outlined, echoing Burton’s (1992: 26) assertion that history is not simply the past, but also 
the knowledge about this past that we are conscious of. It was in this section that the 
contemporary significance of this historically located research emerged with regard to 
looking to the past for answers to contemporary questions.  
The female presence in women’s writings examining women is recognised as ever-present, 
however, deviations between ‘feminist’ history and a history of women and their 
movements needs to be acknowledged (Gillis et al., 2007: xxi). Recognition of feminist 
history for Gillis et al. (2007: xxi) is orientated around the emergence of the three feminist 
waves. Acknowledging feminist history within this framework whilst emphasising points of 
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departure from previous movements and tensions between them can be viewed as 
exclusionary. Whilst the first wave of feminism positions historical insight within the 
nineteenth century, it subsequently omits anything prior to this prominent recognition of 
women’s rights. Moreover, the confinement of feminist history to this framework, whilst 
emphasising prominent movements and the advocation of specific rights, potentially 
excludes specificities outside of the purview of the dominant feminism of the era.  
When examining feminism in a non-Western context, McEwan (2001: 97) recognises 
arguments that it emerged as a result of European colonialism and anti-colonial struggles; 
subsequently ‘feminism must…engage with its imperialist origins’. This unequivocal 
association between feminism and Western influences is however, contested to a certain 
extent by Jayawardena (1986: 2) who posits that it was not ‘imposed on the Third World’, 
rather its multifaceted existence across the non-Western world was altered by ‘important 
material and ideological changes that affected women’, with colonialism being a prominent 
contributing factor. It is therefore through the differing engagements between Egypt, Iran, 
and Western powers that the secular nature of the state emerges, and will thus be 
examined in relation to the impact it had on women’s marital rights. 
What remains continuous throughout feminist history is its continued positioning as a 
political and social challenge to ‘male authority and hierarchy’ (Offen, 1988: 152). What is 
emerging more recently however, in conjunction with challenges to male supremacy, are 
challenges to universalisations of women and the various forms of oppression that have 
been experienced. The most vocal of these challenges has arisen from women in the non-
Western world and women of colour, with primary criticisms circling generalised 
assumptions which presuppose that all women have the same concerns. Mohanty (1988, 
cited in McEwan, 2001: 97) is recognised for producing a highly persuasive critique of 
western epistemology in regard to exploring the intersecting fields and experiences of 
women outside of a Western location. Iterating the inconspicuousness of coloured and non-
Western women, this critique can be understood to have positively interrupted feminist 
history as well as the history of feminist writing. This interruption has resulted in the 
emergence of a voluminous amount of work seeking to reject universalised assumptions 
and has resulted in a form of dislocation between feminism and the West. This is not to 
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argue that the feminism/West relationship has been completely refuted, but new paradigms 
have arisen which reinforce Jayawardena’s (1986: 2) assertion.        
Universalisations have not only occurred with regard to the experiences of women however, 
with some feminist theorists providing critiques of key elements of Enlightenment thought 
which have resulted in representations reflecting the ‘perspective of dominant white male 
westerners of the last few centuries’ (Strickland, 1994: 265). This perspective is argued to 
rely on the ‘othering’ of ‘genders, classes, races and cultures’ whose various experiences 
and perceptions have been ‘silenced and suppressed’, resulting in feminist assertions that 
all knowledge is dependent on and constricted by location (Strickland, 1994: 265). 
Consequently, feminists have called for increased awareness of historical, social, and 
political contexts by theorists as a means of evading universalisations (Strickland, 1994: 
265). It is through this discussion that the manifold significance of feminist history is 
reinforced, within this however, the examination of binaries and power structures becomes 
pivotal as a means by which the relevance of history can be further understood in relation 
to this thesis.   
A primary tenet of feminist scholarship is the addressing of the relationship between 
woman and women, with the former being recognised by Mohanty (2003b: 50–51) as ‘a  
cultural and ideological Other’ and the latter as ‘real, material subjects of their collective 
histories’. It is posited that the relationship between the historical subject and the 
production by means of hegemonic discourse serves not as a ‘direct identity’, but as ‘an 
arbitrary relation set up in particular cultural and historical contexts’ (Mohanty, 2003b: 50). 
Emerging from this observation is a critique of the homogenising effects of the feminist 
works analysed by Mohanty (2003b: 50–51) which result in the singular ‘Third World 
woman’ and essentially reinforces oppressor/oppressed power structures; not only within 
the male/female binary, but also within dichotomies such as coloniser/colonised, whereby 
power relations pertaining to biological, cultural and geographic determinants are 
reinforced. 
According to Lazreg (1994: 54), patriarchy is represented in the works of Eisenstein (1979) 
and Hartmann (1979) as ‘the expression of maleness, and therefore biology.’ One of the 
perceived flaws with their works however, is the ahistorical nature of their use of patriarchy 
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and its stagnancy which contributes towards the continued tendencies of feminist historians 
to generalise the historical experiences of women (Lazreg, 1994: 54).  
Fanon’s (1967: 114) observations present world history as the ‘history of men’s struggle for 
dignity’, with those oppressed by colonialism being invited to contribute towards the 
deconstruction of the colonial system. Whilst his observations provide invaluable insight 
into the effects of colonialism within Algeria, the omission of women from this 
representation reinforces a masculinised power structure. Moreover, the effects of 
colonialism function beyond the oppression of individuals, with it being noted that whilst 
colonialism only represents a segment of the histories of post-colonial states, its impact on 
contemporary social, political, cultural and economic situations extended far beyond that of 
‘legacies’ (Rajan, 1993: 6). Additionally, Said’s ‘politics of blame’ according to Rajan (1993: 
7), ‘short-circuits investigation’ into and about the formation of post-colonialism, therefore 
indicating that the attribution of blame within the context of colonialism and its 
consequences is detrimental to more nuanced historical insights. 
As Hegde (1998: 281) observes, ‘it is almost impossible to think of the twentieth century 
without focussing on the impact of colonialism in the production of cultural and aesthetic 
forms.’ Resulting from this is an increased awareness amongst new forms of colonial 
resistance, including nationalism, which enables a ‘critical consciousness’ pertaining to 
continued Western influences and the effects it is having across social and political 
spectrums (Hegde, 1998: 281). Following the colonial history of oppression and 
exploitations, Jacobs (2003: 672) posits that the suspicion of women in post-colonial states 
regarding Western fixations on difference is justifiable. This suspicion also emerges from the 
prominence of the homogenous ‘Third World woman’ as represented in Western discourse 
whereby they are presented as ‘victimized, tradition bound, and passive’ (Hegde, 1998: 
281). 
Whilst divergences in the experiences of the post-colonial woman are sought, Rajan (1993: 
6) posits that similarities between post-colonial nations can be observed through a shared 
history of colonisation. It is from this broad historical commonality that implications of 
colonialism can be shared between states through the centrality of the state; ‘inequalities in 
social structures; the contrary pulls of nationalism and regionalism (or centralization and 
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federalization); and the conflicts between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, with all of them being 
seen to have similar encroaching effects on issues of gender (Rajan, 1993: 6).  
According to Chaterjee (2010: 83) examinations of subaltern history indicate that the 
subaltern emerged internally and externally to colonial spheres of influence and ‘nationalist 
critic.’ It emerges externally in the sense that independence had been maintained however, 
its internality originates from participation in processes and institutions within these 
spheres and thus served as self-transformative (Chaterjee, 2010: 83). From this emerges the 
need for a greater understanding of the historical process and points of contact between 
spheres within this context, and it is from this that historical insight into the effects of 
secularism on women’s marital rights can be situated. Within the examination of the 
colonial power structure however, emerges a call for a shift in analysis. It is from this that a 
greater focus on cultural and ideological aspects of the (post-)colonial impact on societies is 
advocated (Rajan, 1993: 9). Within this emerge discussions regarding religion and its 
formation as a power structure which, within the MENA region, is traditionally associated 
with the family. 
In the context of the MENA region, Islam is not only a structure for specific aspects of 
societal life, but it is also viewed as ‘the cause of gender inequality’ whilst also being 
responsible for ‘underdevelopment’ within a vast amount of modernisation theory 
(Mohanty, 2003b: 59). Moreover, it is argued that feminist discourse on women from the 
MENA region is seen to reflect ‘theologians’ own interpretation of women in Islam…’ 
(Mohanty, 2003b: 59). Consequently, this exemplar serves to ‘deprive women of self-
presence, of being’, women are overshadowed by it and they are seen to have almost no 
history (Lazreg, 1988: 87; Lewis & Mills, 2003: 59). This omission of women’s historical 
identities and experiences and the sole attribution of religion to issues pertaining to gender 
equality and development increases the need for further understanding of the effects of 
secularism on women’s marital rights. Furthermore, exclusion from history is recognised by 
Mohanty (2003b: 58) to be considered applicable to the patriarchal family due to its 
continuation from the era of the Prophet Mohammad.   
Power structures, as has previously been shown, transcend publicly determined boundaries, 
however, it is within this line of thought that the family becomes positioned as one, 
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regardless of geographic location. It is within this that responsibilities and division of labour 
become prominent, however, Gillis et al. (2007: xxvi) contend that the ‘privileging’ of one 
generation over another, potentially by means of recognising feminist waves as 
generational, reinforces the masculine hierarchy of the family and serves as a point of 
tension between women. Consequently, a fluid dialogue between women of all generations 
is required in order to achieve a more nuanced understanding of feminist history and 
responsibilities (Gillis et al., 2007: xxvi). The family is not to be understood in monolithic 
terms, with its historic and contemporary contributions to the political economy as well as 
‘patriarchal social relations’ being multidimensional and disputed (Spivak, 2010: 32).   
Within this context, Spivak (2010: 32) argues against simply replacing the family or the 
adoption of a positivistic inclusion of women as oppressed ‘whose unfractured subjectivity 
allows them to speak for themselves against an equally monolithic “same system.”’ 
However, it is acknowledged that concepts such as reproduction, division of labour, the 
family, marriage and patriarchy, are frequently used as overarching concepts with no 
cultural or historical contexts being provided (Mohanty, 2003b: 58). This subsequently 
serves as a point of contention within feminist work when specificity is absent and they are 
employed as explanatory for women’s oppression (Mohanty, 2003b: 58). 
Spivak’s question Can the Subaltern Speak? functioned as a supplementary precursor to the 
fissure which remained between the ‘necessities of historical and political representation’ 
and means of existing which move beyond official methods of ‘voice giving’ (Birla, 2010: 98). 
It is within this context, and the significance of the interrelated power structures which have 
been outlined above, that history is of paramount importance. Moreover, the historical 
situatedness of family law within religious law and the subsequent debates which have 
arisen pertaining to gender equality iterates the importance of challenging these normative 
portrayals through an historical examination of the impact of secularism on women’s 
marital rights.  
3.5 Comparative-Historical Analysis: A Qualitative Approach 
This thesis endeavours to establish how secularism affected women’s marital rights in Egypt 
and Iran between 1920 and 1939. Whilst there are competing definitions of secularism and 
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its role within the state, the positioning of MENA family law within Islamic law is universally 
recognised. This thesis does not seek to contest the continued situatedness of this area of 
law in Islamic religio-legal jurisdictions, it does however, seek to challenge notions that it 
has remained untouched by secularism. This is not necessarily to indicate that secularism 
penetrated this aspect of law, rather it supposes that its position as an external factor, 
located within various state power structures, impacted on alterations made to these laws. 
To understand family law within this milieu, whilst observing divergent historical trajectories 
and cultural practices, comparative-historical analysis is adopted.  
Comprised of an amalgamation of two diverging approaches, comparative-historical analysis 
enables ‘contextualising comparisons of similar and contrasting cases’ which contributed to 
its uniqueness (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003: 13). A comparative approach is advocated 
for research conducting ‘feminist cross-cultural work’ as it enables theorising of intersecting 
factors such as experience, history and location whilst emphasising ‘common differences’, 
thus providing stronger foundations for understandings to develop across differences as 
well as ‘unequal power relations’ (Mohanty, 2003a: 518). This method however, is not 
restricted to differences, with similarities being of equal importance in critical enquiry 
(Rajan, 1993: 1); this mode of analysis is therefore justifiable for this thesis as similarities 
and differences are sought within and across state boundaries.  
Central to comparative analysis is the case study, and it is through the adoption of this 
framework that a more nuanced examination of the impact of secularism on matrimonial 
equality in Egypt and Iran can be achieved. Whilst there is no prescribed number of studies 
which should be used (Rowley, 2000: 21–22), Ragin (1987: 49–50) posits that studies of this 
nature work well with small-N projects with two to four cases being seen as manageable, 
possibly arising from conflicting results in large-N projects (Moghadam, 2013: 2). The 
rationale for adopting two cases in this context thus relates to the point of inquiry being 
patterns of development in family law, with a specific focus on matrimonial equality; 
therefore case study selection, as previously discussed in chapter one, is paramount as they 
need to be representative of the wider process. Secondly, a small-N project is justifiable for 
this research due to its qualitative nature which is grounded in historical approaches and 
methods, rather than producing a taxonomy.   
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The adoption of a small-N comparative-historical approach also enables researchers to 
move ‘between theory and history in many iterations of analysis ‘as a means of developing 
new ideas’ or refining ‘pre-existing theoretical expectations in light of detailed case 
evidence’ (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003: 13). Researchers adopting this method are also 
recognised for generally having a good understanding of their cases and are subsequently 
able to ‘measure variables in light of the broader context of each particular case’ (Mahoney 
& Rueschemeyer, 2003: 13). This attribute is recognised to increase levels of measurement 
and theoretical validity which is less likely to occur in large-N projects, whilst also enabling 
the researcher to see how variables could have different causal effects in different contexts 
and has thus been labelled ‘contextualized comparisons’ (Locke & Thelen, 1995 cited in 
Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003: 13). 
Working in conjunction with comparative methods, historical methods or historiography 
ordinarily occur when examining events or characteristics of phenomena which transpired 
at a specific time and place. In regard to this project, historical methods will be employed as 
a means of examining the impact of secularism on women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran 
between 1920 and 1939. The significance of this era in relation to secularism and women’s 
rights pertains specifically to the secular nature of the state following governmental changes 
and foreign occupations, as well as the post-revolution environment in which the 
constitutions of both countries were established. 
It is through the use of historical methods that the historian can attempt to reconstruct as 
much of human history as is possible (Gottschalk, 2006: 44). It is argued however, that this 
method has a tripartite construction, encompassing the ‘collection of probable sources of 
information’; ‘the examination of these sources for genuineness (either in whole or in part)’; 
and ‘the analysis of the sources or parts of sources proved genuine for their credible 
particulars’ (Gottschalk, 2006: 45). The historical overview provided by this research is 
therefore important because it provides insight into how marital rights and their 
situatedness in religious law are contemporarily conceptualised as a site of contestation.  
The chosen number of cases and the comparative-historical approach, coupled with 
theoretical insight from post-colonial feminism permit qualitative insight to be sought. 
Within feminist work, Oakley (1998: 707) writes of the increased attention which has been 
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given to methodology since the 1960s, arguing that the gender binary can be understood to 
have emerged within it whereby qualitative methods appear to have been aligned with 
feminism and quantitative methods appear to have been affiliated with defending ‘the 
(masculinist) status quo’. Rationales for the preferred alignment of feminist research with 
qualitative methods include concerns such as generalisations which can arise from 
quantitative research, although concerns pertaining to description arise from qualitative 
approaches (Stanley & Wise, 1993: 6). Additional concerns regarding the use of quantitative 
research methods within feminist works include topical choices supporting sexist values, the 
exclusion or marginalisation of female subjects, superficial and over generalised results, and 
the researcher/researched relationship adopting an exploitative nature (Oakley, 1998: 709). 
Concerns encompassing the employment of quantitative methods in feminist research have 
arisen around the ‘fitting’ of women into ‘methodologically conventional quantitative 
frameworks’ and the issues emerging from the statistical analyses which have occurred 
(Tickner, 2006: 36–37). Qualitative methods are not immune to feminist concerns, with 
Kitzinger (2004: 12) articulating apprehensions surrounding frequent claims within feminist 
work of representing experience or ‘reclaiming voices’ which are subsequently represented 
as ‘truth’. A possible explanation for this is however, due to the integral role women’s voices 
are seen to play in feminist qualitative research, with the change from voice to experience 
being common within this methodological approach (Kitzinger, 2004: 29). The feminist 
critique of methodological approaches has thus been viewed by Oakley (1998: 715) as 
placing new emphasis on the ‘extent to which different methodologies imply different forms 
of power relations…’ 
It is from the concerns outlined above that the adoption of a qualitative, comparative-
historical approach is justifiable. Whilst trepidations towards qualitative methods have also 
been emphasised, the employment of a comparative-historical framework for this thesis 
permits continuous transitions between theory and evidence which is considered to be a 
rare occurrence in quantitative methods due to the intensity the framework provides. The 
adoption of two case studies for this thesis permits the emergence of more nuanced 
insights into the political contexts of the period immediately prior to that which is under 
examination. It will also permit insight into the pre-revolutionary epochs of each case and 
the political processes implemented. Additionally, contextualisation of each case prior to 
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1920 is integral so as to further contribute towards an understanding of political, national, 
and religious identities espoused by those actively seeking change, as well as those 
implementing it. Through this it becomes possible to focus on the experiences and identities 
of those involved in various processes, as well as the surrounding intersecting spheres of 
gender, class and power structures. Consequentially, a more contextualised understanding 
of the political situation and environment within which women’s marital rights are 
examined becomes possible, thus avoiding universalised representations occurring.  
3.5.1 Finding and Analysing Sources: Interpreting Archives  
A primary concern surfacing from historically based research is access to documents and 
reliance on secondary data. This reliance is criticised by Goldthorpe due to the potential for 
biases resulting from the researcher’s ability to choose between two accounts of the same 
event and the risk of data manipulation due to the historian’s theoretical understandings 
influencing their interpretation of the data (Lange, 2013: 144). These concerns can be 
directly related to access. For historical researchers access to (reliable) materials can be 
problematic, and whilst proximate access occurs where the observer and the observed co-
exist; historical researchers have mediate access to the observed through sources due to 
their existences not being co-present. Subsequently, observations made by the researcher 
are reliant on indirect evidence from documents produced by other people in the past 
(Scott, 2006: 5). Due to the historically situated nature of this research, mediate access is 
the only possible form of obtaining data.  
Whilst archival research itself is not a method of analysis, it is an integral method for source 
collection in historical research. One benefit of archival research is the vast array of sources 
available to the researcher and it is because of this that this mode of obtaining data cannot 
be aligned with a single methodology (Gallo, 2009: 264). Secondly, archival research is not 
restricted to use by historians, with it becoming an integral tool for scholars of other 
disciplines which are not solely reliant on empirical experiments (Gallo, 2009: 264). Finally, it 
is flexible with regard to the qualitative or quantitative nature of the project; however, it is 
normally associated with the former.  
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Although archives cover a broad spectrum of historical documents and span a large period 
of history, there are some disadvantages to their usage, with the primary one being 
availability and the different types of issues which arise within this. According to Scott 
(2006: 29), in order for a source to survive it needs to be deposited in a place which is likely 
to accommodate this, such as libraries or archives. Unfortunately this does not happen for 
all sources, with some being disposed of. The second issue is ‘weeding’, and this occurs 
when documents are assessed on their perceived value to the researcher or their suitability 
to be released to the public – for example, some sources may be considered too politically 
sensitive or may contain confidential information about individuals or institutions (Scott, 
2006: 29-30). 
Another issue which arises within archival research is that data is collected for non-scientific 
reasons and for the benefit of those collecting rather than those researching; the researcher 
is thus ‘at the mercy of any biases that may have occurred in collecting the data…’ (White & 
McBurney, 2009: 201). Fortunately, locating and obtaining sources within archives and 
libraries has not proven to be too troublesome, and this is potentially due to the period 
being examined falling within the colonial era. For this thesis, a number of different sources 
will be analysed, including historical monographs, memoirs (al-Sultana/Vanzan & Neshati 
(eds.), n.d./2003; Farman Farmaian, 1993; Shaarawi, 1987), biographical accounts (Sharawi 
Lanfranchi, 2012) and legal texts (Peaslee, 1950c; Wright, 1919b). By contextualising sources 
through these categories it thus becomes possible to further understand their purpose and 
target audience, as well as better understanding their author.  
Initial results indicated that The National Archives (TNA) was the most fruitful with regard to 
relevant source materials. Emerging prominently within these searches were access to the 
(French) draft of the 1923 Egyptian Constitution (TNA, FO 141/516/7, 1922) and a report by 
colonial officers pertaining to the activities of Egyptian women activists (TNA, FO 141/511/6, 
1924). A primary issue which arose from this archival research however, was access to 
documents concerning Iranian history with there being no access to the 1906 Constitution 
or reports on women’s activities. What was retrieved were two reports outlining the 
political situation in Iran during the period being examined in this research (TNA, FO 
248/1369, n.d.; TNA, FO 416/112, 1932). Whilst TNA was unable to provide some of the 
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sources required to gain insight into the political climate of Iran during the early twentieth 
century, access to legal databases served to counter this issue.  
Through these legal databases translated versions of both the Egyptian and the Iranian 
Constitutions were obtainable (Peaslee, 1950a: 721–735; 1950b: 200–205). Moreover, 
access to newspaper archives through the Wellcome Library provided insight into British 
representations of Egypt and British troops in Egypt as portrayed in The Illustrated London 
News. Another issue which arose during the research process was access to documents 
pertaining to women who were not of the upper echelons of society, thus the key women 
examined do lean the analysis conducted towards the experiences of more privileged 
women, thus this thesis does not claim to represent an overarching female experience. 
Rather it presents partial insights into the lived experiences of some key women, 
recognising that they are not representative of all women in Egypt and Iran. 
A total of forty-one sources will be used for the analyses of Egypt and Iran in conjunction 
with the surrounding academic literature, with a ratio of 32:9 for primary to secondary 
sources occurring (see Appendix 2 for breakdown of sources). More specifically, Egypt 
emerges with a ratio of 19:4 and Iran 13:5; with the larger number of primary sources being 
used for Egypt potentially arising from its official occupation by Britain. Differentials 
between the numbers of sources used, reinforces the overarching prominence of primary 
sources in the later analyses, thus addressing concerns of the over-reliance of historic 
research on secondary data. Goldthorpe’s (cited in Lange, 2013: 144) criticism of a 
researcher’s ability to choose between accounts of a situation is also countered through the 
inclusion of diverging perspectives, thus limiting the potential for bias in this historically 
situated, qualitative project.  
Another issue to arise from this is that of the researcher bias, whereby the expectations and 
hopes of the researcher regarding the outcome becomes active in producing results, thus 
threatening the validity of the research. In approaching this research, expectations 
regarding the effects of secularism, and more specifically the secular nature of the state, on 
women’s marital rights were present. It was anticipated that secularism would have had an 
effect of matrimonial equality in Egypt and Iran and that there would be similarities in how 
this occurred; but what was not expected was the manner in which rights were affected, 
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where the similarities and differences arose, and how this has continued to affect the 
secular nature of each state into the twenty-first century. One of the methods adopted to 
ensure that researcher bias did not threaten the findings of this thesis was through the 
inclusion of multiple accounts and interpretations of the events discussed, moreover, the 
use of several translations of documents ensured increased reliability for this research and 
lessened the risk of other researcher biases, thus speaking to Goldthorpe’s (cited in Lange, 
2013: 144) assertion.  
Stanley and Wise (1993: 218) claim however, that it is not solely the representative 
foundations of historical research which need to be examined, with all research involving 
‘the production of the textual representation of a research reality’. Consequently, textual 
analysis will be used for source analysis. The application of this form of investigation to this 
thesis is neatly summarised by Edwards (2000: 8): 
…it is often helpful to combine observation with an evolving theory—to identify the likely 
key factors and relationships among factors early in order to be better able to “see” and 
interpret historical cases with some sophistication. The purpose is to evolve good, structured 
insights, even if rigorous and precise conclusions cannot be drawn from the historical cases 
alone. 
This form of interpretive analysis examines the underlying meaning(s) of a text, how it is 
interpreted by various actors, and its relationship to surrounding social contexts (Gephart, 
1997: 584). Furthermore, it is argued that this approach: 
...involves mediation between the frames of reference of the researcher and those who 
produced the text. The aim of this dialogue is to move within the ‘hermeneutic circle’ in 
which we comprehend a text by understanding the frame of reference from which it was 
produced, and appreciate that frame of reference by understanding the text. The 
researcher’s own frame of reference becomes the springboard from which the circle is 
entered, and so the circle reaches back to encompass the dialogue between the researcher 
and the text.  
(Scott, 2006: 35) 
The reflexive relationship between the researcher and the text consequently enables a 
greater sense of identity to be established regarding the author and the intended audience. 
In addition to this, a feminist research ethic encourages self-reflection on how we analyse 
our work through the application of the same criterion to each case, it also enables the 
recognition of unintended biases which may affect the interpretation of information being 
analysed (Ackerly & True, 2006: 137). This also directly relates to the aforementioned 
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reflexive relationship between theory and history and will subsequently reinforce the 
analytical framework adopted for this project through the reflexive manner in which theory, 
text, and researcher are linked.  
This form of analysis can also be seen to understand culture as a form of narrative, with 
specific texts linking (both directly and indirectly) to larger aspects of society. It is argued 
however, that ‘It is difficult to speak of a politics of interpretation without a working notion 
of ideology as larger than the concepts of individual consciousness and will’ (Spivak, 1987: 
161). This type of textual analysis therefore focuses on how identity formation occurs within 
texts for those using them. This method of analysis thus accounts for the issues raised 
against Western feminism by post-colonial feminists and enables a greater understanding of 
individual rather than universalising experiences. The analysis will thus occur within the 
framework of power structures (see section 3.3), focussing specifically on gender, 
colonialism and religion. Simultaneously, perspectives and interpretations of all sources 
used will inform the analysis in parallel with recognition of who the intended audience was 
and the original purpose of the document. 
The application of this approach to various sources also needs to be addressed with regard 
to their intended and received content, with the former referring to the author’s intended 
meaning and the latter referring to meaning constructed by the audience. Once the 
researcher begins analysis, they then become part of the audience and recognition needs to 
be made of the perspectives and interests of the varying number of audiences it may be 
received by (Scott, 2006: 36). Within the context of this thesis, the utilisation of this 
interpretive approach will facilitate a comprehension of the language used in sources whilst 
also recognising the cyclical relationship between author and audience as will be evidenced 
through analyses conducted in the following chapters. 
3.6 Conclusion: A Historical, Post-Colonial Feminist Approach 
Feminism has evolved as a set of theories which permit gender (in)equality and sexual 
differences to be comprehended through different lenses. These lenses permit 
engagements to occur between gender, women’s rights and spheres which intersect with 
them, thus allowing more nuanced understandings of divergent experiences. Concerns 
pertaining to the homogenisation of women and frequent restrictions when researching 
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women within the MENA region to rights and gender based binaries within a religious 
paradigm are some things which are still proving burdensome in contemporary debates.  
From the above discussion, it is apparent that there are close relationships between 
feminist research, qualitative analysis, comparative-historical analysis and textual analysis. 
Consequently, a qualitative, comparative-historical approach will be accompanied by a post-
colonial feminist framework and implemented throughout the succeeding chapters. These 
chapters will examine whether normative family law was challenged and altered to 
accommodate a greater sense of gender equality within marriage; or whether legal 
alterations appeared to mask issues of matrimonial inequality, whilst maintaining 
conditional loopholes by which the normative structure of the family and gendered 
normativity within the state remained essentially unchanged.  
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Chapter Four 
An Unhappy Relationship: 
Colonial Power Structures in Egypt 1900-1919 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis endeavours to understand how secularism affected women’s marital rights in 
Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939. The previous chapters have contextualised this 
research’s situatedness within contemporary political occurrences and existing scholarly 
works, with chapter three positioning it within a comparative-historical, post-colonial 
feminist paradigm. The purpose of this chapter however, is to provide the historical 
background to one part of this comparative-historical study. Throughout the analysis of the 
period 1900-1919, it will be possible to contextualise the ‘trial separation’ which occurred 
between Britain and Egypt and the effects of the British colonial power structure on aspects 
of socio-political life, all of which intersect with gender, marriage and the family.  
This chapter subsequently serves to comprehend the effects of diverging power structures 
on women, family law and gender equality in the epoch immediately prior to that which is 
the point of examination in this thesis. Commencing with insights into the effects of British 
occupation, the first part of this chapter examines the significance of representations of 
Egypt and the British presence there. It also explores the socio-economic and political 
effects of colonising forces on the Egyptian peoples. The chapter then examines the effects 
of World War One on social, political and economic variables within Egyptian society which 
provides the foundations for an examination between economic concerns and declining 
marriage rates. This section therefore provides a point of transition to socio-economic 
concerns of marriage. Within this emerge discussions pertaining to the economic 
considerations of marriage and the problematising of foreign settlers and subsequent mixed 
marriages. From this it is possible to gain insight into nationalistic and cultural concerns 
arising from inter-national marriages and points of tension between Egyptian and non-
Egyptian peoples. 
The chapter then discusses the politics of resistance against occupation and patriarchy. The 
former includes the examination of resistance during World War One and subsequent 
events, such as the 1919 revolution; the latter pertains to the gendering of the revolution 
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which saw an increased female public presence. Throughout both of these discussions 
however, emerge cultural, political, social, economic, and gendered observations, including 
the (in)visibility of some social classes. The chapter then concludes by reinforcing the 
conjoined nature of these factors and their significance in providing the foundations for the 
later comparative analysis which will occur with regard to the effects of secularism on 
women’s marital rights in the following decades.   
4.2 British Occupation: A Country Interrupted22  
The 1882 British occupation of Egypt was only ever meant to be temporary. Whilst quasi-
independence was gained in 1922, Britain refused to relinquish complete control of the 
country until 1952. Numerous factors contributed to the repeated colonisation of Egypt by 
foreign powers, with a primary justification being orientalist perceptions of Egypt as the key 
to both the African and Asian continents (Said, 1978: 84). The relationship between Egypt 
and Britain was tumultuous, and prior to it Egypt had experienced unhappy relationships 
with France and the Ottoman Empire in addition to other forms of foreign occupation 
eradicating Egyptian independence (see section 1.3.2). Following the successful removal of 
French and Ottoman forces by the British, Egyptians sought the removal of British forces 
which culminated in the 1919 Revolution. 
The British government’s removal of forces however, is recounted by Goldschmidt (1992: 1) 
as difficult. This is due to the development of hypothetical financial and administrative 
reforms which Britain believed necessary should the suppression of the Urabi revolution23 
have proven insufficient (Farid/Goldschmidt, 1992: 1). Within a year of the British 
occupation, Lord Cromer was sent to Egypt under the guise of political representative and it 
was established that Britain’s, and subsequently Egypt’s, interests would be best served if 
the hypothetical reforms became realities (Farid/Goldschmidt, 1992: 1). Despite British 
presence in Egypt, prior to the establishment of the 1914 protectorate (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 
                                                 
22 This notion was derived by Jaques Berque in his historical monograph of Egypt (1972: 102). 
23 The Urabi revolution was a sequence of political and military events between 1879-1882 led by Colonel 
Ahmed Urabi who sought to remove British and French forces from Egypt. However, the revolution came to an 
end following an increased British presence and is perceived as responsible for the continued British 
occupation of Egypt. 
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2011: 58) Egypt remained under the hereditary rule of the Ali dynasty24 which followed the 
‘Ottoman rule of succession’ and governors adopted the title of khedive25 (Goldschmidt, 
1992: 1). 
A prominent concern within the British colonial power structure however, was the 
representation of both Egypt and Britain to each other as well as to the wider international 
audience; with Cuno (2003: 265) positing that these concerns arose within the palace 
regarding public opinion within both Europe and Egypt. The significance of representation is 
reinforced by Spivak (1999: 113): 
In order to resist, we must remind ourselves that it should not be possible, in principle, to 
read nineteenth-century British literature without remembering that imperialism, 
understood as England’s social mission, was a crucial part of the cultural representation of 
England to the English. The role of literature in the production of cultural representation 
should not be ignored…  
This depicts normative discourses of hegemonic Western portrayals which post-colonial 
theorists seek to disrupt (Hegde, 1998: 281). Representation goes beyond literary domains 
however, and ventures into the realm of the media, with newspapers providing one of the 
most common means of information dissemination amongst British peoples. Consequently, 
the representation of British troops was arguably just as, if not more important than the 
portrayal of Egypt, due to the need to reinforce the continued dominance of colonial power 
structures within foreign territories.  
Between 1907 and 1908, The Illustrated London News produced at least three articles 
pertaining directly to Lord Cromer and his work in Egypt. Language used in the headlines 
‘The Maker of Modern Egypt: Lord Cromer, His Successor’ (1907); ‘And Landmarks of 
Egyptian History Under His Rule’ (1907); ‘Lord Cromer’s Egypt’ (1908) and throughout the 
articles denotes a sense of ownership and superiority which subsequently imply that Lord 
Cromer’s work was not only raising the status of Egypt as a country, but also reinforcing the 
strength of Britain. This speaks to post-colonial feminism’s criticism of Western centric 
knowledge which in turn has resulted in endeavours to perturb powers of representing, 
amongst other things (McEwan, 2001: 100). The language used in these instances also 
                                                 
24 Following the convention of 1840, Egypt was to remain under the rule of Muhammad Ali and his 
descendants. Signatories included the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain, along with all of the other great 
powers (Goldschmidt, 1992: 1).  
25 Persian term which roughly translates to ‘viceroy’ (Farid / Goldschmidt, 1992: 1). 
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reinforces Cohn’s (2013: 5) observation that rationales for colonising powers frequently 
related to perceptions of racial inferiority of those being colonised; thus underlining 
Western-centric portrayals and perceptions of Western, in this case British, superiority. 
Four years later, ‘To-Day in Egypt’ (The Illustrated London News, 1912) provided British 
‘insights’ into the behaviour of the Egyptian peoples. Throughout the article there is an 
obvious sense of pride in the developing resemblance to Western cities. Surprise at this 
achievement in some places is also evident through language such as ‘Even Port Said…’ 
however, the benefits of this development are only recognised to benefit Europeans in the 
region. The remainder of the article is gendered in two senses. First is the gendering of the 
state through phrases such as ‘…Young Egypt will never be right until he has an educated 
mother…’ This imagery implies that Britain’s primary role was to act as the educated mother 
to Egypt; moreover, Egypt is depicted as a young delinquent in need of guidance, 
subsequently reinforcing a positive understanding of the British occupation of Egypt 
amongst its readers.  
The final part of the article pertains to Egyptian men. Derogatory references to male citizens 
as ‘dark skinned youngsters’ who ‘ogle’ English girls and speculation about their opinions of 
these girls further contributes to the young, delinquent portrayal of Egypt and its citizens, 
whilst simultaneously serving to reinforce Cohn’s (2013: 5) observation of rationales for 
colonising powers. Moreover, it implies the naïveté of English girls and their choice of 
friends. What the article does not say however, speaks in greater volumes than what it 
does. Omitted from this article are British men and Egyptian women and questions 
pertaining to British opinions of them consequently arise. It therefore becomes possible to 
query whether Egyptian women were seen as docile and unthreatening to British men, or 
whether British men were understood to be less naïve than the ‘girls’ who were seen to 
fraternise with Egyptian men. The perceived strength of the British man and the 
unthreatening nature of the Egyptian woman are thus expressed more strongly through 
their absence.26 Secondly, the use of ‘girl’ rather than woman places the English woman into 
the same category as children, implying that they need to be protected and guided. The 
                                                 
26 The alternating between British and English is intentional. Egypt was considered part of the British Empire, 
and thus denotes strength and capability. The term English is used to refer to female citizens and is considered 
here to represent innocence, possibly as an indirect reference to the ‘English rose’. 
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language used thus reinforces patriarchal overtones, whilst silences reinforce male strength 
as well as a positive depiction of the British occupation.  
Despite the inclusion of the ‘English girl’ and ‘Egyptian man’ within this account, the article 
excludes female and Egyptian experiences, reinforcing the white, male, colonial narrative. It 
is the exclusionary nature of such universalised, Western centric accounts which (post-
colonial) feminist theory seeks to disturb (Bethke Elshtain, 1981: 303). Within this context 
Connell’s (1987: 130) observation of the patriarchal state representing ‘a reverberating set 
of power relations and political processes...’ is reflected. Subsequently emphasis is placed 
on the importance of understanding gendered and colonial relations as sought by post-
colonial feminism in situating the effects of secularism on women’s marital rights within an 
historic context. 
In 1911, Lord Kitchener was appointed Agent and Consul-General, and it was under him that 
progress was seen to be made in the economic and social conditions of the Egyptian people 
(R.I.I.A, 1952: 2) and was presented as ‘The Strong Man for Egypt’ by The Illustrated London 
News (1911). Colonial power structures are thus reinforced in this portrayal of Lord 
Kitchener through his empowerment as ‘the strong man for Egypt’ over other individuals, 
concurrently serving to position Britain over Egypt. In 1913 a new organic law (Wright, 
1919a) was promulgated, along with the creation of a legislative assembly of which some 
members were elected; however, this consultative body had no authority to initiate 
legislature, but it did have veto powers over tax (R.I.I.A, 1952: 2–3).  
The language used throughout the law once again denoted ownership and control (‘our’, 
‘us’)(Wright, 1919: 175,178) and modernity (‘enlightened’) (175); as well as a monogamous 
relationship to the khedive and subsequently Egypt (‘fidelity’) (177); and finally, it is 
emphasised that the development of government systems will not be a ‘servile imitation of 
Western methods…’(176) thus reinforcing the determination of the khedive to present 
Egypt as an independent nation and serving to threaten established British power 
structures. This determination could thus have contributed to his expulsion following the 
British overthrow of Ottoman control in Egypt and the implementation of the British 
protectorate over Egypt (Berque, 1972: 263). Indicative of the destabilising potential he 
wielded, his removal represents a means of reinforcing power in a country of perceived 
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importance to Britain. It also emphasises the hegemonic masculinity of the strong, white 
male within a colonial context which speaks to Connell’s (cited in Cohn, 2013: 4) perception 
that it functions to legitimise some men’s power over others, irrespective of sex. 
Consequently, this indicates the multifaceted effects of power structures and reinforces its 
effects on men as well as women; therefore reinforcing the socio-political effects of power 
structures within the context of occupied Egypt. Subsequently, the polygonal nature of 
power structures within Egypt during this epoch serves to historically contextualise the 
intertwined nature of different spheres and how they impacted upon women’s marital 
rights. 
The social and economic restructuring which happened throughout these years is 
understood to have had a detrimental impact on women’s position within society. Golley 
(2004: 531) advances that the impact of the new capitalist system was an increased working 
urban population which resulted in a higher rate of competition. Consequently, a vast 
number of women became unemployed and were forced to return to the domestic sphere; 
however, this was, according to Golley, another means by which cultural identity was 
reinforced against the ever looming European influences whilst also reinforcing a pre-
capitalist patriarchal structure as discussed by Bethke Elshtain (1981: 212). However, 
women’s rights had been emerging as a prominent subject area, with Western inspired 
feminists such as Qasim Amin arguing that the position of the nation could not be improved 
without advancing the position of women, and women’s rights thus emerged within a 
religious framework (Golley, 2004: 531-532). This Islamic framework is interpreted here as 
an oppositional move by Egyptian citizens against the secular politics and Western models 
which were being implemented, rather than opposition to the ‘foreign Christian regime’ 
they were critical of (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2011: 63). Within this milieu it is arguable that the 
continued presence of family law within a religio-legal jurisdiction functioned to ‘protect’ 
the cornerstone of society from foreign socio-political threats.  
Economic prowess was thus perceived as powerless in the face of nationalist prejudice 
(Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2011: 63) and contributed to another fear. This time, the concern faced the 
British and was a decline in power. According to Berque (1972: 263), by 1910 both sides of 
the argument for British occupation had occurred; moreover, by the eve of World War One, 
British prominence in Egypt appeared to be ‘utterly exhausted’. It is from this observation 
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that fluctuations in the strength of colonial power structures becomes prominent, however, 
in order to further understand these instabilities, it is necessary to examine them in parallel 
to variables such as war. Prior to this however, it is necessary to understand the impact of 
monarchical transitions during World War One, fluctuations in monarchical patriotism which 
occurred, and their subsequent implications for secularism and women’s rights.  
4.2.1 Khedive, Sultan, King: Monarchical Transitions and Patriotic Fluctuations 
Occurring during World War One, the monarchical transitions is pivotal in understanding the 
implementation of secularism in Egypt and therefore historically contextualising how the 
secular nature of the state shaped the development of women’s marital rights. Until 1914 
Abbas Hilmi II, the seventh ruling member of the Muhammad Ali dynasty, was khedive 
(Sonbol, 1998: 1). Recognised as an enthusiastic nationalist, clashes with the British 
authorities began in 1893 when he sought to replace pro-British members of his 
government without the consent of Lord Cromer (Goldschmidt, 2000: 2). After 1894, Abbas 
was unable to publicly oppose British rule and secretly established ‘The Society for the 
Revival of the Nation’, which ‘became the nucleus for Mustafa Kamil’s National Party’ 
(Goldschmidt, 2000: 2). 
Despite clashes with the British, peace was made and Abbas’ anti-British sentiment ended, 
whilst maintaining support for constitutional rule. Goldschmidt (2000: 3) suggests that the 
ending of his anti-British sentiment was due to the retirement of Lord Cromer – who he felt 
has attempted ‘to make himself the true monarch of Egypt’ (Sonbol, 1998: 12), and while his 
successor, Gorst, was in charge relationships with the British strengthened and he turned 
away from the nationalists (Goldshcmidt, 2000: 3). A reason for improving British relations 
emerges, as Gorst’s writings indicate that ‘he preferred the idea of working with the 
khedive’ (Hunter, 2007: 49), thus placing him in stark contrast to his predecessor. Through 
the adoption of this method, Gorst began improving relations with Egypt whilst 
simultaneously weakening the nationalist party. This more lenient approach, however, can 
be understood to have been detrimental to Gorst’s profile with cooperation potentially 
resulting in him being disliked by older British colonialists. Additionally, Abbas’s memoirs are 
recognised by Sonbol (1998: 6) as illustrating ‘the harmful effects of the “open door” policy 
on Egypt’. 
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Gorst’s perceived ability in Egypt was, however, questioned. Analysis of Britain’s role in 
Egypt (see section 4.2) emphasised the presentation of Lord Cromer and Lord Kitchener as 
strong, capable men. The apparent absence of representations of Gorst, indicate that his 
approach did not conform with more traditional colonial methods. Following his return to 
England, Lord Kitchener was appointed to this position and Abbas’ anti-British sentiment 
soon returned; however, by this time the power of the Nationalist Party had waned. Despite 
the disappearance of his anti-British sentiment during Gorst’s time, it is argued that it was 
his patriotism which saw him deposed in 1914 (Hassan, 2000: 49). His patriotism is 
reinforced in his memoirs (Sonbol, 1998: 177-178) when he says: 
I cannot mention all those who, under my rule, devoted themselves to national rebirth; but 
those who defended the rights and liberty of women merit a place of honour. 
Whilst language indicates that women’s rights were considered important, the emphasis on 
‘those who defended’ raises questions about recognition, with ‘defending’ indicating 
strength and the ability to protect. In examining his account of this, recognition is paid to 
specific individuals who advocated women’s rights, however, closer examination reveals an 
emphasis on male advocates with a ratio of 2:4 (women to men) emerging. Moreover, 
whilst male advocates were recognised directly, Malak Hifni Nasif was recognised through 
her pen-name, Bahithat al-Badiya, with the other being identified by her husband: ‘Bishara 
Takla and his alert wife…’ (Sonbol, 1998: 178; fn 9). Consequently, whilst women’s rights 
have been recognised, and praise has been given to those advocating them, the lack of 
recognition or engagement with female advocates reinforces notions of the male strength. 
Building on this, within the context of developments in education and studying abroad, 
Abbas wrote: 
It pleases me to add here that we also did not forget that it was necessary to pay attention 
to the feminine element of our country, for centuries kept apart from national life, which 
was, however, already showing itself energetic and active here and there, following the 
example of what was taking place elsewhere in the world. 
(Sonbol, 1998: 197) 
In reference to this, Sonbol (1998: 197 fn 7) posits that this was ‘one of the few places 
where he discusses the condition of women’. Divergently, it is argued here that this does 
not refer to the position of women; rather, ‘feminine element of our country’ implies 
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disengagement from women and advocates of gender equality. Furthermore, ‘feminine’ 
stands in contrast to masculine; once again reinforcing binaries of strength and weakness. 
Following his removal from power, the British offered the position to his uncle, Hussayn 
Kemil three times. Having declined the first two times due to his belief that Abbas was the 
‘rightful sovereign’, he accepted the third offer following the threat that the dynasty would 
change and that a British candidate was in a nearby hotel (Hassan, 2000: 80). Subsequently, 
he was give the title of the ‘first “sultan” of Egypt’ (Goldschmidt, 2000: 83). Abbas’ (Sonbol, 
1998: 325) observation of his removal and the appointment of his uncle, was that it 
‘effectively sanctioned the unlimited extension of a so-called temporary occupation and 
entry into war, and the defence of Egypt became a uniquely British affair’. British 
prominence is further enhanced when Abbas (Sonbol, 1998: 325) recalls imposed 
restrictions which were placed on his uncle, resulting in the British Agent being the only 
person able to conduct ‘relations between the Egyptian Government and foreign Powers in 
Cairo’. Following his death three years later, Fuʾād ascended the throne, with his nephew 
being perceived as ‘anti-British’ (Goldschmidt, 2000: 59). Abbas (Sonbol, 1998: 140) 
indicates that his appointment was because he was seen as ‘an honest and ardent patriot’ 
with an ‘uncompromising attitude towards England’. Five years later, he issued a decree 
permitting him to change his title from Sultan to King.  
From these transitions emerge several observations which build on Berque’s (1972: 263) 
notion that both sides were ‘utterly exhausted’. Firstly, the khedive’s inconsistency in 
nationalist and anti-British sentiment indicates more of an anti-individual sentiment rather 
than opposition to British occupation as a whole; and this has been evidenced in his 
diverging approaches to Lords Cromer, Gorst, and Kitchener. Subsequently, Gorst’s more 
lenient approach and the khedive’s altering approaches can be seen to have threatened the 
British colonial power structure. Secondly, Britain re-established its power through threats 
to the dynasty and the appointment of individuals with more pro-British sentiment. Thirdly, 
Fuʾād’s adoption of the title ‘King’ is interpreted here as showing increased allegiance to the 
occupying power. The appointments of Kemil and Fuʾād indicate the reinforcing of British 
control in Egypt, thus providing the occupying power with a stronger framework within 
which their secularising policies could be implemented, whilst not engaging with the private 
sphere and women’s rights. 
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The disengaged language of Abbas’ memoirs in reference to women and their rights 
reinforces the manner in which nationalism was prioritised. Whilst praise is afforded to 
specific individuals advocating increased gender equality, the prominence of men and the 
absence of direct references to women reinforces patriarchal power structures. Moreover, 
the independence of the nation is presented as more important, with references only being 
made directly to the British colonising power structure. The positioning of women within 
Abbas’ memoirs alongside restrictions imposed by the British and Fuʾād’s perceived loyalties 
to them indicate that the introduction of secularism via this power structure did not directly 
impact on women’s rights. Rather, these observations reinforce the above argument (see 
section 4.2) pertaining to how this emphasises hegemonic masculinity, with the strong, 
white male being representative of this within a colonial context. Whilst these transitions 
occurred, however, Egypt was embroiled in World War One, the effects of these power 
structures within this context thus become pivotal in historically contextualising this 
research and how the secular nature of the state shaped the development of women’s 
marital rights in the following decades.  
4.3 An Era of War: 1914-1918 
On November 7th, 1914 the Egyptian Journal Officiel published a proclamation outlining 
rules of conduct regarding British and Egyptian relations with the Ottoman Empire, as well 
as the presence of Ottoman ships in Egyptian ports. The absence of ‘any days of grace in 
which to depart…’ from these ports (1919: 436) suggests restrictions being implemented 
against Ottoman presence. Moreover, the above restrictions are understood here to 
indicate a degree of paranoia regarding a potential Ottoman threat to Britain’s position in 
Egypt. Later, in December 1914, another proclamation was issued, thus making Egypt a 
British Protectorate. The document indicates that it was Turkish action in the state of war 
which resulted in Protectorate status, and the termination of ‘The suzerainty of Turkey over 
Egypt’, and was considered to be in the best interests of the Egyptian people (1919: 436). 
The manner in which Protectorate status occurred and the British fear of Ottoman rule in 
Egypt, thus reflects Britain reinforcing control over Egypt through the adoption of ‘all 
measures necessary for the defence of Egypt…’(1919: 436). 
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In addition to the removal of Ottoman authority from Egypt, the imposition of British 
‘protection’ over it, and the restrictions against Ottoman ships in Egyptian ports, the two 
proclamations discussed above were not formalised until three and four months 
respectively after the onset of war in August 1914. This indicates the increase of threat 
perception from a British perspective over their ‘special position’ in Egypt during the first 
few months of conflict. Therefore maintaining control in the region and ensuring Egypt’s 
position as an ‘ally’ was of substantial importance to the British government. Subsequently, 
the establishment of such rules and the implementation of a protectorate speaks to the 
notion of ‘power-over’ (Yoder & Kahn, 1992: 382) (see section 3.3). 
Egyptian involvement in the war was not optional, as ‘a part of the British empire’, it was 
automatically considered an ally of the British forces against Germany (Farid/Goldschmidt, 
1992: 173). Prior to the aforementioned proclamations, British fears of colony revolts had 
been expressed and Muhammad Farid27 took it upon himself to write to the khedive, 
encouraging him to take advantage of this unstable period and declare an Egyptian 
constitution (Farid/Goldschmidt, 1992: 173–175). The letter implored the khedive to take his 
suggestions into consideration, and throughout repeatedly praised the khedive through 
language such as ‘exhalted’ and ‘Your Highness’. Additionally, Farid made it explicitly clear 
that he sought not to instruct the khedive in this matter; rather, he sought to encourage him 
to take it upon himself to deliver said constitution to Egypt. It is clear throughout that 
should he decide to take Farid’s advice, that the National Party and the people will support 
him and that Farid will assist him by instructing his colleagues in Egypt to work cooperatively 
with him. Additionally, the language used throughout the letter has religious overtones with 
references to ‘God’, the ‘Islamic ummah’, and the use of ‘amen’ (Farid/Goldschmidt, 1992: 
173–175).  
What this implies is not only the desire of an Egyptian nationalist leader, but also an attempt 
to remove secular influences from issues relating to Egyptian independence. The 
incorporation of religious language into the letter has been interpreted here as an attempt 
to reassert a religious and cultural identity of matters political. Finally, the use of ‘British’ to 
                                                 
27 Muhammad Farid (1868-1919) was an influential political leader of Turkish descent. He was a nationalist 
leader, lawyer and writer in Egypt. ‘Close to Mustafa Kamil, Farid became one of his main political and financial 
backers’; following Kamil’s death in 1908, Farid became second president of the National Party (Goldschmidt, 
2000: 53). 
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refer to the controlling government, and ‘English/England’ to refer to the occupying forces 
(Farid/Goldschmidt, 1992: 173) reinforces power through labels (see section 4.2, fn 5 for 
alternation between terms). The power of labelling is further supported by Spivak (2008: 
209) who advances that ‘Asia’ reflects the direction of Europe’s gaze however, determining 
its first usage is impossible; thus reinforcing the Western-centric nature of geographic 
terminologies. 
The outbreak of war not only highlighted fissures in the British front, but also immediately 
exposed weaknesses in the Egyptian economy. A critical concern was Egypt’s sole reliance 
on cotton exports as a source of income, as well as extensive European funding to market 
their sole product (Tignor, 1976: 42). Consequently, when war was declared, the British 
Protectorate over Egypt enabled them to prohibit sales to countries which were either 
considered to be or could act as suppliers to British enemies; thus reinforcing colonial power 
in Egypt through exportation restrictions. Subsequently, the demand for cotton declined 
dramatically along with its market value (Tignor, 1976: 42).28 This decline in exports as well 
as the value of cotton detrimentally impacted on Egyptian agriculture and economy, and 
can also be linked to declines in marriage due to increasing mahr demands from many 
families (see for example Kholoussy, 2010: 26) (see section 4.4). Additionally, export 
restrictions to enemies invoked by British authorities suggests that Britain was at least partly 
responsible for the economic crisis facing Egypt and can thus be viewed as another potential 
factor in the politics of resistance which was experienced in the immediate post-war era 
(see section 4.5) as a means of challenging colonial power which had ensured Egypt’s 
economic reliance on Britain. This also mirrors women’s enforced economic reliance on men 
within the family, thus reinforcing the prominence of international variables in 
understanding women’s marital rights.  
As the war advanced Britain become more aggressive in their approach to Egypt in an 
attempt to control the entirety of the country. An increase in both British civil servants as 
well as troops, was accompanied by high inflation severely impacting on the majority of the 
population (Botman, 1991: 25). Whilst nationalist efforts were suppressed during the war, 
aspirations for independence grew (Baron, 1991: 285) as Anglo-Egyptian tensions increased, 
                                                 
28 The export value of cotton was seen to have declined from £E34,000,000 (1913-14) to £E20,000,000 (1914-
1915) (Tignor, 1976: 42). 
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particularly due to British interests in the war appearing to be more important than the 
interests of the Egyptian state (Botman, 1991: 25). 
By the end of the war, the Ottoman Empire was no longer an option in the struggle to 
remove British occupation, thus requiring alternative methods to be adopted in the quest 
for national independence. For Baron (1991: 285) the nationalist movement was seen to 
change direction and adopt for a form of liberal territorial nationalism. This change in 
trajectory was also understood to have been welcomed by women in the hope that it would 
assist them in advancing their rights. What this shift signifies is not only a move towards the 
hoped integration of women into Egyptian society, but also the hoped integration of Egypt 
into the international system as a sovereign, self-representing nation instead of being 
represented under the banner of British colonialism; thus a dual emancipation was sought. 
Whilst France and Britain emerged as dominating powers in the MENA region, it was one 
area where they were seen to remain regional rivals. However, the war drained both 
countries, leaving them with few resources to distribute amongst their newly acquired 
territories. This, along with the impact of various mandates resulted in an increased 
presence of nationalist resistance. Instead of marking a new era in the ‘Eastern Question’,29 
Goldstein (2002: 68) contends that this presented the same pre-war issues in a slightly 
different light; thus resulting in it being viewed as the same issue in a different world. 
During this era, it is possible to establish numerous ways in which the Egyptian state, and 
subsequently the Egyptian citizen were affected by the British Protectorate. The 
unquestioned loyalty which was expected of Egyptians to the British during the war 
resulted, firstly in detrimental economic declines, and secondly in the forced conscription of 
Egyptians to fight. This, accompanied by the lack of resources available from the European 
powers to support and assist with recovery in the post-war era also contributed to the 
increased nationalist drive which resulted in the constitutional revolution of 1919 (see 
section 4.5.1). In addition to this, the family structure can be seen to have been damaged 
                                                 
29 The ‘Eastern Question’ refers to ‘the problem of who was to succeed the Ottoman Empire’ for territorial  
control in the Middle East. This was addressed by Britain’s ‘Eastern Committee’, who saw continued British 
control in the region as a central concern; primarily because it provided a ‘gateway to India’ and there were 
‘potential petroleum resources. Those supporting the notion that Britain’s primary interests were in the 
Empire and shared concerns regarding ‘non-European elements of the post-war settlement’ were ‘old style 
imperialists’ (Lord Curzon) and ‘imperial reformers’ (Lord Milner) (Goldstein, 1987: 419). 
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through the period of economic downturn through increased unemployment and thus 
higher dowries, consequently questioning the effects of foreign influences on women’s 
marital rights and subsequently the formation of the family. 
4.4 Marriage in Crisis: Part One 
The family, as previously iterated in chapters two and three, represents the foundations on 
which (Islamic) society is based and a prominent criticism of European influences was the 
decline in the familial structure they believed was being brought into Egyptian society. The 
marriage crisis, as presented by Kholoussy (2010) uses the impact of economic downturn in 
Egypt as a framework within which Egyptian marriages can be examined. Here the concept 
of a marriage crisis is adopted, but the tenets of Kholoussy’s (2003, 2010) enquiries into 
marriage in Egypt during the early twentieth century will be amalgamated to present a 
double factor crisis, which can ultimately be seen to emerge from diverging economic 
issues. This will also contribute to an understanding of different manipulative methods 
adopted by French occupiers in Egypt as a means of deflecting blame from themselves onto 
Egyptian men (Talhami, 1996), thus reinforcing power hierarchies which occurred between 
colonisers and those being colonised. 
4.4.1 The Economics of Marriage 
A prominent concern which resulted from economic downturn (see for example Tignor, 
1976) was the subsequent decline in the total number of marriages in Egypt. This presented 
socio-political problems, with the stability of the family being representative of state 
stability. Within this, one of the most prominent concerns was over bachelorhood which 
provided insight into political and cultural apprehensions, which were frequently seen to 
support ‘experiments in colonial modernity’ (Kholoussy, 2010: 6). What this omits however, 
are the effects or concerns pertaining to unmarried women; and this potentially relates to 
the prominent male role in marriage proceedings. The exclusion of women in this instance 
speaks to Yoder and Kahn’s (1992: 382–384) ‘interpersonal power over’ whereby an 
individual has power over another within the context of relationships such as marriage. For 
Rabinow (2008) however, claims to modernity need to be traced through the manner in 
which they are made, rather than attempting to define it. Adopting this approach, Kholoussy 
(2010: 6) argues that modernity in Egypt can be understood through the development of 
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the family, with ideas of colonial modernity being (re)produced as a circumstance for 
political independence. 
A point of tension in this respect was the middle-class man, more specifically the bachelor, 
whose emergence as a distinct group was proving to be cause for great concern (Kholoussy, 
2010: 6). Awareness of bachelorhood and decisions not to marry are also traceable to the 
pre-twentieth century epoch, and for Amin (1899/2000: 81) it was not  
…an exaggeration to claim that the new generation of men prefer bachelorhood to marriage 
because they do not believe that present-day marriage will fulfil any of their dreams. 
He believed that the man who assumed the sharing of good and bad days with a companion 
could be achieved through marriage was severely mistaken. Rather, he (1899/2000: 80–81) 
understood the marital contract to be a means by which patriarchal norms could be 
continued within the domestic sphere unless women were to remove the veil of ignorance 
they were shrouded in. For Amin, female understanding and awareness was to be primarily 
achieved through education. The low opinion of women and the patriarchal system he 
(1899/2000) promoted thus explains the absence of single women in discussions of 
matrimonial decline.30 
Western dress was also considered a possible cause for this marriage crisis. Ahmad al-Sawi 
Muhammad (cited in Kholoussy, 2010: 7), outlined the dilemma facing most men in his 
journal al-Ahram: 
You are the victims of this society that . . . gives you a paltry salary . . . and forces you at the 
same time to become an effendi, wear a fez and suit,… ride the tram, read the paper, and sit 
in a coffeehouse. But if you were, my brother, to wear a galabiya . . . you would find 
thousands . . . happy to marry you. 
Another issue which contributed to declining marriage rates was that of mahr. According to 
the 1875 Egyptian Islamic Code of Personal Status a man should not be wronged with an 
excessive mahr, just as a woman should not be wronged by one too small. According to 
                                                 
30 The stance taken by Amin shares similarites to Mary Wollstonecraft’s (1792/2004) in which a scathing 
overview of women is presented to the reader. This attitude is understood here to indirectly critique the 
patriarchal system and the restrictions which were placed on women. Through the criticism of women and 
their lack of rights, both Amin and Wollstonecraft can be understood to have circumvented obvious criticisms 
of patriarchal society whilst achieving exactly that. A prominent difference which emerges however, are critical 
perceptions that Amin sought to enhance male experiences through improving women’s status in specific 
areas (see for example Abu-Lughod, 1998; Ahmed, 1992). 
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Kholoussy (2010: 33), reformers sought more viable opportunities to marriage through the 
limitation of mahr, with excessive mahrs relating directly to the economic situation in Egypt 
having been touched upon (see section 4.3). With increased unemployment and a struggling 
economy, which was seen as the result of fighting in a war they had not chosen to 
participate in, it is likely that families elevated mahr prices, with most men being unable to 
afford them. From this, it is possible to see the inextricable link between foreign occupation, 
economic decline, and the private sphere which subsequently concluded in the politicisation 
of the private sphere as the normative structure on which society was based began to 
disappear. Whilst this aspect of the marriage crisis was male dominated, there were other 
factors which directly affected both men and women’s abilities to marry, with mahr 
concerns being focused on the excessive cost to men. 
4.4.2 “Stealing Husbands”: Mixed Marriage in Egypt 
The occupation of Egypt by French and British troops can be seen to have been problematic 
for Egyptian women, as with foreign occupation also came an influx of settlers. Two issues 
emerged from the presence of French women in Egypt. The first was the manner in which 
the French circumvented blame for patriarchal laws in Egypt in 1800 by influencing the 
female sector of society and instigating criticism of Egyptian men for restricting their rights 
in comparison to the French woman. Exposure to French women was understood to have 
encouraged the unveiling of some women as well as increasing fraternisations with French 
men. According to Talhami (1996: 2) this resulted in mixed marriages, some of which were 
illegal, others of which were legal following a compulsory conversion to Islam; thus 
indicating that legalities were reliant on religion.  
The second issue was the ‘threat’ European women posed to Egyptian women. The notion 
of ‘threat’ emerged, according to Hatem (1989: 187), because European women were 
understood to ‘steal’ intelligent men. The subsequent mixed familial environment was 
understood to produce a generation of mixed loyalties; and this resulted in nationalist 
determinism adopting a gendered lens as Egyptian women sought to dissuade Egyptian men 
from marrying foreign women. 
Mixed marriages however, were not the only point of tension between European and 
Egyptian women. Nabawiyya Musa (cited in Hatem, 1989: 187) advances another area of 
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contention was the perceived audacity of the European woman to seek the right to vote; 
which from her perspective placed Egyptian women in an inferior position. These rising 
tensions resulted in the portrayal of the working class European woman as manipulative for 
successfully ‘convincing’ middle class Egyptian men to marry them. Moreover, when 
challenged, Egyptian men justified their commitment to a European woman with the belief 
that they could transform her and any children into loyal Egyptians (Hatem, 1989: 188). 
The impact of economic fluctuations on the private sphere not only placed pressure on 
issues relating to household expenditures, but also the amount to be asked for as mahr 
should a daughter be married. In addition to this both Egyptian men and women had to 
contend with their European counterparts as fraternisation with European peoples became 
more common. However, additional tensions, such as European women seeking the right to 
vote in Egypt, could thus be seen as a contributing factor to engendering political resistance 
in the struggle against British occupation. These concerns speak to Connell’s (1987: 121) 
observation that as a power structure, the familial environment is where socialisation skills 
are presented; as well as Urry’s (2011: 104–105) reflection that the family reproduces social 
order as well as maintaining the social structure. The potential threat of European spouses 
not only relates to concerns regarding national loyalties of future generations, but also 
contributes towards an increasing number of unmarried Egyptian women. Additionally, 
economic downturn and prerogatives which accompanied increased pressures resulted in 
unaffordable mahr prices. From this emerge queries pertaining to the increased presence of 
a public female voice, rights being sought, and women’s marital rights in the immediately 
succeeding era, all of which will be discussed in chapters five and six as a means of 
understanding the effects of secularism on matrimonial equality. 
4.5 Politics of Resistance 
Post-colonial feminism sits at the juncture of intersecting fields such as gender, class and 
race. It seeks to destabilise hegemonic, Western-centric assumptions of peoples in non-
Western contexts and is thus pivotal in the examination of political resistance. The politics 
of resistance takes many forms whether it is through literature, art, or armed force. It is not 
only about that which individuals seek to oppose, rather, it also refers to the organisation of 
those seeking to resist. Within the Egyptian context of 1900-1919, it is possible to recognise 
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numerous forms of resistance which occurred against two primary backdrops; foreign 
occupation and patriarchy. From the above discussions, it is possible to ascertain that both 
men and women fought forms of oppression in their varying guises; with the predominant 
form being foreign occupation and the demand for national independence, and the second 
being the liberation of women. As has previously been highlighted (see section 4.2), literary 
portrayals have been integral to the development of normative, hegemonic discourses. Prior 
to the revolution however, nineteenth century Egypt witnessed the emergence of a genre of 
writing to be labelled as autobiographical. Women’s work was often submerged and not 
recognised as contributing to this genre and it was not until the turn of the century that 
feminist discourses began to emerge following publication increases in 1890 (Booth, 2013: 
36).  
The majority of these discourses were produced by Egyptian and Ottoman Syrian 
intellectuals, however, because they were not recognised as autobiographical, Booth 
(2013:36) argues that it is necessary to recognise them within other genre classifications. 
Despite this genre categorisation dispute, the ‘fragmentary, relational, and indirect 
autobiographical practices’ produced by these late nineteenth century texts, which reflected 
gendered writing restrictions, are also recognised as establishing some of the foundations 
for 1920s Egyptian feminism (Booth, 2013: 37). Marriage was also used as a framework 
within which male and female writers were able to critique Egyptian society and modernise 
the family. What must be recognised however, is the partial rather than complete adoption 
by Egypt of the Western model (Kholoussy, 2010: 6), thus ensuring the recognition of 
Egyptian identities in these developments. 
The emergence of a female voice in literary spheres thus reinforces questions pertaining to 
the role of women in nationalist movements, and how this presence contributed towards 
vocalising demands for increased rights in the domestic realm. However, before this can be 
approached, it is necessary to understand the impact of foreign occupation and the First 
World War on Egyptian politics, thus providing a backdrop against which the emergence of 
women onto the political scene can be addressed.  
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4.5.1 Nationalism as Resistance 
Nationalism, with reference to most of the ‘classics’, is understood by Al-Ali (2000: 40) to be 
represented as a ‘kind of monolithic or universal phenomenon’, with the singular of 
nationalism being challenged, in particular by post-colonialists. Until the advent of the First 
World War and the implementation of the British Protectorate, the dominant form of 
nationalist ideology was an Egyptian ‘adaptation’ of Ottomanism, and it is argued that this, 
along with the Ottoman suzerainty which accompanied it, were preferable to the extended 
British occupation (Baron, 1991: 283).  
When discussing nationalism in occupied Egypt, Baron (1993: 244) reiterates Lord Cromer’s 
restrictive measures which were justified by his belief that ‘there is no such thing as an 
Egyptian nationality’. It is not that Baron sought to reinforce the justifications presented by 
Cromer, rather, it is understood here to represent the attitude of the occupying powers 
towards the Egyptian people. Thus the argument presented here is that by denying the 
existence of an Egyptian nationality, it was increasingly justifiable to try and impose British 
customs and thus develop an Anglo influenced nationality for Egypt and this is what 
nationalist groups were trying to resist.  
Tripp (2013: 10) reinforces this view by arguing that after enduring this extended period of 
imperial domination, resistance (in the Middle East) was considered to be both a religious 
and national duty against ‘alien forces’. Imperial domination was also viewed as a 
hegemonic system which sought to dominate the globe which presents itself under the 
guises of secularism, liberalism, and capitalism, with imperial history being seen as ‘a 200-
year’ campaign to dominate the Middle East (Tripp, 2013: 178). This echoes Fanon’s (1963) 
Algerian observation in which the superiority of the colonising power is amply recognised; 
however, as has been evidenced, there is no overarching historical experience due to 
differentials arising between countries and individuals; thus the homogenised historical 
experience, not only of the MENA region, but more specifically Egypt has been further 
dislocated. 
During World War One, Egypt was re-classified as a British Protectorate under the guise of 
protecting the Egyptian nation from the threats of war. In reality however, this was likely a 
cover for the prominent position of British security being above that of the Egyptian state, 
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and despite its previous association with the Ottoman Empire, Goldstein (2002: 67) posits 
that British domination preceded the advent of war. However, it is argued (R.I.I.A, 1952: 4) 
that this involuntary incorporation into the British Empire represented the demise of 
Egyptian identity as it became recognised as a British colony. Moreover, the experiences 
and impact of the war on Egypt can be seen to have been a prominent trigger in the 
elevation of national sentiment. This is understood to have been further reinforced by 
President Wilson’s theory of self-determination; with Egyptian nationalists determining 
Egypt’s new position as not only a sovereign state, but also as the leading Muslim state. The 
nationalist sentiment among Egyptians was thus successfully and energetically championed 
by Sa’d Zaghlul31 (R.I.I.A, 1952: 5). 
The effects of foreign occupation and war coupled with the denial of an Egyptian nationality 
are understood here to be the root causes of the 1919 revolution in which nationalist 
demands for Egyptian independence were vocalised. Tripp (2013: 180) reinforces this 
understanding by arguing that the system of ‘imposed forms of behaviour’ as experienced 
by Egypt, and other territories in the MENA region, justifies the terminology of ‘resistance’ 
as those who have experienced it seek change or the overthrowing of said regime. 
From 1919 until 1922 when Egypt became quasi autonomous, the nationalist call that 
echoed throughout parties was that of complete Egyptian independence. Jankowski (1991: 
259) posits however, that independence did not only refer to the liberation of Egypt from 
the British Protectorate, but also from the remnants of Ottoman rule. Moreover, no 
alternative external affiliations were provided by those, primarily the Wafd party,32 who 
represented Egypt (Jankowski, 1991: 259–260); thus reinforcing the determination of the 
Egyptian citizens to recover from foreign occupation and war, and present Egypt as a strong, 
independent state. 
Egyptian resentment of British occupation can thus be seen as one of, if not the strongest 
motivating factors in the emergence of the 1919 revolution. Within the Egyptian population, 
‘the lower segment of Egyptian society’ suffered numerous economic hardships which, 
                                                 
31 Zaghlul Pasha was an Egyptian statesman, leader of the Wafd party and nationalist movement (1918-1919) 
and was Prime Minister briefly in 1924. 
32 The Wafd party was established in 1918 and was a national delegation which claimed to represent Egypt in 
its search for independence (Botman, 1991: 55). 
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according to Tignor (1976: 44) were effective in the development of rural and urban 
discontent. Additionally, the Egyptian press played a significant role in highlighting the 
exploitive nature of foreign business in Egypt. Within the call for independence and a 
recognised national identity, emerged demands to develop Egyptian controlled and 
financed companies which would have a ‘more sympathetic’ outlook (Tignor, 1976: 44). It is 
thus the situating of post-colonial feminism at the intersection of spheres, with interests in 
aspects of political economy, which brings economic concerns into this thesis as political 
resistance sought not only the removal of colonising powers, but the subsequent effects of 
this power structure which filtered down through and spilt over into diverging sections of 
society.  
The socio-economic, national and international issues which were raised during the 
revolution can all be placed under the umbrella term of nationalism. This is not because 
national identity was more prominent, but rather because it addressed independence as a 
whole. Under this umbrella, it is possible to recognise various factions which emerged 
demanding independence within the country as well as the ability to represent themselves 
as independent. Thus within this broader nationalistic framework, traditions and institutions 
which were considered to be directly threatened by foreign powers were frequently 
adopted as symbols of resistance. The consequences of this, according to Megahed and Lack 
(2013: 205), can be seen to have taken the form of an anti-European sentiment, including 
the notion of gender equality. Subsequently, this questions the prominence of gender 
equality in the revolution and the impact of occupation and resistance on women’s marital 
rights in the immediately succeeding era. 
4.5.2 1919 and the Gendering of Resistance 
The 1919 constitutional revolution is not only recognised for its achievements in attaining 
the development of an Egyptian constitution and quasi-independence (1922), but also for 
being the environment in which women’s resistance became more prominent. Prior to the 
revolution, women were rarely recognised as being involved in the national struggle and this 
period in Egyptian history represents the point when nationalist activities shifted to a 
feminist orientation (Baron, 1991: 272). However, Baron (1991: 272) argues that the 
establishment of the 1919 revolution as the turning point in Egyptian feminist politics has 
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resulted in the overshadowing of previous (non) feminist happenings prior to this event. 
This reinforces Spivak’s (2010: 61) observation of the disappearance of women as a result of 
the patriarchy-imperialism relationship and moreover, the universalised representation of 
the ‘third-world woman’ who is situated between tradition and modernity.     
An important relationship which arises from this discussion is the one between nationalism 
and feminism and how different socio-political environments can be seen to affect 
trajectories. Furthermore, Al-Ali (2000: 45) reiterates Yuval-Davis’ (1997:116) argument that 
it is problematic to conceive of a single category of men and women as: 
Differential positionings in ethnic, racial, class, age, ability, sexual and other social divisions 
interface with gender divisions, so that although women usually are constructed and treated 
by various agencies as different to men, “women” as well as “men” do not constitute 
homogenous categories as either social agents or social objects. 
Secondly, the role of women as the possessor of cultural values, traditions and community 
symbols must be emphasised as a means of recognising the variety of positions held by 
women in the national collectivity. Despite this, women are frequently relegated to ‘object’ 
rather than ‘subject’ and are thus commonly excluded from the wider group (Yuval-Davis, 
1997: 116 in Al-Ali, 2000: 44). 
Whilst it is recognised that some groups such as the EFU were born from the 1919 
revolution, arguments have been put forward (Fluehr-Lobban, 1980: 243) that such groups 
were not in existence prior to this nationalist event. It is however, debatable as to whether 
nationalism can be seen as responsible for the emergence of feminism. Whilst there is no 
denying that strong correlations exist between the Egyptian nationalist movement and the 
emergence of feminist groups in 1919, it is crucial to recognise the presence of feminist 
work and activities prior to this period.  
For Baron (1991: 272), the “woman question” in the pre-1919 epoch is represented 
primarily through the works of male advocates of reform (Qasim Amin) or those who 
opposed it rather than from a female perspective. This restricts historical understandings in 
the development of a feminist sentiment within Egypt. Not only does the fixation on the 
1919 revolution as the point of departure for such groups detract from activities prior to this 
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period; but the use of male work as the primary source of information removes the female 
identity from women’s history.  
Whilst the term ‘feminism’ is multifaceted and there are risks associated with the 
amalgamation of women’s history under this umbrella term, Conway (cited in Baron, 1991: 
273) distinguished between two types of feminist. The first is the ‘enhanced-authority 
feminist’, who seeks to increase women’s roles within the private sphere; and second is the 
‘equal rights feminist’ who seeks equality with men in social, political and economic spheres 
through the removal of boundaries of separation. Whilst Conway’s work initially focused on 
eighteenth and nineteenth century America, Baron (1991: 273) understands it to be of great 
relevance to discussions on early twentieth century Egyptian women, and thus places these 
women in the framework of ‘enhanced-authority feminists’. 
The focus of women’s rights advocates during this era and the manner in which they have 
been understood is thus reinforced by varying understandings of relationships of ideas, 
beliefs and identity and how they all relate to social action. Therefore reinforcing the 
primary tenet of Tripp’s (1996: 51) thesis which is that ‘people have the capacity to choose 
their symbolic vocabulary according to their perception of their interests at the time’. Whilst 
this argument was provided in relation to the Islamic state, notions of symbolism, identity 
and belief can all be applied to the nationalist movements of 1919, as well as (self) 
portrayals of women. 
Despite debates over the impact of nationalism on the emergence of the feminist 
movement in Egypt; the correlation between nationalism and feminism is strong, with 
feminist groups drawing on nationalist motivations in an attempt to achieve their goals. It is 
argued here that feminist activities during this time had two primary objectives. The first 
was to assist in the emancipation of Egypt from foreign powers; the second was to liberate 
women through the advancement of education and increased domestic equality. In addition 
to this, it was not during the 1919 revolution when concerns about liberation of women 
were first voiced, it was however, possibly the first time in which they had been voiced in 
this manner. Thus insight is to be sought into the impact these demands had on matrimonial 
equality between 1920 and 1939. 
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Throughout this epoch of Egyptian history, some women involved in the feminist movement 
viewed ‘men as valuable allies’ and are understood by Hatem (1989: 187) as explaining the 
negative attitude adopted by Egyptian women in reference to mixed marriages (see section 
4.4.2). Their role in ‘emphasizing moral influence as mothers’ was also problematic (Baron, 
1991: 284), thus indicating concerns about their own marital rights and future generations. 
What is interesting to note however, is the deference of blame onto European women and 
foreign powers rather than onto Egyptian men (Baron, 1991: 284). This represents several 
stances adopted by Egyptian women, which speaks to the aforementioned value men were 
perceived to have. The first justification for not attributing blame to Egyptian men for 
women’s subjugation is that it provided a medium through which calls for reform and 
increased gender equality could be made; second is the possible recognition of male 
oppression under foreign powers. Finally, European women were seen to have been more 
threatening than may originally be recognised. The primary difference between foreign 
occupation of the nation and foreign occupation of the home was the direct involvement of 
the family, and the impact mixed families could have on future generations and 
subsequently the state; therefore questioning the extended effects of colonial power 
structures on the family. Whilst this does not directly contest assumptions that colonial 
authorities were reluctant to interfere in areas of family law, as recognised by Asad (2003: 
227), it does highlight the intersecting nature of colonialism and marriage within the 
Egyptian context. Furthermore, this colonial impact raises questions about the effects of 
secularism on women’s marital rights in Egypt in the post-1919 revolution environment. 
Women made their presence in the 1919 revolution known when thousands descended on 
the streets in the ‘March of the Veiled Woman’ which sought independence from Britain 
(Fluehr-Lobban, 1980: 238). Later, in 1923, it is argued that groups such as the EFU 
developed as a result of the events of the revolution. However, this was not the first group 
to have been organised by Huda Shaarawi who had assisted in the development of Mabarat 
Muhammad ‘Ali (Muhammad Ali Institute, 1908) which provided sewing classes for less 
131 
 
fortunate women and medical assistance for women and children (Talhami, 1996: 12);33 
thus emphasising co-operation between classes and across fields.  
It was not only Muslim women who contributed towards the nationalist effort. The events 
of 1919 also brought forward women from conspicuous Coptic families such as the Wasefs, 
Iskanders, and Hannas (Talhami, 1996: 10). However, the visibility of these prominent 
women could have contributed towards criticisms of the bourgeois classes dominating 
movements, thus indicating class divides within Egyptian society. Whilst these divides did 
exist, it is argued here that the achievements made by those advocating gender equality, no 
matter how small, affected all classes; and whilst the voices may have been elite, it does not 
necessarily mean that all of their support was too. 
The 1919 revolution represents a stepping stone in Egyptian women’s political history. Due 
to the already existing female voices which were emerging through outlets such as literature 
and media (primarily journals), as well as the voices of male advocates for reform, this event 
is seen to represent the next phase in women’s history, rather than the beginning of it.  
4.6 Conclusion: Women, Power Structures and the State 
Traditionally, Egyptian women have been omitted from public politics; but in recent history 
an increased visibility of women in the public sphere has ensued with some having actively 
participated in political discourse, often ‘under the banner of nationalism’ (Fluehr-Lobban, 
1980: 236). This chapter has examined early twentieth century Egyptian history up until 
1919, including observations on the revolution which occurred in the immediate post-war 
era. Against backgrounds of foreign occupation, monarchical transitions, and involuntary 
accession into war, it has become possible to understand the context in which feminist and 
nationalist voices began to emerge more prominently. 
For Fluehr-Lobban (1980: 236-7), who sought to undermine the ‘myth’ of Arab women’s 
conservative and a-political status, it is not customary for the West to contemplate the 
position of Arab women in the political sphere and thus the media are less inclined to 
                                                 
33 Princess ‘Ain al-Hayat helped Sha’rawi in the development of this group. Later in 1914, these two women 
established Jamʿiyat al-Ruqqi al-Adabi lil-Sayyidat al-Misriyat (The society for literary advancement of Egyptian 
women) and Jam’iyat al-Mar’ah al-Jadidah (The society of the new woman) which provided women with 
access to lectures on topics such as art, literature and music  (Talhami, 1996: 12). 
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portray Arab men or women within the context of the national struggle for liberation. This 
speaks to Briggs and Sharp’s (2004: 664) observation that post-colonial theorists have 
queried Western academics preparedness to engage with non-Western peoples, which in 
turn requires the decentralisation of these academics as experts. 
The position of women within Egyptian society has, for the most part, maintained the 
traditional overtones of the public/private dichotomy. What can be evidenced from the 
discussions which have occurred throughout this chapter is that a feminist consciousness in 
Egypt was evident prior to its emergence in the 1919 revolution. That is not to say that the 
revolution did not assist in advancing feminist voices, rather it is emphasised here that 
greater attention needs to be paid to the pre-1919 feminist works and the advancing of 
gender equality in the Egyptian state.  
Attention also needs to be paid to ‘protocols’ following marriage. According to Berque 
(1972: 563), following their nuptials in 1919, which King Fuʾād had postponed until he had 
successfully established a ministry he deemed appropriate, Safinez was required to change 
her name to one beginning with F; which was understood to then place her ‘in the category 
of King Fu’ad’s children.’ This act alone speaks volumes as to the position of some women, 
implying that some women in the upper echelons of society were viewed in a similar 
manner to children, thus reinforcing the patriarchal order within the family; whilst also 
setting a precedent for maintaining the normative familial structure amongst Egyptian 
citizens. Moreover, this is understood as signifying submission to her husband, therefore 
implying his attainment of a fatherly status and her requirement to obey. Through the 
altered perception of women, this speaks to the hierarchical relationship between parents 
and children as espoused by Locke (see section 2.3) (Eisenstein, 1981: 34–39). 
From the above discussions it has been possible to contextualise several things. First is the 
presence of the British in Egypt, the impact they had on politics, monarchical transitions, 
and Egyptian perceptions of them through events such as the 1919 nationalist movement. It 
has also been possible to establish the manner in which British presence in Egypt and the 
Egyptian people were presented to the British public through The Illustrated London News. 
Not only has this highlighted the orientalist overtones in British representation of Egypt, but 
the denial of nationality has also indicated that Britain did not necessarily regard Egypt as an 
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official state. Arguably the most significant impact of the British on Egypt was the 
involuntary accession to World War One. In addition to human losses, nationalist sentiment 
was that the representation of Egypt as a British colony eradicated the Egyptian identity; the 
economic effects of war were also felt heavily across the country, especially amongst 
landowners. 
The detrimental effects of war on the Egyptian economy have also been seen to extend 
beyond the realms of trade and employment into the family. Through each of these 
different discussions, the politics of resistance emerges as a prominent point of contact. 
Calls for the political and economic emancipation of Egypt from Britain, alongside calls to 
liberate women from patriarchal systems of oppression and the increasing threat of 
European-Egyptian marriages echoed this. What remains to be seen however, is if the 
increased visibility of feminist movements and the quasi independence of Egypt (1922) as a 
result of the 1919 revolution, provided an environment rich enough to further establish a 
feminist voice. Moreover, the question still remains as to whether the manner in which 
secularism was introduced to the state through British occupation affected women’s marital 
rights in Egypt? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
Chapter Five 
The Tug of War:  
Power, Politics and Resistance in Iran, 1900-1919 
5.1 Introduction 
This research endeavours to comprehend how women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran 
were affected by secularism between 1920 and 1939. Previous chapters have located this 
point of inquiry in contemporary events, academic literature and a qualitative, post-colonial 
feminist paradigm; with the previous chapter functioning as the first part of the historical 
background for the chosen case studies. The purpose of this chapter is to compliment 
chapter four by providing the historical background to the second part of this comparative-
historical study. Throughout this chapter, the analysis of the period 1900-1919 will permit 
the contextualisation of the effects of foreign power structures on socio-political life in Iran, 
all of which relate to gender equality, marriage and family law, and how they were 
influenced by ‘internal’ secularism. 
The investigation which occurs in this chapter therefore serves to understand the impact of 
various power structures on gender equality, women and family law in Iran between 1900 
and 1919. Beginning with insights into the effects of the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, 
socio-political contextualisations are sought in relation to demands being voiced as well as 
those who participated. The chapter then moves to examine the gendered nature of the 
revolution through the increasing prominence of women in the public sphere. Throughout 
these discussions arise socio-political, cultural, geographic and gendered observations 
pertaining to methods of resistance and the (in)visibility of some social classes.  
The chapter then examines the 1906 Constitution and its various periods of 
implementation; highlighting alterations and its initially discontinuous nature. The chapter 
then studies the effects of British and Russian power structures within Iran, as well as the 
impact of World War One. Moreover, the conflicting relationship between Britain, Russia 
and Iran, and the looming fear of Ottoman imperialism in Iran essentially resulted in a tug of 
war between the two great powers, with Iran seeking to maintain control of its affairs. It is 
also during this discussion that the circumstances surrounding Reza Khan’s emergence are 
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clarified. The final point of examination for this chapter is thus the monarchical transition 
between the Qajars and the Pahlavis. The chapter will then conclude by emphasising the 
intersecting nature of these factors and their significance as the backdrop against which the 
later comparative analysis on the effects of secularism on matrimonial equality will be 
situated.   
5.2 Political Resistance and the 1906 Constitutional Revolution 
Situated at the intersection of gender, class and location, post-colonial feminism enables 
insights into experiences which have previously been omitted or homogenised. It is within 
this milieu that comprehensions surrounding the Qajar dynasty, reforms and the 1906 
Constitutional Revolution are pivotal in understanding the era immediately prior to that 
under examination in the following chapters. 
Spanning over 129 years, the Qajar era is recognised as a period of ‘cultural and artistic 
contributions and of important popular movements’, it represents a key point in the 
transitional process between pre-modern Iran and the later societal and cultural 
modernisation (Keddie, 1999: 1). Keddie (1999: 2) contends that whilst under Qajar rule, 
Western perceptions of Iran were that of a ‘backward Oriental society with very different 
and often irrational values’. Those writing on the subject often displayed sympathy for 
movements such as the Babis, or the revolutionaries (1905-1911) who represented religious 
and political opposition. Keddie’s perception thus speaks to the concerns highlighted by Said 
(1978), whereby Western representations became normative.  
This era also heralded some significant changes, such as the reestablishment of a ‘durable 
central government’, policy reformation pertaining to foreign threats, as well as aspects of 
social and economic modernisation which were accompanied by some disruptions (Keddie, 
1999: 14). Additionally, Keddie (1999: 16) notes that during this period, women of the upper 
classes were heavily veiled when leaving the private sphere, with more freedoms being 
granted to them within the domestic realm. Conversely, women of the more rural classes, 
specifically peasant and nomadic pastoral, remained unveiled and did not experience such 
extreme seclusions, with many working outdoors, as well as continuing with their domestic 
work. Recognition of diverging roles and experiences across class boundaries and 
geographic locations therefore serves to refute homogenising representations such as those 
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problematised by Keddie (1999) and Said (1978). However, despite the greater amount of 
work rural women conducted throughout their property, urban women were more likely to 
inherit and control properties, as was prescribed by the Qur’an; with royal and tribal women 
occasionally exercising ‘considerable political power’ (Keddie, 1999: 16).  
Abrahamian (1974: 11) posits that Western observations and interpretations of Qajar 
politics were that they fundamentally lacked the tools for the effective implementation of 
their power, despite contemporary visitors awe at their all-encompassing power. Disparities 
between these interpretations are potentially due to framework differentials for observers. 
The overarching power which visitors remarked on could be primarily understood from a 
socio-cultural perspective, whereas the waning power and lack of appropriate apparatus 
could be framed within a political discourse, thus reinforcing the importance of perception 
and interpretation and their equally subjective roles.  
In an attempt to strengthen their position and potentially develop tools to enforce their 
power, the Qajars developed new institutions; however, those recruited are believed to 
have undermined Qajar thinking. The newly developed intelligentsia indicates this as those 
involved described themselves as munaver al-fekr (modern intelligentsia or Enlightened 
thinkers) and had been exposed to Western customs and thought, such as the ‘March of 
Human Progress’ rather than the revelation of God’s will, as was believed by the ʿulama 
(Abrahamian, 1979: 395). Additionally, the ‘Western challenge’ along with the Qajar 
response resulted in structural changes at the societal level. The first, according to 
Abrahamian (1979: 393) was the incursion of mass manufacturing, modernisation and 
commercialisation of various sectors, as well as the development of monopolies which 
resulted in the forging of a ‘middle class consciousness’ due to its effects on bazaars. 
Moreover, the development of a secular education system, increasing the central 
administration and the ‘development of a small but vital salaried middle class’ all 
contributed to the changes and the emergence of a new middle class (‘modern 
intelligentsia’). This evidences the expansive ramifications of reforms throughout social 
classes, emphasising the spill over effects and the inclusion of all levels of society regardless 
of diverging effects. It also evidences the establishment of an ‘internal’ secularism whereby 
institutional structures began to be modernised and provided the foundations for Reza 
Khan’s later project. 
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For Tripp (2013: 252-3), political resistance is especially discernible in the ‘post-colonial 
Middle East where the definition of national identities has been integral to the struggle for 
power.’ However, as the twentieth century progressed, discontent with foreign 
interference, the government, and the absence of a constitution grew. With over ninety-five 
per cent of the population being Muslim, Cottam (1979: 75) argues that ‘a near unanimity 
has characterized the country for several centuries’ and the ability of the religious minorities 
such as Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians to cope with relatively little hindrance speaks 
volumes with regard to ‘the tolerance of Islamic Iranians’. With the emergence of Iranian 
nationalism, Cottam (1979: 75) argues that feelings of solidarity would potentially have 
been easy due to the majority of the population being Muslim, and this may have reinforced 
the élite position of Shi’i Muslims. However, due to the intrinsically secular characteristics of 
nationalism, it is argued that the exclusionary atmosphere which may have initially been felt 
by the minority populations could be (partially) overcome through the uniting of peoples of 
different religions through a common allegiance (Cottam, 1979: 75). This is partially 
evidenced through the public emergence of women and the vocalisation of their public and 
domestic concerns. Consequently, the predominantly secular nature of nationalism and the 
emergence of women raise questions about secularism’s effects on women’s marital rights. 
Diverging from socio-religious aspects, the prominence of official Islamic leaders and their 
relationship with the current system becomes integral. For Akhavi (1980: 25), the 
involvement of the ʿulamāʾ in the constitutional movement proved to be a strong 
demonstration of the intersection of  religion and politics, with the majority of these Islamic 
leaders agreeing with those seeking freedom. It is however, during this period that the Shah 
sought the aid of Russian forces following his defeat by the constitutionalists, thus resulting 
in him reversing the initial outcome and triumphing against them; this was however, once 
again reversed, resulting in the overthrowing of the Shah in favour of his more passive 
replacement, Ahmad Shah (Akhavi, 1980: 25). The motions of the constitutional revolution 
were arguably not new to the Iranian peoples, with the Tobacco Protest (1891-1892) being 
viewed as a trial for the revolution itself (Afary, 1996: 17). What emerges from this is thus 
indicative of deviating levels of social collective action, with the intersecting nature of class, 
gender and location become increasingly prominent as diverging levels of discontent arose 
throughout the country, with varying experiences evidencing different impact factors.   
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The Tobacco Protest was not alone in impacting on the political climate of early twentieth 
century Iran. Developments during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
contributed to the clergy-state hostility, and Algar’s (cited in Akhavi, 1980: 25) study 
compares the ‘ulamāʾ’s swelling power during the era of Qajar rule to its relative weakness 
during the Safavid epoch. Despite modifications in strength, both the Shah and the ʿulamāʾ 
are understood to have interpreted the daulat (state) and din (religion) as separate yet 
intertwined entities, with survival of both being reliant on the other (Bayat, 1991: 21). 
Members of the ʿulamāʾ active during the revolutionary period are also believed to have 
drawn on familiar language previously used against the Shah during the nineteenth century, 
with accusations of tyranny and corruption being made (Akhavi, 1980: 25).   
Afary (1996: 12) posits that the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) enables the study of 
the multifarious issues in the Third World, such as Western imperialism, internal and 
external pressures to implement Western models of modernisation, calls for democracy, 
women’s rights and conflicts involving religious institutions. The revolution thus serves to 
reinforce the intertwined nature of different fields, reinforcing the necessity of recognising 
broader, deviating impacts and experiences. The post-colonial feminist emphasis on location 
also becomes apparent as public discontent was not restricted to Tehran, with regions such 
as Tabriz and Shiraz becoming involved at separate instances. However, most events 
remained within the capital due to the vast majority of religious leaders and merchants 
residing there (Cottam, 1979: 93). Following the establishment of the constitution however, 
regional disparities in governmental approval became visible. Cottam (1979: 93) posits that 
the urban north strongly embraced the movement, whilst in the south minimal responses 
were heard and villages generally indicated no response, with this disparity potentially being 
due to larger middle class populations residing in the north.  
Public discontent with the Shah continued into the twentieth century, with extravagances 
being a source of dissatisfaction amongst people. Of particular concern were indulgences in 
land sales and his insistence on continued pensions, which were often inheritable; he is thus 
seen to stand in opposition to Amin od-Dauleh’s (1897-98) proposed reforms (Keddie, 1969: 
8–9). However, disillusionment with the Shah and the intertwining of religion and politics 
were not the only contributing factors resulting in an Iranian constitution. 
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For Foucault (1982: 794), power relations are ‘a strategy of struggle’ whereby 
confrontations arise. This is visible within the Iranian context whereby the increasing 
presence of Western powers contributed towards a heightened sense of nationalism, with 
many slogans pertaining directly to sovereignty. Whilst external influences contributed to 
strengthening the movement, external conflicts and colonial endeavours served to reinforce 
the determination of the revolutionaries. Evidencing this is the Japanese defeat of Russia 
(1905), with Japan becoming a symbol of progress against dominating powers in Asia, 
especially amongst the Iranian peoples (Browne, 1910: 2). 
The Russian Revolution (1905) also impacted Iranian politics and economics, with their 
economy further deteriorating due to the voluminous amount of trade which occurred 
between the two countries (Afary, 1996: 50). Moreover, inflation saw sugar prices increase 
by thirty-three percent, and wheat by ninety per cent, thus further heightening discontent 
throughout the country. The economic situation was further aggravated by the custom 
tariffs of two years previously, subsequently resulting in merchant strikes (1905): 
Between spring of 1905 and summer of 1906 three sets of strikes and protests took place, 
sometimes concurrently, in Tehran, at the Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim Shrine outside Tehran, and in 
Qum. Each strike attracted a broader number of participants; the earlier ideas of a house of 
justice and a representative form of government were now popularized and radicalized, 
leading ultimately to the creation of a much broader institution of democracy in the Majlis.  
(Afary, 1996: 51) 
Increased popularity for a more centralised, representative government indicates that 
political instability and a reliance on external sources were seen as the root causes of such 
extreme inflation. In December 1905, a second set of strikes were triggered by the forceful 
actions of Tehran’s governor, ultimately demanding decreased sugar prices in the bazaars. 
In protest to Ahmad ‘Ala’ al-Dawlah’s demand, the bazaars closed. The final set of strikes 
were in Qum, where the government began a process of arresting and exiling some 
nationalist leaders (Afary, 1996: 51–53). The establishment of a National Consultative Majlis 
was finally agreed on 9th August, 1906,34 indicating a victory for the secular constitutionalists 
and those supporting them (Afary, 1996: 58). 
In a recently post-revolution Iran, Colliver-Rice (1923: 107) observed that ‘A Persian is proud 
of his country and its past greatness, of his religion, of his sons, and of himself’. This can also 
                                                 
34The given date is August 5th 1906, which also happened to be the Shah’s birthday. 
140 
 
be aptly applied to the periods before and during the constitutional revolution. Moreover, 
this observation refers to the Persian (man) rather than the Muslim, indicating the potential 
unity amongst citizens of a state, irrespective of religion, thus reinforcing Cottam’s previous 
tolerance argument. However, the gendered nature of this statement reinforces the 
absence of women in the public sphere, as well as further accentuating its predominantly 
male nature, especially with regard to nationalism and religion. Consequently, questions 
emerge about female roles and rights, both during the constitutional revolution and after, 
as well as the effects of this historic event on gender equality within the state of Iran. 
Moreover, the victory of the secular constitutionalists raises questions about the impact of 
secularism on women’s rights, and the gendered nature of values included in the 
constitution and its accompanying documents.  
5.3 Gendering the Revolution 
During the constitutional revolution, ‘national will’ (himmat-i millī) (Tavakoli-Targhi, 1990: 
77) became increasingly prominent across most sectors of society. During this period 
women became increasingly visible in demanding a constitution and freedom from foreign 
powers. With increasing dissatisfaction with foreign power structures, women arrived in the 
public sphere prepared to fight for their rights and their country, sometimes unveiled. The 
increased nationalist tone of the constitutional movements indicates calls for a new national 
identity as well as reforms in the nation’s political discourse. Tavakoli-Targhi (1990: 77) 
argues that these calls were in part enabled by the ‘selective remembrance of things pre-
Islamic’ thus enabling a form of dislocation between Islam and Iran, subsequently facilitating 
questions pertaining to the effects of secularism on women’s marital rights. 
The championing of women’s rights was not however, new, nor was it restricted solely to 
Muslims. Fischer (1978: 296) notes that in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, 
Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani and Shaykh Ahmad Ruhi, two renowned Babis, chose to focus on 
women’s rights as one of their many areas of inquiry. More contemporary intellectuals, such 
as Mirza Malkum Khan and Mirza Fathali Akhundzada, a convert to Islam and reconvert to 
Christianity, and an atheist respectively, also wrote comprehensively on the same issue. This 
indicates that concerns relating to gender equality were thus trans-religious, and were not 
restricted to women.     
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As an observer of the Constitutional Revolution, Qajar Princess Taj al-Sultana witnessed its 
multifaceted nature, becoming intrigued with women’s emancipation. The emergence of 
women into the public domain is perceived by Amanat (in al-Sultana/Vanzan & Neshati, 
n.d./2003: 67) as representing ‘an important force of dissent, often appearing in the front 
line of demonstrations’. Moreover, Taj appeared to have no qualms advocating the Western 
liberal values of the women’s rights movements of Britain, America and France; seeking to 
travel to Europe and meet these ‘freedom-seeking ladies’ (khanomha-ye hoquq-talab) and 
ask them to recognise the endeavours of Asian women (Amant in al-Sultana /Vanzan & 
Neshati, n.d./2003: 68). This reinforces the prominence of cross-cultural and transnational 
influences, whilst echoing post-colonial feminist emphasis on the significance of location.  
From a young age, Taj believed that women’s education was vital to marriage and the 
family, possibly influenced by her experience as a child bride, and it was her reformist 
attitude to this aspect of women’s lives (Amanat in al-Sultana/Vanzan & Neshati, n.d/2003: 
69) which spilled over into her later work. Her modernist views also extended to issues of 
veiling and marriage, with her understanding of gender equality predating a decade of 
women’s activism (1910s-1920s); which, during the 1930s under Reza Khan became a non-
political venture that remained from the revolutionary era (Amanat in al-Sultana /Vanzan & 
Neshati, n.d/2003: 71).  
Outside of the royal harem, female perspectives began to alter, looking beyond the 
imposed, patriarchal harem (Bamdad, 1977: 25–26). Shuster (1907 cited in Amanat in al-
Sultana/Vanzan & Neshati, n.d./2003: 67) evidences this through his recognition of women’s 
roles and their importance in the revolutionary movement: 
The women did much to keep the spirit of liberty alive. Having themselves suffered from a 
double form of oppression, political and social, they were the more eager to foment the 
great Nationalist movement for the adoption of constitutional forms of government and the 
inculcation of the Western political, social, commercial and ethical codes. Equally strange is 
the fact that this yearning by the people received the support of large numbers of the 
Islamic priests, a class which stood to lose much of its traditional influence and privilege by 
the contemplated changes.  
Recognition of women’s dual oppression and their determination to ensure a more Western 
style of government through the implementation of a constitution reinforces dissatisfaction 
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with the current system and attempts to destabilise normative power structures. Shuster 
also wrote that: 
Special commendation must be given to the veiled women of Iran—women kept in seclusion 
by an impenetrable wall of social customs, deprived of any social or intellectual 
independence, allowed no opportunity to acquire knowledge or mental training, but filled 
nevertheless with an intense love of their country. When rumours spread that Iran’s 
parliamentary deputies had decided in secret session to surrender to the threat of force, it 
was this love of their country which made the women respond to the foreign insult with 
manly courage. At the same hour of the same day, three hundred of them walked out of 
their homes and their barred harems, with glowering expressions and in many cases with 
pistols hidden under their black chádors, and made their way to the Majles (parliament), 
where they tore off their veils and declared that rather than see the deputies timidly and 
cravenly let the nation’s dignity be trampled underfoot, they would kill the deputies and 
their own husbands and children and themselves so that at least the corpses might vouch 
for Iran’s honour.  
(cited in Bamdad, 1977: 27) 
Within this purview the honour of the nation and women can be viewed through similar 
lenses. Frequent justifications for implementing a patriarchal system include the protection 
of women’s honour by male relatives; the sentiment behind the women’s nationalist 
movement is perceived as maternal, reinforcing perceptions of duty to protect the state 
from foreign intervention. This is emphasised by reference to the ‘independence of the 
motherland’ in women’s speeches (Bamdad, 1977: 35) as well as in the works of Russian 
nationals Akhundov and Abdol Rahim Talebov who, as pioneers of Iranian secular 
nationalism ‘addressed themselves to issues related to Iran and Iranians living in the 
motherland’ (Bayat, 1991: 98). Furthermore, the female personification of the state serves 
as a metaphor for those involved in the movement, with the independence of the 
motherland symbolising the independence of women. The political climate of 1906 is thus 
understood by Sanasarian (1982: 20) to have provided an idyllic environment for women to 
enter the public sphere due to the changing nature of power structures and the intertwining 
of nationalism and feminism. It is also understood here to have provided a framework 
within which dominant Euro and male-centric representations can be challenged. 
Women began organising into societies, one of which held its meetings outside of Tehran so 
as to avoid unnecessary attention. The Women’s Freedom Society, of which Taj and one of 
her sisters were members, focused exclusively on issues facing Iranian women (Bamdad, 
1977: 30). The meetings were mixed, however, male attendees were not permitted to 
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speak, rather, the purpose of their attendance was to assist women with appropriate 
behaviour when addressing a mixed group and to overcome any fears they may have had 
about speaking publicly (Bamdad, 1977: 30). 
In the early stages of the women’s movement religious leaders were supportive and 
facilitated the emergence of a sense of freedom amongst some women accompanying men 
in nationalist campaigns. This is evidenced, according to Sanasarian (1982: 20), by the bread 
riots, where women’s ‘very unladylike’ behaviour appeared on the public scene; by 1906 
women are understood to have become more discernible and autonomous with anjumans 
(societies) and dowrehs.35 This combination of formal and casual modes of communication 
amongst the female population increased awareness of potential non-domestic roles 
(Sanasarian, 1982: 20); and it is within this milieu that the post-colonial feminist refutation 
of the public/private dichotomy becomes visible within the Iranian context. 
Following the establishment of the constitution, many female advocates sought to challenge 
the absence of an enfranchised female population. Five years later, these women found 
themselves an advocate within the Majlis (religious council) who instigated a debate on the 
matter (Bayat-Philipp, 1978: 300). The response to this was shock and uncertainty as to 
whether the proposed discussion was serious. A few days after the publication of an 
account of the meeting in the London Times (August 22nd, 1911), an ‘authorised’ and 
‘accurate’ account was provided: 
Hadji Vekil el Roaya: I beg leave to ask for what reason should women be deprived of votes; are 
they not human beings, and are they not entitled to have the same rights as we have? I beg the 
ulama for a reply. Sheikh Assadollah: we must not discuss this question, for it is contrary to the 
etiquette of Islamic Parliament. But the reason for excluding women is that God has not given 
them the capacity needed for taking part in politics and electing the representatives of the 
nation. They are the weaker sex, and have not the same power of judgment as men have. 
However, their rights must not be trampled upon, but must be safe-guarded by men as ordained 
in the Koran by God Almighty.  
(cited in Bayat-Philipp, 1978: 301) 
This not only indicates resistance to the female vote (Bayat-Philipp, 1978: 301), but it 
further indicates the determination of the state to maintain Islamic customs according to 
their interpretation, thus ensuring religious prominence in political life. Women’s nationalist 
                                                 
35 ‘A dowreh is best defined as “an amorphous amalgam of patterned personal relationships. The contact that 
exists between the members is what makes the structure a group while at the same time guaranteeing that it 
remains an informal group,” (Sanasarian, 1982: 20).  
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endeavours however, proved more fruitful than their search for political equality. A vast 
number of men advocated increased political rights for women along with basic social 
change, the foundations for which lay with the improved status of women (Bayat-Philipp 
cited in Sanasarian, 1982: 23). Despite increasing support for the women’s cause, Regan 
(1985: 61) argues that during the earlier stages of the revolution, mullás (religious leaders) 
used the veil as a tool of manipulation when referring to the movement, indicating that they 
would later suggest the unveiling of women. The impact of this suggestion was the closure 
of bazaars in opposition to women attending the same revolutionary meetings as men 
(Regan, 1985: 61); subsequently reinforcing traditional perceptions of gender segregation, 
as espoused by patriarchal power structures, especially within the public sphere. 
Opposition to mixed meetings did not deter some, as is evidenced through the 
establishment of secret societies and organisations. (Non) violent methods were employed 
by groups advocating the development of a constitution and the removal of foreign powers 
(Sanasarian, 1982: 20). Action by women’s groups against foreign influences included the 
sale of items such as jewellery in order to buy bonds from the National Bank that the Majlis 
sought to establish and the boycotting of foreign goods – succeeding in tea shop closures to 
reduce imported sugar usage (Bamdad, 1977: 45; Sanasarian, 1982: 20). Consequently, this 
reinforces the prominence of imperial power structures within Iran, their far reaching socio-
economic effects, and the impact of such responses on feminist organisations. 
The established women’s groups however, had diverging objectives. The National Ladies 
Society (Anjoman Mokhadarat Vatan Iran, 1910) focused primarily on the eradication of 
foreign occupation indicating that imperialism was blamed for the Iranian political situation, 
which subsequently impacted on their status (Bamdad, 1977: 35). Conversely, the Women’s 
Freedom Society blamed internal issues like restrictive clergy, with gender inequality being a 
point of contact for these groups as they sought to challenge diverging power structures 
(Sanasarian, 1982: 35). Other anjumans which were formed during this era include: The 
Anjuman for the Freedom of Women (Anjuman-i Azadi-yi Zanan, 1907); The Secret Union of 
Women (Ittihadiyah-yi Ghaibi-yi Nisvan, 1907); The Anjuman of Women (Anjuman-i Nisvan); 
The Anjuman of Ladies of the Homeland (Anjuman-i Mukhaddarat-i Vatan, 1910); The 
Association for the Welfare of Women of Iran (Shirkat-i Khairiyah-yi Khavatin-i Iran, 1910); 
The Anjuman of Ladies of Iran (Anjuman-i Khvatin-i Iran, 1910); The Union of Women 
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(Ittihadiyah-yi Nisvan, 1911); The Anjuman of Women’s Efforts (Anjuman-i Himmat-i 
Khavatin, 1911); and The Council of Women of the Center (Hay’at-I Khavatin Markazi, 1911) 
(Afary, 1996: 184). Prominent commonalities between these groups however, were situated 
around the challenging of patriarchal power structures, foreign or national, with education 
being prominent amongst their concerns. However, questions also arise regarding group 
methodologies for challenging gender inequality in family law. 
5.3.1 Writing to Resist 
Women’s public protesting against foreign powers and female subjugation was assisted by 
the emergence of writing as a mode of communication. Whilst the former is understood 
here to represent the oppression of individuals by a colonising power, irrespective of 
gender, the latter refers to gender specific subjugation; with women mobilising against both 
due to their experiencing a ‘dual oppression’. Browne (1910: 127) observed that ‘one of the 
most remarkable features of the Constitutional Movement was the rapid development of 
journalism, which was, however, most marked in 1907, when the total number of 
newspapers appearing in Persia was said to be about 90.’ It was also during this period that 
numerous male intellectuals advocated women’s rights, amongst them poets, journalists 
and members of the Majlis.  
According to Afary (1996: 178), male advocates included Dihkhuda in Sur-i Israfil (Satirical 
columnist, 1907-1908); Iraj Mirza (Poet); and Vakil al-Ru’aya and Taqizadah (Majlis 
delegates), with their stances being accompanied by numerous articles in Habl al-Matin 
(1907-1909), Musavat (1907-1908), and Iran-i Naw (1909-1911). Moreover, she (1996: 178) 
notes that institutional support of the women’s rights movement by members of the Majlis, 
whilst not effective in securing changes, was more significant than that received during the 
later 1979 revolution. This therefore indicates the more advanced, modernist approach 
being taken by some Majlis members during the formative years of the twentieth century; 
subsequently reinforcing the prominence of the early twentieth century for challenging 
gender inequality. 
It was also during this epoch that women’s writing became more prominent. According to 
Parvis-Brookshaw (2013: 22) the royal harem was a sphere of female autonomy and was 
where a vast number of patrons of female poetry resided and celebrated the works of 
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others. Moreover, ‘A number of the leading male writers, prominent royals and court poets 
composed poetry in praise of royal women in Qajar Iran’ (Parvis-Brookshaw, 2013: 23). For 
women outside of the royal harem, writing posed numerous issues and was more complex, 
and Parvis-Brookshaw (2013: 19) draws on the work of Milani (1992: 6) to emphasise this:  
It is not surprising that, given the religious, social, and aesthetic constraints on women’s self-
expression in public, exceptionally few women could or perhaps even wanted to break this 
ancestral silence. Women writers had to transgress feminine proprieties that shut them out 
of the public domain. They had to expose their voices because literature transmits and 
translates the human voice to the printed page. Writing, with its potential for public 
communication, for entering into the world of others, could be considered no less a 
transgression than unveiling. In both, a woman expresses/exposes herself publicly. Through 
both, an absence becomes a presence … Writing, like unveiling, makes a woman publicly 
visible and mobile. Naturally, it could not be included in the repertoire of proper behaviour 
for women. Instead, it was a closely defined filial activity passed down from fathers to sons.  
Milani’s (1992: 6) observation thus emphasises patriarchy’s transcending reach within 
society. It reinforces traditional roles and expectations, and why some women adopted 
writing as a mechanism to address gender relations. Traditional perceptions of roles and 
activities reinforce Briggs and Sharp’s (2004: 666) notion that power relations form around 
hegemonic masculinity which subsequently encompasses the powerful/powerless 
dichotomy. Two prominent concerns which emerged within the writings of women’s rights 
advocates were access to education and polygamy. The notion was that increased female 
education and the eradication of multiple marriages could contribute towards a new 
generation of Iranian patriots due to the establishment of a “healthy’ family environment’ 
(Bayat-Philipp, 1978: 297). Moreover, some advocated the eradication of mahrs, in favour of 
putting the money towards female education; thus placing education at the fore of the 
gender equality campaign. The subjugation of women also became a prominent topic for 
satirical columnist Dikhuda who wrote:   
Everyone knows that, among us, it is a shame to call a woman by her own name. Not such a 
small shame, but a big one! Really, what does it mean to mention the name of one’s wife! 
While the woman is childless you call her by saying “hey!” Once she has a child you then call 
her by the child’s name as in Abul, Fati, Abu, Ruqi, and so on. Then the wife says Ya? And you 
tell her what you want. That’s it! Calling a woman by her own name is absolutely improper!’  
(cited in Afary, 1996: 130) 
As previously evidenced (see section 4.6), this represents the removal of women’s identities, 
recognising them only through their roles as wife or mother. Furthermore, this indicates the 
paralleling of women with children, effectively depoliticising them whilst simultaneously 
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implying immaturity and an inability to be self-sufficient. It also speaks to the hierarchical 
relationship between parent and child as espoused by Locke (see section 2.3) (Eisenstein, 
1981: 34–39) when justifying the unparalleled nature of politics and the family.  
Despite this attitude, the first women’s journal, Danesh (Knowledge) was published around 
1910. Later, in 1913, Shekoofeh, the oldest women’s newspaper was founded and focused 
on numerous aspects of women’s education. It later became more opinionated, openly 
criticising child marriage as well as addressing issues of  foreign imperialism and nationalism 
(Sanasarian, 1982: 32). In 1919, the publication Zaban Zanan (Women’s Voice) by the 
Women’s Association of Isfahan directly condemned the position of Iranian women, and 
was the first one to openly advocate the abolition of the veil (Afary, 1996: 187). It was the 
first journal to be openly registered under a woman’s name, Sediqueh Dovlatabady, and 
proved integral in the long campaign for gender equality (Sanasarian, 1982: 32).  
Whilst the Iranian women’s movement was more successful on the nationalist front than 
they were on the issue of gender equality, the various roles played by women and the 
support they received from men indicates the increasingly modernised attitude towards 
gender relations. The development of groups and publications represents growing 
challenges to power structures in which women are positioned as binary opposites to men 
(Stanley & Wise, 1993: 204). Whilst education was the most prominent concern, the 
inclusion of child marriage and mahr indicates that women’s marital rights were also 
emerging as prominent concerns. This, accompanied by the increasingly secular atmosphere 
in revolutionary Iran thus raises questions pertaining to the effects of secularism on 
matrimonial equality in post-revolutionary Iran. 
5.4 Constitutional Periods 
The intersection of feminism and post-colonialism serves as a point of departure for 
challenging Western homogenisations (McEwan, 2001: 96). Seeking to dislocate over 
simplified (cultural) portrayals, post-colonial feminist criticisms are pivotal in further 
understanding specific events and experiences. It is within this milieu that the Iranian 
constitution and its surrounding environment are crucial in understanding the effects of 
secularism on diverging aspects of socio-economic and political life. Additionally, following 
its implementation, it was later revoked and subsequently reinstated, thus indicating the 
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disinclination of the Shah to commit to the constitution, potentially due to its power to 
decentralise his political position.  
The constitution was arguably not Iranian in nature, and failed to grant women any rights, 
situating them on the same point of the spectrum as the insane and the criminal 
(Sanasarian, 1982: 19). Moreover, Western influenced individuals were prominent amongst 
those involved in its development, and it was viewed as ‘an odd amalgamation of 
contradictory concepts, including Muslim religious law, secularism, and Western 
constitutional precepts’ (Sanasarian, 1982: 19). Additional critiques by Sanasarian (1982: 19) 
present the constitution as lacking an innovative and national component; being a 
proclamation with religious nuances, it was a poor replica of those established by Western 
monarchies such as Belgium and The Netherlands. 
Muzaffaru'd-Din Sháh, crowned on June 8th 1896, according to Browne (1910: 98) will be 
remembered for his permitting the establishment of the constitution, thus distancing 
himself from the previous actions of his father. Ratified on December 30th, 1906 (Dhu’l-
Qa’da 14, A.H. 1324), and despite the fact that the movement which had resulted in its 
development had been predominantly secular, the constitution began with ‘In the name of 
God, the Merciful, the Forgiving’ (Peaslee, 1950c: 200; “The Persian Constitution,” n.d.: 
527). The overarching reach of religion in the political realm and its continued presence in 
Iranian politics, despite the predominantly secular tones of the movement, are thus 
reinforced. It also suggests reluctance to part from religion in the political world; indicating 
the prominence and perceived importance of religion in Iran, whilst also raising questions 
about the broader effects of secularism with regard to law and gender relations. 
The preamble to the constitution framed its purpose in relation to the Kingdom and the 
peoples, as well as reinforcing governmental structures and government employee duties 
whilst seeking to ensure the execution of religious laws as prescribed by the Prophet (FIS, 
n.d.; Peaslee, 1950: 200; Wright, 1919: 482; “The Persian Constitution,” n.d.: 527). Prior to 
the first chapter, references to God, the Prophet and Islamic Law are prominent, 
immediately indicating continued religious influences in its construction, despite the 
increasingly secular nature of its advocates.  
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Chapter one outlines the establishment of the Assembly, with Article One indicating that 
this had been achieved in accordance with the Firman. Article Two then states that it 
represents the entirety of the Iranian nation who are involved in Iran’s political and 
economic affairs (FIS, n.d.; Peaslee, 1950c: 200). Gendered language is evident through 
specific references to the participation of people in politics and economics. Therefore 
removing women from this representation due to their relegation to the private sphere; 
subsequently excluding them from participating in politics and permitting the prohibition of 
non-domestic female work. Moreover, this indicates the continued relegation of women 
within society and removes the possibility of female emancipation under the constitution. 
Wright (1919: 482) permits a more egalitarian reading with regard to female representation 
under the Assembly by referring to ‘political and domestic affairs’. Domestic affairs can be 
more broadly understood to represent the work of women within the home. However, 
women’s absence in the political realm, enables ‘domestic’ to represent the patriarchal 
order of the family and the predominantly male role of ensuring an income to account for 
domestic expenditures. Subsequently, this speaks to Stanley and Wise’s (1993: 75) 
argument that many feminists perceive the family as crucial in understanding female 
oppression. 
Article Eleven then reinforces the religious nature of the constitution through the 
compulsory oath members of the Assembly have to swear to (FIS, n.d.; Peaslee, 1950: 201; 
Wright, 1919: 483; “The Persian Constitution,” n.d.: 528). The exclusion of women from the 
political process under the new constitution was then reinforced in Article Thirty-Two when 
referring to complaints or cases being made to the National Assembly. This was evidenced in 
‘his own case’ and ‘give him a satisfactory’ (FIS, n.d.), which once again removes women 
from the public, political role and reinforces the patriarchal structure of Iranian politics.  
On October 7th, 1907 (Sha’ban 29, A.H. 1325) The Supplementary Fundamental Laws were 
ratified by Shah Muhammad ‘Ali, and their purpose was to complement those already 
outlined in the constitution. As with the constitution, the supplementary laws began with ‘In 
the name of God the Merciful…’ (FIS, n.d.; Peaslee, 1950a: 206; Wright, 1919: 489; “The 
Persian Constitution,” n.d.: 534), thus reinforcing religious overtones and the continuing 
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relationship between religion and politics. This brings the impact of secularism on the 
political process, and more specifically women’s rights, into question.  
Article One outlined the official religion as the Ja’fari doctrine of the Ithnā ʿAshari (Twelve 
Imams) branch of Islam and states that the Shah must endorse this (FIS, n.d.; Peaslee, 
1950a: 206; Wright, 1919: 490; “The Persian Constitution,” n.d.: 534). Conversely, this 
Article may well have been broken by Reza Khan as he implemented his policies of 
modernisation and secularism. With regard to equality, Article 8 stated that all people of the 
state are entitled to equal rights under Iranian law (FIS, n.d.; Peaslee, 1950a: 207; Wright, 
1919: 490; “The Persian Constitution,” n.d.: 535). The language used indicates gender 
equality in the eyes of the law, the absence of ‘citizen’ further implies this as it has 
frequently referred to enfranchised males. As evidenced previously however, gender 
equality was not prevalent throughout, with previous lexical analyses indicating that it had 
yet to be established. 
The constitution not only restricted women, and essentially limited the role of the Shah. In 
the summer of 1908, the Cossack Brigade staged a coup against the Majlis, thus ending the 
First Constitutional Period (Afary, 1996: 119). Cronin’s (1997: 9) analysis of the first Majlis 
concludes that they accomplished very little during their time, however, the second part of 
the revolution (1909-11) produced ‘effective legislation’ through the ‘increased prominence 
of state building as a constitutionalist objective’. In 1909 the Constitution was reinstated 
and those advocating reform and state restructuring formed the new Majlis (Cronin, 1997: 
9) and members were elected to their positions under an electoral law which contained no 
class discrimination. Lack of representation in some areas however, resulted in the majority 
of those voting being from wealthier, more conservative socio-economic groups (Keddie, 
1999: 61); and new political parties such as the new Democrat Party and the Moderate 
Party also emerged. The former comprised of social democrat organisations which had 
formed prior to the revolution, along with members from the liberal left. They followed a 
secular line and sought land reforms, various forms of direct taxation, a centralised 
government and equality for women and religious minorities (Keddie, 1999: 61). Conversely, 
the Moderate Party was formed, primarily consisting of conservatives and ‘including most of 
those in the old ruling class and ulama’ (Keddie, 1999: 61). Whilst this provides insight into 
disproportionate class representation and constitutional inconsistencies, the effects of war 
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and foreign power structures in Iran need to be understood as a means of discerning the 
development of secularism and its impact on women’s marital rights in the post-World War 
One era. 
5.5 Foreign Partitions and a World at War 
Recognition for the need of a constitution marked Iran’s political history, with Britain and 
Russia playing prominent and often opposing roles in escalating tensions. British motives for 
involvement and the Russo-Iranian relationship were arguably egotistic in nature, viewing a 
strong Iran as a shield for India and subsequently British interests there. Divergently, fear of 
angering Russia is posited as justification for British reluctance to support reform in Iran 
(Cronin, 1997: 4). This speaks to Cohn’s (2013: 5) observation that colonialism ‘empowers 
some people at the expense of others’; as well as Fanon’s (1963: 127) argument that 
colonialism was regionally preferential. It is because of this looming foreign presence that 
an Iranian nationalist movement developed, based primarily on cultural identity and anti-
imperialistic sentiments. Contrariwise, Ghani (1998: 298) argues that the emergence of this 
form of nationalism diverges from modern definitions of the term, suggesting that this 
would not occur until after Reza Khan’s seizing of power and the drastic socio-political 
changes which would be implemented. 
Early twentieth century Iran witnessed the completion of large Russian loans and the 
establishment of new trading agreements between Russia and Iran. New regulations 
following Russo-Iranian trade agreements and Iran’s apparent economic dependence on 
Russia were accompanied by sentiments that Iran was essentially being ‘sold to foreigners’; 
resulting in a growth in anti-government sentiment and the development of secret societies 
(Keddie, 1969: 3–4). It was during this initial period of the twentieth century when Britain 
received persistent calls for help from the anti-Russian36 movement. Whilst Britain 
responded, it was limited and their focus was directed towards the more conservative 
members of the opposition, thus excluding reformers of a more secular or revolutionary 
inclination (Keddie, 1969: 4). Limited responses to calls for help indicates British reluctance 
to become completely involved, possibly out of fear of angering the Russians. It also 
                                                 
36 This sentiment was labelled ‘Russophobia’ by Edward Granville Browne (1910: 265), and is understood to 
represent the intense hatred of Russia and its peoples with regard to their position in the Iranian state. 
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indicates a disinclination to assist in the increased secularisation of Iranian politics, 
potentially due to perceptions that increased control would be possible if secularisation 
were not to occur. 
Iran was classed as a semi-colonial zone due to its avoidance of direct colonisation and the 
precarious nature of state sovereignty (Marashi, 2008: 17). It is within this milieu that the 
establishment of ‘internal’ secularism can be further understood, therefore contributing to a 
comprehension of secularism’s impact on women’s marital rights. This classification is 
arguably linked to the failure of the constitutional movement to bring forward a strong 
parliamentary rule, a solid leader and a more confident and coherent party system as had 
emerged in India (Ghani, 1998: 21–22). Tensions increased during 1906 following demands 
that merchants lower sugar prices, and anti-government merchants along with tradesmen 
and some mullás took refuge in the Royal Mosque of Tehran (Keddie, 1999: 55), thus giving 
rise to the constitutional revolution which continued until 1911. The eventual success of the 
movement that saw the establishment of the constitution was, according to an article in the 
St Petersburg Birzheviya Viedomosti (September 13th, 1906 cited in Browne, 1910: 123), not 
entirely an Iranian triumph:  
it was becoming obvious that Persia would succeed in obtaining reforms and even a 
Constitution, thanks to the benevolent co-operation of England, and that this would be 
another heavy blow to Russian prestige in Asia. 
This indicates that Russian opinion of the Iranian achievement was that it would not have 
been possible without foreign assistance, thus illustrating normative Western perceptions of 
non-Western abilities. It also suggests a form of Russian resentment towards perceived 
British assistance in the constitution’s establishment, essentially viewing this as Britain 
working against them, therefore suggesting a struggle between foreign power structures.   
Prior to the establishment of the constitution however, Japan defeated Russia (1904-1905); 
subsequently Russia became more amenable in cooperating with the British with regard to 
developing a means by which their respective interests in Iran could be protected, especially 
with the increasing power of Germany in the international system (Ghani, 1998: 8). The 
Japanese defeat of Russia served two purposes for Iran. Firstly, it reinforced the capabilities 
of an Asian country against a European power; secondly, it reinforced the benefits of a 
constitution, with Japan having one and Russia not (Foran, 1998: 17). The perceived power 
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of a constitution was consequently emphasised through the fact that Japan was the only 
Asian state with an established constitution whereas Russia was the only major Western 
power without one (Tabari, 1983: 54). 
Resulting from British-Russian negotiations was the signing of the 1907 Anglo-Russian 
agreement which, whilst directly relating to the territorial divisions of Iran, was arranged 
without Iranian involvement. The Agreement resulted in foreign partitions within Iran; the 
wealthier Northern provinces were allocated to Russia. Moreover, the two powers became 
more inclined to work together following the Agreement in order to address two issues; 
first, the looming threat of Germany, and second, the potential implications of the 
constitutional revolution (Foran, 1989: 15). Concerns pertaining to the sovereignty of Iran 
were then raised and a response from the British envoy to the minister of Foreign Affairs a 
month after the signing of the Agreement guaranteed independence by both powers (Bayat, 
1991: 196). Furthermore, British behaviour following the signing of the Agreement caused 
much disappointment, with observations being that Britain was preoccupied with 
establishing authority and influence in the south rather than ensuring the sovereignty and 
independence of Iran. This resulted in them appearing to have adopted the same approach 
as the Russians (Hermann, 2013: 444), essentially ‘undermining constitutional rule’ (Keddie, 
1999: 59).  
By 1914, oil had become a significant feature of Iran. Not only did this discovery encourage 
interest from other foreign entities, but the British viewed this development as vital and 
their hold in the South became livelier (Keddie, 1999: 64). By 1914 there were fourteen 
large British corporations which dealt with other areas of trade such as silk worm eggs and 
carpets; with trade rising from approximately 1.7 million pounds in 1875 to 4.5 million in 
1914 (Foran, 1989: 11-12). Additionally, Iran was economically weak as the Russian 
stronghold in the North increased (TNA, FO 416/112, 1932); thus indicating the effects of 
imperialism on Iran’s failed economic restructuring and the continuing economic hardships 
which were to be felt throughout the country. 
With the effects of war being felt across the globe, British policy makers took this 
opportunity to reinforce their exclusive position. Initially the plan was to place Iran under a 
British mandate at the 1919 Peace Conference, however, due to perceived interest by the 
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United States and France towards the region imperialistically, it did not occur. Instead, 
Britain sought to isolate Iran and leave them with no option other than British control; with 
access to Iran being limited, ‘undesirable foreigners’ such as Germans and Turks not being 
permitted entry, and the expulsion of others (Ghani, 1998: 23).  
By 1921, the Cossack Brigade remained a ‘reliable military force to the monarch’ with Reza 
Khan as its leader (Akhavi, 1980: 26). With goals concerning the modernisation of the state, 
self-promotion, independence and the establishment of order being at the fore of his 
agenda, it is at this point that Reza Khan began his rise to power (Akhavi, 1980: 26–27), and 
increased secularisation occurred. Emerging from this are queries pertaining to the effects 
modernisation and secularism had on matrimonial equality, but more immediately, the 
nature of the monarchical transition which enabled the emergence of a modernising power. 
5.6 A Monarchical Transition: From Qajar to Pahlavi 
Situated in the era of Reza Khan’s rule, the transition between the Qajars and Pahlavis is 
crucial in historically contextualising this thesis as a means of understanding how the 
implementation of a secular, modernising project occurred and the effects it had on 
matrimonial equality. Tensions between the Qajar dynasty and the Cossack Brigade had 
been evident throughout the early twentieth century, and Cronin (1997: 2) posits that the 
era of Qajar rule has scatterings of military reform attempts as the European model was 
sought for a standing army. The superiority of this model and its tools were further 
evidenced by the Russian defeat of Iran, thus reinforcing the determination of Abbas Mirza37 
to develop an army capable of defending Iranian territory. His determination was such that, 
according to Cronin (1997: 2), he brought in French and British instructors and sent students 
abroad so as to solidify the foundations of the army of the Azerbaijani province. Despite the 
initial success of this, it was not possible to maintain due to the increased resistance it met 
and the hindrances of the new army (Cronin, 1997: 2). 
Later in 1919, Britain sought to place Iran under a protectorate to ‘systematize a de facto 
situation’; however, this was met with patriotic opposition, which saw Reza Khan and 
Sayyed Zia al-Din Tabatabaʾi, instigators of the later 1921 coup d’état, as the main 
beneficiaries (Keddie, 1999: 77). Reluctance to accept reforms of this nature indicate the 
                                                 
37 Abbas Mirza was the crown-prince of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. 
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force of modernisation opponents. This was not only due to perceived Western influences 
and breaking from more traditional methods, but the conversion of the traditional army into 
a standing army would result in tax increases, along with a reduction in areas such as 
pensions (Cronin, 1997: 3). Subsequently, more financial constraints were placed on the 
Iranian people, creating further economic hardships in an already struggling country. 
It was not, however, only internal disputes which were proving to be problematic for those 
seeking to modernise and advance Iranian military capabilities. With less than supporting 
attitudes from the two squabbling powers, advocates of this military enhancement were 
hindered by Russia’s desire to maintain military weakness in the state (Cronin, 1997: 3). The 
Qajar dynasty were viewed as weak, militarily and otherwise; following the 1921 coup which 
saw Reza Khan emerge further onto the political stage, his support increased due to his 
political stance towards modernisation. Moreover, this support grew due to his recognition 
of the yet unaccomplished second aim of the constitutional revolution, the development of 
a resilient, centralised government with a modern national army at its core (Cronin, 1997: 
10). This new army however, is understood to have been plagued by the ineffectual nature 
of the Qajar army and the financial implications which accompanied it (Cronin, 1997: 7). This 
indicates the transcending nature of socio-economic, military and political issues.  
5.7 Conclusion: Women, the State and a Period of Transition 
Traditionally, Iranian women have been excluded from political endeavours, however, 
recent history evidences increasing female visibility in the public sphere. This chapter has 
examined the first two decades of the twentieth century with a specific focus on power 
structures, the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, and the emergence of women through 
various mediums. Against these backgrounds it has become possible to contextualise and 
further understand the emergence of feminist and nationalist voices as well as their specific 
goals. 
In chapter four, Fluehr-Lobban’s (1980: 236-7) attempt to destabilise ‘myths’ of the 
conservative and a-political status of Arab women was introduced. A concern which arises 
from this however, is the restriction to Arab women, with those of other cultures such as 
Persian women in Iran being excluded. Her (1980: 236-7) concerns are thus transferable to 
the Iranian (and other) context(s), and permit Briggs and Sharp’s (2004: 664) reflection on 
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post-colonial theorists querying of the willingness of Western academics to engage with 
non-Western peoples to re-emerge. 
The discussions which have occurred throughout this chapter have contextualised the socio-
economic and political situation in Iran, the impact of foreign power structures, the strong 
presence of patriarchal hierarchies and the emergence of female voices. It has also 
reinforced the manner in which Iran was excluded from some negotiations regarding its 
political future and the tug of war which occurred primarily between Britain and Russia. 
However, minimalistic efforts were made with regard to increased gender equality, and 
familial law remained within the purview of Shari’a law. As mentioned previously, the family 
represents the foundations of society which subsequently form the state as a whole and by 
maintaining its presence within this religio-legal jurisdiction, religion and politics thus 
remain intertwined.  
Moreover, as will be evidenced in the following chapters, the separation of religion and 
politics are understood here to have further contributed to the international façade of 
modernising the state and removing potential impediments to the state’s further political 
and cultural development. What remains unclear however, is the impact secularism had on 
women’s marital rights in Iran in the immediately succeeding decades, therefore the next 
chapter provides a comparative analysis of this in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939. 
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Chapter Six 
Matrimonial Equality 
6.1 Introduction 
In seeking to comprehend the development of women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran, this 
thesis examines how secularism affected them between 1920 and 1939. Chapters one 
through three have situated this point of enquiry in contemporary occurrences, an academic 
milieu and a qualitative post-colonial feminist paradigm. Chapters four and five 
subsequently drew on these methodological and academic considerations, and have 
historically located this thesis in the first two decades of the twentieth century. This chapter 
therefore serves as the first part of this comparative analysis and will provide analyses of 
Egyptian and Iranian laws within a post-colonial feminist framework. It will also highlight 
divergences in Islamic interpretations through the incorporation of various schools and their 
perspectives on marriage. 
The analysis which occurs in this chapter serves to understand rights which were (not) 
afforded to men and women in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939. By examining this 
through a post-colonial feminist lens, diverging experiences based on factors such as class 
and gender will become visible. Commencing with insights into the politicisation of the 
private sphere, the public/private dichotomy is scrutinised through the examination of laws 
and specificities pertaining to behavioural aspects of marital relations. It will also provide 
insight into the gendered and politicised identification of prominent women during this era. 
An examination will then occur as to the rights of men and women in choosing who they are 
to marry, and emphasising the removal of ‘participants’ by parents and/or male relatives. 
The chapter will then examine the role of the wali in establishing a marriage, thus 
reinforcing the removal of those being married. The chapter then analyses the role and 
significance of mahr in establishing a marriage, and the business connotations 
accompanying it. This will be followed by analyses of diverging factors which contributed to 
marriage being in crisis. In this section, the reiteration of economic aspects will be 
accompanied by analyses of laws pertaining to health and age; subsequently emphasising 
numerous concerns about the gendered divisions within and detrimental effects on marital 
relations. 
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The chapter will then conclude by reinforcing the socio-political nature of marriage in both 
Egypt and Iran. Moreover, it will emphasise the overarching consequences of the laws which 
have been examined and the feminist demands which were being advocated and how these 
contribute towards a more nuanced understanding of the effects of secularism on women’s 
marital rights in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939. 
6.2 Politicising the Private 
Recognised as the union of families between two persons; marriage is also the traditional 
establishment of the familial structure. The family is understood to represent the 
foundations of society, and thus the nation; and it is within this structure that future societal 
participants are raised and educated. Traditions have resulted in the absence of women’s 
rights, with male relatives or assigned guardians being responsible for their honour and 
eventual marriage. It also represents a specific type of power relation, whereby one person 
has the power to influence another (Yoder & Kahn, 1992: 382–384). Whilst post-colonial 
feminism endeavours to avoid the use of binaries, the examination of the public/private 
dichotomy is unavoidable in this instance. This is due to its prominence in debates and the 
societal ‘structuring’ which was evident in Egypt and Iran during the 1920s and 1930s. This 
thesis thus echoes radical feminist assertions that the private is political following the 
introduction of Personal Status Laws, which in turn determined relationships and roles of 
different familial members. 
Previous analysis of the Iranian Constitution (1906) and its Supplementary Fundamental 
Laws (1907) (see section 5.4) alongside Reza Khan’s progressively rigid framework for 
marriage indicate the increasing politicisation of the private realm in comparison to the pre-
constitution era. Subsequently, these policies further politicised the female body through 
the granting of rights to women, ultimately reinforcing the patriarchal system that 
advocates of gender equality challenged.  
Changes in Iran ‘can be thrown into sharper relief as a contrast is initially drawn with the 
Arab tribal society’, which is frequently confused with the broader status quo across the 
MENA region (Fischer, 1978: 197). This stereotype is formed from three sources. First is 
partially from reasoning pertaining to maintaining a form of social order when there is no 
state, the second is derivatives of Sunni jurisprudence, and the third is related to a man’s 
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assumed right to marry his paternal cousin which he must relinquish should another suitor 
have been found (Fischer, 1978: 197).  
The politicisation of the private sphere also occurred through the emergence of the public 
female voice and increased advocations of gender equality, with women in both countries 
opening their homes for meetings and salons. The politicisation of the private by making the 
home a forum for women’s political discussions thus links to Botman’s (1991: 109) 
observation of the absence of government support, and the short reaching effects of female 
emancipation to both male and female citizens, which was evident in both Egypt and Iran. 
Following the Egyptian nationalist movement of 1919, political scepticism and distrust of 
activists remained noticeable. On December 25th and 28th 1921 political communications 
emerged about Safiyya and Huda respectively (TNA, FO 141/511/5) with both women being 
identified through their husbands. Distrust of these two women emerged prominently, 
being determined by their activities and affiliations. In a communication to Cairo City Police 
it was stated that ‘Mme. Zaghloul is to be carefully watched’ (FO 141/511/5, 1921). This 
indicates her perceived untrustworthiness, and whilst it did not provide justification for such 
suspicions, it possibly related to her public persona as well as her husband’s perceived 
threat to the British presence in Egypt. This is reinforced by a letter (1922) warning the press 
not to publish Safiyya’s appeal38 (TNA, FO141/511/6). This not only reinforces the notion of 
her being a threat, but also indicates the restrictions placed on the freedom of thought and 
expression of individuals as a potential means of protecting the current nature of the state.  
Similarly, Huda was identified as ‘… one of those who have gone back to the Wafd’ (TNA, FO 
141/511/5). This indicates that her primary identity was as a wife, thus reinforcing the 
absence of female identification; secondly, that despite party disparities, some people had 
returned to the Wafd Party. The phraseology of the note – ‘one of those’ - indicates 
potential disdain for returning Wafd supporters and possible generalisations regarding their 
behavioural and political characteristics; thus identifying her through her affiliations. The 
only certainty of who she was, emerges through the identification of her husband, thus 
bringing a private relationship into the public domain. 
                                                 
38 This appeal was to the Egyptian public, calling on her Egyptian son’s to assist her in ensuring the return of 
her husband from exile (see for example Baron, 2005). 
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Later, a letter was written regarding Safiyya, her husband and the murder of Sir Lee Stack:39     
November 27th, 1924 
Dear Furness, 
 You may be interested to learn that Madame Zaghloul has recovered from her 
emotion, and is inciting her husband to stir up resistance. You will guess the source of this 
information. I had tea this afternoon with Hilmi Issa Pasha, late Mudir of Gharbia. He said 
quite frankly that he regarded Z. as responsible for the recent murder, since he had created 
the required atmosphere. 
Yours Sincerely 
Sd. P. G. Elwood 
(TNA, FO 141/511/6) 
The use of ‘inciting’ suggests that Safiyya was considered problematic; there was no 
recognition of Zaghloul Pasha’s previous activities, nor of his own ability to create 
resistance. Moreover, it implies her ability to control him. She was also identified as a 
‘continuing problem’ to authorities due to her anti-British sentiment which was prominent 
during the years of her husband’s exile. ‘You will guess the source of this information’ 
indicates that previous communications of a similar nature have occurred. However, the 
letter itself appears contradictory as it commences with accusations of Safiyya encouraging 
her husband, yet it concludes with Zaghloul Pasha being held accountable for the murder 
due to his role in creating the necessary atmosphere, thus implying that this was considered 
equal to pulling the trigger. Not only does this highlight a British perspective of some 
Egyptian activists, but it indicates a potential means of reinforcing Zaghlul’s state of exile, 
thus finding a solution to a prominent Egyptian nationalist. 
The politicisation of the private continued into the world of business as the language used in 
reference to marriage carry heavy overtones of property and ownership. This was observed 
by Iranian Sattareh Farman Farmaian (1993: 154) who noted that ‘…after marriage a woman 
belonged not to her own family but entirely her in-laws’. The linguistics not only denote 
business but also reinforce the strength of the patriarchal system and the shadow status of 
women in society whereby they are considered property. 
Observations pertaining to the arrangement of marriage were made by Iranian Princess Taj 
al-Sultana (n.d./2003: 111) who recalled: 
                                                 
39 Sir Lee Stack was the British Governor-General of the Sudan and Egyptian Army Commander. He was 
assassinated on November 19th 1924. 
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A few months later, my future father-in-law took one of the daughters of the Grand Vizier to 
wife. After his marriage, he petitioned my father to allow me to be married, too; or if 
permission was withheld, it could wait until he was so inclined….Permission for my wedding 
was granted, and they began to celebrate. The preparations were done beautifully and 
exquisitely, but the numbers were smaller than at the betrothal ceremony I relapsed into a 
state of frenzy bordering on insanity, constantly fearful of some external threat. I found 
myself sinking deep into a whirlpool with no means of escape. I wept and pleaded a great 
deal, entreating that my wedding be delayed. But the force of my father’s wrath subdued 
me, and, using threats, he compelled me to submit.  
Stanley and Wise (1993: 93) posit that power within the familial structure transcends the 
institution of marriage, moving into feminist understandings of individual/society relations. 
This is emphasised through the business of marriage, and Taj reinforced this as she wrote of 
‘taking’ a woman ‘to wife’ and the petitioning to her father for her marriage. This also 
indicates how Taj felt removed from the process as ‘they began to celebrate’; secondly, it is 
possible to interpret this ‘external threat’ as her looming nuptials and future husband. Taj 
also indicates that she had been placed in an inescapable situation far beyond her. Thirdly, 
her response to her betrothal and the effects such fears had on her caused her father to 
become angered and forced her to acquiesce to his decision. This evidences the strength of 
the patriarchal system within the family and paternal authority over their daughters’ future; 
with Walters (2011:18) reinforcing this through the example of the giving of a bride by her 
father.  
It was not however, only male relatives who had authority to grant permission for marriage, 
with Iranian men of governmental authority being permitted to reject requests for 
marriage:  
In view of the consular instructions prohibiting a consular officer from solemnising a 
marriage of parties who profess a religion which recognises polygamy or concubinage, His 
Majesty’s Minister rejected the application for his marriage in the consulate’.  
(TNA, FO 416/112, 1932: 44) 
In addition to non-family members being able to determine the actuality of a marriage, the 
Iranian Civil Code (1928) outlined legal impediments to marriage, thus further politicising it. 
Section 1050. If a person marries a woman (already) having a husband despite the 
knowledge of the matrimonial tie and the prohibition of such marriage, or a woman who has 
not yet completed her 'Iddah for divorce or death (of her husband) despite the knowledge of 
(the woman's not having completed) the Iddah and the prohibition of the marriage, his 
contract of marriage shall be void and the woman shall be rendered perpetually unlawful to 
him.  
(Naqvi, 1968: 151; Taleghany, 1995: 155) 
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This outlined prohibitions for a man marrying a woman, reinforcing the monogamous 
relationships women were required to maintain, whilst reiterating the ʿiddah and the 
absence of a waiting period for men following the death of a spouse. Furthermore, ‘his 
contract of marriage’ reinforces ownership not only of the woman but of their marriage and 
his ability to determine its existence; therefore underpinning the gendered nature of 
marriage and laws pertaining to it. 
The legalities of mixed-marriages were also outlined in relation to religion and nationality. 
The marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man was prohibited (Sections 1059 in 
Naqvi, 1968: 152; Taleghany,1995: 156), yet silences remained regarding the marriage of a 
non-Muslim woman and a Muslim man. British records (TNA, FO 416/112, 1932: 44–45) 
expand on this, noting that should an Iranian woman marry a foreigner then she forwent 
her right to Iranian nationality. However, following the death of or divorce from her 
husband she could resume Iranian nationality by ‘offering an application and request to the 
Persian Government’, thus requiring them to follow the ‘usual terms’. The requirement for a 
woman to relinquish her right to Iranian nationality whilst married to a non-national 
indicates that a woman’s (national) identity was dependent on her husband or father; thus 
reinforcing the masculine representation of the state.  
Section 1060 stated that a marriage between an Iranian woman and a non-Iranian required 
governmental permission providing there were no other impediments (Naqvi, 1968: 152; 
Taleghany, 1995: 156), thereby suggesting that providing the man was Muslim their 
marriage would be permitted. Similar conditions were attached to the marriage of a man 
(associated with the government) seeking to marry a foreign woman (Section 1061 in Naqvi, 
1968: 152; Taleghany, 1995: 156). Permissions in this type of mixed marriage were not 
compulsory; however, it was at the government’s discretion whether it was necessary. 
Additionally, these criteria and rules for marriage further emphasise the manner in which 
the private was politicised. 
The Civil Code further enforced the politicisation of the private sphere through legalities 
pertaining to marital behaviours and relations: 
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The conjugal relation between a husband and wife begins immediately after the execution of 
a valid marriage contract, and the rights and obligations of the two parties to each other are 
also established with immediate effect.  
(Section 1102 in Naqvi, 1968: 156; Taleghany, 1995: 161) 
Through this legalisation of marital relations, the sexual contract (Pateman, 1988) was 
essentially established in Iran, with behavioural requirements being justified as necessary in 
the strengthening of their relationship and the family should children be involved (Section 
1103 & 1104 in Naqvi, 1968: 156 - 157; Taleghany, 1995: 161–162). The family’s role as a 
power structure confines women to a ‘service and domestic mode of behaviour’ (Stanley & 
Wise, 1993: 75). This is evidenced by the ‘special privilege’ the husband had as head of the 
family and his ability to prevent his wife from non-domestic female work should it be 
damaging to the honour and dignity of any family members (Section 1105 & 1117 in Naqvi, 
1968: 156 - 157; Taleghany, 1995: 161–162). Furthermore, it was stated that: 
In case as a result of the marriage contracted in contravention of the aforesaid provisions 
and intercourse causes damage to any part of the body of the woman or a permanent 
disease in the woman, the person (marrying her) shall be liable to an imprisonment for five 
to ten years with hard labour. If the intercourse results in the death of the woman, the man 
(marrying her) shall be liable to an imprisonment for life with hard labour.  
(Naqvi, 1968: 158) 
Rigid structures pertaining to post-marital relations reiterate the depth of the government’s 
reach into the private sphere. Criminal charges brought against a husband should he cause 
damage to his wife, whether through illness or death, and the marriage contravened legal 
criteria also indicated the politicisation of the male body. However, the scope of bodily 
politicisation was far greater for women than men, and the exclusion of women from the 
public, political sphere is arguably contradicted through these legalities. Politicising female 
bodies through legislation determining sexual activities, bodily damages and private 
behaviour ultimately politicised the private sphere and resulted in female participation in a 
form of politics. The legalisation of cooperation between spouses further politicised the 
private sphere and the individuals involved as it sought to ensure a strong, stable 
environment which was beneficial for the family; thus ensuring that the foundations of 
society were secure through the politicisation of the private sphere. 
The inclusion of British perspectives of Egyptian actors and experiences of prominent 
Egyptian and Iranian women illustrates how women were identified and how they related to 
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the marriage process. Not only does this emphasise women’s masculine identity,40 but it 
reinforces the importance of marriage at the societal level, with women being identified as 
the wife or daughter of a male individual. The politicisation of the private sphere through 
laws and the political identification of women thus reinforces their removal from the 
marriage process, subsequently raising questions as to their rights in choosing the individual 
to whom they were to be married. 
6.3 Choosing a Partner 
Mohanty (2003: 57) contends that the status of women is revealed simply through 
‘describing the structuring of the marital contract.’ Expanding on this, this thesis argues that 
their status is clearly evidenced through the partnering of individuals as the marriage 
process begins. Traditionally, parents or guardians were responsible for ensuring the 
marriage of a daughter, with her suitor being selected for her, often without their meeting 
beforehand.  
Engagement is defined as an ‘unbinding promise of marriage between a man and a woman, 
whom he can lawfully marry; it is a precursor to marry’ (NWRO, n.d.: 22), and either party 
could refuse to marry the other unless a marriage contract had been completed (Section 
1035 and 1036 in Naqvi, 1968a: 148; Taleghany, 1995: 151). Chapter One of the Iranian Civil 
Code pertained to marriage, with sections 1034-1036 and 1039 relating explicitly to ‘A Suit 
(khāstgārī)’ and betrothal, also ‘A man can be a suitor for any woman who is free of (legal) 
impediments to marriage’ (Section 1034 in Naqvi, 1968a: 148; Taleghany, 1995: 151). The 
language of these definitions highlight masculine overtones and the patriarchal order which 
determines a man’s right to marry a woman. What it omits is women being lawfully capable 
of marrying a man. It could be, however, that due to the absence of women in the betrothal 
process, they were considered to have no legal rights in choosing their future husband. 
‘Lawfully marry’ indicates that the woman had no spouse, or had observed the necessary 
waiting periods if she were widowed or divorced. It also suggests that due to the common 
practice of polygamy, the man was lawfully permitted to wed the woman in question 
providing he had no more than three wives. However, should there be deception to the 
other party involved and no valid excuse for refusing to marry is provided, then 
                                                 
40 This refers to their identity being that of their husband or father. 
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compensation was payable for any losses, with a maximum period of two years from the 
breaking of the betrothal being provided for any cases to be filed (Section 1039 in Naqvi, 
1968: 148). Another contributing factor to a man’s ability to marry was obtaining paternal 
consent, indicating the male arrangement of marriage.  
A key problem arising from arranged marriages was age discrepancies (see section 6.6.1); 
with Badran writing that in Egypt ‘They were often acquired at a young age’ (Shaarawi, 
1987: 11). The ‘they’ she refers to are women, or more precisely girls, and the use of 
‘acquired’ indicates business, which is reinforced by its later usage when referring to the 
land acquisitions of Huda’s father (Shaarawi, 1987: 15). Additionally, the process of choosing 
a partner was one from which women were removed. From her observations in Iran, 
Colliver-Rice (1923: 91) noted that ‘She is betrothed and married as a child without the 
slightest reference to her own wishes or ideas, in fact without any knowledge, on her part, 
of the man to whom she is to be married.’ One justification for the removal of women from 
this process was that of age, with tradition permitting the youthful marriage of girls. 
Another was female seclusion, thus preventing them from interacting with men they were 
not related to and leaving the ‘job’ of finding a suitor to their male relatives. The latter is 
recalled by Sattareh (1993: 27) whose father, whilst an advocate of women’s education, 
emphasised the importance of establishing domestic skills such as cookery, should she wish 
him to find her a husband.  
Naturally, I had no way of looking for a husband myself. Western-style courtship was 
unknown; a girl sat in the andarun and waited until her father or brother or cousin found her 
someone, and if they couldn’t, she was out of luck and had to spend the rest of her life being 
looked after by her brothers or other male relatives. 
(Farman Farmaian, 1993: 114)  
This reinforces the position of some Iranian women and the role of male relatives in finding 
a suitor, and emphasises the manner in which a husband was sought to care for a woman. 
The manner in which she writes of the ’consequences’, should a suitor not be found, depicts 
the unmarried woman as burdensome on her male relatives. Furthermore, it re-emphasises 
the patriarchal system and absence of liberties experienced by women. 
Huda recalled her exclusion from the decision to marry her to her cousin and guardian, Ali 
Shaarawi. Recollecting conversations between her mother and ‘Aunt’ Gazibiyya Hanim, who 
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were responsible for her marriage, she remembered the shock and how the ‘room began to 
spin’ on hearing ‘If necessary…we could arrange a marriage with her cousin’ (Shaarawi, 
1987: 52).  
Similarly, Taj (2003: 144) recalled her own betrothal, and a conversation with her father: ‘I 
will have you married soon. I will come to your home often and you must serve me.’ This 
conversation was preceded by an incident involving her mother, and it is in this context that 
her future marriage can be understood as a means by which she could escape her. 
Moreover, the latter part of the conversation implies that suitors will be brought to Taj’s 
home by her father and she is to respect his wishes. Through this, the patriarchal order of 
the domestic realm is reinforced and indicates how removed she was from the betrothal 
process. The unknown element of this relationship and the suitability of a family rather than 
the bond between two people is emphasised as she ‘prepared myself to love him’, thereby 
reiterating the absence of an established relationship prior to marriage and highlighting the 
forced, unnatural nature of her love for him.   
Throughout her memoirs, Taj recalled the emotional turmoil experienced as a result of 
being married to someone unknown at such a young age. Remembering her wedding day: 
The vow was said and everyone waited for my response. But tears left me no reprieve for a 
reply, and I was trembling all over. Finally, after painstaking efforts, and several clandestine 
beatings, I said a feeble aye,” thereby winning release from the turmoil and confusion of the 
moment… Oh, what a cursed day, what an evil hour! Never will I forget that moment. When 
freedom and dignity were snatched away from me and replaced with antipathy and 
revulsion. Holding that damnable day as the author of my ruin, I will denounce it forever.  
(al-Sultana /Vanzan & Neshati, n.d./2003: 111–112) 
A similar situation, was observed in Iran by Colliver-Rice (1923: 27), whereby a woman’s lack 
of response incited demands for an answer. This silence infers reluctance to commit to this 
arrangement, yet the eventual answer was forced. Divergently, Taj remembered 
‘clandestine beatings’ as a means of ensuring she answered correctly. It was at that moment 
that she believed she lost her independence and her dignity, falling into a new patriarchal 
structure. 
At a young age Taj was very critical of customs and traditions associated with marriage:  
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Ah misery! Of mankind’s great misfortunes one is this, that one must take a wife or husband 
according to the wishes of one’s parents…Man must always choose his eternal companion 
well, and get to know her thoroughly before making his choice, so that he does not ruin his 
life and fall prey to temptation.  
(al-Sultana /Vanzan & Neshati, n.d./2003: 108) 
Taj therefore questioned the traditions of Iranian marriage and the absence of a sense of 
knowing the person to whom you are to be married. The language she used is prominently 
male. ‘His eternal companion’, ‘his choice’ and ‘ruin his life’ all represent the patriarchal 
nature of marriage. Moreover, Taj believed that unhappiness due to ignorance about their 
future spouse and being unable to make an educated decision would potentially result in 
extra marital indiscretions. 
Whilst both Huda and Taj’s experiences occurred prior to 1920, similarities can be drawn 
with other women’s experiences. In 1920, following the death of her mother, 12 year old 
Egyptian, Doria Shafik, requested her arranged betrothal be ended (Nelson, 1996: 22), thus 
representing a break with conformity. The use of ‘ask’ signifies respect towards her 
grandmother and indicates recognition of the implications of what she was requesting. The 
use of ‘this’ when referring to her betrothal to al-Sa’id al-Qasabi suggests that Doria did not 
identify as participating in this process. This request also indicates the emergence of a 
feminist consciousness, an understanding of self-determination and achieving personal 
satisfaction without a pre-determined future; characteristics which were also evident in 
Huda, but were not as obvious with Taj. These divergences are potentially due to varying 
constraints which accompanied differing class expectations, and this is evidenced through 
the social positioning of the three aforementioned women; with Doria being middle class, 
Huda upper class, and Taj of Iranian royalty.  
In 1926, a committee became responsible for amendments to the Egyptian law of 1920 
which proposed the inclusion of stipulations by the wife in the marriage contract (Shaham, 
1999: 465). Whilst approved by the Cabinet, King Fu’ād vetoed the proposal due to the 
public outcry which ensued, and it was omitted from the later 1929 law (Shaham, 1999: 
465). One justification for objecting to the proposal was its contravention of the Hanafī 
doctrine (Shaham, 1999: 475). Due to the rigid nature of the Hanafī law, and the adoption of 
the principle of selection (takhayyur) by Egyptian legislators by the 1920s, it was later 
suggested that the Hanbalī doctrine be adopted as it permitted the inclusion of stipulations 
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in the marriage contract providing that they do not contradict Shari’a (Shaham, 1999: 476). 
Despite King Fu’ād’s veto, stipulations had become an informal tradition prior to 1926. This 
is evidenced through the inclusion of a stipulation by Huda’s mother prior to her marriage to 
Ali, and by the ending of her Uncle Idris’ betrothal following stipulations pertaining to the 
location of the marital residence (Shaarawi, 1987: 24). Whilst this indicates a move towards 
protecting women once the marriage has been contracted, the stipulations in both cases 
were implemented by the bride’s parent(s), thus indicating that control was not possible. 
However, the proposition of 1926 placed the responsibility of stipulations with women, thus 
indicating the proposed relinquishing of power from guardians.  
Contrastingly, under Iranian law a marriage contract was invalid should it contain 
stipulations however, this was further clarified stating that a marriage contract was invalid if 
stipulations related to its revocation. If stipulations in a contract of permanent marriage 
pertained to the possibility of mahr providing that a time frame is specified ‘…after 
revocation it will  be as if no dower had been mentioned (in the marriage contract)’ 
(Sections 1068 and 1069 in Naqvi, 1968: 152; Taleghany, 1995: 157).  
The method by which potential suitors were found was also referred to in a negative 
manner, ‘If a man swam into Shazdeh’s net whom he and Khanom considered suitable, I 
would have no choice but to obey’ (Farman Farmaian, 1993: 155). The language used makes 
the betrothal process comparable to fishing, finding a fish and, if not suitable, throwing it 
back into the water. The search for a suitor, according to Sattareh (1993: 157), was not 
simple, recalling an instance where after the ‘interview’ her father decided it would be an 
unsuitable match. The language used in this instance once again denotes business, which 
has proven to be a common occurrence when discussing marriage arrangements. The 
interview for potential suitors reinforces this, ensuring that the contract which will be 
established will provide strong foundations for the extension of his family. Additionally, it 
reinforces Kaufman’s (1994: 63) argument that connotations of ‘“normal” manhood’ 
emerge from social processes which occur within patriarchal familial relations. Sequentially, 
questions about the impact of secularism on matrimonial equality, and the role of the wali 
arise. 
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6.4 Wali 
The wali is recognised differently by all schools of Islam. One commonality is the recognition 
of the right of ‘marriage guardians’ to marry children of both sexes without their consent 
(Coulson & Hinchcliffe, 1978: 39). Moreover their role in determining a woman’s marital 
future relates directly to female restrictions in choosing a partner (see section 6.3). In Hanafī 
law however, the individual who was married by a guardian who was not the paternal 
(grand) father was permitted to end the marriage when puberty was reached. For women of 
other Muslim faiths, marriage was contracted on her behalf and against her will, regardless 
of her age, until she had already been married (Coulson & Hinchcliffe, 1978: 39), thus 
refuting monolithic representations of Islam and reinforcing the significance of its divergent 
nature and accompanying interpretations. 
The Iranian Civil Code, Section 1071, stated that either of the betrothed may permit another 
individual to contract the marriage for them (Naqvi, 1968: 153), however, a woman may not 
marry without her guardian’s consent until she reached the age of eighteen (Section 1042 in 
Naqvi, 1968: 149). For non-Hanafī women:  
The marriage of a girl who has not yet married depends on the permission of her father or 
paternal grandfather, although she may have attained the age of more than 18 years. In case 
her father or paternal grandfather fails to give permission for her marriage without any 
sound reason, the girl may contact the Marriage (Registration) Office, introduce fully the 
man whom she wishes to marry, and (mention) the conditions of marriage and the dower 
agreed upon by them, and also inform her father or paternal grandfather through the said 
Office about the details. After fifteen days of the (receipt of) notice, the Marriage 
(Registration) Office can lawfully execute the marriage. The said notice may be sent to the 
father or paternal grandfather through a channel other than the Marriage (Registration) 
Office, but the receipt of the notice must be ensured. 
(Section 1043 in Naqvi, 1968: 149) 
The following section then clarified that only the paternal (grand) father may personally give 
consent; should they not be around and the individual has another guardian, then it is not 
necessary to obtain his permission (Naqvi, 1968: 149). This reinforces the strength of the 
patriarchal familial structure and a girl or woman’s future. It is also apparent that 
guardianship was solely a male responsibility, therefore further emphasising the enforced 
dependence of women on men. For both Sattareh and Taj, their fathers maintained the role 
of wali and were responsible for finding suitors; for Taj however, it was Anis al-Dawla – 
considered head of the harem - who became responsible (Amanat in al-Sultana/Vanzan & 
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Neshati, n.d./2003: 34). The death of Huda’s father resulted in her cousin adopting the role, 
which was essentially eradicated when Huda was betrothed to him and she was asked: 
‘Whom do you wish to designate as your wakil to sign the marriage contract?’ (Shaarawi, 
1987: 54). Whilst this represents an aspect of choice for Huda, the decision of whom she 
would marry was still removed from her. In Huda’s case the decision had been made by her 
guardian, but due to their betrothal, it is arguable that the position he gained as her wali 
was abused by his involvement in arranging their betrothal. 
The removal of women from the process of choosing a partner through the wali resulted in 
calls from feminists in both Egypt and Iran for increased female participation in marital 
arrangements. This is evidenced in Egypt through the ‘questioning of the Egyptian father’s 
authority’ (Kholoussy, 2010: 115). In both cases, the wali essentially denoted ownership of 
the father, or allocated male, over women or children; thus reinforcing the patriarchal, 
business-like framework which ensured the predominance of male authority in the marital 
process. This signals the distancing of women from marital arrangements, thus indicating 
that they had limited conditional rights, and this is further evidenced by mahr. 
6.5 Mahr 
Mahr, also known as the bride price, is the monetary amount ‘contracted by the groom’ and 
whilst this is payable when demanded by the bride, it is generally given if he divorces her. 
The payment of material goods to women prior to their marriage represents a woman’s 
acceptance. Moreover, the value of mahr indicates the societal position of the bride’s 
family, subsequently reinforcing the prominence of class hierarchies and social strata in 
establishing a marriage.  
A small amount is usually paid at the point of marriage, however, the remaining payment is 
understood to discourage divorce (Coulson & Hinchcliffe, 1978: 200). This small amount is 
also known as milk price (shir baha) and ‘theoretically is to pay the mother of the bride for 
bringing up the girl’ (Coulson & Hinchcliffe, 1978: 200). This initial payment, and the 
labelling of it as ‘milk price’ represents a form of compensation should a daughter be born. 
Consequently, traditional gendered attitudes towards female children and the burden they 
were seen to represent is reinforced. 
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Kasravi (cited in Regan, 1985: 70) posits that mahr is not required due to marriage being the 
‘joining and living together’ of two people. Justification for this tradition ensures that 
women will not face destitution should the marriage disintegrate, and in some instances a 
means by which fathers profit (see section 2.2.1). However, Kasravi (cited in Regan, 1985: 
70) believed there should be an alternative to this potential issue, especially as it is 
understood to favour women, leaving men with numerous daughters in a potentially 
precarious situation. It is possibly due to these initially unforeseen circumstances that the 
financial position of men is taken into consideration when mahr is discussed.  
It was also not uncommon for mahr to be paid in instalments, and in early twentieth century 
Egypt, the advance was usually between one third and a half (Kholoussy, 2010:28). The 
payment of goods to a certain value, depending on the social status of the woman, once 
again reinforces the business of marriage. This thesis posits that advanced payments 
represent the marital equivalent of a reservation payment, thus ensuring that women were 
recognised as betrothed.  
Huda recalled her excitement upon finding an array of jewellery from which she was to 
choose her favourite pieces. ‘I found a casket of jewels lying open in front of her; she asked 
me to select some pieces in fulfilment of a vow she had made for the recovery of my illness’ 
(Shaarawi, 1987: 52). This recollection reiterates the exclusion of women in betrothals, 
however, it could have been a result of Huda’s youth, as she was thirteen when she married. 
The marriage of girls at a young age potentially removed issues of refusal as obedience to 
elders, especially fathers or guardians, were of great importance within the familial 
structure.  
Taj also recalled a morning, when in the presence of her father, trays of toys and jewellery 
were brought into the room and placed in front of her. It was announced that they were for 
a young boy to give to ‘any girl’ he wished. She remembered how he had been advised to 
choose her despite one of her older sisters also being a candidate for betrothal. Taj wrote of 
her mother’s forceful approach in ensuring she was chosen and that the boy had complied 
(al-Sultana /Vanzan & Neshati, n.d./2003: 99). Taj further recollects the boy’s nerves: 
As soon as my father had spoken, the boy picked up a ring and put it on my Sisters finger, 
saying, “S-s-s-sir, I ch-ch-ch-choose th-th-this girl as my b-b-b-betrothed!” My father 
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embraced him and said, “My dear Aziz! Your betrothed is this Other girl, and it is my wish 
that you have her. 
(al-Sultana /Vanzan & Neshati, 2003: 100) 
This indicated the prominent role of parents in this instance, with the future of each child 
being determined for them despite the element of ‘choice’ given to them. Huda (1987: 53) 
recalled her excitement at the jewellery she had been permitted to select. ‘I chose a 
splendid diamond necklace and bracelet and I rushed to show them to Umm Kabira so she 
could share my joy’.41 Huda’s excitement evidences innocence and unawareness of the true 
meaning of her materialistic gains. Following the acceptance of mahr, Huda became aware 
of their displaying whenever guests visited her mother, thus making public her betrothal to 
Ali within the private sphere. 
The tone of Taj’s recollection varied drastically to that of Huda’s, with the use of ‘candidate’ 
reinforcing the business of marriage. Moreover, the boy’s decision as to whom he should be 
betrothed to was not his, as is evidenced by Taj’s father’s response when his elder daughter 
was chosen. Additionally, the presence of toys, reiterates the age of the persons being 
betrothed; whereas Huda was presented with jewellery with the absence of toys 
representing the substantial age difference. 
Under Iranian law, anything ownable with a monetary value can be offered, items or 
amounts given in this form however, must be clarified so as to eradicate any confusion at a 
later date and all parties must agree to the amount (Sections 1078 - 1080 in Naqvi, 1968: 
153). Should the husband fail to pay mahr, the marriage would become void within a certain 
period of time, with the marriage and mahr remaining valid but ‘the condition shall be void’ 
(Section 1081 in Naqvi, 1968: 154). The legalities of mahr payments were outlined in 
Sections 1082-1084, with women’s ability to determine its use once the contract was 
established, and the husband’s liability should it have been or become flawed after the 
marriage but prior to consummation, being clarified (Naqvi, 1968: 154). 
Should a woman not immediately receive mahr, then she could legally refuse to fulfil duties 
to her husband without ramifications of maintenance refusal; however, if she fulfilled her 
duties without coercion prior to receiving it, the absence of ramifications would not be 
                                                 
41 Umm Kabira (Big Mother) was her father’s other wife, with whom she appeared to have more of an 
emotional connection than with her own mother. 
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applicable to her (Section 1085 in Naqvi, 1968: 154). Furthermore, if the marriage was 
permanent and mahr was not mentioned or its absence was stipulated in the marriage 
contract, the marriage would be valid and negotiations could occur as to the amount, but 
she would be permitted the full amount if the marriage had been consummated. Should 
either party die before consummation and the agreement of mahr, then women were 
entitled to nothing (Naqvi, 1968: 154).   
In the case of the husband divorcing his wife prior to consummation she was entitled to half 
of the agreed amount; however, should she have been paid more than half, she was 
required to return the outstanding amount to her husband as it was given to her or 
something of equivalent value. Should this occur without an amount having been agreed, 
then women were entitled to mahr al-mut’ah; if she was divorced subsequently then she 
was entitled to the full amount (mahr al-mithl). Whilst establishing mahr al-mut’ah, men’s 
financial status were taken into account (Sections 1092-1094 in Naqvi, 1968: 155).  
The patriarchal structuring of marital laws, irrespective of class, was reinforced through the 
legalities of mahr for temporary marriages, stating that if it was not mentioned then the 
marriage was invalid. Should the woman die she did not lose her mahr – regardless of 
consummation, and if the husband excused the remaining period of marriage to the wife 
before its consummation, he should pay her half of the dower (Sections 1095-1097 in Naqvi, 
1968: 155). 
Sections 1098 and 1099 stated that regardless of the permanence of the marriage, if it had 
been void and was not consummated the wife was not entitled to mahr and anything she 
had received must be returned to the husband. However, if she was unaware of its invalidity 
and the marriage was consummated, then she was entitled to mahr al-Mithl (Naqvi, 1968: 
155). Furthermore, should issues arise with regard to clarity as to the form of mahr or she 
was unable to own it, then she was entitled to the full amount. Should it belong to another 
person then another item of similar nature or value should be provided unless the other 
owner permitted her to have it  (Section 1100 in Naqvi, 1968: 155). For all other reasons for 
divorce after consummation, other than the husband’s impotency, the woman would not be 
entitled to her mahr (Section 1101 in Naqvi, 1968: 156). 
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Should the marriage not take place, section 1037 stipulated that either party could demand 
the return of gifts from the other. Should this not be possible, the recipient of the gift(s) 
must ensure the other party received the equivalent value. This condition was further 
clarified by the subsequent section which stated that this was not applicable should the 
revocation of the betrothal be due to death (Naqvi, 1968: 148).  
In 1937, whilst undertaking her two theses at the Sorbonne, Egyptian feminist Doria Shafik 
was reunited with her cousin Nour. Having had previous betrothals end and having sought 
divorce from her husband, Doria was sceptical of marriage, its potential restrictions, and 
what it represented. The significance of Doria’s marriage to Nour was three-fold. Not only 
had she married in a foreign country without parental consent, but she had refused to 
accept mahr (Nelson, 1996: 92). This indicates an increased sense of the feminist 
consciousness which can be seen to have emerged during Doria’s childhood (see section 
6.3). Moreover, her rejection of mahr represents a different type of marriage than was 
experienced by Huda and Taj, with the primary difference being that she was not ‘bought’. 
The absence of mahr in this instance represents a change in forms of marriage and male 
attitudes, and whilst reforms had occurred, mahr was still a prominent factor. The removal 
of this aspect in Doria’s marriage potentially increased her sense of liberty within the 
bounds of the marriage contract. Whilst cultural and traditional aspects of Egyptian 
marriage and family were clearly important to her, the removal of the sense of ownership 
on Nour’s part indicated a new type of marital relationship where equality was more 
prevalent than in other cases.  
Whilst mahr had a prominent role in the betrothal and eventual marriage of a couple under 
Islamic law, Kholoussy (2010: 28) identifies it as a contributing factor to the Egyptian 
marriage crisis which occurred during a period of economic hardship. Moreover, the noting 
of the total mahr in the marriage contract indicated a formal acceptance of the price paid 
for the bride, thus reiterating the business configuration of marriage. Traditionally, mahr 
was paid in two parts. The first (muqaddam) was paid before the consummation of the 
marriage, with the latter part (muʾakhkhar), being reserved for the ending of a marriage, 
whether through divorce or death. However, the economic climate in Egypt and Iran during 
the (inter) war (years) contributed to a higher than average mahr being expected. 
Subsequently, more Egyptian men chose to remain bachelors, primarily because the cost of 
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mahr was too great (Kholoussy, 2010: 28), and Iranian girls remained single due to their 
father’s inability to provide an appropriate mahr (Regan, 1985: 71). Through this lens it thus 
becomes possible to see the impact of secularising power structures on the economy and 
the subsequent effect on marital opportunities for both men and women. 
6.6 Marriage in Crisis: Part 2 
The marriage crisis was comprised of many variables, and previous discussions (see section 
4.4) focused exclusively on the Egyptian case with issues such as economic downturn and 
mixed-marriages coming to the fore. Here the discussion on Egypt will continue however, a 
comparison will occur following the introduction of the Iranian case; along with other 
variables such as age and health. 
Despite Colliver-Rice’s (1923: 107) observation that ‘Bachelors are not found in Moslem 
lands,…’ , Kasravi (cited in Regan, 1985: 69) argues that one of Iran’s biggest problems was 
that ‘men are not marrying’ due to difficulties in finding ‘honourable women’. Bachelorhood 
not only refers directly to the aforementioned variables, rather, it also represents a 
metaphorical stance adopted by Egyptian, and to a certain extent Iranian men with regard 
to foreign occupation. The socio-political construction of Egypt as a bachelor through the 
envisaged future of a post-colonial Egypt (Kholoussy, 2010: 11) reinforces the 
personification of the state. This had already been achieved, according to Baron (2005: 11, 
7) who writes of the familial metaphors used throughout the nationalist struggles, Safiyya 
Zaghlul as ‘mother of the Egyptians’, and the gendering of the Egyptian nation as a woman 
through the term Misr (Egypt) being female.  
Whilst this politically symbolic bachelorhood may be seen to contradict Baron’s position, 
she recognises the gendering of the Arabic language, and whilst Misr may be female, watan 
(territory/homeland) is male (Baron, 2005: 7). Through Baron’s recognition of the gendering 
of terminology, it is possible to see how the Egyptian state can be portrayed as both female 
and male. This indicates that the majority of Egyptian citizens - inclusive of those who 
sought to increase women’s political rights, as well as those who chose to remain unmarried 
- mirrored their public, nationalist beliefs onto their private, personal decisions.  
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Despite correlations between bachelorhood and national self-determination, Mustafa Sadiq 
al-Rafi’i believed that: 
Marriage is the cornerstone of manhood and a principle of national allegiance. A man who 
does not marry is like a deserter from the army: Both betray their responsibility and duty to 
their nation. Manhood can only be attained through marriage.  
(cited in Kholoussy, 2010: 23)  
Kholoussy (2010: 23) notes that concerns regarding the Egyptian marriage crisis in 1934 
were not new, nor were they fully examined, with the emasculation of men and questioning 
of their national loyalty occurring rapidly. Whilst the decision not to marry has been 
metaphorically linked to the gendering of watan as well as nationalist self-determination, 
the criticism of Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi’i indicate support of a female Egypt and the familial 
metaphors which emerged with the feminist movement. 
Iranian bachelorhood can be viewed through the same lens, with freedom for the state and 
for the people being the primary objective of nationalists and constitutionalists, along with 
calls for the increased secularisation of politics. One area of the marriage crisis where 
parallels can be drawn between the two states is mahr. Due to economic misfortune in 
Egypt mahr rates increased to the extent that suitors were unable to afford them (see 
section 4.4.1); in Iran the same issue is understood to have occurred. The primary 
divergence was that in Iran it was fathers who ‘were not wealthy enough to provide a 
dowry’ (Regan, 1985: 71), thus resulting in girls remaining single and not being viewed as 
honourable by prospective suitors due to the ‘unfortunate situations’ they may have found 
themselves in (Regan, 1985: 69). 
For Kholoussy (2010: 42), the Egyptian crisis provided an alternative lens through which 
governmental responsibilities were able to be redefined, and this is equally applicable to the 
Iranian case. Additionally, alternative variables were brought to the table with possible 
explanatory values as to why Egyptian marriage rates had declined. In 1920, arranged 
marriages bore the brunt of the blame for reductions in marriage, and in 1931 the 
public/private dichotomy was deemed responsible (Kholoussy, 2010: 52), thus echoing the 
primary tenets of Amin’s (1899, 1900/2000) theses, as well as concerns raised by Taj 
(n.d./2003) and Sattareh (1993). However, as these issues dissipated, blame shifted onto 
debauched women (Kholoussy, 2010: 55); thus indicating that no single factor can be 
177 
 
attributed to the Egyptian, or the Iranian marriage crises. The inability to connect a single 
factor to the crisis reinforces the intersecting nature of all fields. It is thus within this milieu 
that economic, social and religious factors contribute to the examination of the impact of 
secularism on women’s marital rights.  
6.6.1 Age 
A prominent contention was the young age at which girls were married. This was 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, in some cases, girls as young as twelve were being 
married to much older men, thus having a potentially detrimental impact on the 
development of the child. Second is the tension caused by the age differential between 
spouses; thus age can be seen to contribute to the marriage crisis, not only as defined by 
Kholoussy (2003, 2010), but also with regard to the stolen innocence and youth of many 
girls. 
Talhami (1996: 106-107) perceives Egyptian Law 56/1923 to be ‘much more pro-feminist.’ 
This law was, in essence, aimed at encouraging a higher age of marriage for both men and 
women, with marriages where the wife or the husband were under the age of 16 or 18 
respectively, being invalidated if it became a judicial case (Talhami, 1996: 107). 
According to Harik and Marston (1996: 69) a traditional father may seek to ‘marry off his 
daughter as young as possible’, thus relinquishing him of the burden of maintaining her 
honour and supporting her financially. Another justification for marrying girls at such a 
young age was that they ‘are thought to be more pliable, better able to learn and adapt to 
the ways of the husband’s family’ (Harik & Marston, 1996: 70). The ‘privileging’ of one 
generation over another however, creates tension amongst women (Gillis et al., 2007:xxvi). 
This could potentially be removed due to the ‘pliability’ of young girls and their learning the 
structural framework of the husband’s family relating directly to the notion of obedience 
(taa’a).42 By immersing his wife in the familial structure of his home at a young age, she was 
less likely to behave in a disobedient (nashez) fashion, thus reinforcing the patriarchal 
system of his family from a young age, essentially replacing the role of her father, and 
ensuring taa’a from the onset of marriage.  
                                                 
42 Obedience, or taa’a is regarded to be a legal obligation since Shari’a is understood to have made marital 
rights and duties ‘mutual and complementary (NWRO, n.d.: 30). 
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Married to her cousin (and guardian) at the age of thirteen, Huda experienced the effects of 
arranged marriage (Fay, 2003: 94), and it is evidenced in her later activities that she sought 
to prevent other young girls being subjected to this. During their activities in the 1920s, 
…the EFU petitioned the government to set a minimum marriage age. Parliament acquiesced 
and set the minimum marriage age for girls and boys at 16 and 18 respectively. 
(Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2011: 136) 
Taj (n.d./2003: 167) recalled the first day of marriage and the impact of their youth on their 
relationship, ‘Both of us were so young, still children’, and its later deterioration. She 
recalled the unpleasantness of her husband towards her, and his preoccupation with playing 
(al-Sultana /Vanzan & Neshati, n.d./2003: 168). Betrothed at the age of eight, Taj became 
acutely aware of the significance of maturity in relationships, particularly hers. Reflecting on 
this part of her life, the emotive language used evidences its impact (al-Sultana/Vanzan & 
Neshati, n.d./2003: 104). Moreover, the removal of the two children from this process and 
the domineering parental role in establishing this union reinforced Taj’s belief that the 
foundations of marriage should be love, the choice of the individuals involved, and 
moreover, the importance of meeting each other rather than remaining shadows of each 
other’s future.  
Whilst visiting a village near to Isfahan, Colliver-Rice (1923: 146-147) recalled another 
situation of a young Iranian orphan girl: 
…they told me that her father had left her some money,…It was soon known in the village 
that she had money, and she was married when very young to a man thirty years her senior. 
He represented to her guardians that he wanted to start business as a muleteer, and 
persuaded them to let him have his wife’s money to buy mules and pack-saddles. Very soon 
after this he and his mules set out on a journey and were never seen nor heard of again. The 
child’s money had all gone, and she was dependent on her aunt, and her future seemed very 
uncertain...She went to school, and proved clever and promising, and thoroughly enjoyed 
the freedom of her new life...the mother of another pupil came to see me, and said: “I am 
not going to send my daughter to the school any more, and some of the other mothers say 
they will take their girls away too.” I asked the reason for this, and she said: “We don’t think 
it good that a girl who has been married should come to school with our girls. Her mind has 
been poisoned with all that she has seen and known, and she is not fit to mix with our 
daughters.”… 
This reinforces the issue of age differentials and the social stigmatisation she experienced 
from parents who learnt of her situation. Their primary concern was that she may be a 
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wayward influence on their daughters, primarily by suggesting that her reputation was 
damaged. 
Whilst age was a cause for concern, Section 3 of the Iranian Marriage Act stated that a 
prison sentence of six months to two years would be punishment for anyone marrying 
someone who had not attained the legal age as previously stated in Section 1041 of the Civil 
Code. Moreover, the individual marrying her would receive a two to three year sentence if 
she had not reached the age of thirteen (Naqvi, 1968: 158). However, Sattareh (1993: 50) 
recalled that whilst puberty was the benchmark for girls to become of marriageable age, 
some were married as young as nine or ten; thus indicating that, as in Egypt, social 
traditions were prioritised over law. 
Whilst the petitioning of the Egyptian government was successful, minimum marriage ages 
at the societal level were not always adhered to, with document falsification occurring 
(Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2011: 136). Legal stipulations pertaining to the minimum marriage age can 
be considered successful on three fronts, and was understood to have different implications 
throughout the class hierarchy. Additionally, it adopted a supportive role for parents who 
sought to continue their children’s education to sixteen and eighteen for girls and boys 
respectively, thus relegating marriage to second place behind education, as was evidenced 
in chapters four and five in the case of pre-1920 Egypt and Iran. The law also addressed 
Huda’s other primary concern of women’s health, due to the risks of childbirth at a young 
age and limited access to the necessary resources (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2011: 136).  
Because of the various damages which accompanied child marriages, the Iranian publication 
Patriotic Women stressed ‘the danger of early marriages of young girls’ (Sanasarian, 1982: 
36). This simultaneously reinforced the presence of an Iranian feminist consciousness and 
press, and emphasised the awareness amongst women, some of whom will have 
experienced child marriage, of the risks of marrying children, primarily girls, at a young age; 
thus sharing the primary tenets of the Egyptian feminist movement of the same era. 
Sanasarian (1982: 46) further notes that the one of the many interesting aspects of the 
Iranian feminist movement was ‘their classless character’, and despite the majority of them 
coming from upper classes, they still experienced ‘degrading conditions’. These conditions 
included situations such as child marriage and divorce, thus indicating that these issues 
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which were not only being addressed across the parameters of class, but also across state 
boundaries.  
Another area of interest highlighted by Sanasarian (1982: 47) was the reluctance of Iranian 
feminists to criticise Islam, condemning those interpreting it for their inferior social status. 
This method was also adopted by Egyptian feminists and indicates that those advocating 
women’s rights did not oppose Islam, rather they opposed the patriarchal system which 
endorsed female seclusion. Therefore suggesting that those advocating women’s rights 
understood them and the movement to be compatible with Islam; whilst some participants 
were criticised for adopting a secular approach, the impact of secularism on increasing 
women’s marital rights was minimal. 
6.6.2 Health 
Under Iranian law, it became customary to establish the health of those to be married so as 
to ensure the prevention of transmitting sexual diseases and other illnesses. Section C2 of 
the Marriage Act stated that prior to marriage all persons must present a medical certificate 
at the Registration Office proving that they are medically fit. However, ‘Girls are exempted 
from production of a medical certificate to the effect that they are not suffering from any 
venereal disease’ (Naqvi, 1968: 161). This implies her assumed virginity, whether this was 
age related remains unclear, however, there was no mention of women having to produce 
one, and this could be because of the tradition that girls would be married once at a young 
age. 
Section five stated that either party, regardless of sex, would face imprisonment for six 
months to two years should they be found guilty of deception at the time of marriage 
(Naqvi, 1968: 159). The placement of women and men on equal grounds with regard to the 
type of punishment which they would be dealt should they be found guilty of this was 
possibly due to marriage forming the familial framework. Whether men and women 
received different sentence lengths for the same ‘crime’ however, remains unclear, thus 
suggesting that gender related discrepancies could still have occurred in this instance. 
The health of those entering into a marriage is also understood by Kasravi to be of great 
importance due to the potential risk of passing such diseases onto children. Moreover, he 
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argues against ‘Lepers’ having children, and advocates penalties against those marrying with 
diseases (Regan, 1985: 70). Throughout the analysis of Kasravi’s work, Regan (1985: 69) 
highlights that approximately ninety percent of ‘marital incompatibility problems today’ 
have an adequate solution. Arguing the same position as Taj al-Sultana, Kasravi (cited in 
Regan, 1985: 69) states that such situations can be circumvented if both parties receive an 
adequate education, arguing that its absence ‘strengthens bad habits and selfishness’. 
Additionally, Kasravi (cited in Regan, 1985: 69) believes that the introduction of anti-
violence laws may further contribute to the reduction of family problems, however, health 
related laws further reinforced gendered divisions within family law.  
6.7 Conclusion: Equality and Matrimony 
This chapter has analysed various family laws relating specifically to marriage, demands 
regarding women’s rights in marriage, and lived experiences of some individuals. Through 
the various discussions, it has been possible to determine that whilst acts pertaining to the 
establishment of the family were implemented, the rights afforded to women were minimal 
and carried strict conditions. Issues regarding child marriage brought to the discussion the 
actions of feminist groups and their differing methods of addressing such problems. Whilst 
this analysis has indicated the necessity to improve the position of women in society, 
Colliver-Rice (1923: 274) stated that Iran had a women’s movement, it was not large nor 
particularly well organised, but what was more important was the awareness it was raising 
about the poor position of women and the progress they sought to achieve, and the same 
observation can be aptly applied to the Egyptian case.  
A prominent question which emerged for Fay (2003: 77) however, is why elite women, such 
as Huda, who founded the EFU, became proponents for the ‘Western-style nuclear family?’ 
Moreover, Fay (2003: 92) argues that reforms sought by Huda and the EFU should be 
understood as an attempt to ‘re-write the patriarchal bargain within the context of the new 
nation-state that was taking shape in Egypt.’ It is understood here that the new Egyptian 
state was primarily founded on the establishment of the 1923 Constitution. Based on 
European influences at the state level, with European educated lawyers being amongst 
those who drafted the Constitution, and the increasing cultural influences evident at the 
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societal level, it is arguable that whilst Islam was established as the state religion, it could 
not completely be recognised as a religious state. 
What has been established from the above analysis is the sparse nature of women’s rights. 
Traditions of arranged marriage spilled over from the nineteenth century into the twentieth, 
and it was not until the 1920s that marital age was legally determined. Moreover, mahr and 
wali continued to play prominent roles in the betrothal and marriage of women, thus 
placing tradition above all else. Additionally, whilst marriages declined throughout the first 
half of the twentieth century, women who were being married still faced issues inherent in 
the patriarchal nature of the private sphere, as well as of the marriage process. In contrast 
to Sunni Egypt, the foundations of Iran’s family laws are based on the principles of Ithnā 
ʿAshari Shīʿa, with the Majlis adding aspects of civil laws which became legislation between 
1928 and 1935, and Vatandoust (1985: 114) posits that legislation such as the Civil Code and 
the Marriage Acts did not deviate from Shariʿa. 
Throughout these two decades, significant reforms were implemented under Reza Khan. 
Women were able to stipulate that husbands remained monogamous otherwise she could 
seek divorce; and men had to inform their betrothed if they were already married. Issues 
which had been raised by feminists, such as child marriage were ‘addressed’, making it 
illegal to marry anyone who had not yet reached puberty. However, this did not necessarily 
address the issue of girls being married too young as it was common belief that they 
reached puberty before boys (Sanasarian, 1982: 61). Despite these token reforms with 
regard to increased gender equality in family laws, Reza Khan implemented reforms in 
education and other cultural areas such as dress, more rigorously (Sanasarian, 1982: 61). 
Based on feminist demands, it is clear that Reza Shah’s fixation on banning the veil and 
other religious clothing was essentially a mask to hide the continued lack of matrimonial 
equality experienced by women. Sanasarian (1982: 65–66) argues that it is apparent that 
women had far more significant needs than the banning of the veil. With European fashion 
being of little significance to women, especially those who were already married with a 
family, the reforms being implemented can be seen as superficial. 
Whilst in Iran, Colliver-Rice (1923: 91) questioned how men could become patriots and 
leaders with uneducated, ignorant mothers. The relegation of women to the private sphere, 
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their lack of knowledge, and the perceived reduction in their capabilities is thus understood 
to be detrimental to the domestic, and subsequently the political spheres (Colliver-Rice, 
1923: 91). Although some gains had been made with regard to women’s rights following the 
1919 Egyptian revolution, it is argued by Botman (1991: 107) that women were still 
‘regarded as legitimate possessions of men’, and has been evidenced in both cases; 
however, women’s rights in divorce remain to be seen.  
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Chapter Seven 
Dissolution of a Marriage 
7.1 Introduction 
Family law is prominently situated in Shari’a law, and in seeking to understand how 
secularism affected matrimonial equality in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939, this 
thesis moves beyond traditionally employed religious frameworks. Chapters one to three 
have positioned it in contemporary events, academic literature and a qualitative post-
colonial feminist milieu. Chapters four and five drew on these considerations and situated 
this thesis historically in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Chapter six then 
formed the first part of the analysis into women’s marital rights between 1920 and 1939. 
This chapter therefore serves to compliment chapter six by providing analyses of legalities 
regarding women’s rights in divorce. 
The analysis conducted in this chapter will establish the rights which were (not) afforded to 
men and women in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939. By situating this research within 
a post-colonial feminist paradigm, understandings of diverging experiences and impact 
factors such as class and gender will be possible. Beginning with insights into the initiation 
of divorce, rights in divorce proceedings come under scrutiny, evidencing the continued 
patriarchal dominance in this area of family law. The chapter then examines different types 
of divorce and the conditions surrounding them. The primary comparison which arises in 
this section will be between revocable and irrevocable divorces, waiting periods and the 
reclaiming of a wife by her husband. 
The chapter then examines rights in polygamy and temporary marriage, with the latter only 
being permissible in Iran. During this discussion, women’s rights pertaining to the taking of 
another wife are examined, outlining the required evidence proving that this had a 
detrimental impact on her. A discussion on temporary marriage will then ensue, outlining 
the unrestricted number of ‘temporary’ wives a man can take, and the specifiable duration 
of the marriage. Following this, financial rights will be discussed in the form of maintenance, 
alimony and inheritance; outlining the strict rules which accompanied them. 
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The penultimate section then examines rights in child custody; emphasising the restricted 
period of maternal custody, and reinforcing gendered stipulations concerning remarriage. 
Within this section however, it will become apparent that the duration of maternal custody 
and children’s decisions as to which parent they reside with are determined by the Islamic 
school which is adhered to. The chapter then concludes by reiterating the socio-political 
nature of divorce in Egypt and Iran. Furthermore, it will accentuate the overarching 
patriarchal nature of these laws, the increased stipulations pertaining to women’s rights in 
this area of family law, and subsequently contribute to a more nuanced understanding of 
the effects of secularism on women’s rights in divorce between 1920 and 1939 in Egypt and 
Iran. 
7.2 Initiating Divorce 
The right to initiate divorce was applicable to both men and women, the primary difference 
being that in order for women to begin proceedings, certain criteria had to be met. Such 
conditions included evidence that suffering had been inflicted due to a subsequent 
marriage, inability of the husband to financially support the wife (and children), 
disappearance, imprisonment and abuse. Consequently, women were positioned at the 
intersection of the patriarchal legal system and the familial structure, whereby their rights 
remained embroiled within patriarchal structurings of the public and private spheres. 
A prominent question which has arisen when examining family laws in Muslim countries is 
the ease with which men are able to divorce their wives. Divorce was understood by 
Colliver-Rice (1923: 91) to be used as a threat or punishment should women not have 
maintained their looks, pleased their husbands, or, more seriously, not given him a son. 
Should she suggest divorce, her husband was understood to punish her by withholding her 
mahr which she would receive when divorced by him (Colliver-Rice, 1923: 91). However, 
stipulations in the contract provided a means by which women could seek divorce should 
they be broken. 
This is evidenced prior to 1920 by Huda who, at the age of fourteen, became aware that her 
husband had returned to his pregnant concubine. Prior to their marriage, Huda’s mother 
had stipulated that Huda was to be his only partner. Upon the discovery that the 
stipulations had been broken, Huda left Ali and moved back to her mother’s quarters (Fay, 
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2003: 94); and they were separated for around seven years (Sharawi Lanfranchi, 2012: 29). 
For Fay (2003: 94) it is important to recognise her decision separate from Ali prior to 
meeting European women such as Eugenie Le Brun43 and  her intense self-education; and it 
is because of this that Fay seeks to understand the conditions that changed Huda’s 
perception of the family structure. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that Huda and Ali did not divorce and she returned to 
him at the age of twenty-two. What Huda’s actions indicate however, is the recognition 
such stipulations gained and her ability to leave her husband should he violate them; 
according to Badran (Shaarawi, 1987: 18), Huda’s decision to separate was ‘by no means 
typical of other young women’. This suggests that Huda broke with conformity, indicating 
the emergence of her own feminist consciousness and a clear understanding of her rights 
based on the stipulations determined by her mother; moreover, the term ‘young’ raises the 
question of whether such actions were more common place amongst older women. 
Contrastingly, Taj expressed her unhappiness with her marriage. Whilst laws stipulated that 
only a man may complete the act of divorce, she (n.d./2003: 216) referred to ‘my separation 
from my husband’, with Amanat (in al-Sultana/Vanzan & Neshati, n.d./2003: 217) referring 
to it as ‘her divorce’. Whilst the marriage was severed and no stipulations in the contract 
were recorded, similarities lie between her and Huda as they played prominent roles in the 
eventual direction of their respective marriages. What is further emphasised here however, 
is that both of these women are understood to have broken with conformity by initiating 
each process. This is evidenced in Taj’s case through the language used in these two 
accounts of the ending of her marriage, which indicates she divorced him. Due to legal 
restrictions however, this could mean that she initiated proceedings, with the result being 
him granting her a divorce. The inability of women to divorce their husbands under Iranian 
law is further emphasised by Sattareh (1993: 136) who highlighted this legal disadvantage 
when recalling Reza Shah and his determination ‘to create the appearance of emancipation’.  
In Egypt under Law 24/1920, reforms began to occur with regard to a wife’s right to seek a 
divorce should her husband be unable to support her or suffer from an incurable illness 
                                                 
43 Eugenie Le Brun was the wife of Husain Rushdi Pasha. Born in France, and later marrying an Egyptian man, 
Eugenie was a great influence in Huda’s life, was prominent in Egyptian feminist politics and was a prominent 
salon host. 
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(Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2011: 135). Therefore making it possible for women to begin divorce 
proceedings; however, certain criteria had to be met and evidence provided. Whilst this 
indicates a relaxation of Egyptian divorce laws, the strict criteria which had to be met 
reinforced the legally recognised patriarchal stronghold of men in marriage. This later 
became law in Iran under sections 1120-1142 of the Civil Code of 1928 which outlined the 
premises on which a marriage contract may be dissolved (Naqvi, 1968b: 358).  
More specifically, Section 1121 of the Civil Code stated that either ‘party’ was able to revoke 
the marriage should the insanity of their spouse be established, ‘whether permanent or 
intermittent’ (Naqvi, 1968b: 358). What is unclear however, is the intermittent period, its 
length and whether it will be determined by the length of one period or whether it is the 
cumulative amount of time these episodes have occurred. Specific blemishes in both men 
and women were then outlined, which resulted in the other being permitted to seek 
revocation. The primary difference between the two sections is that the first outlined 
blemishes which ‘prevent him from fulfilling the duties of a husband’ whereas the second 
referred to ‘blemishes in a woman’ (Sections 1122 & 1123 in Naqvi, 1968b: 358). The Code 
stated that in order for a woman to be able to seek revocation of the marriage contract, her 
husband must suffer from:  
1. Impotency, subject to the condition that it is not cured even until one year after the 
woman's application to a judge (for revocation). 
2. Eunuchism.  
3. Removal of the penis. 
(Naqvi, 1968b: 358; Taleghany, 1995: 163) 
In order for a husband to revoke their marriage contract, it is stated that the wife must be 
suffering from: 
1. Fleshy protuberance or bone in the vulva which prevents intercourse.  
2. Black leprosy   
3. White leprosy  
4. The two passages of nature becoming one  
5. Invalidity resulting in the wife's being confined to bed.  
6. Blindness with both the eyes.  
(Naqvi, 1968b: 358; Taleghany, 1995: 164) 
Marginal gender equality is visible here as medical conditions permitting revocation were 
available for both men and women. The severity of these conditions however, and the 
number of conditions which permitted this situation varied greatly between men and 
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women. The primary discrepancy was the one year waiting period for a wife whose husband 
suffered from impotency before she was permitted to apply to a judge for revocation, 
whereas no waiting period was prescribed for the husband. Additionally, there was no 
mention of men having to apply to a judge for revocation, thus reinforcing the ease of male 
divorce. Moreover, the number of ‘blemishes’ for women was double that of men, thus 
providing men with more opportunities to end the marriage should they wish to.  
Section 1124 further clarified circumstances surrounding these conditions, stating that they 
‘entitle a man to revoke the marriage contract only in case the blemish existed at the time 
of execution of the marriage contract’ (Naqvi, 1968b: 359). Women were permitted to 
revoke marriages in the case of insanity or impotence, even if symptoms occurred after they 
were married (Section 1125). In all other instances where the other blemishes were known 
about prior to and at the point of contracting the marriage, neither party was permitted to 
revoke it ( Section 1126 in Naqvi, 1968b: 359). The final health related stipulation which 
permitted women to refuse sex with their husband should he have a venereal disease; 
moreover, this section permitted such refusals without the risk of losing maintenance 
(Section 1127 in Naqvi, 1968b: 359). Subsequently, the prerogative of the government to 
ensure the health of the couple so as to ensure a healthy base for society was reinforced. 
The following sections also stated that should a man fail to maintain his wife, satisfy any 
other duties, or the wellbeing of the wife is at risk – due to violence or illness - then ‘the 
wife may apply to a court of the law for divorce, and the judge shall compel her husband to 
divorce her’ (Sections 1129 & 1130 in Naqvi, 1968b: 359; Taleghany, 1995: 164-165). 
Additionally, Section 1120 of the Civil Code stated that dissolution without medical or 
financial issues may be achieved through revocation or divorce in the case of a permanent 
marriage, and the relinquishing of the remaining period in a temporary marriage, however, 
this could only be executed by the husband (Naqvi, 1968b: 358). Whilst these criteria 
provided women with the right to divorce, the language indicates that it was only men who 
could divorce; rather, she was only able to petition a court that then encouraged him to 
divorce her rather than her being able to divorce him. This further indicates the perception 
of divorce as a male realm, whereby it can be initiated by women but not completed.  
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In 1921, Egyptian women gained the right to sue for divorce when husbands were found 
guilty of darar (mistreatment). Later, the 1929 law introduced additional grounds whereby 
women could gain a judicial divorce because darar had occurred, and reconciliation was not 
possible (Kholoussy, 2010: 97). From 1925 onwards, Egyptian repudiation was proscribed 
(Badran, 1991: 76 cited in Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2011: 135) and legislation was geared more 
towards the discouragement of repudiation and divorce, whilst enforcing a minimum 
marriage age and removing the necessity of parental consent once the age of consent had 
been reached (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2011: 135). Recognition of women’s marital rights was thus 
beginning to emerge in Egyptian Personal Status Law, but a gendered division remained 
with regard to accessing divorce. 
The promulgation of Law 25/1929 introduced, amended and removed stipulations from the 
previous Law of Personal Status (1920). Chapter two outlined laws pertaining to the 
Disagreement between husband and wife and Divorce for wrong caused to the wife (The 
Egyptian Gazette, 12th March 1929: 4), with Article 6 promulgating that should men behave 
in a manner detrimental to the marriage, a qadi (judge) could be requested by women to 
grant a divorce. Should the qadi be unable to reconcile the relationship and evidence had 
been provided to support the wife’s claim, a divorce Bain (irrevocable) would be granted. If 
the claim was rejected, renewed, and it lacked evidence supporting her claim, the qadi was 
to appoint an arbitrator from both families whose responsibility was to reconcile the 
issue(s). Should the arbitrators be unable to come to an agreement, two other arbitrators 
would be appointed (Articles 7-10). Once a decision had been agreed upon, the qadi would 
‘give his judgement in conformity with the arbitrator’s opinion’ (Article 11). 
The rights of a wife and the procedure to be adhered to in the case of divorce being filed 
due to the husband’s absence or imprisonment were then stipulated. Should the husband 
have been absent for one year or more without a legitimate reason, the wife was permitted 
to request a divorce Bain ‘even if the husband has left wealth upon which the wife can live 
and cover expenses’ (Article 12 in The Egyptian Gazette, 12th March 1929: 4). If 
correspondence with the husband was possible, then the qadi would fix a period of time 
within which the husband was to return to his wife to either resume co-habitation or to 
divorce her (Article 13 in The Egyptian Gazette, 12th March 1929: 4). If he failed to return or 
provide a legitimate excuse for his absence, then the qadi would provide the wife with a 
190 
 
divorce Bain. If communication was not possible, divorce would be granted immediately. 
Additionally, Article 14 referred to the husband’s imprisonment, whereby the wife was 
permitted to request a divorce Bain from the qadi if the term of the husband’s 
imprisonment was three years or more after waiting for a period of one year; even if the 
husband left enough wealth for her to live on. 
In the case of the husband’s disappearance, the new law promulgated regulations 
pertaining specifically to his presumed death: 
A husband who disappears in circumstances rendering his death very probable will be 
declared to be presumed dead four years after the date of his disappearance. 
In all other cases the period after which he may be declared presumed to be dead will be left 
to the appreciation of the Cadi. 
In one case or the other, the Cadi will not give his decision except after investigations made 
by all possible means with view to know if the disappeared is dead or alive. 
(Article 21 & 22 in The Egyptian Gazette, Tuesday 12th March 1929: 4) 
Following the qadi’s decision in which the husband was presumed dead, the wife was 
expected to observe Iddet el Wafat (period of continence prescribed for a widow) and the 
inheritance would be distributed amongst the husband’s surviving heirs on the date of the 
decision (Article 22 in The Egyptian Gazette, Tuesday 12th March 1929: 4). The revisions of 
laws in 1929 also included stipulations that the husband could not repudiate his wife ‘in a 
moment of duress’ (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2011: 135). 
Unlike Egyptian law, which did not recognise stipulations placed in the marriage contract, 
Section 1128 of the Iranian Civil Code stated that should stipulations have been made in the 
contract and it later became apparent that the party did not have ‘that particular quality’, 
then the spouse was entitled to revoke the contract regardless of whether it was 
established on this quality or whether it was ‘expressly mentioned’ (Naqvi, 1968b: 359). In 
order for revocation to be possible, it must be sought immediately after learning of the 
cause, otherwise the marriage remained valid (Section 1131 in Naqvi, 1968b: 360). 
Moreover, section four of the Marriage Act, along with Section 1119 of the Civil Code 
stipulated that the production of a ‘certificate of non-reconciliation’ is also applicable to the 
wife who ‘had the power of attorney to repudiate herself if her husband did not abide by 
the stipulation(s) included in the marriage contract’ (Naqvi, 1968a: 159; Taleghany, 1995: 
163; Vatandoust, 1985: 116). 
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Chapter two of this section of the Civil Code also outlined general provisions for divorce. It 
stipulated that a husband may divorce his wife whenever he wants, however, it shall only 
have occurred when the necessary words have been said in the presence of two male 
witnesses; an ‘authorized agent’ may also say these words. The man divorcing his wife must 
be of sound mind with genuine intention to divorce ‘and free’. Moreover, should the man 
be permanently insane his guardian may divorce his wife for him if it was in his best 
interests. Divorce may only occur if the marriage was permanent, however, the equivalent 
for a temporary marriage required the husband to waive the remaining duration of their 
contract (Section 1133 in Naqvi, 1967: 242; Sections 1133-1139 in 1968b: 359). Divorce was 
not valid should the woman be menstruating, unless the husband had not been present to 
be aware of this (Section 1140-1142 in Naqvi, 1968b: 360; Taleghany, 1995: 166). 
Furthermore, should the wife be of menstruating age yet not have had her course, and a 
period of three months had elapsed since she was last intimate with her husband, then a 
divorce was valid (Naqvi, 1968b: 360; Taleghany, 1995: 166).  
The first thirty years of the twentieth century witnessed a rise in Egyptian female 
consciousness. Paternal authority in the arrangement and dissolution of his daughter’s 
marriage and male jurisdiction over divorce began to be challenged. Paternal annulments 
were simplified through evidence that the husband was of an ‘inferior social status’ 
(Kholoussy, 2010: 112; 114); therefore indicating that it was not only husbands who had 
jurisdiction over the dissolution of a marriage. Class was thus crucial in determining 
women’s social positioning with a husband’s lower social status representing a potential 
hindrance. 
This indicates that both Egyptian and Iranian law created the appearance of increased 
gender equality in divorce. However, on closer inspection, the absence of stipulations and 
their rigid nature under Iranian law implies reluctance to provide women with ‘loopholes’ 
when establishing the marriage contract. Moreover, legalities pertaining to a woman’s right 
to divorce remained tightly bound in the prevalent patriarchal framework of each country. 
Whilst these laws potentially advanced gender equality in the matrimonial sphere, the 
stringent rules by which women had to abide, the requirement of evidence, and the 
necessity of an application to a judge, reinforced the ease of male divorce. This speaks to 
the patriarchal structuring of the family, thus contradicting arguments that the private 
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sphere is female. Whilst the examples of Huda and Taj’s experiences occurred prior to 1920, 
they evidence traits which were later discussed within a legal context. 
7.3 Types of Divorce 
Under Islamic law there are several different types of divorce; the two recognised by Sunni 
Islam are types of repudiation (talaq). Understood to be in agreement with the Sunna, talaq 
becomes effective following ʿidda or the birth of a child should the wife be pregnant. The 
single pronouncement or three over a period of three months, is not permanent and the 
husband may take his wife back (Coulson & Hinchcliffe, 1978: 42–43). However, the most 
popular form of divorce is the ‘talaq of innovation’ (talaq al-bidʿa) and whilst considered to 
be immoral, is legal and effective (Coulson & Hinchcliffe, 1978: 43). This form of divorce is 
immediate and requires the husband to pronounce three talaqs consecutively. Unlike the 
single pronouncement, this form is permanent and husbands are unable to take their wives 
back; he is also unable to remarry her until she has married another man, consummated the 
marriage and it has ended in divorce or death. The Ithnā ʿAshari Shi’i’s however, do not 
recognise talaq al-bidʿa (Coulson & Hinchcliffe, 1978: 43).    
For  Ithnā ʿAshari Shi’i's, the validity of a divorce relies on it meeting specifications and the 
accurate Arabic pronouncements of specific words and ʿidda must be observed (Ferdows, 
1985: 28). Sunni Islam recognises no formalities with regard to the method of divorce and its 
validation except for the period of ʿidda (Ferdows, 1985: 28). Ferdows (1985: 27) 
understands Mernissi to interpret the regulations of khul and tamlik divorces as ‘the only 
remnants of the pre-Islamic practices where women had more rights and sexual freedoms’, 
with talaq being practiced with little limitations by both sexes. 
Repudiation is outlined in the Egyptian draft law of 1929, as the rejection of something or 
the denial of validity of something. In this case, it represented the denial of the validity of a 
marriage contract, or the denial of responsibility towards a wife. According to this law: 
Article 1. – Repudiation (of a wife by a husband) made in a state of drunkenness or under 
constrains is invalid. 
Article 2. – Conditional repudiation, used as a means of constraining the wife to do or not to 
do certain acts is invalid. 
Article 3. – A single repudiation remains a single repudiation even though accompanied by 
words or gestures aiming at giving it a multiple or three-fold significance. 
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Article 4. – A formula of repudiation which is ambiguously worded is only valid as a 
repudiation providing the intent to repudiate is clearly established. 
Article 5. -  Every repudiation is “Radjii” or revocable, except repudiation pronounced for the 
third time (three-fold repudiation); repudiation prior to the consummation of marriage, 
repudiation in exchange for compensation, and the repudiation considered as “Bains” or 
irrevocable by the present Law and by Law No. 25 of 1920. 
(The Egyptian Gazette 12th March 1929: 4) 
The invalidation of repudiation when inebriated or under pressure, removed a threatening 
element from the relationship. However, only a woman can be repudiated by her husband, 
so whilst this removes a threat from the relationship, the process itself was not eliminated. 
What was achieved however, was reassurance that decisions of this nature could not be 
made in a drunken haste. The invalidity of repudiation based on conditions of the wife’s 
behaviour also eliminated the possibility of the husband using it as a threat to ensure 
certain behaviours. Stipulating the necessity of clarity and intention in repudiation, negating 
the replacement of words with gestures and stating that ambiguity, also rendered it invalid. 
Finally, Article 5 clearly specified that repudiation was Radjii (revocable) except in certain 
circumstances, thus reinforcing the gendered nature of divorce, indicating that minimal 
changes occurred in family law during this era.  
Serving as the counterpart to this, the Civil Code outlined permissible types of divorce 
(Sections 1143-1155 in Naqvi, 1968b: 361). Only revocable when it occurred before 
consummation; a woman was past child-bearing age; divorce occurred through Khul or 
Mubarat providing ‘the wife does not demand the return of compensation (paid to the 
husband); and a third divorce following three ‘consecutive matrimonial connections by way 
of recall or a fresh contract’ (Section 1145 in Naqvi, 1968b: 361; Taleghany, 1995: 167). 
Additionally, it was forbidden if girls were under nine years of age (Ferdows, 1985: 27). It 
stated that ‘Khul divorce is one which a wife obtains from her husband due to the hatred 
borne towards him against payment of some money to the husband, whether the money is 
the dower itself or its equivalent, or more or less than it’; whilst Mubarat ‘is one in which 
there is hatred in both the parties, but in case of a Mubarat divorce the compensation (paid 
by the wife to the husband) shall not exceed the amount of dower’ (Sections 1146-1147 in 
Naqvi, 1968b: 361; Taleghany, 1995: 167). Naqvi (1967: 242) posits that the purpose of an 
irrevocable divorce as outlined in the Civil Code and Marriage Act was a form of protection 
for women so as to prevent husbands recalling them during ʿidda. 
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According to NWRO (n.d.: 47), talaq has several variations within the Egyptian legal system. 
However, in the case that the wife be the claimant, talaq occurs by a third party (tatliq), 
therefore removing the possibility of female divorce, placing it in the hands of a qadi, who 
thus appoints male arbitrators. Whilst the wife was granted the right to request divorce, the 
ultimate decision remained a male jurisdiction. The processing of divorce or the inclusion of 
a third party contained certain conditions and had three different classifications. The first 
was revocable, which was applicable to a single divorce, whereby the husband ‘owns the 
right to take back his divorced wife to the marital bond during her waiting period (Idda)’ 
without the need for a new contract regardless of her acceptance (NWRO, n.d.: 47). The 
other two are minor and major irrevocable. The former was reliant on the wife’s acceptance 
of returning to him, thus removing the notion of male ownership. This form of divorce 
required a new marital contract and mahr if the wife agreed to return, and could occur 
either during or after the end of ʿidda. The latter refers to divorce following the third 
pronouncement by the husband, whereby he had no claim over the wife and could not take 
her back unless she had entered into another (consummated) marriage which ended either 
in divorce or widowhood (NWRO, n.d.: 47). 
The conditions under which wives could request divorce included imprisonment, harm, 
polygamy, illness, and absence (NWRO, n.d.: 48–50). Whilst women were afforded this right 
it was more theoretical than practical, with the formation and dissolution of marriage both 
being male domains. One reason for this stringent and gendered approach to divorce is the 
prominence of the Hanafī school in Egypt since the Ottoman epoch (Shaham, 1999: 463). 
Thus, whilst family law remained under religious law, the effects of secularism on women’s 
rights in this area of law are integral to further understanding their development. 
An alternative to divorce is annulment, and this depends on the marriage having been 
contracted with witnesses. An area of contention with regard to matrimonial validity was 
mixed marriages. Whilst understood to have contributed to the Egyptian marriage crisis (see 
section 4.4.2), insecurities pertained directly to the marriage of a Muslim man and a non-
Muslim woman. Clarity over the dissolution of mixed marriages had to be determined by 
the High Commissioner in Egypt, in reference to the validity of divorce recognised under 
Egyptian law. On August 31st 1927, the Acting First Secretary’s response read as: 
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…2. ‘Article 120 of the Code du Statut Personnel recognizes the validity of a marriage 
between a Mohammedan and a Christian woman, provided that there are two Christian 
witnesses to the wedding. But, although these witnesses can bind the Christian woman, 
their testimony is valueless against the Mohammedan man. It seems to follow from this, 
that in a case such as the present where the Mohammedan man denies the validity of the 
marriage, there will be no witness to prove it, and, therefore, under Article 134 (4) it will be 
null and void, as being a marriage contracted without witnesses. 
…3…By Article 217 the husband alone has the right of repudiation. Divorce can apparently 
be obtained by mutual consent… 
(TNA, FO 141/792/4) 
The absence of rights for the marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man indicates 
that such marriages were not permitted. Secondly, the legal necessity for two Christian 
witnesses to be present at the marriage and no mention of Muslim witnesses, indicates that 
non-Muslims were perceived to have the same value as (Muslim) women – whose 
statement of evidence is considered to be half of a man’s. It places the Muslim man in a 
superior position to his wife and the witnesses, thus making it easy for him to remove 
himself from the marriage. Article 217 also reinforced the absence of women’s rights to 
repudiation prior to the 1929 law. Moreover, it emphasised the lack of rights non-Muslim 
women had when entering a mixed-marriage. Not only does this legislation highlight the 
patriarchal system of marriage and divorce, but it reinforces the perceived superiority of 
Muslim men over (non) Muslim women under Egyptian law, thus emphasising the dual 
oppression experienced as a result of gendered laws and colonialism.  
7.4 Polygamy and Temporary Marriage 
Ferdows (1985: 19) argues that in the West, polygamy is the most recognised feature of 
Islamic marriages, and for Muslims it is the most contentious issue. The homogenous 
interpretation of polygamy amongst Sunni and Shi’i Muslims is unsurprising due to Sura 4:3 
of the Qur’an forming its foundations. However, the marrying of four wives is only 
permitted should the necessary criteria be met; furthermore, this practice is not encouraged 
in Islam (Ferdows, 1985: 19). Justifications for this tradition are shared by Sunni and Shi’i 
scholars as it is understood to prevent ‘spinsterhood’ amongst women and in the case of 
female infertility, it enabled husbands to father children without the need for divorce (Lari, 
1979: 115 cited in Ferdows, 1985: 20). The fear of increasing numbers of unmarried women 
was in part due to the ratio of female to male children born, along with threats of war, 
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lower male life expectancy, restrictions on women’s reproduction and poverty on women’s 
ability to find husbands (Lari, 1979: 114 cited in Ferdows, 1985: 20).  
Whilst there was increasing controversy regarding the absence of monogamy, the 
permission granted to men by the Egyptian and Iranian states to have more than one wife 
was one area which was not reformed. It was however, one of the areas attacked by the 
emerging Egyptian and Iranian feminist voices. Additionally, Iranian law permitted 
temporary marriages which could last from hours to decades, thus placing an expiration 
date on the marriage contract and determining the length of time the couple would be 
married. This second form of marriage thus provided an additional aspect of male 
dominance, and is understood here to be as, if not more, destabilising to the familial 
structure than polygamy. 
7.4.1 Polygamous Relations 
Defined as the taking of more than one wife, with the maximum permitted being four 
(NWRO, n.d.: 60), polygamy was an unregulated area of marriage in Egypt, except in Article 
11 of Law No. 25/1929 which translates as: 
A woman whose husband has taken another wife may petition for divorce from him if she 
had been inflicted with physical or moral harm whereby continuation of cohabitation 
become impossible, even if she did not set forth a condition in her marriage contract to the 
effect that the husband may not take another wife. In the case the judge failed to reconcile 
between them, he shall award her a single irrevocable divorce. The wife’s right to petition 
for divorce for this reason shall drop if one year has elapsed after her knowledge of the 
second marriage of her husband, or if she had accepted this situation implicitly or explicitly. 
Her right to petition for divorce shall be renewed each time the husband takes another wife. 
In case the new wife had not been aware that he is married to another woman which had 
been the case, she is entitled to request divorce as well.  
(NWRO, n.d.: 60) 
This indicates leniency towards women and the right to petition for divorce. However, the 
restrictions which are indicated, such as the stipulated one year period from her point of 
knowledge of the marriage, and the role of the qadi in reconciliation, indicates strong 
patriarchal overtones upon which female divorce was based. Evidence of irreconcilable 
damage caused by supplementary marriages was to be provided by the wife and this did not 
guarantee her request for a divorce (Talhami, 1996: 115). Primarily, this new law introduced 
a more ‘equal’ grounding for divorce, so far as it permitted women to request one. 
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Limitations remained however, with male authority being responsible for determining the 
validity of the claim and whether a divorce would be granted; therefore emphasising the 
patriarchal power structure of the family as reproducer of such formations. 
Similarly, under Iranian law the conditions which permit men to have numerous wives, but 
no more than four, according to Naqvi (1967: 245) were not explicitly stated in the Marriage 
Act, Civil Code, or other Iranian Acts. Section 1119 of the Civil Code did however, state that 
stipulations which did not contravene the essence of marriage may be included in the 
contract. These included the wife’s right to divorce herself on her husband’s behalf should 
he fail to maintain her, create an environment which resulted in cohabitation becoming 
intolerable through maltreatment, threaten her life, or take another wife44 (Naqvi, 1968a: 
157–158; Taleghany, 1995: 163). Whilst this provided women with a means for achieving 
divorce, should the dissolution of the marriage contract transpire, it occurred on the 
husband’s behalf and must have been taken to a judge for approval prior to its enactment. 
This reinforces the patriarchal nature of family law and divorce as a male jurisdiction, thus 
speaking to Urry’s (2011: 104–105) assertion that the family reflects social order and 
reinforces social structures which are influenced and limited by social norms.  
Betrothed men were required to inform the woman of any wives he may already have and 
have it recorded in the ‘marriage deed’ (Section 6 in Naqvi, 1968a: 159). Should he be 
dishonest then he faced legal prosecution if the wife files a grievance (Section 7, Marriage 
Act in Naqvi, 1968a: 159). Should it be known that the man was already married, it was 
possible for the woman to insist that the first marriage be dissolved (Colliver-Rice, 1923: 
121), as has been evidenced by Huda’s experience. Moreover, Colliver-Rice (1923: 51) 
observed that numerous wives was generally detrimental for the familial structure and 
resulted in an atmosphere of uncertainty amongst wives as to the stability of the marriage.  
Whilst stipulations pertaining to subsequent marriages were not embedded in Egyptian law, 
concerns were evident of the status of non-Egyptian women who entered into mixed 
marriages, and the rights they had or the stress they might endure due to the polygamous 
nature of the relationship. In 1931, a letter was sent from the Society for the overseas 
                                                 
44 The words ‘whenever a husband marries another woman’ were removed from Section 4 of the Marriage Act, 
thus revoking the woman’s right to divorce her husband should the relationship become polygamous as was 
previously afforded to her in the Civil Code (Naqvi, 1968a: 131). 
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settlement of British women querying the validity of stipulations within the marriage 
contract: 
5/1/31 
Dear Sir, 
 I was interested to see in Saturday’s “Times” the enclosed paragraph. I shall be 
interested to know whether you can find out if it really is law that a wife can stipulate in 
marriage contract that the man should not marry anyone else. 
 In paragraph 21 of the enclosed with regard to marriage laws, it does not give 
information, and in interviewing any woman who is bent on marrying a Mohammedan, we 
could advise her to get this kind of contract if it really would be legal in Egypt. 
Yours Faithfully 
 
E.S. Nicholas 
(TNA, FO 141/792) 
The language used indicates the author’s perception of Egyptians and women. First, ‘really is 
law’ expresses disbelief that such stipulations would be possible, especially with regard to 
marriage (in Egypt). Second, ‘interviewing’ reinforces business connotations, with ‘bent’ 
suggesting determination or stubbornness. The use of ‘man’ in the first paragraph, rather 
than husband, indicates that sex and gendered divisions were more prominent than the 
marriage. Third, ‘…we could advise her…’ indicates a form of intervention and control over 
the marital process and maintaining a form of influence throughout the marriage suggesting 
that protection of British women was intended. The letter ends in the same manner as it 
began, ‘if it really would be legal in Egypt’ denoting surprise and disbelief that women could 
make such stipulations. It is arguable that this disengaged understanding of marital rights 
and law, is due to the perception that marriage under Islamic law represented a different 
and inferior institution to that of English or Christian tradition because of its polygamous 
nature (TNA, FO 141/792/4).  
Whilst negative connotations accompanied polygamy and the detrimental effects it was 
understood to have on familial relations; Sattareh (1993) recalls a more positive 
environment, justifying her father’s polygamous relations with his religious devoutness, 
noting that when his wife Ezzatdoleh  
could no longer bear children or offer him his conjugal rights even if she wanted to, and he 
would thus be morally as well as legally justified in taking a new wife. Furthermore, since 
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Shazdeh was a pious Moslem and believed strongly that marriage was the proper context for 
sexual relations, he would probably do just that. 
(Farman Farmaian, 1993: 54) 
Not only does this reiterate the ease with which men could marry, but it also indicates the 
strong religious currents which coursed through the expansion of the family through 
multiple marriages. Whilst this is understood as problematic and was heavily criticised by 
the emerging feminist movement in Iran, Sattareh indicated positive relations between her 
father and his wives, as well as between the wives themselves (Farman Farmaian, 1993: 15-
16; 19). 
The number of wives, whilst usually limited to four in Islamic Law, was disregarded in this 
case. However, this is potentially due to the prominent social position of Sattareh’s family 
and her father’s wealth. Therefore linking to Coulson and Hinchcliffe’s (1978: 40) notion that 
the financial and emotional capabilities of a man to treat numerous wives equally is at his 
own discretion and not a judicial matter. Moreover, those following Ithnā ʿAshari Shi’ism do 
not have to obtain permission to contract another marriage from current wives, and there 
are no restrictions on the number of temporary wives (Coulson & Hinchcliffe, 1978: 40).  
Polygamy has been the referent point for much criticism, especially from Western actors. 
Despite criticisms of Islam and its advocation of polygamous relations, Hatem (1989: 186) 
argues that this tradition was not inspired by the Qur’an, rather, it existed in the pre-Islamic 
era. Responding to this new law was a debate voiced by Islamists and legalists, contending 
that polygamy could not be considered detrimental to the first wife due to its permission by 
Shari’a law (Talhami, 1996: 115). 
If ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, marry women of your 
choice, two three or four; but if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly (with them), 
then only one, or (a captive) that your right hand possess. That will be more suitable, to 
prevent you from doing injustice.  
(Sūrah 4:3 Ali, 2000: 60) 
This indicates the Qur’an’s permissiveness toward polygamy, but states that should unequal 
treatment be likely to prevail, that men should limit themselves to one wife. Correlations 
between Egyptian law of 1929 and religious teachings are thus visible as the former 
permitted women to request divorce based on the notion of inequality between the two 
wives and the detrimental impact she perceived this to have had on her marriage. Despite 
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this, the ultimate decision pertaining to divorce remained a male jurisdiction and the only 
right women appeared to have was that of making a request. 
Prior to the introduction of Law 25/1929, the EFU became staunch advocates of gender 
equality in the public and private spheres. Some of the more difficult reforms they sought 
related to restrictions on easy divorce for men and the elimination of polygamy (Talhami, 
1996: 11). Whilst the latter was not eradicated, it is arguable that the inclusion of a single 
article which gave women grounds to request a divorce based on the injurious nature of a 
subsequent marriage, was a response to the demands being made. The focus on polygamy 
and divorce also stemmed from experiences of some of the women involved. Hatem (1989: 
185) notes Huda’s experience with arranged marriage, stipulations and separation, as well 
as the experiences of Nasif. Both ‘submitted to family arranged marriages and eventually 
had to contend with polygamous husbands’. Similar voices were also emerging across Iran, 
however, Reza Khan did not abolish the practice, rather minor reforms were made and 
repeatedly altered between 1926 and 1940 (Sanasarian, 1982: 61). The failure of Reza Khan 
to abolish polygamy and the token changes which were made to marriage and divorce laws 
reinforces the notion of the creation of an illusion to the outside world whilst maintaining 
rigid patriarchal power structures within the state. 
7.4.2 An Expiration Date 
Marriage, according to Walters (2011: 18) is amongst those institutions which exemplify 
patriarchy’s organisational powers. This is evidenced by mut’a (temporary marriage), which 
in reference to this thesis, was only permitted in Iran. Ferdows (1985:22) posits that this was 
common practice of both sexes during pre-Islamic times. This form of marriage permitted 
men and women to determine their partners and contract a marriage without paternal 
interferences; whilst this can be perceived as more liberal than permanent contracts with 
regard to its establishment, abuses resulted in it being viewed as little more than 
prostitution (Ferdows, 1985:22). Shi’i Islam understands mut’a as legal and a means of 
preventing illicit practices such as adultery (Ferdows, 1985:22). Conversely, Sunni Islam 
rejects it due to the argument that Sura 4:25 was revoked ‘by a tradition recorded in 
Muslim’s Sahih’ (Ferdows, 1985: 23), therefore providing insight into its continued legality in 
Iran between 1920 and 1939, and its absence in Egypt. Subsequently, interpretational 
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differentials emerge between the two Islamic schools and cultural divergences arise as the 
‘suitability’ of practices comes under scrutiny. 
The Shi’i Fiqh, and subsequently Iranian law, did not impose restrictions on the number of 
temporary wives a man may take providing that he was in a suitable economic and physical 
condition to treat them equally (Naqvi, 1967: 245–246). Whilst polygamous restrictions 
were not in place with regard to the number of marriages which may be contracted at any 
one time, the financial and emotional considerations were still a requirement, thus 
indicating some similarities between polygamous and temporary marriages. 
Specificities pertaining to temporary marriages were outlined in sections 1075-1077 of the 
Civil Code. It stated that a marriage was only considered temporary when the contract was 
clearly stipulated as valid for a specified period of time. The length of a temporary marriage 
was determined by the parties involved, with it lasting ‘anywhere from an hour to ninety 
years’, however, only men can have more than one temporary spouse (Sanasarian, 1982: 
13). The restriction on women to one temporary husband reinforces similarities between 
polygamous and temporary marriages; therefore reiterating the prominence of patriarchy in 
the establishment of a marriage. It also indicates the absence of gender equality within this 
aspect of family law, with it being interpreted here that women were viewed as disposable 
depending on the situation. 
With regard to inheritance and dower, it was stated that the conditions were stipulated in 
the relevant sections (see section 7.5) (Naqvi, 1968a: 153). Ferdows (1985: 23) notes 
however, that neither party was entitled to inherit from the other and the husband was not 
responsible for the maintenance of the wife once the contract had expired. Contrastingly, 
children born into a temporary marriage were entitled to the same financial rights, such as 
support or inheritance, as those born into a permanent marriage (Ferdows, 1985: 22). 
Another issue which arose from temporary marriages, was the social status of the women 
who were embroiled in such contracts. Whilst they were legally viewed as a ‘real wife’, their 
status was not too dissimilar to that of a slave concubine, with her ʿidda being the same 
period of time which was half of that of a woman leaving a permanent marriage (Ferdows, 
1985: 23). Not only are there discrepancies regarding interpretation and implementation of 
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temporary marriages, but the manner in which they impacted on women’s lives afterwards. 
The primary issues appears to be the ease of male marriage for unspecified periods of time.  
7.5 Financial Concerns: Maintenance, Alimony and Inheritance 
The family as a patriarchal power structure extends beyond the realms of marriage and 
gender roles into the ‘private’ economic sphere. The financial responsibilities of the family 
ultimately lay with the husband; his wealth determined mahr as well as maintenance of the 
wife and children. It was also on this basis that his financial strength to accommodate a 
polygamous relationship was determined. Due to the patriarchal nature of family laws and 
the prominence of finances in areas such as maintenance and dower, this section analyses 
women’s financial rights with regard to the dissolution of a marriage, whether it be through 
divorce or death. 
7.5.1 Maintenance and Alimony 
When divorce occurred, women were entitled to claim any unpaid mahr. If her husband did 
not provide it, she had to file a civil suit to obtain it. Additionally, she was entitled to 
continued maintenance, but only during her ʿidda, and had no right to apply for additional 
financial support after it ended (Coulson & Hinchcliffe, 1978: 43). The various schools of 
Islam are in agreement that should divorce be revocable, then a woman’s right to 
maintenance extends beyond her ʿidda, with it being less clear as to the various stances 
adopted with regard to irrevocable divorces. Of the schools, Hanafī is the only one to permit 
this in all cases, with the others reserving this right for pregnant women only (Coulson & 
Hinchcliffe, 1978: 43).  
Under Shiʾi law however, faskh and khul divorce do not carry the same financial conditions. 
Khul grants women the right to seek divorce due to married life becoming intolerable, 
requires the woman to relinquish any outstanding payments owed to her, and her husband 
is not required to pay maintenance during her ʿidda (Ferdows, 1985: 26). Divergently, faskh 
is revocable, thus permitting the husband to take her back should he wish to. 
Predominantly, Shi’i scholars are of the opinion that ‘divorce is a natural right of man’ and 
the enforced patriarchal nature of this aspect of family law is because of women’s perceived 
weakness and the need to protect the family (Ferdows, 1985: 27).  
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There are four different areas of financial concern which relate to marriage, and 
subsequently divorce. The first, mahr has been discussed in chapter six (see section 6.5), the 
other three relate to maintenance, alimony and inheritance. According to Kholoussy (2010: 
93), Law 25/1920 provided additional grounds for divorce due to the legislators drawing on 
aspects of the more liberal Maliki Shafi’i school. These clauses related to the husband’s 
failure to provide financial support, his absence and illness; thus providing a more 
permissive tone in this area of Egyptian law. This law also determined that the waiting 
period of an ex-wife, who was not breastfeeding or expecting a child could not exceed a 
twelve month period, even if her menstrual cycle did not return (Kholoussy, 2010: 89). 
Chapter five (The Egyptian Gazette 12th March 1929: 4) pertained directly to alimony and 
ʿidda. Alimony payments were calculated on the husband’s financial status, irrespective of 
the wife’s financial situation, with a period of one year being the maximum time frame for 
alimony claims (Articles 16 & 17). This indicates the financial responsibilities of the husband 
to his ex-wife during ʿidda, and his continued financial duty to her in spite of talaq. 
Moreover, the introduction of other Sunni schools into divorce legislation indicates 
recognition of the rigid structure and conditions of the Hanafī school, thus acknowledging 
the more liberal, and the potentially equal nature of the other schools.  
The Iranian Civil Code stated that in a permanent marriage, women were entitled to 
maintenance from their husband, including clothing, food, accommodation, and household 
items in accordance to her status, along with a servant should she be used to one or require 
one due to personal illness (Sections 1106 & 1107 in Naqvi, 1968a: 156; Taleghany, 1995: 
161). Should a wife refuse her duties with no legal justification then her husband may 
revoke her maintenance, he was also excused from this duty following her ʿidda unless she 
was pregnant. However, she was not entitled to maintenance during ʿidda if she was 
widowed (Sections 1108 - 1110 in Naqvi, 1968a: 156). 
Should men fail to provide maintenance whilst married, the wife may take him to court; 
however, maintenance was not a requirement in a temporary marriage unless stated in the 
contract or the contract was formed on this basis (Sections 1111 & 1113 in Naqvi, 1968a: 
156-157). Accommodation provided by the husband was to be chosen by him unless he 
delegated the decision to his wife, should the husband behave in a manner considered to be 
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threatening by the wife, then she was entitled to a separate house, and providing the fear 
was proven a court would not force her to return to her husband’s dwellings. Should there 
be disagreement between the couple as to appropriate accommodation for her, a court 
would decide for them (Sections 1114 - 1116 in Naqvi, 1968a: 157). 
Following the implementation of the Marriage Act, section 9 removed the words ‘in a 
permanent marriage’, thus extending the husband’s responsibility of maintenance to 
temporary as well as permanent wives. Alterations also resulted in the ability of a court to 
give ‘a religious sanction’ for divorce should the husband have failed to maintain his wife 
(Section 1112 in Naqvi, 1968a: 131–132).  
The ninth book addressed responsibilities of maintenance. Section 1199 outlined the 
father’s responsibility of the maintenance of his children and its reallocation to the paternal 
grandfather should he have died or be unable to meet the requirements. If there were no 
immediate paternal relatives then the responsibility fell to the mother or maternal 
grandparents (Naqvi, 1968b: 282). If there were individuals other than the wife who were 
entitled to maintenance she took priority, and any of these individuals may have demanded 
this through a court. Should the man be proven financially incapable of paying maintenance 
the wife took priority over other claimants and she was able to demand back payments for 
any outstanding amounts whereas other claimants may have only demanded future 
payments (Sections 1203, 1205-1206 in Naqvi, 1968b: 283). 
With regard to the responsibilities of children born following a divorce, section 1159 (Naqvi, 
1968b: 284) stated that the child would be affiliated to the ex-husband providing the period 
following the divorce in which the child was born did not extend beyond ten months and 
she had not remarried, or that there was less than six or more than ten months between 
intercourse and the birth of the child. These rules were also applicable (Section 1160) 
should she have remarried and this would be established based on the necessary time 
frames (Naqvi, 1968b: 284). The patriarchal nature of the family and the financial onus 
placed on the husband to support his family are thus reinforced, therefore indicating that 
gendered laws hindered both men and women due to female seclusion and an inability to 
contribute financially   
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7.5.2 Inheritance  
Inheritance laws are an area where gender inequality is most prominent, with the value of a 
woman’s inheritance being substantially less than her male relatives. Ferdows (1985: 24) 
argues that these laws were amongst the most distinctive aspects of Ithnā ʿAshari Shi’i and 
Sunni laws, with the former basing them on blood relations and the latter on paternal 
lineage. Subsequently female relations were excluded from inheritance rights under Sunni 
law; reinforcing the patriarchal nature of family law. 
Inheritance in Shi’i law is determined through the segregation of all heirs by ‘levels of 
entitlement’ which is established by their relationship to the individual. The first includes 
parents, grandparents and children; the second encompasses siblings, nieces and nephews, 
and grandparents; the final one includes aunts, uncles and cousins on either side of the 
family. However, should there be any surviving relatives in the first class, then those in the 
lower classes are excluded; should there not be anyone then it moves to the next class until 
a surviving relative is found (Ferdows, 1985: 24; Naqvi, 1968c: 362).  
Inheritance laws and ‘categories of heirs’ were specified in sections 861-892 of the Iranian 
Civil Code, with ‘consanguinity and special connection’ being the two reasons for 
inheritance (Naqvi, 1968c: 362). Homicide of any nature revokes the right of inheritance, 
unless it was established that it was not ‘wilful murder’, it was self-defence or it was in lieu 
of a legal decree (Section 880-881 in Naqvi, 1968c: 365). 
The fourth division pertained to inheritance between spouses, with each party being 
entitled to inherit from the other providing they were permanently married and there were 
no inhibitions (Section 940 in Naqvi, 1968c: 375). The share of the inheritance was 
prescribed as: 
In all the cases mentioned in this division each of the spouses who survives the deceased 
spouse shall receive his/her prescribed share, which shall be one-half of the whole estate in 
case of the husband and one-fourth in case of the wife, provided that the deceased has left 
no (child, or) children or children's children, and one-fourth of the estate in case of the 
husband and one-eighth of it in case of the wife where the deceased has left a child (or 
children), or children's children, and the residue shall be divided among the other heirs 
according to the provisions of the preceding section.  
(Section 913 in Naqvi, 1968c: 370) 
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Divergently, the draft Egyptian law of 1929 stated that should the husband be presumed 
dead, inheritance would be divided amongst his surviving heirs, with no mention of the 
wife’s entitlement to inherit (Article 22 in The Egyptian Gazette, Tuesday 12th March 1929: 
4). However, Article 17 removed the divorced wife’s right to claim her portion of inheritance 
if there was a dispute and divorce occurred more than twelve months prior to his death (The 
Egyptian Gazette, Tuesday 12th March 1929: 4). 
The halving of the inheritance value for women, as stipulated in Iranian law, reinforced the 
perceived inferiority of women (see section 1.2) and consequently strengthened the 
gendered hierarchy of the family. Should there be more than one wife inheriting from the 
deceased, the amount inherited by a single wife would be divided equally amongst them. 
They only inherit from each other in the case of divorce should death occur before the 
wife’s ʿidda is complete and the divorce was revocable (Sections 942-943 in Naqvi, 1968c: 
375). If the husband was sick when he divorced his wife revocably and died from the same 
illness, she inherited; she also inherited if the divorce was irrevocable and she had not 
remarried. Should he marry whilst sick and die from the same illness prior to consummation 
she would not inherit (Sections 944-945 in Naqvi, 1968c: 375–376).  
Section 946 stated that a husband would inherit all of his deceased wife’s property but the 
wife’s inheritance from her deceased husband was restricted to ‘1. Movable property, of 
any kind or description. 2. Buildings and trees.’ However, it was only the value of said 
buildings and trees, not the items themselves (Sections 946-947 in Naqvi, 1968c: 376). 
Should heirs of the deceased husband refuse to pay the wife’s portion of the inheritance, 
then she was ‘entitled to recover it from the buildings and trees themselves’ (Section 948 in 
Naqvi, 1968c: 376). 
Gendered divisions of inheritance are also stipulated in the Qur’an (Sūrah 4:11 & 4:176 Ali, 
2000: 61, 80), reinforcing perceived male superiority with men inheriting twice as much as 
women, and heirs inheriting over their widowed mother. This emphasises the prominence 
of religion throughout family law despite calls for increased gender equality and a more 
secular approach to politics. 
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The legalities of inheritance reinforce the patriarchal nature of Egyptian and Iranian society, 
and are evidenced through the continued prominence of religion in family law. Numerous 
explanations exist for the absence of gender equality in inheritance laws, with two of the 
primary justifications pertaining to mahr and compulsory financial support during marriage, 
as well as exemptions from going to war. It is argued that it is because of the financial 
burden placed on the husband that he inherit twice as much as the wife; these 
interpretations are shared by Sunni and Shi’i laws (Ferdows, 1985: 25). Should the deceased 
not be Muslim, then it was stipulated in Iranian law that the ‘rules and customs of the 
religion professed by the deceased;…’ will be indisputably recognised (Naqvi, 1968a: 162). 
7.6 Child Custody 
Another issue which arose was child custody, with Shari’a law determining the age at which 
paternal custody began. During maternal custody however, the father or nearest male 
relative maintained guardianship of the child and thus enabled him to determine the 
education of the children, and contract any of them into marriage without maternal consent 
(Coulson & Hinchcliffe, 1978: 45). According to Harik and Marston (1996: 99), this was 
because children were understood to belong to the paternal family, thus reinforcing notions 
of gender segregation, male dominance, and ownership. Additionally, maternal custody was 
conditional on mental, physical and moral abilities to care for the child as well as her not 
remarrying, regardless of degrees of familial separation (Coulson & Hinchcliffe, 1978: 45). 
The duration of maternal custody varies between schools and it is determined by the age 
and sex of the child. Ithnā ʿAshari law permits mothers to maintain custody of sons until the 
age of two, and daughters until seven; Hanafī law increases this period to the ages seven 
and nine respectively. Shafi’i law permits children to choose which parent they reside with 
once they are seven; and Hanbali law permits boys to choose, however, fathers 
automatically gain custody of daughters when they are seven. The most liberal school 
however, is Maliki, which emphasises the mother’s rights and permits her to maintain 
custody of her son until he has reached puberty and it is the same for daughters with the 
inclusion of marriage (Coulson & Hinchcliffe, 1978: 45). What is doubly evident here is the 
patriarchal nature of custody laws. First is the right in all interpretations, except the Maliki, 
of the father over the mother with regard to custodianship of the children. Second is the 
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manner in which the age determined by law appears to permit paternal custody of children 
once they are either no longer reliant on their mother for nourishment, or have learnt to be 
self-sufficient.  
Child custody under Islamic law, has traditionally favoured fathers over mothers. Under 
Personal Status Laws, and more specifically chapter seven of the draft law of 1929, the end 
of maternal custody is legally determined. In the case of Egypt, Article 20 (The Egyptian 
Gazette, 12th March 1929: 4) enforced Hanafī law. It determined however, that ‘if it is found 
in the interest of the child necessitates such a measure’, a boy may reside with his mother 
until the age of nine and a girl until eleven (The Egyptian Gazette, 12th March 1929: 4). 
Whether continued maternal custody was in the child’s best interests was determined by a 
qadi, once again indicating the institutionalised reliance of women on men in determining 
their rights. If the mother remarried during this period, custody was automatically revoked 
and children resided with their father, who never lost his right to custody (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 
2011: 136).  
Revisions to child custody laws were justified by drafters of the 1929 Egyptian law, as a 
response to ‘the large number of complaints of women’ who believed their children were 
too young to be away from them (Kholoussy, 2010: 121). Kholoussy (2010: 121) posits that 
those responsible are likely to have been influenced by the familial, maternal metaphors 
(see for example Baron, 2005) which were adopted into the nationalist discourse. The 
representation of women as responsible for raising future societal participants is thus 
understood to have served as a ‘loophole’ within Islamic law, which is unchangeable and 
favours the father in custodial cases, and became practice in Islamic courtrooms (Kholoussy, 
2010: 121). 
Sections 1168-1170 of the Civil Code and section 15 of the Iranian Marriage Act reinforced 
child custody laws as determined by Ithna ʿAshari Shiʾism, with section 16 outlining the 
aforementioned conditions for women to maintain custody (Naqvi, 1968a: 160; 1968b: 285). 
What remains absent in this case is whether women may regain custody should men 
become physically, mentally or morally unfit to raise them. Moreover, silences on the issue 
of male remarriage indicated that custodial rights would not be affected should he choose 
to do so and this is supported by Bamdad (1977: 33) who noted the removal of Taj’s children 
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‘to live with their father’s next wife’. The absence of women’s custodial rights and its 
duration is evident in the above legislation. Moreover, the imposed nature of these laws 
gave no leniency in favour of women, as is once again emphasised by the case of Taj who 
experienced ‘forced separation from her daughters’ (Amanat in al-Sultana/Vanzan & 
Neshati, 2003: 73).  
Whilst child custody was another area of family law in which feminists sought an increase in 
gender equality, the aforementioned stipulations were determined by religious laws and 
were thus understood to be an area where changes would not be made, despite the more 
liberal nature of the Maliki school. Another prominent issue is the limited period of 
maternal custody; thus emphasising the temporary nature of many aspects of the familial 
structure. The primary difference, other than age, between custody laws in Egypt and Iran 
was the increased flexibility Egyptian law appeared to show towards the need of the child 
with regard to the necessity of residing with their mother for longer than initially stipulated. 
7.7 Conclusion: Equality in Dissolution 
This chapter has sought to establish the rights of women with regard to the dissolution of 
marriage. Throughout the above discussions, it has been possible to determine that divorce 
remained firmly grounded in the patriarchal systems of Egypt and Iran. Following the raised 
volume of feminist demands, government concessions to increase female participation in 
divorce proceedings were minimalistic and ensured that it remained a male jurisdiction.  
Criteria which enabled women to request divorce were more complex than the few 
legalities which stipulated conditions for male divorce, thus reinforcing the ease of male 
divorce. Furthermore, whilst stipulations under Iranian law pertaining to health concerns 
indicated potential grounds for divorce for both parties, the doubling of criteria men may 
use to divorce women emphasises the notion of a woman being half as valuable as a man.  
The requirement of women to procure evidence of her husband’s inability to support her 
financially, his mistreatment of her, and any damages caused as a result of polygamous 
relations also reinforced gendered value and trustworthiness. The emergence of an Egyptian 
and Iranian feminist consciousness during the early twentieth century and its enactment 
during the 1920s and 1930s - through salons, the increased presence of women’s writing, as 
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well as boycotts and marches (see sections 4.5.2, 5.2, 5.3 & 6.2) - mark a significant point in 
their respective histories, moreover it is through this lens that parallels between the secular 
nature of these two states may be drawn. However, the continued prominence of religion 
through the maintained implementation of Shari’a over family law and the patriarchal 
reliance evident in the rights afforded to women in the realm of divorce indicate that 
secularism had a more diminished effect on family law, with minimal reforms primarily 
occurring in response to demands of women’s rights groups, rather than independently by 
the government. 
The examples of Huda, Taj and Sattareh adopted in places have evidenced experiences of 
the various laws being discussed. Whilst each of these women were from the upper 
echelons of society and are therefore not representative of female experiences in either 
state, their incorporation does evidence diverging experiences and provide insight into 
some women’s experiences under patriarchal family laws. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion: 
Matrimonial Equality, Secularism and Women 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has inquired how secularism affected women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran 
between 1920 and 1939. The literature on gender equality, family law and secularism in the 
MENA region is extensive. Academics, analysts, journalists and observers alike have 
provided a myriad of information which continues to situate family law and women’s rights 
within a religious, and often orientalist milieu. Scholars such as Al-Ali (2000), Ali Agrama 
(2010), Badran (2005), Bahramitash and Kaziempour (2006), Halliday (2003), and 
Mirsepassi-Ashtiani (1994) have contributed valuably to this literature in the pre- and post- 
9/11 eras which has resulted in the capacious nature of this field of research; however, 
continued orientalist observations and homogenisations – such as the oppressive nature of 
the veil, the perceived need to save women, and representations of Islam as a violent and 
intolerant religion (see section 1.2) - alongside voluminous interpretations leave loud 
silences in contemporary and historical knowledge. 
It is not only (non) Western observers of Islamic laws and customs contributing to scholastic 
disarray, but also adherents to Islam due to the multifarious interpretations which arise 
from each Islamic school. The dialogue which emerges with regard to gender equality, 
Islamic law and secularism in the MENA region thus moves beyond the imagined 
geographies of East and West to the national and individual levels of society. Subsequently, 
explanations for the continued patriarchal nature of Islamic law and the (in)compatibility of 
Islam and women’s rights have become increasingly convoluted as stereotypes and 
homogenisations dominate the public sphere through various (media) outlets. This thesis 
has thus sought to further clarify aspects of this field of research through a methodical 
analysis of women’s rights in family law in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939 and the 
effects of secularism on them. Within a post-colonial feminist framework, it moved beyond  
Western-centric perceptions of gender equality and Islamic law, whilst ensuring that they 
remained present in the analysis due to their role in (re-)presenting religious, gendered and 
regional conceptualisations at a broader level; as well as Europe’s perceived prominence as 
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a ‘sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories…’ (Chakrabarty, 2000: 27) including those 
referred to as Egyptian and Iranian.  
This chapter serves as a point of contact for the previous analyses and contextualisations. It 
will provide a systematic outline of the previous chapters and how they have contributed to 
further understanding the effects of secularism on women’s marital rights in Egypt and Iran 
between 1920 and 1939. The chapter will then address each of the research questions 
outlined in chapter one, before concluding that despite its continued situatedness in a 
religio-legal jurisdiction, family law in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939 was affected 
by secularism and the manner in which it was introduced to each state. 
8.2 Modernity, History and Secularism      
Secularism, like religion, has no single meaning. Divergences in interpretation and 
implementation at the national and societal levels differ across states; therefore a single 
definition of secularism within the context of this thesis has not been possible. However, as 
will become apparent throughout this chapter, definitions emerge which are dependent on 
the state being examined and the individual being addressed.  
Contemporary events outlined in chapter one reinforced prominent gaps which still exist 
within history. The chapter began by outlining the contribution this thesis makes to the 
fields of gender, political, historical and Middle Eastern studies and homogenisations of the 
MENA region as represented by Said (1978). The context and background of this project 
thus emerged from observations of 9/11, 7/7, and the Arab Spring which resulted in 
increased cultural, religious, geographic and historical generalisations and heightened 
Islamophobia. 
A discussion then ensued on the multifaceted nature of Islam and the divergent schools of 
which it is comprised. Contemporary events such as the prominent emergence of ISIS, the 
imprisonment of Ghoncheh Ghavami in Iran, and the UAE Lachaux custody battle served to 
emphasise the continuation of debates surrounding gender equality, state sovereignty and 
religious laws across the MENA region. From this emerged a more nuanced discussion on 
the dual lensed process of ‘othering’ and its consequences; subsequently reinforcing deficits 
in historic understandings of Islam, the MENA region and the diverging effects of secularism. 
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From chapter one emerged reflections on regional observations, and generalisations 
pertaining to women’s social and legal rights; thus permitting this thesis’ research questions 
to emerge. 
Discussions on family law, religion, feminism and secularism subsequently ensued as a 
means of situating this thesis within an academic milieu. Superficially, arguments may arise 
regarding the exhaustive amount of literature and data on women’s rights and Islam, and 
the absence of silences surrounding matrimonial equality. Moreover, arguments may arise 
which dismiss the effects of secularism on matrimonial equality due to the continued 
positioning of family law within a religio-legal jurisdiction. These discussions not only 
reinforced the divergent rights of women throughout the MENA region, in (non) Muslim 
countries; but it also (re)emphasised the multifaceted relationships individual states had 
with secularism.  
Emerging prominently within this discussion was the rise and fall of the secular and religious 
state. Whilst Iran experienced longer durations as a secular or religious state, Egypt’s history 
appears more haphazard, with fluctuations occurring during leadership transitions as well as 
during their term(s) in office. Subsequently, initial conclusions about the relationship 
between each state and secularism can be drawn; with secularism in Iran appearing more 
resilient than in Egypt, potentially due to the manner in which it was implemented at the 
state level. Fluctuations were also evident throughout the MENA region when examining 
women’s marital rights and these correlated with the broader political situation at the time, 
with the Iran-Iraq war impacting on rights in each state. 
Despite secularism being a prominent aspect of this research, the inclusion of women’s 
marital rights and the multifaceted experiences which arise within this topic resulted in a 
post-colonial feminist lens being adopted for this thesis. Chapter three thus facilitated a 
discussion on feminism, and more specifically post-colonial feminism in reference to this 
research and the chosen methodology. From the initial discussion on feminist insights (see 
section 3.2), continued homogenisations of women, gender and experience emerged with 
Western-centrism being a prominent factor. Whilst perspectives of various feminist strands 
were recognised, post-colonial feminism’s location at the intersection of spheres such as 
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class and gender, alongside experience, served to reinforce divergent experiences within 
each state.  
Within discussions on (post-colonial) feminism emerged power structures, with colonialism, 
patriarchy and the family being prominent amongst them. Through an examination of the 
literature on these variables, different types of power emerged and permitted insight into 
prominent concepts such as hegemonic masculinity which subsequently linked gender and 
colonialism more strongly. The oppression of individuals, irrespective of sex emerged 
prominently through the works of Cohn (2013) and Fanon (1963); subsequently reinforcing 
the prominence of power structures and the necessity of de-centralising Western 
perspectives as a means of understanding how secularism affected women’s marital rights 
in Egypt and Iran. In moving towards a methodological discussion, chapter three also 
outlined the significance of history in challenging normative representations of women’s 
rights and family law in the MENA region.  
Following this, chapters four and five historically situated this thesis in Egypt and Iran 
respectively, between 1900 and 1919. As has been evidenced in these chapters, Egypt and 
Iran share similar yet distinctive histories. The presence of foreign powers in both states 
resulted in the emergence of strong nationalist and feminist voices as liberation from 
oppression was sought on two levels. Additionally, during these first two decades Iran 
established its first constitution, both states felt the economic, social and international tug 
of war, the effects of other conflicts and revolutions, and the overarching ‘threat’ of 
Western ideals as an alternative to Islam. It is argued that this final point was felt in Egypt in 
the post 1919 Revolution era as ‘western liberal ideals’ were adopted by society’s elite (Al-
Ali, 2000: 135). This ‘threat’ of westernisation continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s, 
with the 1936 Treaty being understood by Berque (1972: 561) to represent an aspect of this 
as Britain assumed responsibility for half of the cost of the new army barracks. Thus 
indicating that despite Egypt’s quasi-independent status, the threat of Britain’s continued 
exertion of power within the state was prominent. 
Modernisation was also a prominent factor in the Egyptian state, with awareness being 
evident of the need to develop an independent, competitive economy, a more rigid position 
in the international arena, and a stronger society through social and political reforms. 
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However, due to their continuing history of foreign occupation and colonisation, Egypt was 
finding itself in an increasingly precarious position, which resulted in an enforced reliance on 
foreign powers. Moreover, the introduction of settlers into society is understood to have 
been perceived as a means by which the foundations of Egyptian society were weakened, 
and this occurred in several ways. In addition to the Western economic and political 
standpoints which were enforced throughout Egypt, the introduction of foreigners at the 
societal level further contributed to the increasing Westernisation of the state as social 
practices became common amongst Egyptian citizens. Egyptian women began adopting 
Western ideals as part of their campaign against oppression, and the foundations of 
Egyptian society were understood to have been put in jeopardy through mixed-marriages. 
These characteristics and concerns were not unique to Egypt, with Iran - although not 
having been formally colonised or placed under British Protectorate at this time - sharing 
many of these experiences. Under Qajar rule, Iran’s economy was unstable, with a 
decentralised government contributing to the political and economic crises. The indecisive 
nature of this government, and the absence of representation throughout the various 
provinces, provided fertile grounds for the expansion of British and Russian troops 
throughout the country. A defining feature of this period of Iranian history however, was 
the establishment of the 1906 Constitution and the 1907 Supplementary Fundamental Laws. 
Whilst those advocating constitutionalism in Iran sought a more secularised approach to 
Iranian politics, disappointment was rife when prominent religious overtones remained. It is 
arguable however, that the impetus for the secularisation of Iranian politics through the 
establishment of a constitution did not emerge from the increasing influences of 
occupation. Instead, it can be understood to have been dramatically influenced by the 
defeat of the only non-constitutionalised country in the West (Russia) by the only 
constitutionalised nation in Asia (Japan).  
Following his role in the Cossacks, Reza Khan rose steadily through the political rankings, 
being viewed as ‘the Prime Minister-in-waiting’ by early 1922 (Ghani, 1998: 289). One of the 
main criticisms to arise however, was the uninspired nature of the selected cabinet 
ministers, with the Minister of Education, Soleiman Mirza (Eskandari), whilst believing in the 
need for social and economic reforms, being impeded by ‘a meagre education and being 
poorly read’ (Ghani, 1998: 289). 
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The primary objective of Reza Khan however, was the establishment of a modern state. This 
was to be achieved through the introduction of Western science and technology, and the 
adoption of European models of economics, education and administration. Of these reforms 
however, secular changes in the legal system and the development of a railway took priority 
(Ghani, 1998: 397). Education was also reformed, with the implementation of compulsory 
education for children between the ages of six and thirteen, as well as the adoption of the 
French curriculum for secondary education, with enrolment increasing six fold, and the 
number of girls receiving an education increasing tenfold (Ghani, 1998: 399). 
With the call for the increased secularisation of Iranian politics becoming more prominent, it 
was believed that Reza Khan was the ‘only logical contender’ (Ghani, 1998: 299). Despite his 
perceived strength by the Iranian people, another prominent criticism was his lack of 
knowledge regarding political theories, and the absence of a solid plan to remove the 
secular/religious dichotomy (Ghani, 1998: 299). The outcry that writers were generating for 
a secular state and a fresh beginning, with acknowledgement that Reza Khan was the only 
logical contender to lead the nation, resulted in Iran becoming an externally facing secular 
state whilst remaining privately religious. The appearance of a façade when it came to 
modernisation policies throughout the state thus becomes more visible. 
This apparent distrust of Reza Khan in achieving state modernisation, increased gender 
equality and a break in the secular/religious dichotomy has not only been evidenced 
through personal accounts, but also through political accounts of British observations. It was 
noted that in 1922, there appeared to be increased misgivings amongst the Iranian peoples 
(TNA, FO 416/112, 1932: 11), thus indicating a lack of trust in the state by the people. 
Moreover, the Iranian state was still feeling the effects of World War One with its legacy 
being that of refugees (TNA, FO 416/112, 1932: 65), therefore adding another concern to its 
already unstable economic climate. Additionally, Western interest in Iran grew in 1922, with 
the United States being drawn to the north due to potential oil deposits (TNA, FO 416/112, 
1932: 19), thus adding to foreign interest and presence in Iran, this time for materialistic 
gains. From this it is possible to draw comparisons between the Egyptian and Iranian cases, 
the situation each state found itself in, and the continued external pressures which 
inevitably impacted on the internal situation in each state. 
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The main area of examination for this thesis however, has been women’s marital rights. 
Inseparable from this is the public emergence of a feminist consciousness in both states. 
Whilst matrimonial equality was a prominent issue in both states, the precarious position of 
women within Egypt and Iran resulted in a bottom up approach, as advocates of equality of 
rights and opportunity in both countries believed that the root problem was access to 
education.  
Accompanying ignorance in the fight for increased equality were disease, superstition and 
illiteracy, and when compared to the feminist movement in the United States over a century 
before, it became apparent that education was not as rigorously opposed as it was in Iran, 
thus permitting them to address more general concerns (Sanasarian, 1982: 48). The 
analyses conducted throughout this thesis however, indicates that women in Egypt and Iran 
stood together in their calls for reform through increased female writings, salons, boycotts, 
and marches (see sections 4.5.2, 5.2, 5.3 & 6.2); with access to health care, education, 
restrictions on polygamy and ease of male divorce being prominent in both countries. 
Criticisms of these issues became more public as advocates of gender equality in both states 
used nationalist and gendered rhetorics to lift oppression against women and the nation. 
Charitable work was one area Reza Khan was amenable to due to its correlations with his 
perception of women’s roles (Sanasarian, 1982: 68), thus indicating how some women’s 
rights groups were able to exist during his reign. 
This thesis is situated in an era of political and social upheaval in both the Egyptian and 
Iranian state; therefore it is of great significance to understand the respective environments 
of each state prior to and during the period of enquiry. Moreover, through understanding 
the political climate of each state, it is possible to further comprehend personal and political 
experiences. It was during this time that secularism became increasingly present in the 
Egyptian and Iranian states. From the analyses conducted in chapters four and five, it thus 
becomes arguable that external influences such as foreign occupation and behaviours 
contributed to the formation of a secular consciousness. Its application in each state varied 
however, with stronger internal (governmental) voices advocating its implementation in Iran 
than in Egypt; subsequently giving rise to conceptualisations of internal and external 
secularism (see section 1.4). 
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The inquiry into matrimonial equality in these two historically significant countries has 
resulted in the inclusion of emerging feminist voices, as well as a deeper exploration of the 
political history of each state, and the perceptions of those who experienced it as nationals 
and those who experienced or observed as occupiers. It is through these various 
investigations that textual analyses of the various laws has been possible. Furthermore, it is 
because of the social, political, and economic factors that similarities and disparities have 
been drawn between the histories, feminist activities and political reforms of each state 
respectively, which has resulted in a more nuanced understanding of power, politics and 
matrimony in Egypt and Iran between 1920 and 1939.  
8.3 Matrimonial Equality 
Marriage has been defined in this thesis as the traditional establishment of the familial 
structure, which forms the foundations of society through the introduction of new societal 
participants. Through analyses of various experiences of key Egyptian and Iranian women, it 
is possible to draw comparisons between their very unique encounters. The primary 
similarity between these women however, has emerged through the language of memory, 
with marriage being presented as little more than business.  
The absence of women from the process of choosing a partner and establishing the 
contract, the political power of men, established in the form of the patriarchal system, is 
reinforced. It is argued that the absence of female participation  is primarily due to age, with 
both Egyptian and Iranian fathers traditionally marrying their daughters whilst they were 
still children, however, the ‘duty’ of the father or a woman’s guardian to select a suitor, 
does not end when she reaches adulthood. Through textual analyses of Egyptian laws 
25/1920, 33/1926 and 25/1929 (NWRO, n.d.), alongside the Iranian Civil Code (Taleghany, 
1995) and the Marriage Act of Iran (Naqvi, 1967, 1968a, 1968b, 1968c) the marital rights of 
men and women have been established, alongside their shared permissions and restrictions. 
Moreover, it has been possible to establish independent and shared rights of Egyptian and 
Iranian peoples.  
A total of six marital rights for Egyptian and Iranian men can be identified from the analysis 
of the aforementioned laws in chapter six. The first right is the right to marry, and this 
carries a dual meaning for men in both countries as they have the right to marry a woman 
219 
 
themselves and they have the right to marry a woman to someone else, thus bringing in the 
second right which is that of being a wali. This right can also be understood through a dual 
approach, with the first pertaining to a father’s right to marry off his daughter, and the 
second being a man’s appointed right as guardian in finding a suitor. In both countries, men 
were involved in the process of choosing their future partner, and should they be married, 
both countries permitted the husband to prevent non-domestic female work. In the process 
of establishing the contract, men were afforded the right to have their financial position 
taken into consideration with regard to mahr and maintenance; thus protecting him from 
overly ambitious financial demands from the bride and her family. Finally, a male right in 
Egypt and Iran was to engage in polygamous relationships, providing that he was able to 
ensure equality of treatment between all wives. 
This analysis then highlighted aspects of marriage where both men and women were 
restricted. Again, six areas were found, with four of them only being applicable in Iran, with 
the other two being shared experiences. First, whilst it emerged that men were able to 
participate in choosing partners, should they have been married as a child, this right was 
removed. Boys were thus placed in the same position as girls and women; subsequently 
ensuring the prominence of parental rights in marrying off their children in both countries, 
and reinforcing the familial power structure. Another restriction shared by men and women 
in both countries was the requirement to obtain consent of the woman’s guardian, which if 
denied, acted as a preventative measure against marriage. Under Iranian law however, both 
men and women were restricted in the inclusion of stipulations in the marriage contract, 
should they refer to its revocation. Furthermore, should either party have deceived the 
other in the establishment or completion of the marriage contract, they faced 
imprisonment. Later reforms then placed restrictions on mixed-marriages, with women 
needing to obtain government approval and men possibly needing to obtain approval 
depending on their circumstances. Finally, whilst restrictions were later implemented in 
both countries with regard to marital age, Iranian law stipulated that men could not marry 
and girls could not be married if they had not yet reached puberty.  
In addition to restrictions, there were marital rights which were shared by both men and 
women. Five of these were established from the previous analyses, with the majority of 
them occurring under Iranian law. Both countries permitted either party to end a betrothal, 
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with it being an additional requirement that any gifts be returned to the other party. 
However, under Iranian law it was possible to assign the role of contracting the marriage to 
a third party; therefore essentially removing one or both of the betrothed from the process. 
Iranian law however, permitted temporary marriage which was not recognised in Egypt. 
Whilst identifying this type of marriage as legal, Iranian law stipulated that mahr had to be 
established otherwise the marriage was invalid.  
As well as the above mentioned permissions and restrictions, there were aspects of both 
laws which resulted in gendered divisions and hierarchies. With regard to marital rights 
there were areas of law in Egypt and Iran which were only applicable to men or women. For 
men, as previously established, both countries permitted polygamous marriages with there 
being no more than four wives at any one time; they were allowed to choose partners 
unless they were married at a young age; and they were able to work outside of the house. 
Moreover, men were allowed to marry girls when they themselves were no longer children 
however, legal restrictions were later implemented with Egypt setting ages as sixteen and 
eighteen for girls and boys respectively, whilst the Iranian attempt was more vague with 
puberty being used as the benchmark. The final aspect of marriage which was permissible 
for men but not women in both states was that of mixed marriages, with it being easier and 
more legally accepted for men to marry foreign or non-Muslim women. It was only stated in 
Iranian law however, that men engaging in mixed-marriages were permitted to maintain 
their nationality; however, due to concerns raised by Kholoussy (2003, 2010) with regard to 
mixed marriage in Egypt and the increased impact of foreign husbands over foreign wives, it 
is possible to determine that the same was applicable in Egypt. Men were also permitted to 
abstain from mahr or maintenance payments should a wife not fulfil her duties; however, 
until 1931, men were not required to pay maintenance in a temporary marriage unless 
negotiated prior to the contracting of the marriage. Finally, whilst restrictions were placed 
on men in both countries, according to Islamic law, with regard to the number of wives they 
may have at any one time, under Iranian law, temporary marriages did not carry such 
restrictions for men.  
Conversely, under Egyptian and Iranian law, women were permitted to sue their husband 
should he fail to pay mahr or maintenance; and once mahr had been paid, women were 
able to determine how it was spent. Women also had the right to be informed of any 
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current wives at the time of contracting the marriage, and any subsequent to it. Stipulations 
were also permitted in the marriage contract however, this was only legally recognised in 
Iran, with Egypt recognising it at the social rather than the political level due to it being 
entrenched in tradition. Finally, under Iranian law, girls were exempt from obtaining health 
certificates prior to marriage. Whether women over a certain age were required to obtain 
one is unclear, however, the absence of this within Iranian law is understood to represent 
the assumed virginity of the bride. Moreover, it is legally permitted for a woman to refuse 
sex with her husband without any ramifications should he have a venereal disease. 
From the analyses which have occurred, it is possible to determine four marital rights of 
women in Egypt and Iran. Under Egyptian and Iranian law, women were entitled to mahr, 
with Egyptian brides receiving between one third and one half prior to marriage. Women 
also had the right to maintenance whilst married and should the husband fail to pay this or 
mahr when there were no inhibitions, she was legally permitted to sue him for it. Following 
feminist demands, both governments acquiesced with regard to a minimum marriage age, 
thus giving girls the legal right to a childhood and protection from risks associated with 
bearing children at a young age, however, its implementation at the societal level was more 
problematic. The final right which emerged from this analysis is controversial, with it being 
the woman’s right to be married. Whilst the traditional role of women as wife and mother is 
prominent throughout the analyses, this right is understood to be reversed in the sense that 
the marriage of women was predominantly a male domain.   
From this it is possible to determine that the most significant achievement of Egyptian 
feminists was the legal recognition of a minimum marriage age, however, due to social 
pressures and financial concerns of fathers, ensuring its implementation at the societal level 
was far more difficult. Whilst recognition of the same calls in Iran is evident, its ambiguous 
nature left girls just as vulnerable as they were previously, and Naqvi (1967: 241) argues 
that the Iranian Civil Code and Marriage Act lacked substance in addressing the issues of 
Iranian society at the time. The same criticisms can be made of the Egyptian laws. Whilst a 
more rigid definition was provided for marital ages of both sexes, the rights afford to 
women in both countries with regard to the establishment of the marriage contract and life 
after were primarily materialistic, with no actual marital rights appearing to be afforded to 
them. 
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8.4 Equality in the Dissolution of a Marriage 
The dissolution of a marriage, as evidenced in chapter seven, takes two forms. The first is 
that of a decision and the marital contract is dissolved through divorce; the second is a 
natural occurrence through the death of a spouse. Through analyses of Egyptian and Iranian 
laws, it has been possible to establish the rights of each spouse in the cases of divorce and 
death. One significant similarity which occurred through these analyses however, is the 
continued predominance of male rights in both cases despite amendments which were 
intended to provide women more rights. 
From the analysis presented in chapter seven, four prominent male rights occurred in 
relation to the dissolution of a marriage. The first, which became a prominent feature of 
both the Egyptian and Iranian feminist movements, was the ease of male divorce, with the 
second right making significant contributions to this as they were not required to provide 
evidence or approach a judge. Additionally, Iranian law stated that should divorce occur 
before the marriage had been consummated, then the husband was entitled to a ‘refund’ 
on any additional amount of mahr which had been paid and exceeds half the value of the 
agreed total. Finally, should the marriage end in divorce, the ex-husband had unconditional 
child custody following the allocated period of maternal custody, unless she lost it. Whilst 
there are few rights discussed here, the overarching powers these rights carry far outweigh 
their scarcity. 
Despite the ease of male divorce, there were aspects of the dissolution process which were 
restricted for both men and women. According to Egyptian law, should the woman’s father 
have evidence pertaining to the inferior social status of her husband, he was permitted to 
annul the marriage, thus removing the decision and process from both parties involved and 
reinforcing the significance of class in marriage. The remaining areas which were restricted 
were primarily applicable to men with regard to women. Under Egyptian and Iranian law, a 
husband’s repudiation of the wife was invalid should it happen under duress or as a result of 
intoxication; moreover, Iranian law prohibited conditional repudiation if it was intended to 
be a way of controlling the wife. Additionally, Iranian law proscribed revocable divorce 
should the wife be under the age of nine years old. Furthermore, divorce was considered 
invalid under Iranian law should a woman be menstruating, unless the husband had been 
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absent and was unaware; it was also not permitted on the grounds of a health blemish if it 
existed at prior to or at the time of marriage and was known about. The stipulation that the 
blemish in the woman must have existed at the time of marriage in order for divorce to be 
permissible on these grounds, is thus understood to have removed blame from the husband 
and absolved him of any bodily harm he may have caused, which itself carried a criminal 
sentence. 
With regard to rights afforded to men and women it was stipulated in Egyptian and Iranian 
law that they both have the right to initiate divorce. Under Iranian law, divorce was 
permitted to either party in the case of deceit by the other party in stipulations placed in the 
contract, or if insanity was proven in either spouse, regardless of its permanence. Divorce 
was also permitted to either party should the other have any of the health blemishes 
outlined in the Civil Code (Naqvi, 1968b: 358; Taleghany, 1995: 163-164). With regard to 
inheritance in Iran, both spouses were permitted to inherit from each other providing there 
were no lawful impediments.  
As was the case with marital rights, there were legalities pertaining to divorce which were 
only applicable to men. As previously mentioned, men in both Egypt and Iran were 
permitted to repudiate or divorce their wives at will without the need to apply to a judge or 
provide evidence. In the case of a revocable divorce, both countries permitted men to take 
back their wives within a certain period of time, and have unrestricted child custody 
following the mother’s (loss of) custody. However, under Iranian law it was further stated 
that in the case of an irrevocable divorce, the husband had the right to stop maintenance 
payments following ʿiddah; he was also permitted to reclaim his wife’s mahr should the 
divorce of a consummated marriage be for any reason other than impotency. Finally, in the 
case of a temporary marriage, should the termination of the contract be sought prior to the 
agreed expiration date, the husband was permitted to relinquish the wife of any remaining 
time.  
In the case of rights of dissolution, women were permitted in both countries to sue 
husbands for any outstanding mahr or maintenance, and they were permitted to apply to a 
court for a divorce in the case of maltreatment by the husband. As well as the right to seek a 
divorce, Egyptian and Iranian women were permitted to receive maintenance payments 
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until the end of ʿiddah or the pregnancy, unless the divorce was revocable, in which case 
Iranian law permitted its continuance beyond the two designated time periods. Under 
Iranian law, should a woman consummate a marriage whilst unaware of its invalidity, she 
was entitled to receive Mahr al-Mithl; however, in the case of a temporary marriage, the 
wife was permitted to keep her mahr if she died, regardless of consummation, and if the 
contract ended prior to consummation and before the agreed date, then she was entitled to 
half. However, unlike Iranian law, Egyptian law permitted women to request an increase in 
their period of child custody should it be considered to be in the child’s best interests. 
From this analysis it is also possible to determine five areas where women had rights with 
regard to the dissolution of the marital contract. The first was that under Egyptian law a 
marriage may be terminated when puberty was reached should she have been married 
prior to this. With regard to mahr, under Egyptian and Iranian law, a woman was entitled to 
the remaining amount when divorced, only half of the amount should divorce occur prior to 
consummation; and under Iranian law, the full amount should divorce occur with no 
amount being agreed or mentioned in the contract when it was consummated. Women 
were also entitled to maintenance during ʿiddah, and may seek a divorce should her 
husband be unable to support her, was incurably ill or mistreated her. They were also 
entitled to their full mahr under Iranian law, should clarity in its form or an inability to own 
it occur. However, in each case that a woman sought to divorce her husband an application 
must be made and evidence provided.  
With regard to women’s inheritance rights, should the husband be presumed dead due to 
prolonged absence, there was no mention of the wife’s entitlement (The Egyptian Gazette, 
Tuesday 12th March, 1929: 4); however, should they be divorced for more than one year and 
a dispute occurs, her right to inheritance was removed. However, under Iranian law a 
woman may inherit a percentage of the value of her husband’s estate, and if there was 
more than one wife at his time of death, the allocated percentage of one woman will be 
divided equally amongst them.  
It is possible to establish that of the two forms of marital dissolution, rights following the 
death of a spouse appear to be the most restricted with regard to gender equality. 
However, this does not mean that divorce was any more liberal in its approach. The focal 
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point for women’s rights advocates in Egypt and Iran, with regard to dissolution of the 
marital contract was the ease with which men could achieve this. Whilst the inclusion of 
specific clauses pertaining to circumstances under which a divorce was (not) considered to 
be valid, attempts to discourage revocable divorces, and the inclusion of conditions under 
which women could apply for divorce could be seen as a form of advancement in balancing 
the equilibrium, they appeared to achieve little more than reinforce the patriarchal nature 
of the state and the shadow status of women within society. 
8.5 Conclusion: Women, Secularism and the State 
The politicisation of the private sphere has many faces and they have been discussed 
throughout this thesis, beginning with the public/private dichotomy (see section 2.3) and 
moving to the political reach into the private sphere (see section 6.2). From the analyses 
which have been conducted in chapters six and seven, along with the findings presented 
above, it is apparent that it was not only the private sphere which was politicised, but also 
the bodies of the people within it. By dictating the legalities of marriage, the roles of 
individuals in establishing it, the roles of spouses once married, their behavioural duties 
towards one another, and rights with regard to the two forms of dissolution, this thesis 
argues that the private sphere essentially became a secondary political sphere. Moreover, 
whilst the private sphere remained under religious law, its politicisation ultimately brought 
it into the public, increasingly secular domain.  
Throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century, both Egypt and Iran experienced 
the public emergence of a feminist consciousness, instigated by a growing awareness 
amongst advocates of gender equality of the various forms of oppression being experienced 
by women in both the public and private realms. Despite this understanding and active 
efforts to improve the position of women in each of these states, there was a prominent 
lack of understanding with regard to the scope of female liberation in the West at the time. 
In her memoirs, Taj (al-Sultana/Vanzan & Neshati, n.d./2003: 201) recalled her longing to 
meet with the liberated women of Europe, depicting them in an ideological manner akin to 
her own aspirations for Iranian women. Through observations of (external) actors and the 
‘enhanced’ lens through which their rights were viewed; it becomes possible to comprehend 
the indirect effects of secularism on matrimonial equality through the women’s movement 
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in Egypt and Iran. Whilst observations of Western successes influenced the women’s 
movements, they were not the only driving force. Rather this thesis argues that increased 
awareness regarding the unequal footing on which men and women stood in both states 
with regard to matrimonial equality can be understood to have occurred primarily due to 
the experiences of women and their determination to prevent younger generations falling 
victim to such traditions. 
This was evidenced primarily through Huda (1987; Sharawi Lanfranchi, 2012) and Taj 
(n.d./2003) who both experienced child marriage, became mothers at a young age, and the 
restrictions facing them during married life. What must be noted however, is the primary 
difference in the types of marriage they both experienced, with Huda being married to a 
man much older than herself and Taj’s husband still being a child. These experiences and the 
impact they had on the feminist consciousness of these two women and others who had 
similar experiences, can in turn be understood to represent another means by which the 
private was internally politicised. 
Throughout the first four decades of the twentieth century Egypt and Iran experienced the 
secularisation of the vast majority of political life, nationalist movements against foreign 
occupation, and the public emergence of a feminist consciousness. Al-Ali (2000: 84) posits 
that the 1919 Egyptian revolution, and the establishment of Egypt as a quasi-independent 
state (1922) are amongst many areas to be recognised as significant points in the history of 
the country, as well as the women’s movement. 
A common thread through the various sentiments and movements which occurred in both 
Egypt and Iran during this period, however, is that of self-definition, with issues of ‘identity 
and authenticity’ (Al-Ali, 2000: 185) being prominent in both nationalist and women’s rights 
activities and demands. Feminist demands and achievements throughout Egypt were limited 
in both respects, however, it is noted that the two primary achievements of Huda Shaarawi 
were establishing women’s right to enrol at university, and the implementation of a 
minimum marriage age for both sexes, thus raising it from what it had traditionally been 
(Talhami, 1996: 12). 
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In contrast to Iran, where the focal point for reforms in gender politics were situated around 
the unveiling of women, in Egypt it was the feminist movement which brought this to the 
fore of debates, with women such as Huda Shaarawi and Safiyya Zaghloul publicly unveiling 
in 1924, and Doria Shafik later targeting it through Bint al-Nil (Daughter of the Nile), of 
which she was editor (Talhami, 1996: 13). Moreover, the veil was understood to represent 
the barrier women were battling on entering into the public domain (Talhami, 1996: 13), 
with Sanasarian (1982: 65–66) noting that the Iranian women’s movement felt that there 
were more pressing issues which needed to be addressed other than the veiled status of 
women. This thesis interprets these attitudes to veiling as correlating with the religious 
nature of the state and the people’s religious identity as demonstrated by Moaddel and 
Azadarmaki (2002), whereby people were less inclined to identify as religious if the state 
did. This pattern is evident in the case of (un)veiling as Egyptian women were stronger 
proponents of its removal, and the government remained staunch advocates, whilst the 
approach was reversed in Iran.  
Within each of these women’s movements however, were aspirational differences. 
Established in 1910, the National Ladies Society sought Iranian independence from foreign 
occupation as its primary goal, with many of the women involved allocating blame to 
external rather than internal factors for the poor position of women in society (Sanasarian, 
1985: 94). In comparison, Jamiet Nesvan Vatankhah Iran (1922) is understood to have had 
similar goals to that of the EFU, with its focus being female education, health issues and the 
risks of child marriage (Sanasarian, 1985: 94). Another commonality between the Egyptian 
and Iranian women’s movements is that the majority of those involved did not seek to 
criticise Islam, rather they blamed those interpreting it for the inferior status of women. 
Jamiet Nesvan Vatankhah Iran and the Association of Revolutionary Women were a few of 
the Iranian societies advocating the continuation of Islamic teachings whilst increasing 
gender equality (Sanasarian, 1985: 97), with the EFU promoting similar things.   
Through the contextualisation of each case with regard to the political climate between 
1900 and 1939, it has been possible to develop insights into the impact secularism had on 
the development of women’s marital rights. Based on the analyses conducted in chapters 
six and seven against the political context of 1900-1919 (chapters four and five), it can been 
concluded that secularism did affect women’s marital rights however, the secular nature of 
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the state cannot, in either case, be understood to have positively affected their 
development. Rather, the reforms which were implemented in both states between 1920 
and 1939 as responses to feminist outcries further reinforced the patriarchal dominance of 
both states which provided women with token opportunities.  
Within the Egyptian and Iranian contexts, the process of secularisation can be seen to have 
occurred at the public, state level through occupying powers in Egypt and Reza Khan’s 
modernising project in Iran. Contrastingly, secularism was sought at the societal level 
through nationalist and feminist movements in response to colonising powers, and 
stringent, patriarchal interpretations of religious texts. Secularisation can thus be seen to 
have been embedded in state-society relations through increasingly secular policies, as well 
as the increased presence of (women’s) literature, encounters with Western people and 
occupation, amongst other things. Secularism can subsequently be understood to have 
affected women’s marital rights by providing a framework within which power was further 
sought, thus emerging as internal and external within Egypt and Iran. This power emerged in 
two distinct ways. The first pertains to governmental power which emerged as authority 
over people; and the second pertains to citizens whereby power was autonomy – both for 
women and for the state. It is within this framework that women became aware of the 
dangers of child marriage, their rights in choosing a partner, and the unequal grounds upon 
which divorce was determined. The continued relationship with Islam also served to 
reinforce traditional values whilst emphasising the compatibility of Islam with women’s 
rights and thus female autonomy. Within both states however, irrespective of their secular 
nature, secularism was equated with modernisation.   
The most significant achievement in Egypt is considered to be the legal implementation of a 
minimum age for marriage for both sexes; however, in Iran this issue was met with a 
superficial gesture of puberty being the benchmark for marriage. Under Iranian law, 
however, the inclusion of stipulations in the marriage contract providing they did not 
pertain to its dissolution, provided a possibility for women to be more secure in their 
marriage. Moreover, whilst Egyptian and Iranian law permitted women to seek divorce, the 
right to divorce remained solely a male jurisdiction, with the rights which were ‘afforded’ to 
women through the implementation of the Iranian Civil Code, Marriage Act and Egyptian 
laws enforcing a heightened reliance on men. Through the individual examinations of 
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marriage and divorce, it is also apparent that far more ‘reforms’ were made with regard to 
divorce in Iran than in the other instances; however, the rights which were afforded to 
women were primarily in relation to their legally determined financial reliance on men. 
Whilst it is arguable that the Iranian state appeared to make increased efforts to ensure 
women had more rights in this area of law, on examination the amendments made were 
superficial, with women having to seek permission from male authorities. Consequently, this 
thesis argues that both states were equally restrictive with regard to matrimonial equality, 
and the responses which occurred were minimalistic and ensured the continuation of the 
patriarchal framework in family legalities. This however, is not necessarily due to the 
continuation of Shari’a law over this area. Rather it is because of the continued 
implementation of such interpretations that the impact of secularism - in other areas of 
politics and its perceived liberating potential – was a retreat from its implementation in the 
private sphere and consequently further embedded family law within a religious 
environment. It also provided a second framework within which power was sought. 
Prior to the period examined in this thesis, rumblings of secularism were present 
throughout both Egyptian and Iranian society. As Amanat (in al-Sultana/Vanzan & Neshati, 
n.d./2003: 9) notes, insight into the life of Taj al-Sultana is limited, she has provided a 
restricted lens through which the reader is allowed to view aspects of her life. However, the 
brief glimpse that is permitted, portrays her as ‘a representative of the emerging secular 
intelligentsia’ in the post-revolutionary era as well as ‘an ardent feminist who reflected 
many of the predicaments of her culture and society in a changing age’ (Amanat in al-
Sultana/Vanzan & Neshati, n.d./2003: 9).  
As stated previously, matrimonial equality refers to the rights of men and women in the 
establishment and dissolution of a marriage. Analyses have indicated minimalistic attempts 
to increase gender equality in this area of law during the 1920s and 1930s in either country, 
with feminist movements appearing to have been most affected by secularism, but not 
necessarily the secular nature of the state. Moreover, Egypt and Iran are not only linked by 
their geographic positioning in the MENA region and their shared history of foreign 
occupation, but also through their similar approaches to matrimonial equality.  
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This is evidenced in a contemporary milieu, with increasing attention being paid to the 
implementation and amendment of family laws, thus questioning how this history shaped 
women’s marital rights in present-day Egypt and Iran. Egyptian law 25/1925 was amended 
in 1979, 1985, 2000 and 2004. In 1971, debates emerged in Egypt surrounding the inclusion 
of Shari’a law in the new constitution, and amendments were proposed regarding family 
law. In 1979, amendments to Personal Status Laws legalised divorce on the grounds of 
polygamy, providing women with a one year period within which they could act.  
These amendments were however, reversed in 1985 as authorities ruled that they were 
unconstitutional due to the people’s assembly not having been in session. This resulted in 
women losing their automatic right to divorce if men took a second wife; they could 
however, petition but a qadi would only grant it if it were in the best interests of the family. 
Additionally, should divorce occur, then the qadi chose an appropriate residence for the 
wife and children. Concurrently, Iranian marriage contracts saw the inclusion of twelve 
stipulations providing women with the grounds to get divorce, but only if the husband 
signed them all (Keddie, 2001). Whilst these conditions were not as substantial as those 
outlined in the Family Protection Law (1967), some conditions were reinstated following its 
annulment in 1979. These conditions included the establishment of special courts to decide 
on family disputes, and later, child custody; and the permission of courts to allocate up to 
half the property acquired during marriage to women if they were divorced against their will 
(Keddie, 2001).  
Despite conservative opposition to maternal custody, irrespective of remarriage, the Iranian 
1985 bill also provided women with government funds to assist with the ‘upkeep of needs’ 
(Keddie, 2001). Later, in 1989 a bill was passed which resulted in limitations being placed on 
divorce with it being required that court permission had to be obtained prior to it being 
registered. By 1986 the average age at which women were marrying was twenty years old, 
with it rising to twenty-two by 1996 (Keddie, 2001), thus indicating that whilst Shari’a was 
more strictly adhered to following the establishment of the IRI, traditional child marriages 
were declining in areas. 
Later, Article 20 of Egyptian Law 1/2000 codified khul divorce which was mutually agreed 
and women forfeited their financial rights. In Iran, a Family Protection bill was passed by 
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legal and judicial commissions in 2007; however, its most discriminatory provisions were 
met with stringent opposition in 2008, with activists in the One Million Signatures campaign 
being prominent in the prevention of its ratification (FIS, n.d.). By 2008, the minimum 
marriage age as stipulated in the Egyptian Personal Status Code was eighteen however, this 
was not to be the case under the new constitution (ecwronline.org, 2012). 
In 2011, UN data revealed that Egypt had no official laws against marital rape or sexual 
harassment, but did have one against domestic violence; contrastingly, no information was 
available for Iran regarding laws in these areas (The Guardian, 2011). Furthermore, concerns 
have been vocalised regarding Iran’s Comprehensive Population and Exaltation of Family Bill 
(Bill 315) which proposed ‘harmful and discriminatory measures aimed at encouraging early 
marriage, repeated childbearing and lower divorce rates, at the risk of trapping women in 
abusive relationships’ (Amnesty International, 2015: 6). The current Civil Code (2006) is 
perceived as highly discriminatory due to restrictions on maternal custody and access to 
divorce; in conjunction with the lowering of women’s minimum marital age, requiring 
permission from husband’s to work outside of the home, and the legalisation of temporary 
marriages (FIS, n.d.). 
Whilst the suitability of a religious framework in various legal fields is not determinable due 
to religion’s subjective nature, the rigidity with which it is enforced is questionable. This 
serves not as a means of passing judgement on specific religions or religious values, rather it 
serves to investigate the multifarious nature of interpretations of religious texts and their 
legal implementations and implications. Bill 315 also  
‘entrusts multiple state bodies with developing and promoting “an Islamic-Iranian life style” 
rooted in “traditional” family values and gender-role stereotypes that present  women’s 
primary role as wives and mothers, based on “guidelines” of the Supreme Leader.’  
(Amnesty International, 2015: 7) 
Furthering this, in 2012 Supreme Leader Ayatollah Syed Ali Khamenei condemned ‘existing 
policies as an imitation of Western lifestyle’ (Amnesty International, 2015: 7). This criticism 
reinforces perceptions of gharbzadegi and implies that strict Islamic adherence, with 
specific reference to the private sphere, were believed to counteract this. Simultaneously, 
Egypt was experiencing the aftermath (and in some areas the continuation of) its social 
uprisings, with the Muslim Brotherhood’s brief rise to power proving contentious due to 
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reports of increased sexual violence against (non) Egyptian women and attempts to 
reinforce a stringently gendered public/private dichotomy within Egyptian society. Whether 
Iranian actions during this time were a ‘response’ to the Arab Spring it is not possible to say; 
however, it is conceivable that the implementation of increasingly rigid laws could have 
been prompted by such actions.  
The continued prominence of religion in Egyptian family law has however, resulted in 
increased numbers of urfi marriages,45 as customs restrict individuals from furthering their 
relationship prior to marriage. This not only counters regulations regarding pre-marital sex, 
but it has become increasingly popular due to ‘The costs of a regular marriage and the 
obligations that go with it…’ (Knell, 2010). Concerns regarding female security in such 
marriages have arisen. Whilst urfi marriages have been legally recognised in Egypt since 
2000, women have struggled to prove paternity of children as was recently evidenced by the 
controversy surrounding actors Zeina and Ezz, their court case, and paternity results 
showing that he was the father of her child despite denying it (Lambert & Ramadan, 2015). 
Whilst not identical, urfi and temporary marriages (see section 7.4.2) share similarities 
regarding their gendered nature and the ease with which they can be ended.  
With regard to how the history presented in this thesis shaped women’s marital rights in 
contemporary Egypt and Iran, the effects are multifaceted. The findings of this thesis 
illustrate the continued prevalence of Shari’a in family law in both Egypt and Iran between 
1920 and 1939, with primary divergences being the school which is adhered to. Despite this, 
the effects of secularism on family law, and subsequently women’s marital rights are visible, 
with a prominent argument being that the increased secularisation of the public sphere 
resulted in family law becoming further entrenched in religious law. Consequently, this 
legalistic retreat indicates a protective mechanism for the private sphere, thus ensuring the 
continuation of Islamic traditions and the maintenance of an ‘authentically’ Islamic identity 
at society’s foundations.  
Divergences in the secular nature of the two states also emerged as prominent factors in 
determining the impact of secularism on women’s marital rights. Egypt’s occupation and 
placement under British Protectorate resulted in more direct, external influences guiding 
                                                 
45 Urfi marriage is secret, conducted with no witnesses and they are not registered with the state. 
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the secularisation of policies. As noted in chapter two (see section 2.2), frequent 
assumptions indicate colonial disinclinations to interfere with family law due to its 
prominence in religion (Asad, 2003: 227); however, through enforced (secularised) policies 
in other (industrial) areas and the economic ramifications this had, the secularisation of the 
public sphere ultimately impacted on the private sphere through increasing mahrs and 
financial constraints within the family. These implications were also evident in Iran despite 
the absence of formal occupation and British Protectorate, therefore reinforcing the impact 
of colonial power structures on states, irrespective of the formality of the occupation.  
Whilst both states saw political resistance to foreign occupation, it was not necessarily 
directed against secularism, with both nationalist and women’s movements frequently 
opting for more secularised approaches to resistance as well as politics. Resulting from this 
were criticisms of groups and individuals for being Westernised. The apparently 
synonymous nature of secularism and Westernisation thus proved problematic in some 
areas due to perceptions that the result of secularism was the replacement of Islamic or 
national traditions with Western concepts. From the analyses conducted throughout this 
thesis, this perception becomes visible with specific reference to Iran and Reza Khan’s 
modernisation project which saw enforced Western customs and clothing within the public 
sphere. This is not to refute its visibility within Egypt, rather it serves to highlight the vast 
disparities between the implementation styles within the two states. These potentially arise 
from divergences regarding foreign occupation, with the formally occupied state presenting 
a less authoritarian methodology for its implementation. 
The continuation of religious law in the private sphere and an internationally secular 
appearance by the Iranian state thus reinforces the notion of a façade. The rigid religious 
laws and superficial gestures within family law reinforce secularism’s impact on women’s 
martial rights within both states by further enmeshing it within a religio-legal milieu. 
Similarities thus emerge with regard to the continued religiosity of family law, the public 
presence and private effects of secularism; and differences arise with reference to the 
school adhered to, the strict implementation methodology, and the colonised status of each 
state during the early twentieth century.  
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As the twentieth century progressed the secular nature of the Egyptian and Iranian states 
appeared to alter following the establishment of the IRI and fluctuations in Egyptian 
secularism. Thus the effects of secularism between 1920 and 1939 on women’s marital 
rights in Egypt and Iran shaped the development of women’s rights in the following decades 
through the development of religious and non-religious women’s rights groups and 
governmental policy responses to increasingly secular politics. In this context, Egyptian 
secularism emerges as the separation of religion and politics, whilst Iranian secularism 
presents itself as the separation of religion and the (public) state.  
The continued prevalence of patriarchal interpretations of religious law indicate that 
women’s rights advocacy will continue within both religious and secular frameworks. Whilst 
such interpretations restrict women’s rights, diverging implications do arise, with policies 
such as Iranian Bill 315 reinforcing the politicisation of the female body by determining roles 
within the private sphere, and urfi marriages in Egypt providing another framework within 
which patriarchal power structures emerge. Previous fluctuations in the religious or secular 
nature of the state (see section 2.7), however, make predicting implications for the future of 
women in these societies difficult. This difficulty arises due to the subjective nature of 
religion, secularism and lived experiences and it is through this that Kedourie’s (1993: 138-
139) argument of the unpredictable nature of the spread, political force and outcome of 
nationalism can be applied to the future religious or secular nature of states, gender 
equality, and women’s rights movements due to the different surrounding contexts. 
This thesis has demonstrated how secularism affected women’s marital rights between 
1920 and 1939 by strengthening the religious framework family law was situated in; 
resulting in an original contribution being made to the field of gender and MENA history. It 
has moved beyond traditional religious frameworks, examined the historic effects of 
secularism on women’s marital rights, and how this relates to the contemporary era. It has 
also shown why it is important to understand women’s marital rights in a historical context 
as a means of developing more nuanced insights into present-day family laws. 
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Appendix 1: 
Evaluation of Possible Case Studies in the MENA Region (1920s and 1930s). 
 
 History of 
Colonialism 
/ 
Imperialism 
Type of  
Government 
Western  
Influence 
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Algeria                         2 
Egypt                         1 
Iran                         2 
Kuwait                         5 
Libya                         4 
Morocco                         3 
Saudi 
Arabia 
                        6 
Tunisia                         3 
*Variables which are marked ‘No’ are not included in the final count for applicability as it removes this variable from consideration. 
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Appendix 2: 
Evaluation of Sources Used 
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Al-Sultana, T./Vanzan, 
A. & Neshati, A. 
(trans.)/ Amanat, A. 
(ed.) 
n.d./ 
2003 
Crowning Anguish: Memoirs of a Princess 
from the Harem to Modernity 
                
Amin, Q. 1899/ 
2000 
The Liberation of Women                 
Amin, Q. 1900/ 
2000 
The New Woman                 
Amnesty 
International 
2014 Ghoncheh Gavami, in prison for wanting to 
watch volleyball  
                
Amnesty 
International 
2015 You Shall Procreate: Attacks on Women’s 
Sexual Violence 
                
The Illustrated 
London News 
1907 And Landmarks of Egyptian History Under 
His Rule 
                
Colliver-Rice, C. 1923 Persian Women and Their Ways                 
ECWRONLINE 2012 Egypt fears for girls, marriage laws in new 
constitution 
                
 1919 English Text of the Proclamation of 1914,                 
237 
 
Sources Type Availability Location Used Country 
A
u
th
o
r(
s)
 
D
at
e
 
Ti
tl
e 
P
ri
m
ar
y 
Se
co
n
d
ar
y 
O
w
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Li
b
ra
ry
 
SO
A
S 
W
e
llc
o
m
e
 
Li
b
ra
ry
 
O
n
lin
e
 
TN
A
 
O
w
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Li
b
ra
ry
 
SO
A
S 
W
e
llc
o
m
e
 
Li
b
ra
ry
 
O
n
lin
e
 
TN
A
 
Eg
yp
t 
Ir
an
 
British Foreign and State Papers 
Farid, 
M./Goldschmidt, A. 
(trans.) 
1992 The Memoirs and Diaries of Muhammad 
Farid, An Egyptian Nationalist Leader (1868-
1919) 
                
Farman Farmaian, S. 1993 Daughter of Persia: A Woman’s Journey from 
Her Father’s Harem Through the Islamic 
Revolution 
                
FIS n.d. Iran’s 1906 Constitution                 
FIS n.d. 2007 Family Protection Bill                 
 1921 Political Views and Activities of Egyptian 
Women 
                
 1924 Political Views and Activities of certain 
Egyptian women, particularly Madame 
Esther Fahmy Wissa of Women Wafd 
Committee and Madame Huda Hanem 
Sharawi 
                
 1922 Egyptian Constitution: Draft Constitution                 
 1927 Egyptian Divorce Laws                 
 n.d. Political Situation in Persia                 
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 1932 Persia Annual Reports 1922-1926                 
The Guardian 2014 Iranian-British woman jailed for attending 
volleyball match bailed 
                
The Illustrated 
London News 
 Lord Cromer’s Egypt                 
The Egyptian Gazette 1929 Moslem Marriage and Divorce: Text of the 
New Law 
                
Naqvi, A.R.  1967 The Family Protection Act of Iran                 
Naqvi, A.R. 1968a The Family Laws of Iran (II)                 
Naqvi, A.R. 1968b The Family Laws of Iran (III)                 
Naqvi, A.R. 1968c The Family Laws of Iran (IV)                 
Nelson, C. 1996 Doria Shafik, Egyptian Feminist: A Woman 
Apart 
                
NWRO n.d. Legal Guide for developing a more just 
integrated family law 
                
Peaslee, A.J. 1950a Constitution of Egypt in Constitutions of 
Nations: Afghanistan to Finland 
                
Peaslee, A.J. 1950b Iranian Constitutional Law in Constitutions of 
Nations: France to Poland 
                
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Peaslee, A.J. 1950c The Iranian Constitution in Constitutions of 
Nations: France to Poland 
                
R.I.I.A 1952 Great Britain and Egypt: 1914-1951: 
Information Papers No.19 
                
Shaarawi, H./Badran, 
M. (ed.) 
1987 Harem Years: the Memoirs of an Egyptian 
Feminist (1879-1924) 
                
Sharawi Lanfranchi, S. 2012 Casting off the Veil: The Life of Huda 
Shaarawi, Egypt’s First Feminist 
                
Taleghany, M.A.R. 1995 The Civil Code of Iran                 
The Illustrated 
London News 
1907 The Maker of Modern Egypt: Lord Cromer, 
His Successor 
                
 n.d. The Persian Constitution  
in British Foreign and State Papers 1907-
1908 
 
                
The Illustrated 
London News 
1911 The Strong Man for Egypt: Lord Kitchener on 
Board the “Nubia” 
                
The Illustrated 
London News 
1912 “To-Day In Egypt”                 
Wright, H.F. 1919a English translation of the Organic Law of 
1913, in Constitutions of the States at War 
                
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Wright, H.F. 1919b The Constitutions of the States at War, 1914-
1918 
                
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